Created: 5/1/1958

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Grey Broadcasting Policy Toward

Approved by Committeeadio Broadcasting Policy

1 MAY tt'iR

Ne. 14


In tbe interact of assuring maximum possible impact and effectiveness of the totalroadcasting effort directed to the USSR and to the Soviet-dominated countries of Eastern Europe, the methods and alms of both official and unofficial American radio etations broadcasting to the area have been thoroughly reviewed in the light of current US policy objectives. In accordance with Instructions of the Committee on Radio Broadcasting Policy, upon whose request this review has been undertaken, individual papers are being prepared for each of the target countries on each of the broadcasting operations concerned, outlining the role each should play in the furtherance of both general aod specific American objectives in the area, and recommending such changes or modifications of present operating practices as may seem desirable to this end.

The following paper concerns only grey broadcasts to the Soviet Onion. It eetabllshes practices and policies to be followed by the gray station In its broadcasts to the Soviet Unioniew to assuring close conformity of the activities and alms of the station with current policy objectives of the US with respect to tbe Soviet Union and to achieving maximum effectiveness ln this regard by defining for the grayonstructive role, distinctive in so far as practicable from that of the official Voice of America.


of US Policies

The fundamental alms of US foreign policy are to maintain the security of the US and the vitality of its fundamental values and institutions, and to promote the general welfare of its people.

about the USSR

1. Sovietarge number of significant developments int orbit since the death of Stalin the threat to the US, and ln fact to the Free World by the Communist conspiracy appears to remain basically undiminished.

As far as can be determined Communist leaders retain the objective of undermining and ultimately destroying all rival power; they continue toilitary capacity of truly formidable proportions; they retain ln the world Communistliable Instrument of subversion; and they continue to enjoy the advantage inherentolicy which seeks to exploit and magnify the world's ills rather than to overcome them.


2. ha Soviet Government ha* serious Internal problems and difficulties both actual and potential. However, nothing discernible in tbe present situation Justifies the assumption that the Communist power structure is In Jeopardy in the near future or that there are factors operating that willhange ln the hearts of the Communist leaders or force them soon to abandon any of their objectives. The forces at work sxe erosive rather than explosive. They mayeriod of time producechange. Meanwhile, Soviet power Is and willard reality.

C. US Policy Toward the USSR

The US believes Its security will be enhanced if ln the long run the Soviet Union conducts Itself moreooperative member of tbe society of nations and moves ln the direction of government responsible to the will of tbe Soviet people. The precise nature and composition of suchatter for the determination of tbe Soviet people themselves. The US recognizes tbat there are national minorities in the USSR which may aspirereater degree of autonomy than they now enjoy but does not favor any course of action which would predetermine any government or governments which may evolve in the present territory of the USSR.

The fundamental hostile policies of the USSR and its growing military and economic powerasic threat to US security. The US must find ways to pursue its long-range objectives and at the same ties reduce the military threat of tbe Soviet Union, without however disturbing the peace or becoming engaged ln nuclear warfare endangering the survival of both Western civilisation and the Soviet system.

There is no foreseeable prospect of significantly reducing Soviet military strength, which is the core of Communist power, except by mutually acceptable agreements with the Soviets or by large-scale military action. The initiation of such military action Is not an acceptable course for the US.

Accordingly, US policies are designed to (a) affect the conduct end policies of the Soviet Union ln ways that further US interests (Including safeguardednd (b) to foster tendencies that lead it to abandon expansionist policies. This offers the best hope of bringing about atrolonged period of armed truce, andeaceful and orderly world.

In pursuing thia general strategy, the US efforts are directed to;

Ccaasunlet aggression and preventing total warcompatible with US security.

in building tbe strength and cohesion of the Free World.

Soviet conduct by means of political, militaryprc^ams and actions.

d. Taking advantage of attitudes, conditions and developments within

the USSR In order directly to footer changes in the character and policies of the Soviet Government Id ways that further PS aod Free World security.

e- Destroying or neutralising tbe International Communist apparatus ln the Tree World.

HI. Radio Broadcasting

considerations affecting radio broadcasts to the Soviet Union

It is recognised that the US has limited moans for talcing advantage of the attitudes, conditions, and developments witbln the Soviet Union which might directly foster changes in the character and policies of the Soviet Government. Within available possibilities, however,eading role- With existing limitations on other effective media, radio is depended upon to advance all US Information objectives in the Soviet Union, even though Jamming and other Soviet countermeasures greatly reduce its impact.

It is essential that both the officially and unofficially sponsored American stations broadcasting to the Soviet Union should seek to develop among alligh degree of respect for the stations as thoroughly responsible, reliable and trustworthy sources of news, commentary and other information. Only if there is such reliance is lt possible to gain maximum impact from material made available to tbe Soviet audience.

groups io tha USSR

It should be borne Id mind that the Soviet audiencehole is livingtable and powerful regime and that possibilities for action are extremely limited. Available evidence indicates that tbe broad masses of the population accept the authority of the regime and do not seriously entertain thoughts concerning its fundamental alteration. This doss not imply that there are not specific policies and practices of the regime which are widely unpopular. It does imply that, at the present time, at least, tbe people tend to think of tbe possibilities for change largely within tbe present system.

The specialised nature of US objectives determines ths target audiences to which radio broadcasts must be directed. Thes the group which potentially can exercise the greatest influence In ths direction of liberalising tbe regime and effecting evolutionary changes desired by the ;JB, becomes the primary audience of US propaganda media. For tbe purpose used here the "politically-alert" includes high party and governmental (Including military) officials who actually make decisions; the bureaucracy of managerial ond administrative personnel; the skilled workers; the intellectual proper (writers, artists, professional people, scientists,nd, probably most important of all, the talented youths who may Id time eater tbe decision-making class. These categories embrace both Russian and national minority audiences. The target audience

described above'probablyignificant portion of the actual audience, in as much as'short wave sets seem to be concentrated largely in the hands of the above-listed categories.


While the foregoing groups are the primary radio targets, it is recognised that thereistening audience and larger public which will include many diverse elements of the population. It is believed that the reactions of the masses of the people can materialize into "pressures from below" and canource of concern to those officials directly responsible for the supervision of the people. This wider listening audience includes foremen and workers In factories, toilers onarms and machine-tractor stations, agricultural bureaucrats in tbe cities.

Junior officers and soldiers in the field, and guards and inmates of forced-labor camps and colonies.

Soviet troope stationed"outside the BBSS, particularly In Eastern Europe and East oermaoy,pecial audience. "Their eventual return toins their closer contact vith the non-Soviet vorld and better listening opportunltlee, sakearticularly valuable target. Also, in tbe light of their greater potentialto escape, one of tba objectives ofroadcasts beamed to this group Is to induce defection, although in aa indirect and discreet manner.

C. Pray Broadcasting to the USSR

Gray broadcasting is an unacknowledged Instrument of the OS Govern-ment. Its sole reason for existence is to furtherolicy. Its alms are those of American foreign information policy in general, which includes specific formulations of policy for both tbe official radio and the Gray station.

P- The Relationship Between Gray and Official Stations

In furthering these alms, gray broadcasting has distinctivewhich differentiate it from acknowledged official broadcasting, eueh as VGA. This is mainly because theot formally accountable for the content of grey broadcasts, though its actual responsibility may be Inferred.

A rational allocation of roles between official sad gray broadcasting permits each to concentrate on aspeats for which it is best fitted. In order that taken together their operations efficiently cover all the alms ofroadcasting to tbe Soviet Onion. ertain amount of overlapping la inevitable but the basic principle appllca that each carriesfor certain tasks which have been mutually agreed upon.

*- Objectives of Gray informstion Program*

Gray information programs to the Soviet Onion should give primer? attention to the following objectives:

1- Expose Cossmalst alms and actions and adequately counter Soviet propaganda.

2. Encourage whatever evolutionary development is manifested in the Soviet system, along lines consistent withecurity objectives and the legitimate aspirations of the peoples of tbe Soviet TJnloa:

a. Convince influential elements within the USSR that alternatives exist to preeent Soviet policies which might come to be considered eosnpatibl* with the security interests of tba peoples of the Soviet Union.

b. Encourage popular attitude* aad attitudes Id circles with some influence which will result in making lt mure difficult torend toward peaceful policy and which might over tbe long run lead to basic changes In the outlook or character of the Communist regime.

o. Encourage bureaucratic and popular pressures Inside the Soviet Union for greater emphasis by the regime on tht solution of Internal problems; the effort being to pose the necessity of devoting attention and resources to solve them or facing increased disaffection If they are ignored.

d. To tbe extent possible undermine the faith of the Communist ruling classes in their own system of Ideology.

3. Encourage defection, albeit indirectly, to the Free World of Soviet nationals, particularly Soviet troops stationed in Eastern Europe.

Seek to create support for alternative forms of Soviet governmental structure and behavior and encourage whatever evolutionary change manifests itself io the Soviet system which would better satisfy the natural aspirations of the Soviet people as well as tbe Interests of tbe US and the Free World security.

Short Range

1. Expose Communist alms and action* and adequately counter Soviot propaganda.

2. By stimulating pressures for the satisfaction of popular desires to keep the government's attention concentrated oo its domestic affairs and thereby curtail ita chances to stir up trouble elsewhere.

While the above objectives areegree shared with VGA the Gray station will hove primary responsibility for covering these objectives from the standpoint of the Internal affairs of the Soviet Unioo. The Gray station will shars with VOA responsibility for broadcasting in the national minority languagss.

F- Structure of Gray Broadcasting Stotion

The organisational structure (operating base) and image (propaganda face) of the Gray broadcasting station should be as follows:

1. Organisational Structure

The stotion should be so organized that itoint endeavor of Americans ond emigres, but the Americans should exercise tight control and direction over the station. As en Instrument for furthering unannounced policy ths Gray etatlon will be governed strictly by tba policy guidance

furnished to lt through appropriate channels, in the abaeace of policy guidanceew or uaaatlclpated situation the station will be expected to exercise its own best Judgment oa the most appropriate measures to be undertaken, bearing la mind the total objectives of tba US.

thould aot be dictated to by emigre political orgaaisa-tioaa, aor responsible to thea for what Is laid over the station. The emigres working with the station thould, however, be encouraged to exercise initiative aad to explore new propaganda approaches within the framework of established policy.

The station should assume aa emigre face both befort the Soviet Union and the Free World. While there may be toae question as to whether or not Soviet eltlteasarge measure of kinship and sympathy toward thoes who have left th* USSR sad that there isond between thea that enables Soviet emigres to apeak for their countrymen, aonetbeless, there are approximately oae ndllloa Soviet nationals who have cboaen tbe West9 aad en equal number exiled ftus^ people are dispersed throughout the Free World. Their sneer number* should serverawlag force for their compatriots in the USSR, and the emigre face is the most desirable available image the Oray station can assume. It should, however, be stressed that it is the experience of the emigres ln tbe Free World and their paat acquaintance with Soviet life that are the Oray station's principal assets. It Is from these assets -aad not froa say presumed authority of individual Soviet emigres or groups ofhat tha Oray station should be able to draw and to express thoughts and ideas that will stimulate Sovist listeners to think critically of the Communist system. The station should represent everything ia the emigre community which illustrates the advantages and superiorityree society; it should not represent nay ealgre political group or groups nor serveehicle for the platforms of such groups.

Despite being tan spokesman for the national exile, tba radio atatloa must Bantam its independence of this exile coaaualty and above all refrein froa identifying itself with ealgre political parties or organisations It aunt ttek to serveindow between the Soviet peoples aad the West through the nediuB of the emigres ln the West. To achieve this image the station must achieve stature aad respect on itt own merit yet drawing fully upon tha eaigretlon aad Western institutionsorm wbich lato the peoples of the USSR sad understanding of their need to work thingsheir own way aad in their own form. The station should not try to represent the emigrationtrong political force. It ahould place prlnery stress on trying to identify the ealgres speaking over the station with the psopls they left behind.

The emigre image of the statloa is potentially useful ln the event of opaa hostilities between the USSR end the Wett, or other unforeseen aajor chaage within tbe Soviet Union. Under suchray station would be able to exploit even aore than at present aa area of Sovietof demonstrableanner vbich is denied to officinl US stntloas. The endgre Image isaluable holding Instrument.

IV- The- Role for Gray Radio Broadcasting to tha USSR

(This Station is based on aaBumptious aat forth in the Policy Section as to the probability of evolutionary change within the present political climate of the USSR. It is anticipated that this climate favoring such evolutionary change will continue for the foreseeable future. However, forty years of Soviet history has shown that periods of evolutionary change have been succeeded by periods characterized by increased use of Internal terror, Intensified central internal controls, and some reversal of processes of gradual change. Should this pattern recur end the change In political climate appear sufficiently sharp, this Section will be reviewed).

The general nature and content of broadcasts to the USSR will be adopted to the characteristics of the Grey Radiooice of the Soviet emigre community Interested in the welfare of their fellow-countrymen in the OSSR,n Instrument, unattrlbutable to. Government, for the furthering. policy.

A. . policy will control the overall policy of the Gray Radio.

Broadcasts must adhere to US policy in general and avoid positions which wouldet result injurious to OS policy. Tbe Gray Radio vill, at the same time,lexibility and objectivity appropriate to Its particular identity. With respect to the Internal and external affairs of the US which merit or demand treatment In broadcasts to the Sovlot Union, the Gray Radio will report objectively, giving fair coverage to legitimate points of view not necessarily ln accord with the public position of the OS Government.

unannounced OS foreign policy will from time to time be conveyed to the Gray Radio. As on instrument for furthering unannounced policy, the Gray Radio will be guided strictly by the policy guidance furnished to it through appropriate channels. Thie guidance will relate to specific events and conditions and may, in some iutenees, appear to be in conflict vith announced policy. In most Instances, guidance on unannouncedolicy vtu relate to objectives which con be undertaken by the Gray Radio as on unattrlbutable radio, but which vould be Inappropriate for an official organ or spokesnea of the US Government-

In its programming, the Gray Radio vill strive for an appropriate balance between the nsed to avoid the appearance of an American propaganda instrument and ths natural interest which Soviet audiences have In the

US as the leading Western power. In seeking this balance, the Gray Radio will be guided by (o) tha necessityroad coverage of news, the reporting end commentary on which should be consistent with the Radio's roleedium of Soviet emigres as distinguished from its covert representation of OB policy, and (b) the recognition that it is the principal role of official radio broadcasting to the USSR to reflect the American point of view and to cover "Americana."

*. Although the OS Government and Its official mediaosition of non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations,

it Is desirable end necessary that tba Gray Radio, vith due regard to the eeneltlvitiee of ita eudlencee, concern lteelf vith Soviet domestic affelra. Tne Radio vill serve to promote the objectives of theis the USSR in ite discussions of tba myriad ways in vblch the Cceeninist dictatorship acts against tbe legitimate interests of the Soviet people, deprives them of any meaningful role ln the making and control of policy, end interferes grossly in their private lives. At the seae time, the Radio will suggest alternatives to the system of Communist toteaitarianlsm through program discussing the structure and operation of democratic political, economic end social institutions in free societies.

5- The Radio vill endeavor to convince Its listeners tbat the US, ead the West ln general, haa only peaceful intentions in regard to the Soviet union, but tbat it considers that the peace of tbe vorld cannot be assured until the deep aspirations for peace of tbe Soviet people cen find channels for influencing tbe policy of their government. The Radio vill make clear that it la the aggressive and subversive political nature of the Communist regime and its exploitation of the econoole and human resources of tbe state for these ends which constitute the reel menace to the peece of the world. In Ite discussion of alterne-tive political systems the Grey Radio will attempt to convey the impression thet the Vest desires only that the Soviet peopleorm of government of their own freeovernment truly representative of the Soviet people. While democratic rather than authoritarian systems should be made to seem more attractive, tbe Radio will in no way suggest that tbe West seeks to impose any particular form of democratic government on the Soviet people.

The Gray Redio will combat the Soviet propaganda line which seeks to represent Western society as adhering toh century pettern of socially irresponsible capitalism by elucidating the wealth of progressive reforms instituted in the various free netlons and by analysing the role of democratic governments and social institutions ln bringing about and guaranteeing these reforms. The Gray Radio will also attempt to counter Soviet propaganda about tbe Communist Nave of thend the feeling of futility or resignation that line tends to produce, by calm end objective reporting on ell developments attesting to the growing unity end internal strength of tbe democratic Vest ead ite cepebUltiee of defence against possible aggression, and by heralding tbe steadily increasing awareness in the world that genuine social end hceen progress Is ineeperable from democratically guaranteed civil aad Individual freedosa.

In the event of emergency conditions ie tbe Soviet union due to violent demonstrations, armed uprising or revolution, or war, the Gray Radio will not assume aay attitude toward the event or pertlclpete in it in any way, except for etreignt mews reportleg, uatll It receives direction from appropriate channels.

of tbe Immediate goals of US policy toward the Soviet Caioe, the Gray Radio will be guided by tbe follow lag baelc principles.

The Oray Radio mosteputation of complete reliability; InforBatlon presented as factual la newscasts, cotawaterles aad spools! features thould be tcrupuloutly accurate. Only through utter reliability can th* Radio hope toaithful audience and influence Its thinning. Only In thla way will thepeoplea torn to ths Gray Radio for guidance in the eventualityosntatlc or late mat iccsi crisis.

In order to lendm poaalble conviction to Its loege aa tba vehicle of forner Soviet eltlaens and to derive the maximum possible advantage froa it, the Graynsure that its program* are developed with due regard for those terns and frames of reference ln which its audiences tend to thinkesult of their specific experience* under Coanwnist rule as well as of their specific national

As the voice of former Soviet eltlaens addressing their fellow-countrymenunder Casmtunlst domination, the Radio must maintain and continually Increase its understanding of the attltade* of ita listeners to conditions vitals the Soviet Onion, to tbe position of their country in tbe world community, and to massages directed to thea froa the outside.

3> The Oray Radio conceive* of th* eventual replacement of Coaaunlit totalitarianism la tbe Soviet Cnloa by some form of representative government,rocess having its fundamental root* In the dynamics of soviet society Itself, rather than ln pressures froa the outside. The Radio recognises that tbe pace and nature of this development end the flaal forms it will take are the basic responsibility of tbe peoples of the Soviet Union themselves. Tbe Oray Radio, therefore, assumes the roleatalyst, disseminating information end views on domestic Soviet and foreign developnents, suppressed or distorted by the regime, -hich will stimulate Independent thought, feed existing and latent currents of dissatisfaction with official policies aad skepticism about the prevailing Soviet system, and make Soviet eltlaens more conscious of deslrebl* alternative* to various aspect* of that system.

a. Tbt Oray Radio will rely oa indirection to stinulate Indtptndent thought among its listeners, oa the force of the program material la its eatlraty to suggest points of view and feasible lines of approachroblem. Tbe Radio will aot attempt directly or indirectly to urge any particular political creed or to promote directlys of action.

In reoognltlom that liberalising currents in other Cosntualst countries aaaignificant contribution to similar developments la the Soviet Union, and that these currents, especially ln tbe Soviet Eastern European bloc, will be greatly affected by Moscow's policy towards thea, the Radio vlll attempt to arouse andympathetic understanding among its listeners of what these peoples are trying to achieve. As suggested, such an understeading may be translatedubtle restraint on Moscow't ability to Interfere with positive development* In Eastern Europe ss well aa into pressures for similar policy aodlflcntlons ln the USSR.

Recognising tbe great dearth of purely factual information available to Soviet ci titans, the Oray Radio will strive constantly to

broaden It. coverage of vorld events end or*lgnlfleant political, economic, social and cultural development* In freaand In countries under Communist rule.

In Its vorld news coverage the Gray Radio will be guided in its selection of news by considerations of propegande effectiveness ln addressing the specific audience and of omissions end distortions of neve Items by official Soviet media. The radio will not distort the neve.

7- In broadcasts to the various national minorities of the Soviet Onion, tbe Radio vill be guided by the principle of nonpredetermlnatlon which holds that it is the right of the peoples themselves to determine the over-all state structure of the OSSR when they are free to do so.

6. As the voice ofemigres dedicated to tbe task of helping its listeners find their own path to eventual freedom, the Gray Radio must not servolatform for any political group lo tbe emigration or espouse any political creed or Ideology of any political group in tb* emigration, but will, whan appropriate, report tbe new* and interest* of moderate elements ln the emigration. Moreover, the Radio vill reinforce Its characterervice organ for the Soviet peoples ead give variety and added interest to its progrem* by seeking to broadcast regularly the vieve on problem* in their sphere of ccetpetance of figure* prominent in tbe political, economic, social and Intellectual life of the West end Asia.

C. For the consistent Implementation of the foregoing basic principles, the Gray Radio will be guided io Its daily operations by the ro.loving high-priority considerations end practices.

1. General Approach end Techniquee

e. The sensitivity of tbe Soviet audience to denunciatory and over-.iaplified propegande, the ecctplex emc^lonel involvement of tbe

r*8lw of even

thoee Soviet citisena sharply dissatisfied with one or another aspect of CosatunUt rule make it Imperative for the Orey Radio to avoid generalizedI*oinst Soviet leaders end wholesale condemnation of Ccastunlst domestic end international policies. Criticism of individual leedere end tbe Soviet regime should be selective end focused on specific practice, and policies which are inimical to the Interests of the various

nfr?h!ZVLfH mto the legitimate? tU lnt*rn*tlooal MMfts vhlch ere contradictory

to professed Ccxemunlst principle, and goal*. The positive aspects ofoct.Ud with tbe regis- which ere believed by thTpeople tfbei^Cbrlotle pride (broad extension of educationalidened social security benefits; Industrial modernization; scientific progress; the heightened prestige and Influence

iAb0ttW b" Pledged tt, propagandat the .are time as the notations, di.torSons, he.vP

human costs and implications of many orNjfceee programs arid development are cogently and persistently dlscuased.

Radio viU depead on the cumulative effect ofof tbe Inadequacies of specific Soviet domestic practicesto convince its listeners that it is the totalitarian basis,Party power-Monopoly basis, of the Soviet system,to satisfy the people's material and human needs. In likeRadio will attempt to build ln its listeners' consciousnessof th* responsibility for world tension of tbs aggressive

and expansionist alms of the International Communist character of the regime by tbs cumulative effect of broadcasts giving specific evidence of Moscow's international Machinations.

make tbe audience aware of possible alternatives tosystem, the Oray Radio should systematically explain tbsand guiding principles of democratic institution* ln tbeAsia. Voluntary cooperative undertakings end the variety ofor controlled economic activities end social service* inare good areas of emphasis. However, there should bethat any particular ayatea of government or socialbeing urged on the listeners, nor any attempt Made to concealyet to b* solved by these Institutions. In keeping withcharacteroviet-emigre organ, commentaries mayon tbe greater or lesser relevance of one orfor their native country.

addition to tbe democraticne RadioSoviet listeners fully on desirable divergencies fromin other Communist-ruled countries. Because of tbeknowledge of greater freedoms and concessions to popularother Communist countries Is likely to nave oa tbe SovietOray Radio should pay particular attention to this type ofthe sane time, the Radio should treat this material primarilyreporting, using original source material to th* maximumto show the reasons for tbe particular developments andeffect* they have bad for the people affected.

Grey Radio aunt always cessment on world eventsenlightened Soviet-emigre point of view. While itslead lt to uphold tbe essential unity of legitimate Interestscountries, its Soviet-emigre character demands that the Radiothe impression that it represents the prtmary interests ofStates or the West in general.

about defectors and emigres should be usedto the Soviet audience to support tbe general elms ofRadio. Aside froa their value as defection inducement,defectors can assist In illuminating the inequities of theand the advantagesemocratic aociety. In order tosympathy of tbe audience and its receptivity to the basicbroadcasts should make frank admission of the psychological


conflicts inhereat in tb* decision to defect, aa well aa of th* difficulties of settlingife. Attaapt* by *elgr* group* to forward tho tru interests of tholr fellov-couatryme* ahould alio bo recounted. Of special vela* latoo lute ears'W be programs devoted to prcorlaeat cultural aad profeeeloeal figure* among th* emigre*to their eoatliued activity and tow* ob tb* latellectual llf* or tb* Wait and tha Soviet Union.

g. I* Ita effort to transmit to Ita listener* tbe view* of prominent figure* la tba public, Intellectual, aad axtlatlc life of tbe Weat eed Asia, tbe Oray Radio ahould arrangeial iBterrlevs witheople aad solicit their preparation of material especially for Grey Radio broedceet*. The Radio should alao Include la It* programs appropriate messages from Western aad Asian organisation* aad group*student, writer, axtlat, scientist ead labor groups, aaong their Soviet couaterperta.

2. Tbemea ead Tergeta

e. Gray Radio program* should, where appropriate, be developedend exploit the following tbemea, among other.:

U> Pemocretlc Tieve of tbe Future. The -wave of tbe ruture" beloega act to Cosnexelst toteliterlaalsm, butocial order baaed cm genuine popular sovereignty, which alone caa guarantee both personal freedom aad aocial Justice.

Ideological BaeJiruptey of Coaapinlam. Coaeauiiam has loot ita Ideological appeal. The failure of th* Communist ayatem in prectlce to Juetlfy the peat faith of Ito adhereata ead the coatlaued dlatortioee of Cosacoalst ideology to serve tbe purposes of the Soviet State have emptied It of its former dynamise ead Its ability to command tba loyaltiee of Partyead aympathisera, The continued demonstration of the feet that ita doctrines do not fit tbe ex Uting ooadltloaa or tbe course of develop*.rts la tbe Tree World bee alao contributed to ita loaa of appeal.

Peaceful lateatioa* of the We*t. The sol. aim of the foreign polioy of the OS and th. Weat ia generalis the 8oviet Oaloe i* tha defease of the right of free peoples toeace under freedom.

w Hoetile Soviet Foreign Policy. The Kremlin is engagedoaprehaaslve program to inflame world teaalona ead to subvert free aetloma. All aaaas et Ita coamaad ereto thla ead; dlploaaitlc, military, economic ead payaholofloel iatlmidatioa aad blaadishaeate.

<5) aytem "SoclalUf Ia lame Pair. The ueeterm "aoclell.m" to chereeteriie tbe Soviet system Thia la confirmed mot only byaociallata but also by growing austere of dissident aad

revisionist communists, who have come to realise that Soviet Conmuaiam la the systematic, total exploitation of man economically, politically, socially and culturally. Soviet "socialism"iction cynically cultivated by Moscow to confuse their own people as well as the outside world.

b. The following observations on certain distinctive vulnerabil-

atlea in Soviet society and their relation to target groups are Illustrative of ways in which tbe Oray Radio should make its programs peculiarlyfor various Soviet audiences in the context of the Radio's basic aims and changing

(1) Tne standard of living of tbe Soviet peopleost important theae for tbe Oray Radio to exploitariety of reasons. Pirst of all, dissatisfaction with tbe low standard of living probablyreater number of people ln nil strata of Soviet society than any other complaint. Secondly, tbe Soviet system peculiarly Invites judgment on the basis of its ability to satisfy notarial needs because of the blatantly materialist theoretical basis of this system and the professed raison d'etre of Communist dictatorshipsuperior method of meeting material needs and desires. Next, to the extent that Soviet authorities are compelled to aeet Increasing pressures to improve tba standard of living, to that extent will their ability to concentrate oa war-potential industries and their maneuverability on the international scene be restricted. This is all the more true because demands for Improved living conditions will only be whetted by partial concessions. Moreover, material improvement by itself is not likely to satisfy tbe more alert elements of tbe population; essening preoccupation with basic necessities aad enjoyment of some of iife'e amenities will increase self-respect, consideration for personal and civil rights, and aa appreciation of the need for political reform to guarantee those rights as wellising standard of living.

While, therefore, the Gray Radio should insistently

exploit the standard-of-living thane, its approach should be subtle and varied. Itliche to recall that as rely to draw attention to the shortcomings of the Soviet standard of living, or to make staple direct comparisons with the Vest, onlyesentful nnd even defensive reaction on the part of the listeners. Instead, taking for granted the people's dissatisfaction with their dally lot, the Radio should concentrate on the reasons for the situation and on methods to ameliorate It. The implication for consumer needs and desires of many of the regime's domestic and foreign policies should be shown, for example, broadcasts should point out how much housing could have been financed by funds designated for public buildings and other undertakings meant only to glorify tha regime or to accommodate the bureaucracy; they should show how the satisfaction of the needs of the people Is being subordinated to foreign nld

programserely to enhance the regime 'a influence In the underdeveloped neutral areas and to support inefficient and unpopular legines la the Siao-Sovlet bloc. Inefficient industrial organization and poor adalaietrative procedures should be shown as contributing factors to tbe unsatisfactory supply of consumer goods and the supply of unsatisfactory consumer goods. Regime concasslons to tbe people should not be ridiculed but exploited to Increase tbe people's expectntloa of still further concessions. Programs reflecting superior conditions in the West should be designed to point up tbe role which political, economic and social institutions play la ensuring tbe satisfaction of people's material nesds and desires. Abort all, programs should be devised to emphasise the economic feasibility of greatly improving material conditions in tbe Soviet Union- as opposed to the arbitrary and purely political decisions of tbe Party regime to pay scant attention to the people's needs through the disproportionate emphasis oa investment and heavy industry to the detriment of consumption, agriculture, and light industry.

om tbe stnndard-of-living theae should bealso to impress the mass audience of industrialworkers with their importance in Soviet society andpotential ability to make tbe regime more responsivedlssatiafactions, for this purpose, fullestbe given to those concessions made in otherto factory aad farm laborabolition orobligatory farm deliveries, abandonment ofof workers' councils, increased pay, to all action taken directly by the producers tofrom the regime. Belief im their ability toconcsssioas will be induced among industrial andby dlssaminatloa of all statements by leadingother Communist countries of the barm done to tbemoral life of these countries, as well as of theto the principle of tbe "workers' and peasants' state"

by Ignoring the needs of the people and by keeping themosition of blind subordination to th* impersonal state. Programs oa the Increasing dependence of tbe Soviet regime, im the present economic and social context, on the good-will and labor efficiency of workers In industry and agriculture will also contribute to ths basic broadcasting alas.

order toeeling of solidarity amongstrata of Soviet society ia the movement for afreer life, tha Oray Radio should systematicallywhich indicates that the Soviet intelligentsiaIncreasingly concerned aad articulate not onlymaterial deprivations of the people, but also aboutand neglect, under Communist rule and ideology,purely human nnd spiritual needs.

PO Tneio vlll give priority attention to conmunicatimg vita those politically nlert elements la Soviet societyconomic adaiaistrators aad managers, tbe technical intelligentsia, ailitary officers, tbe cultural Intelligentsia, aad tbe studeatswho have real or potential professional grievaaces or moral objections against tbe Soviet ayatea and who are capable of influencing the ultimate course of Soviet devslopmnnt. Ia devising prograas for these audiences, however, it neat be remembered that along with tbe disoontants, these group*eal personal stake in tbe Soviet system. To tne limits of practicability, therefore, these broadcasts should; (a) endeavor to take advantage of this group's position of being governed from above as opposed to their being the governors, and (b) suggest that more flexible and less doctrinaire policies and astbods will enhance, or nt least not weaken, the privileged position of these groups in the state,

Prograas for tne politically alert target groups should concentrate on exploiting tne speeifle resentaents of its members. Thus, Party controls, limited participation in policy decisions, the adoption of professionally abhorrent policies and procedures for purely political or ideological reasons, arbitrary transfers of post, lack of real Job security, penalties for failure to meet unrealistic goalsall such legitimate grievances of those directly responsible for the economy and the armed forces provide fertile ground for exploitation.

In the case of latellectuala aad students, prograas should take advantage of resentaents over the suppression nnd distortion of information, bureaucratic controls over creativity, denial of free speech, enforced ideological conformity, denial of free access to tbs products of officially disapproved thought, arbitrary asslgnmemt of school graduates, restrictions oa travel abroad, and tbe pervasive cynicism and materialism of elements within the ruling bureaucracy. Broadcasts of this type should attempt subtly to reinforce tbe view which has already occurred to certain elements within these groups that, ia the present social and economic context, tba Partyuperfluous aad parasitic element la Soviet society.

(5) Because of the Party affiliation of large numbers of the politically alert group and their intensive Party indoctrination in general, an important place in programs for these groups should be assigned to demonstrating tbe chasm between Communist ideology and Soviet practice, to holding up the irrelevance of much of .Inarxiam-Imninism to contemporary conditions, and to stressing the rigidity, inhumanity and failures of tbe Soviet Communist adaptation of Marxist theory. It Is la this effort that the intensive dissemination of heterodox views aad practices in tbe Sino-Soviet bloc, in Yugoslavia and in the world.Communist

movement, as veil as of tbe statements of dlsllluslooed in riiBiunlsts. is of special importance. Criticises and actual or potential deviation 1st vievs froa Coasrunlet sources will be highly persuasive because they are couched In tbe habitual language and frames of reference of the target audiencecommunication is direct, the approach is "legitimate-" Moderating developments in countries under Communist rule will provide valuable food for thought for tbe politically alert targets, the dissatisfied members of which, out of conviction or cons Idsrations of practical expediency, tend to think in terms of effecting positive changesasic Conmwnlst system. {The Gray Radio will not advocate tbe theory of Marxism as such or use en exclusively Marxist approach)- At the same time, the present inclination of Soviet Intsllectuals to reexamine Soviet reality in terms both of their national traditions as well as of basic Communist theory should be encouraged by broadcast presentations of tbe best of traditional Russian and other national democratic thought.

appeals by tbe Gray Radio to theprofessional are likely to be unproductive since it

Is to tba personal and selfish Interest of tbe professionals to maintain themselves ln their positions of power and material advantage. Indirectly, bowsver, tbe Radio may contribute to tbe creation of an atmosphere of reduced confidence among Party professionals in tbe ability of Party policies and leaders to continue to forward basic Party alas, an atmosphere which will, in Its turn, facilitate tbs general ferment in Soviet society end make tbs Party more vulnerable to pressures for change. Programs oa dlssldeace and divergencies from Soviet Communism within foreign communist movements, such as those referred to above, may serve as useful material for this purpose, as may thoughtful analyses of tbe Party's serious alienation of those strata of Soviet society on which the continued strengthening of Soviet state power end prestige increasingly depend*.

recognition that in some area* of tbenationalism la an ingredient ln the existingthat lt can play an increasingly large role in tbefor change, the Oray Radio's programs to theshould uphold those cultural, historicalvalues and Interests which are beingor suppressed by Communist pollelen, wheredo not directly eeek to promote politicaltheae broadcasts, the Radio snail attempt to fosterwithout, however, arousing inter-nationalwithout advocating separatism,


(8) While Soviet military personnel stationed in Central and Eastern Europe are basically interested in the saw type of material as their relatives and fellow-servicemen back home, tbe Gray Radio should take Into account their special

situation by informing them of tarn legitimate national asplretloas of the peoples ia their areea of assignment amd by explaining the specific resentments of these peoples sgainst the Mobcow regime- Broadcasts should highlight the favorable deviations of Eastern Buropeaa policies and institutions from thoee lm the Soviet Umiom aad should show, wherever applicable, how these differences contribute to the better living standards of tbe people. Attention should also be given to stressing those complaints agalaat latermal conditions which these people nave in common with the Soviet people.

(9) The Gray Radio will make no direct appeals to military or civilian personnel to defect, but will make clear through broadcasts about defectors aad emigres that all those who ere willing and able to defect will be given good treatnoat, will be granted political asylum, aad will be eble to lead happy aad productive lives ia their new homes.

V. Pray Radio Broadcasts Will Avoid:

of any materiel, harmful to tbe Interests ofgovernments which might embarrass the radio la the conductrelations with the host governments.

vituperative or blatantly propagandist1c Messages will be most effective when constructed aada calm and reasoned manner.

of any material which would cause listeners to regardthe voice of any government or of any emigre political grouping

departure from the principle of aoa-predetermlaatiomfuture state structure of the USSR.

S. Criticism which would offend tbe listeners' self-esteem or national pride.

p. Direct encouragement of any action which could expose the listener to regime reprisal.

which could legitimately be construed asfor revolutionary action.

H. 'Tactical advice or the promise of outside aid ia the event of disturbances or armed uprisings.

condescending tone or material presented lnay as

to imply an obvious assumption of tbe political naivete of the listener.

J. Use of political, ethical or philosophical generalities, which are likely toommunist-perverted meaning for tha Soviet audience, without making clear the practical manifestations of theae,concepts.

E. Sensationalism; frivolous or vulgar satire or humor: flamboyant language.

Original document.

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