REVISION OF NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 4 (DELETED)

Created: 3/7/1958

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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FOR:

SURTEC'i'

Executive Secretary National Security Council

Revision of National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 1+

memorandum datedubject: Report to the President by the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, dated

I *w

ector of Central Intelligence Directive.

2. nclosed condensed version of National Security Council Intelligence Directiveas been approved by the Intelligence Advisory Committee with the understanding that all provisions which formerly appeared in the long form draft, and which have either been deleted entirely from the condensed version or appear there in sunnaary form only, will be incorporated without substantive change in appropriate Director of Central Intelligence Directives.

as stated

; -DATE: 6

Revised Draft Concurred in by the8

I3ATI0NAL SECURITY COUNCIL IOTELLIGEHCB*

Directive supersedes NSCIDatedanuary WSO, and NSCID No. Ik,

DRAFT

Concurred in by th* (JSC8 Concurred in by the IAC3

NATIONAL SECURm COOHCIL IhTELlJGEKCE DIRECTIVE KO.

ELECTRONICS IlrTELLIGERCE" (ELIOT)

Pursuant to, as amended, of the Rational Security Act ofthe National .Security Council hereby authorizes and directs that:

The following organization and procedures are hereby established In

order that Electronics Intelligence, hereinafter culled ELIOT, may be nade most effective.

1- Definition: Tho term ELI NT Is defined as the collectionandnd th* technical processing for subsequent intelligence purposes, of information derived from foreign, non-ccanunicationo,radiations emanating from other than atomic detonation or radioactive sources.

2. The United States Communications Intelligence Boardn addition to its authority and responsibility as defined in other NSCIDs and operating under the procedures established therein, shall be the national policy body for ELI NT, including policy in relation to the Technical Processing Center provided by paragraphbelov, arrangements with foreign governments in the field of ELIOT, and raccenendations concerning research and development requirements.

Directiveo..

3- Subject to the provisions of paragraphbove, the Department of Defence and the Central Intelligence Agency shall be responsible for their respective ELDJT collection activities.

k. The technical processing of all ELIOT shall be accomplishedenter to be organized and administered by the Department of Defense. However, parallel processing may be accomplished for essential operational or tactical purposes. This center shall be jointly staffed by individuals detailed from the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agencyroportion to be determined by the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence.

All data collected by the collection agencies shall be made available forthwith to the Technical Processing Center, subject only to minimum delays necessitated by prior exploitation in the field for urgent tactical or operational purposes.

The Technical Processing Center shall effect fullest and most expeditious processing possible and furnish the results thereof to the interested departments and agencies, and to the extent practicable, in the form desired by them.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretary

National Security Council

Recommended New National Security Council Intelligence

Directiveritical Intelligence Communications

REFERENCES ; (a) Memorandum for ECI and ES/NSC, dated

Recommendation No.eport of the President's

Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, dated) Memorandum for ES/NSC from DCI, Serial TS,ubject as above.

1- The United States Cocmunications Intelligence Board (ISC IB) hastudy of measures which might be undertaken immediately to improve the quality of communications service necessary to provide the President and the Rational Security Council more timely service on critical intelligence, particularly that related to prior warning of Soviet attack.

2. At the present time the intelligence community is primarily dependent upon the commjnlcations capabilities of the Military Services,

land the Department of State for the electrical

transmission of intelligence between intelligence collection sources and intelligence

the networks used,

common-user

nenworis wnere intelligence must compete for circuit time and priority of handling with the communications needs of other users. The communications facilities and services currently available for use by the intelligence community are not adequate to provide for the consistent transmission of critical intelligenceimely basis.

which can provide not believe thatervice can be provided byxcept in unusual circumstances, but does believe that substantial improvement can be made immediately.

he Intelligence Advisory Committee (lAC) has stated that, because of the growing Soviet missile capability, the intelligence community should have communications available speed of service. USCIB does

k. Certain overseas relay centers and communications channels currently provided for the use of the National Security Agency

are suitable for transmitting all-source intelligence and, if augmented and improved, could provide the basis for improved intelligence communications.

5. Preliminary estimates of costs of augmenting and improving communications have been made.

a. the estimated one-time cost of an immediatefor overseas relay centers isand the

estimated annual cost of additionalchannels

necessary to augment existing available channels is In addition to the above, funds would be required by the intelligence agencies in Fiscal9 to interconnect with Idle relay centers since none of the agencies has budgeted for this item.

b. ong-range program for automation, which isbe the logical goal for adequate service, is estimateda one-time expenditure

| equipment for the| relay centers. It is estimated that the annual recurring cost for operation and maintenance ofystem would be "

c. Ho funds have been budgeted for these purposes.

6. USCIB and tbe IAC consider that the following actions must be accomplished if the intelligence community is to have coraounications support necessary to insure timely transmission of critical intelligence.

designation of an Executive Agent for theprovide for the establishment, operation, and perfectionmeans necessary to insure adequatecritical Intelligence.

designationingle authority at theto provide the Executive Agent of the Governmentguidance as to the communications requirementsintelligence community for the transmission of

c. The designationingle authority to define critical intelligence, and to establish uniform criteria for the identification, selection, and designation of relative priority for transmission of critical intelligence.

d. Tee provision of funds, manpower, and resources specifically allocated, over and above those required for any other national defense program, for the establishment, operation, and perfection of communications means to handle critical intelligence.

7- USCIB and the IAC have jointly concluded that, in order to accomplish these actions, it will be necessary for the NSC to:

the Secretary of Defense asof the Government to provide for theand perfection of communications meansinsure adequate transmission of critical intelligence.

the Director of Central Intelligence,advice and support of the members of the IAC, toSecretary of Defense with continuing guidance as torequirements of the intelligencethe transmission of critical intelligence.

the Director of Central Intelligence,with the members of the IAC, tointelligence, and to establish uniformthe identification, selection, and designationpriority for the transmission of

the Secretary of Defense inappropriations for the purpose ofimproving communlcationo needed for thecritical intelligence.

8. USCIB and the IAC have Jointly concurred in my recommendation that the National Security Council approve the enclosed National Security Council Intelligence Directive.

Attachment

Concurred in by USCIB8 Concurred in by the IAC8

RATIONAL SECURITY CCUJiCIL IHTEmGESCE DIRECTIVE BO. 7

CRITICAL mELLIGEWCEjjum

Puruuant to, as amended, of the National Security Act ofthe Hational Security Council authorizes and directs that:

The following organization and procedures are hereby established

so that the coorauni eating of critical intelligence may be made most effective in order that the President and other members of the Hational Security Council may receive, in the most timely manner, intelligence necessary for action.

1. There shall be established communications means for theof critical Intelligence, particularly that related to early warning of Soviet attack, necesoary to the President and high government officials. These means shall consist of tributary lines linking certain overseas intelligence sources of the intelligence coaauni ty to overseas relay centers at key locations. Tbe overseas relay centers shall ln turn be connectedommunications center and distribution oysteo in the Washington area serving the highest authorities.

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2. The Secretary of Derenae shall be the Executive Agent of the Government to provide for the establishment, operation, and perfection of communications means necessary to ensure adequate transmission of critical intelligence. TSie Executive Agent of the Government shall be responsible for tho establishment, operation, and perfection of the vashington and

overseas relay centers, the Washingtonserving the highest authorities, and the interconnecting communications channels. He shall also ensure that, to the extent practicable, intelligence sources overseas are connected with the relay centers designated by hi* for the relay of critical intelligence.

The Director of Central Intelligence, with the advice and support of the members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee, shall provide the Secretary of Defense with continuing guidance as to the communications requirements of the intelligence community for theof critical Intelligence.

The Director of Central Intelligence, In consultation with the members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee, shall define critical intelligence and establish uniform criteria for the identification, selection, and designation of relative priority for the transmission

of critical intelligence.

Original document.

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