NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES BY FOURTH COUNTRIES: LIKELIHOOD AND CONSEQUENCES
Submitted by the DIRFCTOK Ol' CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
'The following Intelligence organizations participated tn the preparation oj this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
the Intelligence organisations of tke Departments ot State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, The Joint Stag, and the Atomic Energy Commission.
In by the
I*hv'. INTELLIGENCE AD VISOMMITTEE
lottiliJiJj MM. Concurring icere The Director ofand Research, Department of State; the Assistant Chief 'of Stag. Intelligence. Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Assistant Chief of Staff,USAF; the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff; and the Atomic Energy Commission Representaltoe to the IAC. The Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Invest!-gallon, abstained, the subject being Outside of hii jurisdiction.
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table of contents
I. CAPABILITIES OF FOURTH
A Nuclear Weapon Capabilities of Indiridual Countries .
Weapons Capabilities of Combinations of
The Addition of the
Capabilities of Fourth
France, Sweden, West Germany, and
Other Possible Individual
Combinations of European
IL PROBABLE COURSES OF ACTION IN FOURTHIN THE ABSENCE OF DISARMAMENT
Affecting the Initiation and Extent of Programs
to Acquire Nuclear
Western European Allies of the
Other European NATO
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
Cooperation in the Production of Nuclear
The Position of the
Courses of Action in other Fourth Countries .
DETERRENTS TO PRODUCTION IN
of Agreements Restricting Use of Fissionableto Peaceful
on European Countries of the US Providing
OF THE POSSESSION OF BY FOURTH
Effect on the World Power Situation andof
Consequences of Fourth Country Production
Reactions to Fourth Country Production
of Acquisition of Nuclear Capabilities by
Estimated Output of Plutonium from Assumed Reactor Programs in Selected
Indicators of Nuclear Weapon Production Capabihty . . 7
3 Estimated Dates by which Fourth Countries Couldand Deploy Long Range Nuclear Missiles,Native
DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES BY FOURTH COUNTRIES: LIKELIHOOD AND CONSEQUENCES
To estimate the capabilities and intentions of "fourth countries" with respect to the production of nuclear weapons and related delivery systems over the nextand to estimate the consequences in terms of US national interests. (Except as they may affect the above, this estimate does not consider nuclear capabilities which might be obtained by the transfer of finished weapons or advanced delivery systems from other powers.)
the nextarge number of individual countries could produce atew nominal-yield weapons and could adapt these weapons for delivery by aircraft. )
However, only France, Sweden,and perhaps West Germany couldproduce substantial stocks of nuclear weapons and missiles capable of reaching major Bloc cities from their respective territories within the ten-year period. Franceigh-prioritycouldimited operational capability with fission warheads for such weaponsubstantial operational capability, including some thermonuclear-armed missiles,)
A combined effort by France, Italy, and West Germany (the FIG states) could develop thermonuclear weapons3 and couldimitedcapability with thermonuclear-armed missiles.)
We believe France will begin nuclear testing by the end8 or9 and,ubstantial disarmament agreement or nuclear weapon assistance from the US, the UK, or both, willindependently proceed to develop andamily of fission weapons within the ten-yearrogram embracing development of long-range missile systems and thermonuclearwouldajor strain on French resources, so that the incentive for France
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to enter some cooperative grouping will remain strong.)
Unilateral production by France could create strong pressures in West Germany and other European countries for aarrangement to produce andnuclear weapons. If neither aWestern program for the production of nuclear weaponsubstantialagreement is achieved in the next five years, we believe West Germany will then seek to enter into independent development and production of nuclear weapons and delivery systems.)
We believe that Sweden will initiate limited nuclear weapons production as the necessary materials become available. Other countries which will probably seek to develop limited weapons production programs within the decade are Communist China and Israel. Japan is unlikely to do so. )
A US-USSR agreement provisionally banning or limiting nuclear tests wouldestraining effect on independent production of nuclear weapons by fourth countries. However, the inhibiting effectsest moratorium would beunless further progress inaimed at effective controls and reduction of stockpileswere evident.X2)
Arrangements by the US to provide Western European countries withweapons under some form ofNATO control would have aninhibiting effect. Nevertheless, France would probably stillew low-yield weapons. US-UK offers totechnical assistance for commonproduction would almost certainly deter production by individual countries.)
fourth country is likely tonuclear capabilities in theyears to change basically thepositions of the US and USSR.acquisition in any manner ofby fourth countriesexclusive national control isproduce difficulties and in mostprobably tend to increaseof general war by anurther, there is thethat nuclear weapons mightthe hands of almost totallygovernments. )
production of nuclearindividual European countries overten years is not likely to reducetheir dependence on the US.
The Depot; Director Tor Intelligence. The Joint StolT, does not agree that "fourth country"capabilities would probably tend to Increase the chances of general war. He considers thiseneralization which is purelyand which is probably erroneous whento the specific nations and groups oflisted in the test as potential possessors of nuclear capabilities.
General war would involve overt engagement of major US and USSR military forces.war can occur only If one of these two dominant powers decides upon Itourse ofocalized conflict would be the most likely catalyst forecision: but the use of nuclear weapons by one or both antagonistsocal conflict Is not considered Ukely tothe ultimate Judgment of either greattoward undertaking eeneral war. Indeed, as suggested In paragraphsndhe dominant powers may multiply their efforts to keep local conflicts local.
Thus, the Deputy Director tor Intelligence, The Joint Staff, considers that while It Is possible. It is not probabie that general war would tend tomore likely due to iourth countryor nuclear capabilities. He believes theshould be terminated after the word
The existenceajor commonprogram might lessen Westernsusceptibilities to Soviet threats, and major European governments might assert greater independence. However, the members of the community would probably continue to regard alliance with the US as essential, at least for some time to come. )
ajor European program wouldegree of deterrence on the USSR, we do not believe that the Soviets would regard it as increasing theof Western Europe initiating hostile action. Independent West Germanwould cause new and sharper threats but of itself would probably not lead the USSR to attack West Germany.)
he acquisition by the Chineseregime of nuclear weapons over the next decade would not in itself alter Peiping's basic international orientation and policies. )
CAPABILITIES Of FOURTH COUNTRIES
A small-scale national program forweapons development and productiononly: (a) one or more fairly largeor power reactors for producing(b) accessupply of uranium, and (c) personnel with an understanding of nuclear physics. These requirements can now or will within ten years time be metarge number of countries. Nuclear know-howto reactor technology is rapidly being spread throughout the world by national and international programs for the peacefulof atomic energy. Many countrieshave or anticipate such programs. Most widely in demand are dual-purpose reactors which generate both power for peaceful uses and plutonium. Although high-grade deposits of natural uranium are relatively limited,low-grade deposits are widelyLastly; the basic principles of weapons design are becoming more widely known in top scientific circles throughout the world.ountry canew kilograms of plutonium,ittle additionalin ordnance research and facilities it can produce low-yield fission weapons.
More substantial weapons programstoarge annual output of fissioniversified range of such weapons or,urther step, the fabrication of thermonuclear weapons would require the construction of major specialized facilities. These would consist for example of large plu-tonium-prcducing reactors and of isotopeplantss to be obtained.weapons fabrication, development, and testing facilities would also be required. The investment required byubstantial program In terms of money, skilled manpower (especially scientists, engineers, andenergy, and natural resources is so large, particularly for the production, thatew fourth countries could by themselves achieverogram over the next decade.
n order to translate nuclear weaponseaningful politico-military capability, weapons delivery systems must be developed. In this, as ln the production of nuclearthereide disparity between the nominal capability to adapt nuclear weapons for delivery by aircraft and the capability to undertake national programs for producing nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. Lightcapable of delivering all but the crudest or largest fission weapons are commercially available to all countries. However,ew of the more industrially advanced stales have the scientific and industrial capabilitiesto develop and produce bothmissiles and adaptable nuclear warheads.
A. Nuclear Weapon Capabilities of Individual Countries
Based on the current status of theirenergy programs, France and Canada already have the capability to achieve aprogram using only native resources. The French are conducting nuclear weaponsand areuclear weapons proving ground in the West Sahara. Wethat France can produce and test its first fission weaponT yield by8 orf France carries out ils reactor program on the scale initially announced, it could have the capacityG of plutonium per year3G per yearnery small pilot isotopeplant is in operation, and plansajor gaseous diffusion facility capableear of weaponsre under consideration.lant could be in operation about five years after the decision to begin construction. The costacility to produceercentof uranium has been estimated by the French at0 million; for enrichment to weapons grade, there would be an additional cost, perhaps on the orderillion. The availabilitytockpile of fissionablewould permit theery high priority program involving extensive teststo design and produceen-yearamily of weapons ranging from small diameter fission weapons capable of beingas guided missile warheads toof megaton yield.1
Canada now has agreements for the sale to the US of^all of its plutonium production, currentlyear. Should these be revoked. It would beosition toa substantial weapons program. On the basis of presently operating and plannedCanada would have the capability to produce plutonium at an annual rate
' See Annex (RestrictedWeaponsCapabilities of Selected Fourthand Giouptr.es"iscussion of French development capabilities in greater detail.
KO3Gwo to four-fold expansion of this program would be well within Canadian capabilities. The fabrication and testing by Canada of an initial nuclear device would be possible withinear after the decision to proceed had been made.
Within the next five years, Sweden and perhaps West Germany are the only other countries which could successfully initiateweapon production from nativealone. Both countries have or can develop adequate manpower, although the use of this manpowerizeable nuclearprogram would involve some diversions from other eflorts. From the large-scaleprogram currently being planned,could have plutonium in quantitiesto fabricate an initial weaponlthough Swedenative source of uranium in shale deposits, its processingare not adequate to supply all thereactor fuel. If an Increased supply of fuel is obtained, either through expansion of domestic processing facilities or purchases abroad, Sweden could produce plutoniumate ofG per yearG3G
West Germany is considering plans for nuclear power stations, but to date no firm program has been initiated. West Germany woulderious problem in findingtest areas. If the West Germans solved this problem and obtained unrestricted access to the fissionable material outputeactor program or to high-grade uranium ores, they could also commence weapons production within three to five years from the dale ofHowever, if entirely dependent on its own supplies of low-grade ores for fissionable materials. West Germany would be in ato commence weapons production only near the end of the ten-year period of this estimate.
discussion of the treaty limitationsa possible nuclear weapons program by West Germany, see paragraph M.
ESTIMATED OUTPUT OF PLUTONIUM PROM ASSUMED REACTOR PROORAM8 IN SELECTED COUNTRIES (Annual Rale In Kilograms 1
Dale of First
1 3 5 3 BOO 3
Canada Is now under agreement to sell all or Its plutonium to Uie US.
Sweden would have to obtain addlUonalof uranium fuel to realize this potential.
Countries which possess the necessaryto produce their first nuclear weapons0 years from now are Belgium. EastCzechoslovakia and perhaps India and Poland. Each of these countries has richof uranium ores within territory under its control, with the exception of Poland which has only low-grade but extractable ores. Bel-glum could commence weapons production without further foreign assistancehe three major Eastern European countries are only ln the early experimental stage of nuclear energy programs and would almost certainly encounter Soviet checks overuse of uranium ores. India couldweapons only by extraordinary efforts and by assigning the highest priorityeapons program.
Other countries which could commence nuclear weapon0 years hence If they could obtain access to fissionablewithout restrictions as to use, areItaly, Switzerland, Norway, and theEach of these countries has planned power reactor programs, but lacks high grade uranium ores. At present reactor fuels are available to have-not countries from major producers in the Free World only on terms intended to prevent diversion to weaponHowever, occurrence of uranium and thorium are common throughout the world and processes for economic recovery of relatively low-grade deposits are now being developed. For example, Japan isthe prospects for recovering uranium from its low-grade deposits. As world uraniumexpands and commercial sales of power reactors are extended, it appears likely that present restrictions on the availability of fissionable materials for weaponswill be progressively reduced.
Compared with the countries discussed above, Communist China. Australia, and Israel possess fewer of the requirements for aprogram and would require majorassistance to produce even the firstwithin the next ten years. Each of these countries is already receiving importantln the development of nuclear energy programs. Communist China could withassistance produce fission weapons on its own territory. If Israel should obtainforeign assistanceeactor program, it has the technical capacity toew low-yield weapons during the next ten years.
In terms of quantity, none of thelisted lnbove is likely without foreign assistance to have theover the next ten years to produce enough weapons-grade fissionable material to support the production of moreew nominal-yield weapons. Only France,Canada, and West Germany couldproduce substantial stocks ofweapons in this period. We believe that lt is possible for these latter countries to develop the capacity toew high-yield0 KT or above) in thisProduction of such weapons woulda major priority program for France, and an all-out effort by the others if thefissionable materials production and other facilities were to be developed. Such programs would also involve an extensiveon delivery systems to be meaningful.
In all of these countries the time required foreapons productioncould be significantly reduced, and the scale of weapons programs increased, byof assistance from the US, the UK, or tlie USSR, particularly if such assistance Included development of isotope separation facilities or weapons design information.
technological breakthrough couldincrease the capabilities of thein this paper, but probablyenlarge the list of those countries ablenuclear weapons within the next
B. Nuclear Weapons Capabilities ofof European Countries
Thereossibilitythe likelihood of which is discussed later in this estimateof various European countries pooling theirweapons efforts in some degree- Th* possible combinations include the "FIG"(France, Italy, and Westhe six European Community countries (FIG plusEU grouping (the Six plus the UK).
France-Italy-West Germany. Anwhich brought togetherustained common effort the missile and nuclear energy programs of the French and the technological and industrial capacities of the Germans would mean the emergenceajor "fourth power" in Europe. An extension of theFIG effort to nuclear weapons would aid in overcoming the obstacles which tend to deter individual nationsespecially the high financial costs and the complex problemsin initially developing advancedand delivery systems. If the FIG stales were toombined nuclearprogram, they could constructfacilities for weapons-grade fissionable materialsarge scale and couldubstantial weapons program. Production of the first fission weapons, starting, would result primarily from the French effort. However,ombined effort could accelerate the development of thermonuclear weaponsear or so, and could produce such weapons more rapidly and withless strain than France alone.
A combined effort by the SIX wouldan important source of uranium from the Belgian Congo as well as additionaland technical support to the capacities of the FIG states, but the time required for the development ot weapons would bethe same as for the FIO pool. If the SIX also obtained the uranium output of South Africa, they could produce byariety of fission weapons Innumbersoderate number ofweapons.
addition of the UK to the aboveeffort,EU framework,highly significant additionaland fissionable materialsfacilities. Any such combination, ifIn the near future, could produceweapons tn substantial numbersfive years.
C. Delivery Capabilities of Fourth
A countryew nominal-yield weapons could deliver them by unorthodox or crude means, such as cargo aircraft orshipping. As previously noted,which can be adapted for the delivery of nuclear weapons are widely available on world markets. However, advanced aircraft for carrying nuclear-armed missiles or heavy nuclear bombs are within the independent capabilities ofew countries.these are also the states which nave or could develop the capacity to produce ballistic missiles
Aircraft Delivery Systems. Of the four countries already noted as having the most Important nuclear weapon potential during the next decade. France, Sweden and Canada are leading producers of advanced militaryand West Germany has an Industrial base which could be expanded for this purpose. The recently developed French Vautour jet light bomber, being produced at the rate of four per month, could deliver the types ofweapons we estimate that France would develop initially. The Super Mystereew delta wing jet intercepter could provide first-class delivery vehicles for some of the more advanced nuclear weapons France could haveanada has demonstrated the capacity to develop modern aircraftsystems with Itsnd theighters. Both France and Canada, more-
have aircraft carriers from which light bomber or fighter types could be operated. Sweden's latesttorrnance fighterraken) and fighter bomberansen) also compare favorably with those of the leading powers. West Germanis presently limited to trainer, lightand transport types, virtually all under license arrangements with other countries.
None of these countries now has or Is likely to undertake in the next tenrogram for the development of medium or heavy bombers.
Apart from their independent capabilities, the major allies of the USincluding West Germany. Prance. Italy, and Japanor are in the process of obtaining advanced types of US miliury aircraft which could be adapted for the delivery of nuclear weapons.
Potential Bloc fourth countriesChina. East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Polandare dependent on aircraft ofmanufacture or design. Aircraft types now in the hands of these countriesnolably Communist China's force of BEAGLE jet light bombersew BULL piston bomberscould be readily adapted for nuclear weapons delivery.
Missile Delivery Systems. In ourof possible missile delivery systems, we have focused entirely on surface-to-surface missiles capable of reaching the USSR from the territory of the country concerned. There is considerable evidence that such missiles are In the forefront of thinking ln those countries considering substantial nuclear weaponsMoreover, from the capabilitiesalone, we cannot visualize any fourth country over the next decade putting any ma-
Jor part of its nuclear weapons development and production into nuclear warheads foror short-range surface-to-surface missiles, since (a) the weapons types required are either of advanced design or expensive In materials, or both: <b) the numbers ofrequiredeaningful capability are large, especially in the surface-to-airor the same reasons, we exclude theof artillery delivery systems. Aa tolocal war use of nuclear weapons in limited numbers, we believe air delivery would be preferred to short-range missiles andFinally, we also exclude nuclear-armed air-to-surf ace missile delivery systems since these would require medium or heavy bombers for delivery.
In the long-range SSM field, we believe that the eventual goal of the effort of major fourth countries would be missiles employing solid or storable liquid propcllants. As toyield, we believe that the eventual goal of the effort wouldield in the megaton range. For Interim purposes,ission warhead would be accepted, and numbers of delivery vehicles might be produced on this basis. Evenission warhead would beto meet requirements against all military targets, it would be adequate to threaten major damage to Important urban areas.
omprehensive missilesimilar to that of the US or the USSR would be enormously costly, we estimateRBM'sange0 miles" could probably be developed, produced, andsited for about UShe maximum expenditure in any one year of a
Sweden and perhaps Japan max be exceptions to these conclusions.
' in giving missile ranges the term "miles" means nautical miles throughout this paper.
These estimates are general approximationswidely srith the standards ofbeing souaht and the comperauve technological advantages of individual countries. In each caw. the research and development costs could be redaced if information on design and technology waa made available by either the US or the USSR ten-year program could be5omparable program for surface-to-surface missilesangeiles would probably cost about SIuchare within the capabilities of the larger countries of Western Europe and possibly of Japan. These countries have high educational standards and outstanding scientists capable of solving without major foreign assistance the critical problems of propulsion, guidance, and warhead design. In eachajor effort would be required, one which would mean an all-out mobilization ofriority allocation of financial and industrial resources, with consequent major sacrifices in other scientific and industrial areas.
ince research and developmentigh percentage of the cost of missileand involve the greatest sacrifice of scientific and engineering talent, assistance to potential fourth countries by the US or the USSR would greatly reduce the strain of such programs. As US missile systems become available to its allies, their knowledge ofpossibilities and requirements will beTo the extent that the US helpsfourth countries, particularly France, with delivery systems, they will be In ato devote more effort to nuclear programs and warhead development. Most countries which have the potential to develop nuclear weapon systems will almost certainly seek foreign assistance, not only from the US or the USSR but from other countries as well.
France, Sweden, Wost Germany, and Canada
3D. Prance. Using entirely native resources andigh priority program, we believe that France couldimited operational capability with nuclear missilesmile missiles armed with fission warheads). and an importantissiles with fission warheads).igh priority program, France could commence the arming of long range missiles with tliermonuclear warheads at leastnd perhaps two or three
years earlier with an all-outhe French have someissile projectsencompassing every category except long range lypes and they are actively studying the possibilities for these. French capabilities are substantial but they are under financialln partesult of militaryin Algeria. Further, while the country is strong In theoretical and experimentalit is less strong in Industrial
Sweden.oncerted national effort, we believe the Swedes could independently obtainimited operationalmissileissiles withwarheads)ange encompassingiles to Moscow. Sweden couldproduction of shorter range0 miles) as earlyut problems ofuclear warhead would probably delay their operational availability until near the end of the ten-year period. Sweden has an active missile program and hasits ability to develop efficient short-range and coastal defense missiles. Wethe Swedes could solve the more difficult problems of adapting fission warheads and guidance for longer range missiles, although without foreign assistance the guidancewhich they could devise would probably be less refined than desired.
West Germany.riority program and provided it obtained access to flight test faculties, West Germany could develop andimited operational capabilitymile range missile6 and with shorter range0 miles)as earlyy an all-outof resources (including access totest areas) the West Germans could arm such missiles with fission warheads6 and perhaps with fusion warheadslthough present German missileare limited, the Germans have great potential In the field and are believed to have recently designedile ballistic missile with an inertial guidance system.
For discussion of the problems of developing thermonuclear warheads and their probable weights, see Annex (Restricted Data).
In order to establish acapability against the USSR,would need to develop an ICBM.Canada is capable of doing soyears, the sacrifices which would bein an independent effort of thiswould be enormous.
Other Possible Individual Countries
and Italy also could acquireoperational missileagainst major targets in the USSRChina within the next tenneither could produce nuclearthis period without foreign assistance.
With an all-out effortindependently develop and8 ballistic missiles capablecoastal targets in Chinahe Japanesecertainly could not fabricate fissionfor such missiles before thes.
The Italians have afar missile development and Iftest facilities were made available,probablymileof reaching Moscowtaly has been directing its efforts Infield into cooperative endeavorscountries, including developmentjointly undertaken with the US and
do not believe that Communisthave the capabilityevelop and produce missile systemscarrying nuclear warheads. However,Communists couldadrepersonnel for manningsites jointly established with theCommunist Chinese territory.
Combinations of European Countries
FIG Countries. We do notWest German and Italiansignificantly affect our estimatealone couldmile missiles by
owever, such cooperation would greatly ease the burdens on France, and would make possible earlier and larger efforts tothe fissionable materials necessary for thermonuclear warheads. Accordingly,IG combination might be able to produce an Initial capability withmissiles, rather thanstimated for France alone.
he SIX. The addition of Belgium would simplify uranium supply problemsajor effort, and both Belgium and the Netherlands could contribute important technical However, such assistance wouldnot advance the dates estimated for the FIG grouping.
K Participation. We believe the UK will achieve within the nexthermonuclear weapon suitable for an IRBM warhead. This together with its existing programmile missile would make it the clear leader in any program in which it participated. We believeEU combination couldimited operational capability with aIRBM (though notup to yields now sought by the US),tockpileuchear later.
ESTIMATED DATES BY WHICH FOURTH COUNTRIES COULD DEVELOP. PRODUCE. AND DEPLOY LONG RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES, USING ONLY NATIVE RESOURCES
Country and Missile Range
iles West Germany
iles The SIX
iles WEU (SIX plus UK)
II. PROBABLE COURSES OF ACTION IN
FOURTH COUNTRIES IN THE ABSENCE OF DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS
A. Factors Affecting the Initiation andof Programs to Acquire Nuclear Capabilities
those fourth countries which arebecome capable or producingthere are several lactorsimpel them to produce nuclearamong these are:
o. Desire for national prestige.
for military capabilities thatused, politically or militarily, in localparticularly with non-nuclearforces (such as rebels).
that the development ofIs the most efficient use ofand resources available for defense.
by major US allies toor in combination) enoughto exercise some degree ofthe USSR independently of the powerUS.
Of these, the desire for national prestige and the belief in military effectiveness arein some degree to all fourth countries. The factor of possible use in local conflicts Is of particular relevance in France, butirrelevant in Sweden and Canada, for example. The buttressing of neutrality now applies principally to Sweden.
most difficult factor to assessone of crucial importance inextent of, possible European fourthprogramsis the desire to acquireof independent deterrent power.inspired by desire for nationalconflict considerations, andeutral position may be met bymodest programs. However, theof any significant degree ofpoweris theore substantial nature,advanced types of deliveryweapons adapted to them.
Over the past year or two, the desire to attain some degree of independent deterrent capabilities has clearly gained ground among major allies of the US. With the growth of Soviet capabilities making the US Itself appear far more vulnerable than before and with the prospect that the ICBM and seaborne missiles will make the US less dependent on foreign bases, European leaders Increasingly fear that the US might not stand firmly with Europe against Soviet pressures and actions inor vital European concern. Moreover, the example of British stress on nuclearpower under7 White Paper has had wide influence, and it has appeared to the continental allies that the UK hasits influence with the US by that policy. Should this desire for independent deterrent power grow among the continental NATO powers, the cost of the required effort would tend to favor combinations among these powers. In any event, this element in the fourth country outlook Is of much greater Importance than at this time last year.
Over against these factors, generallyto favor fourth country nuclear programs,umber of important restraining factors. The most obvious of these is diversion ofscarce scientific and technical resources from other projects. Financial costs, though not majorominal-scale program, become great in any substantial program. Among major US allies an Important inhibitingis concern for the effect of an independent program on ties with the US. While major US allies are unlikely to consider that then-US ties would be severed completely by their decision to enter the nuclear fieldthey may weigh heavily the possibility thatecision might lead over timeonsiderable loosening of these ties.even after the initiationrogram, fourth countries are likely to remainas to its military effectiveness; inthey may well be troubled by the time lag before their capabilities could becomeand also by doubts as to whether their nuclear striking power, once acquired, could be made sufficiently invulnerable topre-emptive action to constitute anydeterrent to Soviet action.
B. Major Wesiern European Allies of the US
France. There has been growing French support over the past year (or fabrication and testing of atew nuclear devices to restore French prestige and to reestablish France's statusreat power. Conditioned by nationalist fervor, the French press has apparently accepted the eventual production of nuclear armsoregone conclusion and there has been no significant publicof opposition torogram since the Suez crisis. Right wing elements arcin their demands that France obtain nuclear weapons under unilateral control and are highly critical of US nuclear stockpile proposals. They Insist that France mustall arms on its territory.
We believe that the de Gaulle government intends to begin nuclear testing as soon as possible. Preparations for testing are well advanced, and an atomic device can bein the Sahara by8 or
Furthermore, we believe that France will proceed to produce atew low-yield plutonium weapons to establish itselfull-fledged nuclear power. The extent to which the French will carry an independent program beyond this point will depend on whether they are furnished nuclear weapons on satisfactory conditions, and whether the US, the UK, or both furnish major technical and material assistanceommon weapons program. If neither of these developments occur, we believe that France will continue with an independent program with ahigh priority to achieve atamily of fission weapons within the ten-year period.
In the existing Frenchroadly based long-range program to include adequate delivery systems and thermonuclear weapons is unlikely. Moreover, the carrying out of the EURATOM nuclear power program will engage some of France's technical manpower and resources. However, the effect of these restraints may diminish over time. Abovecaling down or ending of militaryin Algeria would make possible far greater financial support of nuclear activities. Moreover, over the ten-year period, French Gross National Product will continue toand the EURATOM program mayadditional training facilities of help to France's national program. Nonetheless, it is highly unlikely that France willoint within this period where it coulda major nuclear weapons programserious strain on ils resources; hence, the incenUve for France to enter some grouping arrangement will remain strong.
West Germany. In the absence of aagreement, it is the declared policy of the Adenauer government to arm West German forces with tactical nuclear weapons supplied by the US under NATOChancellor Adenauer and Foreign Minister Brentano have stressed that theRepublic does not wish to produceweapons but would like to undertake research on them in cooperation with other countries.
There are major restraints upon theproduction of nuclear arms by the Federal Republic. Under the Paris Agreementest Germany accepted treatynot to manufacture- atomic arms and larger types of missiles on its territory. These restrictions do not apply to research, theof these weapons from other states, or cooperative schemes for their productionGermany. Further, certain restrictions can be relaxed, upon the recommendation of SACEUR. by agreement with West Germany's WEU allies. For example, the West German government recently applied for and obtained permission through WEU to manufacture an anti-tank missile. Removal of the restriction on manufacture of nuclear weapons would, however, require amendment of the WEU treaty.
Most West Germans have accepted the arming of US troops in Germany with nuclear weapons, but there remains intenseled by the Social Democrats, to thearming of West German forces. This opposition is based largely on fear of Soviet reactions, on fear of German involvement in
nuclear war, and on concern that theof nuclear weapons would prevent, or at least make far more difficult, the eventual reunification of Germany. However, barring substantial Soviet concessions in the areas of disarmament or reunification, we believe the Adenauer government will proceed with its plans to obtain US tactical nuclearfor West German forces.
To date, the issue of West Germanof nuclear weapons has not been widely debated in Germany, but tt seemsthat elements which now opposeof US weapons would also opposefor independent production.
In the event that West Germany should seek to enter the nuclear armaments field, the restrictions Imposed by the Parisand the limitations on West Germany's domestic resources, especially lack of high-gradeesting area, and up-to-date weapons know-how, would provide powerful practical incentives for West Germany to seek some cooperative arrangement with France. Thus, an influential group within thegovernment, led by Defense Minister Strauss, views cooperative programs as the only practical means foruclear weapons status Independent of the US. The Ideaore independent role for aof European stateson the basis ofatomicrowingin Influential West German circles. Part of this appeal is based on concern to head on* fourth power status for France by seeking to tie French nuclear capabilities toranco-Germanroader European
We do .pot expect the West Germans to press these objectives In the near futureay that would risk alienating the US. If, however, the French were to seek West GermanIG or broader basiswe believe the West Germans would be receptive, while insistingull share in the technical data produced and anGerman voice in the deployment anduse ol the resulting weapons, at least in Western Europe.
By, the Germans will have made good much of their postwar lag In scientific and military research.they will beosition toamily of missiles, as well as nuclearin from four to five years from the time of decision. We believe that Frenchof nuclear weapons, German pride,and military momentum, and their concern over continuing dependence on the US for security would be powerful stimuli forourse. Therefore, we believe that if by this time there is neither an East-West understandingommon Westernfor the production of nuclear weapons, the Federal Republic will probably seek to undertake unilateral production of nuclear weapons systems despite Socialist-ledand concern over adverse effects on chances for reunification. Wo believe that West Germany would seek to obtainof the WEU Treaty and would accept some delay to do so. In the unlikely event they failed, however, we believe that in the last analysis they would probably go ahead anyway, having concluded that Westernin WEU and NATO wasirtual end. There wouldomewhat greater delay ininal decision in favor of unilateral production if the government were controlled by the Social Democrats, but we believeovernment too wouldgo ahead.
Other European NATO Countries.production by either France or West Germany would stimulate other European countries tohare In the control as well as in the production of these weapons. Fear of an unrestrained nationalist resurgence in West Germany and France would beby other motives, suchesire to establish some degree of independentdeterrent within the framework of the NATO alliance. Italian leaders have already considered joining France and West Germanyuclear weapons pool, but they have been anxious to obtain prior US approval andSimilarly, the Belgians and the Dutch would rest more easily II French and German nuclear capabilities could be harnessedroader NATO program. If France and
manyeither separately or togetherto produce nuclear weapons, we believe there would be strong pressures in Belgium, Italy, and the Netherlands to Join them. In the absence of such an arrangement, one or more of these countries might eventually go ahead with unilateral production efforts.
C. European Cooperation in theof Nuclear Weapons
FIG Combination. Franca Germanin the missile field has beensinceollowing the orbiting of the first Sputnik and about the time of the Eisenhower-Mac Mkllan Declaration of Common Intention ofheministers of France, Italy, and West Germany drew more closely together andtheir plans for cooperation indevelopment and production. Tentative agreements have been reached onolidmile missile, an anti-missile missile, and other arms projects. These deliberations Included aof the prospects of giving Franceand financial assistance for theof nuclear weapons to be shared by the three countries.
However. France-Italian-Germanon nuclear weapons cooperation appear to have encountered difficulties. The French have been interested in immediate andassistance without strings and have probably been unresponsive to German in-sistance on guarantees of precise futureAs discussions became more widely known, objections were expressed not only by other NATO countries but also by elements within the national governments of the three countries. The German socialist "campaign against atomicrench preoccupation with Algeria, and general uncertainty over US intentions are other factors which have given pause to FIG leaders. Although the evidence is inconclusive, we believe thatfor FIG cooperationuclearprogram have been postponed, at least pending the outcome of French bilateralto obtain nuclear weapons and weapons technology from the US.
Until the general European posture of the de Gaulle government becomes clearer, it is impossible to estimate whether the FIGwill be strengthened in the missile field and extended into the nuclear field. On the one hand, de Gaulle mayaximum of independent French strength and cut down French cooperation. On the other hand, it is possible that he might attempt to build up the FIG combinationounterweight to the US and UK within NATO. Over the next two years, if France continues under the burden of conflict in Algeria, the practicalfoeooperativeon the continent might become stronger. In the meantime, nationalist sentiment in France might be assuaged by Initial nuclear testing by Francenilateral basis.
The SIX. If the FIG states gave evidence of proceedinguclear weaponsthe desire of Uie Benelux countries tooice in Uie deployment and use of these weapons as well as the ties of theintegration movement would probably leadommon effort by the Six states of the European Communities. The European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) is designed to promote and will probably beto the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, since Socialist support, infor EURATOM is premised on its non-military program.ewdecision to develop and produce weapons jointly could be taken by the SIX either by amending the existing treaty orew treaty. However, at least Belgium and the Netherlands wouldATOand would seek to encourage US and UK participation in any Europeanweapons program.
he Position of the UK. The UK Isopposed to the production of nuclearby any fourth country, Including France, and would be particularly concerned at anywhich might put nationallynuclear weapons In German hands. The British reaction to FIG has been to try to bring it under WEU and NATO scrutiny and to encompass FIG production planningarger multilateral framework Despite
marked continental mistrust of BritishUK collaborationoint advanced weapons programespecially if accompanied by further evolution in British politicaltoward European integrationwould probably be welcome by the SIX. The UK is likely, however, to takear-reaching step only under two conditions. First, the UK would have to be reasonably convinced that either Independent or collective continental programs would eventually succeed, in whichommon program might be analternative. Secondly, the UK would probably not proceed without US concurrence. If not urging, given the importance attached to its special relations with the US and its close collaboration and commitments in the field of nuclear information. On balance, in the absence of such concurrence, we think the chances arc less than even that the British would optommon WEU nuclearon conditions acceptable to thepowers.
D. Probable Courses of Action in other Fourth Countries
Canada has the capability to produceweapons at an early date. However, since the Canadians realize that their security is inextricably intertwined with that of the US. we believe they will continue to depend primarily on US deterrent capabilities.the government and the people will increasinglyarger Canadian role in matters affecting the security of North America. In particular, they are likely to seek nuclear weapons from the US for air defense purposes. If the US provides these weapons, whether US-controlled or not. no compelling-motive would appear likely to lead the Canadians to undertake their own nuclear weapons production program.
Sweden's considerationational weapons program is largely influenced by Its own peculiar situationis the USSR. Sweden will have sufficient plutonium from its atomic power reactors to Initiate theof fission weapons in the next few years, but the debate on whether to do so hasonflict of humanitarian and security arguments. In addition to strong opposition to nuclear weapons on moral grounds, there is uncertainty as to whether Sweden'sneutrality is better served by foregoing or by producing atomicighly vocal minority contends that atomic arms inwould only invite attack in event of war. The major polilical parties and most leaders are inclined to compromise this issue bythe manufacture of tactical and air defense atomic weapons, while avoidingat least Initiallythe more "provocative"range missiles. We believe that in the absence of substantial progress inSweden will initiate production ofweapons as the necessary materials be come available.
Japan possesses the industrial, scientific, and technological resources necessary tonuclear weapons independently, and could probablyodest nuclear capa-bility within the period of this estimate.Japanese public opinion at present is overwhelmingly opposed torogram. Moreover, defense requirementsery low priority In the current plans of Japan's responsible conservative leaders (including Prime Ministerho take the position that Japan's future greatness must reston economic rather than military strength. While the long-range defense plans of these leaders are still tentative, there is nothing to suggest that they intend to modify their present policy of relying primarily on the US for Japan's defense, or that they areconsidering an independent nuclear weapons program for Japan.
We believe that, in the absence of effective international controls, Japan will seek to equip itself with modest defensive (air-to-air,missile systems, and the US will probably be asked to assist In producing such systems and also to provide the necessarywarheads. Despite the uniqueof the Japanese people to nuclear weapons and the threat of war, popular acquiescence inrogram can be obtained.Japan will insist at the very least that such weapons be placed under shared control.
We believe Japan Is unlikely to attempt to produce its own nuclear weapons within the next decade. However,en-year period It is. of course, possible that there could be major shifts in Japanese attitudes towardweapons, as wellarked growth in Japanese desires for Independent power. In the event of such changes, theoing nuclear power program might lead Japan to Initiate weapons production at leastmall scale.
Bloc Countries. Chinese Communistalmost certainly aspire to gain nuclear weapons In the hope ofeterrent to the use of US nuclear weapons in the Far East and ln order to advance Communist China's claim to great power status, enhance its power and prestige in Asia, and eventually lessen dependence on the USSR. SinceChina cannot produce its ownfor some years, we believe that theChinese will press the USSR forand nuclear weapons, especially if the US should increase its nuclear capabilities in the Far East and the Western Pacific. The USSR will probably be reluctant to meetrequests, hesitating to divert suchfrom its own programs and fearing to contribute both to Feiping's capabilities to take independent action ln the Far East and to Pelplng's prestige and influence in the Bloc. While relying chiefly on its own capabilities to counter US nuclear strength in the Far East and the Western Pacific, the USSR, In theof harmonious relations with itsally, will nevertheless probably provide the Chinese Communists with some varieties of missiles and other weapons adaptable to nuclear use, but at least Initially withoutwarhead's. Unless barred by an effective international agreement, nuclear weapons are likely to be positioned on Chineseithin the next five years, although almost certainly under Soviet control. In any event, even if Soviet nuclear weapons were not de-
'The Director of Intelligence and Research,ol Slate believes this should read "may bahich is in accord with theon this point in paragraphf. "Communistated
ployed in Communist China, they would be readily available If Sino-Soviet intereststhem.
lthough firm evidence is lacking, wethat the Chinese Communists have also decided that they must begin now toa modest developmental program of their own, designed eventually to produce at least token amounts of such weapons, even though this will entail some difficult diversions of vital resources. To Implementrogram Communist China would need to obtainscientific and technical support from the USSR. To date the Soviets have givenuclear research reactor to bethis year, and Chinese scientists aretrained in nuclear physics and In certain phases of Soviet missile programs. Thewould be reluctant to give assistancecale that wouldignificantChinese nuclear weapon program. However, Soviet assistance in processinguranium for domestic use is likely, and the USSR will probably share certain of its experience ln weapons design and testing. With such assistance Communist China will probablymall Independent nuclear weapon capability .with the next ten years.
We believe that the USSR would not give its consent to independent nuclear weapons production in East Germany andthe two satellites with the greatestfor production over the next ten years. The USSR will almost certainly decide that any requirements for the physical location of nuclear weapons in Eastern Europe must be satisfied from Its own stockpiles and underwhich assure that effectiveis retained by its own forces.
Other Fourth Countries. Israel wouldcertainly attempt to achieve modestcapabilities if it could obtain fissionable material. Such material could well comeower reactor program initiated with the assistanceoreign country. Indianto acquiring or producing nuclear weapons might decline if Communist China were known to possess nuclear weapons.
from the countries discussedweapons production does notin any other fourth country withinten years.
III. EXTERNAL DETERRENTS TO PRODUCTION IN FOURTH COUNTRIES
of Agreements Restricting UseMaterials to Peaceful
clauses barring diversion towhich are contained in the statute ofAtomic Energy AgencyIn US, UK, and Canadian bilateralspreclude most fourth countries fromnuclear weapons programs. Theare not binding ona position to export nuclear materialsbilateral basis. For example, the USSRa willingness to supply researchand fissionable materials on awithout apparent restriction on thereactor by-products, and even the UKmay be willing over time toFinally, neither France noris dependent on foreign assistanceeapons program.
of Disarmament Agreements
In the interest of encouraging progress in disarmament among the major powers, there Is popular support throughout most oi the worldan on tests.S-USSR agreement provisionally banning or limiting tests would bring Into play strong publicagainst testing by fourth countries, even though such countries might not initially be parties to the agreement. Although it would be possible for some fourth countries toandew rudimentary weapons without testing, the extent and variety of such weapons programs would be severely limited.
The country most immediately affected would be France. De Gaulle Is opposedest ban separateroader disarmament agreement, and the French would onlyagreeif they would agree athort test moratorium. While France would fulfill any commitment it made to refrain from testing, it would probably begin to test and produce its own weapons soon afterof the moratorium,ore extensive international agreement involving at least cessation of nuclear weaponshad been reached or appeared lo beIf France wereartyS-UK-USSR test suspension agreement, the French government might assert Frenchby testing at least one nuclear device. Nevertheless, popular pressure, among other reasons, would probably force theto postpone further tests. In the longer run, France would be most reluctant to restrict its right to make weapons and would almost certainly do so onlyart of an arrangement which required reduction of the stockpiles of the major nuclear powers.
France proceed, theany agreement in restraining otherwould be impaired, and Europeanprobably follow the courses ofearlier in this estimate. Inonly the public but the governmentwould welcome any agreementto be effective. Even if Japana nuclear capability or were closelyIt, the Japanese wouldwhatever restrictions werethey would be reluctant togreater than those acceptedfourth countries, notablyThe Chinese Communistsnot be deterred iromimited disarmamentexcept insofar as they might beby Soviet adherence and Sovietof assistance from Chinaeapons program.
C. Effect on European Countries of the US Providing Nuclear Weapons
US proposalATOunder US control, althoughthe NATO governments, has notdiminished the keen interest ofthese countries inS transfer ofweapons to integrated NATO control
might satisfy for some time allied desiresegree of independent deterrent power.S move would be even more effective if weapons were supplieduropean pool with the decision on use being left to thecountries acting in concert anda US veto. Nevertheless, in the first of these cases we believe that Franceew low-yield weapons, and it might do so even in the second case.
US-UK offers toassistance for commonand control would almostdeter production by individualsome European groups, particularlywould not regard arrangementspooling of weapons as asubstitute for independentwe believe the European NATOwould welcome help with thea nuclear weapon industry inultinational authoritythe means of production andweapons. At the same time,information, facilities, andprovided by such an arrangementbeuarantee ofto carry out nationalthey prove desirable.
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF THE POSSESSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY FOURTH COUNTRIES
the preceding paragraphs we haveto cover all possible cases ofobtaining nuclear capabilities byof finished weapons andsystems from other powers.may obtain nuclear capabilitiesway. Jn this concluding section wethe consequencespread ofto fourth countries, whether byproduction, by foreign militaryor in the long run even by purchase.
A. General Effect on the World Powerand Likelihood of War
situation. The US and the USSR will still be so far ahead of all others as to dominate the scene without much question. Yet theof nuclear capabilitiesourth countryudden and vast increase in the power of that country; this may be truemall state even though its nuclearis merely nominal.evelopment is certain to produce strains and difficulties, it nothing worse.
The actual effect on the world situation of the acquisition of nuclear capabilitiesourth country is likely to depend largely on the country Itself: the character of itsthe nature of its national alms and aspirations, the Identity of its principal rivals, the alliances and alignments in which It is involved, and the chief problems of its foreign relations. There are some countries which would use their added power exclusively for defense, and so would merely become harder to impose upon. There are others which might use It or more Likely threaten its use for offense, to achieve some deeply-feltaim. Most nations would come somewhere between these two extremes, employing their additional power at various times in various ways. Such matters cannot beecade ahead with enough confidence to make the prediction useful.
With more and more countriesnuclear capabilities, the chances become greaterar will occur in which fourth countries Initiate use of nuclear weapons. And, while it may be possible to keepar limited in size and scope. It wouldbe more difficult to do so in most cases than if the war were fought without nuclear weapons. Broadly speaking, therefore, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by fourth countries probably would mean an Increase in the likelihood of general war coming about in this way, although it is not easy to judge whether such an increase would in fact be vers' substantial.9
No fourth country Ls likely to acquirenuclear capabilities in the next ten years tohange in the basic world power
For the dissent of the Deputy Director forThe Joint Staff, see footnote to9.
It may be that both the US and USSR, aware of the changed situation presented by fourth countries acquisition of nuclearwould multiply their efforts to keep local wars from expanding. However, adangerous type of situation might arise if one country whkh possessed nuclear weapons, and which was an ally, associate, or client of one of the two great powers, were tempted to impose its will on another country which did not possess nuclear weapons, but which was protected by the other great power. Despite the restraints operative between the US and USSR, the compulsion upon thegreat power inituation to take strong measures for the protection of its weak friend would be great In many cases.
Finally, there is the possibility thatweapons might get Into the hands of almost totally irresponsible governments. If this were to occur In countries of major rank, having widespread interests in the world, the consequences could be disastrous. II Itin minor countries having onlyinterests, neither the US nor the USSR would be likely to allow the actions ofovernment to inflame the entire world. Only if the country were for special reasons deeply involvedontroversy ofsignificanceas, for Instance, iswould Its actions, howeverbe more likely to leadeneral
B. Specific Consequences of FourthProduction in Western Europe
principal effects of the limitedcapability that France is likely tounaided jvould be (a) to reinforceto be treatedgreatwithin and outside NATO; (b) topressure in Germany for removal ofTreaty restrictions on German(c) to make more evident totheir needoint Europeanorder toignificantis the USSR, and (d) tothe danger of strong FrenchNorth Africa and the Middleof Israel.
he production of nuclear weapons byEuropean countries aver the next ten years is not likely to reduce substantially their dependence on tlieontinentalcommunity couldorenuclear capability, and might henceless susceptible to Soviet threats. Its confidence in its independent capability to deter the USSR would, however, remainfor many years, although this period would be reduced markedly if the UKThe members of the community would probably continue to regard alliance with the US as essential, at least for some time. Yet the fact that they had acquired their nuclear capability largely as the result of their own efforts, and the experience in cooperation gained in the very act of that effort, would tend to give them an Increased solidarityeeling of Independence which might render them less responsive to US policy. At the same time, if there were effective sharedcontrol of the weapons andfor decisions as to their use, this would probably reduce the chances of Europeanwith nuclear weapons.
C. Soviet Reactions to Fourth Country
he spread to fourth countries of aweapons manufacturing capability has apparently notatter of majorto the USSR, except insofar as Westand possible Communist China may be Involved. Aside from these cases, the Soviets have shown far less concern over the risks that fourth countries possessing nuclearmight triggeruclear war than over the risks inherent In the US-Soviet nuclear confrontation.
he threat poseduclear armed West Germany and by the possibility of resurgent German militarismerious concern to Soviet leaders. Soviet support for campaigns by European socialists and other groups against nuclear arms, and Bloc proposalsuclear-free zone In Central Europe are probably motivated In part by Sovietover the prospect ol Germany nuclear armament. However, wc believe that the
mary Soviet motivation is directed toward the advantages which could be obtained from any withdrawal of US nuclear and other deterrent power from Germany Independent Westproduction of nuclear arms would cause new and sharper threats but of itself would probably not lead the USSR to attack West Germany.
The Soviets would be concerned If the Western European countries embarkedarge-scale regional program lor nuclear arms production, particularly one in which the Federal Republic appeared totrong influence. In this event the USSR wouldits efforts to exploit Europeanof Germany, lo drive home theof Soviet military strength, and to stimulate public anxieties and oppositionuropeanajor Europeanwouldegree of deterrence on the USSR and would tend to make the Soviets more circumspect In their dealings with the participating countries We do not believe, however, that the Soviets would regardrogram as Increasing the likelihood ofEurope ini ta ting hostile action. Soviet leaders would probably calculate that aprogram in Western Europe, with Its cross-currents of national Interests,he USSR wouldto play on these diverse interests and to exploit opportunities for loosening the tiesthe US and the European group.
We believe that European fourth country production, whethernilateral orbasis, is unlikely in itself to lead to fundamental changes in the Soviet position in Eastern Europe or otherwise lo alter basic Soviet policies.
by Sweden of fourthwould have little effect on over-allrelations with the Bloc. Moscownotapanese nuclearas materially affecting its ownposition, put would find it morereluse Communist Chinese requestsimilar weapons program inChina.
D. Consequences of Acquisition ofCapabilities by Communist China
The acquisition by the Chinese Communist regime of nuclear weapons over the nextwould not In itself alter Peiping's basic international orientation and policies.would probably continue to recognize Its fundamental dependence on the USSR for strategic security.
The possession of nuclear weaponswould not of itself lead Peiping toits expansionist military policies in Korea, the Taiwan Straits, or mainlandAsia, since the deterrent effect of the threat of US counteraction would remain. However, Communist China would probably estimate that the intimidating effect on neighboring countries of Its military strength had been increased and that this wouldits Interests.