SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE AND AIR-RAID SHELTER CONSTRUCTION

Created: 3/14/1958

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soviet civil defense and air-raid shelter construction

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CONTENTS

Page

Summary and

of Soviet Civil Defense

Defense

World War 11

Shelter

Basement

Public

5- Party and Government

MVD Offices and

Communications

Industrial

ations

Following Page

Figure 1. USSR: Reported Locations of Basement

Shelte r

Figure 2. Sketchilter Ventilating^ SystemSoviet_Air-Raid Shelter /and aof/ Filter Ventilating Equipment

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SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE AND AIR-RAID SHELTER CONSTRUCTION

Summary and Conclusions

The Soviet civil defense program is not new; rather, ita position achieved by the expenditure of considerable sums in construction and training There appears to have been an increase in the scope and cost of the programut there is no evidenceudden acceleration in the intensity of the program or that it is scheduled for completion coincidentuture target date set for the initiation of hostilities. The construction and traininghas, however, continued to provide varying degrees of protectionrowing portion of the population. 4 the civil defense training program has included some instruction for protection against nuclear weapons.

It is impossible to determine the precise state of civil defense readiness in the USSR. Security restrictions obscure such vital aspects of the program as the quantities of equipment provided, the extent and character of operational training, and the number and strength of heavier Soviet shelters. It is difficult for observers to detect civil defense activities, since indoctrination and training have generally beenthrough small groups in such places as factories and club rooms without being highly publicized and since some of the more obvious preparations, such as the posting of shelter signs, will not, in accordance with stated doctrine, be carried out until the declaration of an emergency. Even trained observers have difficulty detecting the existence of shelters, since many of the identifying features of these shelters cannot be readily spotted and since hermetic sealing and ventilating units are often in* stalled after the building has been completed- As an example of the

problems of observation, little detailed information concerning the civil defense program in Hungary was available before the uprising Since then, however, interrogation of large numbers of Hungarian refugees has revealed extensive civil defense preparations.

The organization of civilhe USSR encompasses the useorps of staff officers of the local air defense organization (MPVO) assigned at all levels of government for planning and direction; the maximum use of existing facilities, organizations, and services for carrying out the program; and the use of large public organisations for general training of the population in first aid and civil defense. The MPVO structure also includes an MPVO-MVD school inentral Scientific Research Laboratory, and an experimental medical plant*

Although there has been some civil defense training foragainst nuclear weapons, information on the probable extent of blast damage and the area coverage and possible persistency ofresulting from explosion of megaton weapons has not been made generally available. Furthermore, there has been no training for mass evacuation, and all known civil defense instructions advise theto use the nearest shelter under conditions of air attack.

Participation in the civil defense training program is probably compulsory for most able-bodied citizens. Deputy Minister Tolstikov of the MVD statedecent paramilitary conferenceercent of the population hadivil defense anti-atomic training course. Although this figure may be somewhat inflated, particularly as it relates to rural areas and refers only to an elementary course, two more advanced courses are programed for the entire population and are scheduled for completion8 and

i>. rogram to include reinforced basement shelters in theof new public buildings. factories, schools, and apartment dwellings was initiated as early In this part of the program, priority has been given to the protection of Soviet Party and government personnel andof personnel of important) economic enterprises. eports, including many from returning prisoners of war who worked on basement shelter construction, indicate that air-raid shelters were included in most building construction observed. These shelters, however, were in varying states of readiness, some being fully equipped and ventilated, others having little more than steel doore and roughed-in ventilation openings. Some basements, such as those seen in early stages of construction by Western obsarvers, have only the basic compartment walls in place. Such basement refuges are of modest strength but would nevertheless reduce Immediate casualties in peripheral damage areas.*

Soviet authorities undoubtedly intend to use the Moscow subway as well as subways in other cities aa air-raid shelters. It now appears well established that since5 they have been installing doors in the Moscow subway for air defense purposes. There is also evidence that some shelters have been provided in connection with theaters and railway stations.

On the basismall number of reports from the USSR some well confirmed it is believed that3 the USSR began the construction of heavy air-raid shelters at important economic enterprises. ew reports suggest that heavy shelters were also being provided for certain key Party and government facilities. ubstantial number of heavy shelters have been reported from Hungary, but the extent of the program in the USSR has been successfully hidden.

* See Figureollowing p. 5.

9- The precise extent of the Soviet shelter program is unknown-There is evidence that most state-owned housing of masonry construction built1 has included some provisionhelter area. In

addition, at indicated above, there are shelters in factories and in public buildings and installations. It is roughly estimated that existing shelters couldinimum ofillion toillion of the total urbanillion) and could provide at least partial protection. It is recognized, however, that the availability of shelter protection would depend on such factors as the time of day and the day of the week because these factors affect population location. In the light of recent Soviet civil defense instructions which stress the value of basement shelter even under atomic attack, it ia expected that the Russians will continue to build and improve these shelters. At the same time, it can be expected that the construction of other shelters, including heavy bunkers, will be continued for workers and certain vital facilities in essential industrial, transport, and communications activities and for Party and government personnel.

intelligence indicates thatumber ofSatellites certain civil defense preparations are well advanced.

In Hungary, for example, the extensive intelligence information gathered from interrogations following6 uprising revealed advanced civil defense preparations including compulsory civil defense training enforced by fines, the development of national guard type civil defense battalions, and the construction of heavy air-raid bunkers for the protection of personnel in major economic enterprises. There is also some evidence that these programs within the European Satellites are coordinated and guided by Soviet authorities. On the basis of known Satellite programs and their ties to the USSR, it is likely that certain activities discovered in the Satellites are also being carried on within the USSRore extensive basis than indicated by currently available intelligence.

adequacy of protection afforded by the shelterin the above paragraphs has not been analyzed in thisthis would require more detailed consideration of theof the shelters in association with such weapons variables

an yield, location and height of bursts, and meteorological conditions. Also, no attempt is made in this report to estimate the number of shelters that might survive nuclear attack, but any surviving shelters that might remain air-tight and equipped with adequate filteredwater, food, and medical supplies would substantially roduce casualties which might otherwise result from fall-out of radioactive particles. *

* See Figures Ztndollowing p. 5.

COHHDCMTIAL

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SKETCHILTER VENTILATING SYSTEMOVIET AIR-RAIDSSR Manual)

FILTER VENTILATING EQUIPMENT {From Soviet

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OF APARTMENT AIR-RAID SHELTERS IN THE USSR floor plan

CONSTRUCTION OF BOMB SHELTERS IN BASEMENT OF APARTMENT BUILDING,6

SECRET

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OF A SOVIET DETACHED AIR-RAID SHELTER6 USSR Manual)

DETACHED UNDERGROUND SHELTER

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DISCUSSION

A. Organization.

Hereinafter referred to gencrically aa civil defense.

The organization of Soviet local anti-air defense (MPVO)*the useorps of MPVO staff officers for planning andthe maximum use of existing governmental and economic facilities, organizations, and services for implementation; and the use of mass social organizations for the general training of the population in first aid and civil defense.

MPVO staff officers of the MVD function at all levels of An integral part of over-all Soviet Air Defenseivilhas been the responsibility of the Main Administration of Local Air Defensen arm of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD). (Recently there have been some changes in terminology in referring to civil defense offices. ) Subordinate to GUMPVO areat the republic level and MPVO staffs (Shtab MPVO) for rayons and cities. he MPVO staff of one medium-size Soviet city was described to include an MVD colonel in charge, MVD captains in charge of each city rayon (four innd another captain to supervise training. It is believed that officers with this type of assignmentspecial civil defense training, probably at an MPVO-MVD school known to exist in Leningrad. GUMPVO alsoentralResearch Laboratoryedical experimental plant.

At the city level the Soviet MPVO syatem relies heavily on the organizations in being to furnish the leadership and nuclei of operative civil defense services. Such organizations include the local police and fire departments, medical installations, and communal repair services.

These are organized in civil defense units which include Firo Defense, Emergency Engineering, Medical, Maintenance of Order and Security, Warning and Communications, Shelter and Cover, Blackout, Veterinary, and Decontamination Services. Auxiliary personnel are recruited to bring units to desired strength. If the city is divided into rayons,civil defense services are organized at this level.

It should be stated that the nominal head of each governmental or economic unit is also the responsible leader for civil defense. For example, the chairman of the city executive committee or the plant manager isivil defense commander. His chief of staff MPVO, however, is obviously the official supervising material preparations and training.

Principal enterprises (called national-economic installations) are evidently directly subordinate to city MPVO headquarters. They are organized for civil defense to include nearby workers' settlements. In residential buildings, and in schools and institutions, "self-defense" groups are formed. The dwelling manager or head of schools oris automatically the chief of MPVO and is responsible for organizing appropriate teams.

Both the PVO authorities and the MPVO have roles in theof new construction. It is known that the MPVO takes part in the peacetime function of town planning. It has been reported that PVO iaaues permits for new industrial sites with MPVO having the power to review plans. These functions are probably closely coordinated. each architectural planning trust employs an air defense specialist, and MVD officers have been observed inspecting basement air-raid shelters in new buildings. These measures enable air defense and civil defense authorities to influence the dispersion of plants and the provision of air-raid facilities in new construction.

18. The pattern of Soviet local air defense differs in concept from that of civil defense in the United States. To Western observers, one outstanding characteristic of Soviet civil defense hasack of publicity and easily visible evidences. ecently returned American correspondent said, "There is no overt civil defense program in Moscow such as exists in New York. " Other travelers comment on the absence of shelter signs and city-wide drills. These are valid observations. Civil defense training as described in open Soviet publications and in intelligence reports has so far taken place largely in factories andunits or within paramilitary groups in clubhouses or isolated areas.ew city blackout exercises, however, have recently been reported from several areas. ) The absence of shelter signs is readily explained by Soviet civil defense instructions which require the posting of signs upon receiving noticethreateningublicity for civil defense in the USSR is accomplished largely through paramilitary and Red Cross publications supplemented by civil defense instruction courses.

19- Second, it seems obvious that Soviet civil defense i6 under security restrictions. For example, although sketches of Soviet air-raid shelters are frequently included in civil defense publications, photographs are never found. Planning assumptions for civil defense have not been seen, nor have detailed operational instructions for specific areas or cities. Air-raid shelter plans, other than general schematics, have not appeared in the USSR. {From Hungary, however, we have recentlya book of instructions on the construction of air-raid shelters which was classified in that country. ) Mentions of civil defense staffs were not found in the Soviet press1nd the national MPVO offlce^nditsheadhavenotbcenODenly identified since World

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20- hird aspect, which may be linked with security, is the reticence on the part of Soviet authorities to reveal the possible scope of the effects of nuclear weapons on the general public. The USSR4 has guardedly released to the Soviet public some information regarding the effects of nuclear weapons. This has been accomplished through military and paramilitary publications and civil defenserather than through articles in the daily preaa. Although tho average Soviet citizen has not been fully informed, he has been assured that the USSR has effective active air defenses (PVO) and that the use of shelter will do much to reduce casualties in the event of atomic attack. He knows that fires can be started by nuclear weapons and that there ia also danger from radioactive contamination. The effect of the latter, he is instructed, can be reduced by the use of properly ventilated sheltera or by the use of gas masks and protective clothing. The Soviet citizen does not know the size of the blast damage areas that can be caused by the larger yield nuclear weapons. Neither does he know the area nor the possible persistency of radioactivity created by the hydrogen bomb-He has never boen introduced to an evacuation plan and may thus be spared reeducationhelter concept.

seems evident, at present, that Communistcontrol and do not intend to grant any mobility to the popu-

lation in the event of air attack. All known civil defense instructions advise the population under air attack to seek the nearest shelter, d'gging in if formal shelter ia not available. The average citizen must

remain in place, regardless of what happens, and cope with the local situation as best he can.

there has evidentlyriority system in theof air-raid shelter and defense organizations in the USSR. adaptable subways, few heavy shelters have been reported whichto the general population, who must rely principally onlight refuge areas in apartment basements or prepare field shelters

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in the event that formal shelter is not available. Recent reporting indicates that substantial shelters have been prepared forbuildings and large economic enterprises. Civil defense drills which have been observed have occurred principally in industrial units.

23. Finally, civil defense is centrally controlled by an office of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and civil defense service and training can be required of any USSR citizen. orld War II law, whosehas not been reported, made able-bodied citizens agedoiable to serve in civil defense assignments. ecent paramilitary conference, Marshal Konev called for the inclusion of the "whole Soviet population, withoutn preparation of the country for air defense, and Deputy Minister Tolstikov of the MVD announcedercent of the population had already beenivil defense anti-atomic training course. Although the figure may be somewhat inflated, particularly as it relates to rural areas and refers only to an elementary course, two more advanced courses are programed for the entire population and are scheduled for completion8 and

C. Civil Defense Construction.

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World War U.

The facilities used or adapted for air-raid shelters during World Warincluded railroad tunnels, mines, reinforced basements in public buildings, grain elevators, bunkers, aqueducts, ecwer pipes, and wine cellars. The inhabitants of Moscow sought refuge in the deeper Metro stations, and at nights the tunnels themselves were used ae shelters. An American correspondent notedeople were sleeping in the subway at ths time of the heaviest German raids and that subway stations were equipped with steel doors and air

Shelters were constructed for some government buildings, and there are persistent reportearge shelter under the Kremlin which couIdbereachea^romStahn'e officerivate elevator. TCe-eported that argesWflfTTo^fleoToflTcials had beenilometers north

of Kuybyshev, the city to which part of the Soviet government was evacuated during the war.

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hrushchev waa involved in ordering basement shelters in selected Moscow apartmentn

These shelters were located along the route generally tals in traveling between their work and suburban homes. The same source noted that new school buildings in Moscow and older government buildings were being equipped with basement shelters in thes.

29- Other reports relate that some Soviet citizens were able to take refuge in apartment house basements during World War II but that most dwellings had no cellars and in this case, the population dug trench-type air-raid shelters for themselves, some with earthen Articles in the Soviet paramilitary press recently noted that the tunnels of Stalingrad and the catacombs of Sevastopol', Odessa, and Kerch1 were useful as air-raid shelters during the war.

2. Shelter Planning.

30. In view of the security measures connected with Soviet civil defense, it is unlikely that information on the directivesthe program for shelter construction in the USSR will become available.

31. There are, however, indicationseneral planair-raid shelters in the USSR. 2 Sovieteference to "underground installationsin accordancepecial plan for protecting the populationof enemy attack." The manual, in the same paragraph,the conversion of existing cellars and basements as well as construction of field-type shelters. eturning prisoner ofin Sverdlovsk3 that basements with air locks and iron

doors were being provided in accordance with building regulations "wrthinthe scope" of new Soviet air-raid precaution legislation. hat in Khabarovsk all postwar building projects were^reguUted from the standpoint of air defense" and that air-raid

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shelters were constructed in basements. Additional reports from other areas note orders or rulings requiring basement shelters in new

3- Basement Shelter.

leading Soviet civil defense writer, P.hat the "extensive construction of shelters of the firstpresumably heavy bunkors, was not feasible and urgedbasements be adapted and simple cover constructed toalong with shelters of tho first category. Soviet0 seems to have stressed quantitatively the use

of basement-type shelters and simple cover (field-type shelters). 6 DOSAAF publication, Chto nado mat1 obadioactionykh veshchestvakh (What One Should Know About Poisonous and Radioactivetated that nto protect large groups of people in large cities, special shelters are being built or theof well-constructed, multistory buildings of masonry are being utilized.

of several articles published as earlyescribed basement shelters as follows:

"Air-raid shelters are specially equipped quarters, intended forpeople during air raids and during shelling by artillery. ule, shelters (usually set up inoffer sufficient protection from bomb fragments, artillery shells,bombs, and from fragments of building materials.

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"Each shelter has two entrances, which also serve as exits. One of these is the main exit, the other, theexit. Upersons may be accommodatedellar shelteron its size). The shelter has the following rooms: air locks at the entrances, compartments to shelter the population, air-purificationand toilets. Tho capacity of each compartment usually does not exceedersons, with eachdivided off by strong walls.

"The shelter is equipped withwiringentilating system for providing fresh air. If the outside air contains gases (in eventhemical attack by anir is admitted into the shelterpecial filter, which purifies the air. ufficient quantity of drinking water is kept stored in special containers.11

Other descriptions generally note that the shelter "should have" ceilings capable of resisting the weight of the upper parts of the building in case of cave-in.

34. Many repatriated German prisoners who were interrogated36 had worked on new masonry construction in the USSR. They described cellar shelters in masonry apartments at such varying locations as Sverdlovsk, Asbest, Pervoural'sk, and Revda in the Urals; Stalingrad on the Volga; and Kiev, Krasnopol'ye, and Stalino

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tKe Ukraine. Returning Japanese reported similar construction in

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Far Eastern cities. More recent information, including that obtained from Soviet defectors II has swelled the number of cities which are reporTeaTonavesomeoasements constructed for shelter purposes tond the number of reports of such construction to.

In the cities of Alma Ata, Revda, Chimkent, Asbest, Stalino, Stalingrad, and Sverdlovsk, one or more of the returnees gathered the impression or were told that all newly constructedwere built to contain air-raid shelters. This is probably an exaggerated impression inasmuch as some buildings have beenbuilt without basements, and in other cases shelter waafor in neighboring structures. Nevertheless, in several of these cities, observation accounts have been numerous enough to justify the assumption that shelters were generally provided.

Most basement air-raid shelters are said to have walla with thicknesses varying from aboutonches and with concrete

EO5nches thick. Gas-proof steel doorsouble, with

rs an air-lock betweenre common to the majority of reports,openings for ventilation. In most instances, filter ventilating

devices were not installed at the time of observation,werelassifiedintention may have been to install ventilation later usingthat crated ventilating devices

were recefWacmxTTtore^Tri^rafshkent shelters

Most Western observers, however, have supplied only negative information aa to the general existence of basement shelters in the USSR.

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mcnts they saw were not suitable for shelter purposes. They did note the characteristic heavy construction in new buildings and complex wall arrangements in basements. Several of the group believed thatceiling slabs,nches thick, were not strong enough for any substantial blast protection. They did not find the steel doors or report the ventilation openings common to many of the prisoner-of-war reports.

member of the group, however, reports havingapartment basements without invitation in Stalingrad andair-raid shelters which he described as cut up intoeet square, with walls and ceilingsnches thick and equipped with steel doors offset in such aa blast would blow out only oneime. This person madethat, "the fact that we saw this type of constructionStalingrad does not mean it was used only in that city. Atour hosts were more successful in keeping us on theand out of basements." Another member observedbasement air-raid shelters and steel doors in Kiev These facilities had poured concrete ceilings. He stated

that they appeared to be excellent bomb shelters.

actual discrepancy between most Westernon the one hand and reports of prisoners of war on themay consist largely of differing definitions of an air-raid"normal-type" basement reported by Western observers asprovided is characterized by normal depth; heavy walls,inches thick;oncrete slabnches thick. of average basement walls constructed in the USSRwhat is considered normal in Western design standards

40. The prisoners of war, exceptew cases, haveas an air-raid shelter "special" basements, at no greater than normal depth, with wallsonches thick andnches thick. The prisoners of war identified the purpose of the facilities by having seen plans, by having been told by Soviet authorities that they were to be used as air-raid shelters, or by having noted identifying special shelter characteristics such as steel doors, escape tunnels, or filter-ventilating devices. In some cases, prisoners of war have described such special basements without identifying them asshelters by merely referring to them as "basement to be used as air-raidrisoner-of-war sources have occasionallythe value of such special basements but have also reported that Soviet authorities were convinced that they furnished good

If this similarity between Western reports of "normal basements" and repatriate reports of "basement shelters" in reality refers to similar structures, it explains references to basements and basement shelters which sometimes appear interchangeable in interrogation reports and Soviet defense literature. ecently received MPVO manual, in fact,ketchasement shelter with no stronger first floor (or basement ceiling) indicated than are other floors of the building.

An improbable alternative to this reconciliation in terms of reporting is that basement shelters have been prepared only in some areas and that these are localities which happen to have been visited

A second alternative which might be examined is thatof basement shelters took place extensively in the USSR dur* ing the principal time of prisoner-of-war observation 93 but that construction of special basements was then greatly reduced. Arguments for this theory include less frequent reportingack of current observation by Westerners,ossible awareness on the part of the Soviet authorities that the power of modern weapons makes basement shelter appear inadequate. Opposed to this theory would be the continuing insistence in Soviet instruction issued7 that basement shelters are the best means of mass protection against modern weapons, good evidence that several Europeanhave been following the Soviet lead in providing basement shelters during new construction, and occasional reports from the USSR to this date that such shelters are being built. If, indeed, suspension ofshelter construction were the case, the more alarming possibility would arise that the Soviet authorities have changed their program in order to provide heavier and more effective shelters similar to the heavy bunkers and tunnel types reported by Hungarian refugees.

The most plausible explanation, at this time, is believed to be that the reported program initiatedrobably by civil defense authorities, called for the inclusion of basements adaptable as air-raid shelters in most new masonry buildings. These have been, and in the main continue to be, provided. These basements arein varying stages of completion, some being fully equipped and ventilated, others having little more than hermetic steel doors and roughed-in ventilation openings, while someuch as those seen in early stages of construction by Westerners have only the basic compartment walls in place.

It is apparent that, in any case, the majority of these housing shelters are modest in strength and that without reinforcement they might not answer even the basic requirement stated earlier that they should be

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able to withstand building collapse. Nevertheless the use of basement shelters would reduce casualties in areas of light blast damage.

46. No definitive estimate can be made of the number of fully prepared basement shelters in the USSR. If. however, some provision has been made to provide adaptable basements or basement shelter in most new apartment buildinghen roughlyoercent of the urban population now have this type of refuge. This figure could rise to as much asercent by the end In calculating theof the suburban population which could be protected by basement shelters, it is not possible toreakdown indicating the number of people who could be accommodated by various types of shelterhat ia, basements adaptable as shelters, developed baacment shelters with an average roof cover ofnches, and the heavier basement shelters which are sometimes reported.

4. Public Shelters.

plan to use theshelter purposes. Adequate closures and ventilation safe fromare, of course, necessary. Some stations were equippeddoors during World War II, and more have probably beenthen.occasionally noted shielded construc-

tion going onin^uDwa^^taTiORS.

One returning American official feels quite definitely that doors were being installed in the Moscow subway5 Intations which he examined he found construction strongly suggestive of such installation. Work was not actually observed and apparently was

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carried on during the night. In locations, usually at the top and bottom of escalators or occasionally in other locations where the pedestrian passages narrowed, he feltontinuing effort was going on toclosures which would afford protection to the lower station levels. The most prevalent type of construction strongly indicated that doors were being installed which would slide into the walls, and in one or two instances he was able tolimpseeries of roller hangings installed at the top of the opening. When finished, the opening in the arch was covered by an ornamental grill, and what appeared torack in the floor was covered with loose boards, diamond steel plate, an asphalt-like substance or loosely laid tiles. Other sources have reported similar construction at additional stations. estern visitor noting boarded-up construction at the bottomubway escalator6 was toldoviet acquaintance that "they were buildingdoors* M

The new Lenin Hills extension of the Moscow subway, originally planned to run under the Moscow river, is now to be built over the river. Considerations leading to this change in plan may be the reduced cost of surface construction or some special engineering difficulty. The continued installation of doors in older subway stations, however, seems to indicate that Soviet authorities still intend to make it available for shelter purposes.

The Leningrad subway has also impressed Westerners with its potentiality for useeep-level, mass air-raid shelter. One American reported recently that theeningrad stations are quite large in area and that each could accommodate many times the number of people that could be placedoscow or New York City subway station.

Other subways have been reported in the USSR. One in Kiev has evidently been under constructionumber of years.

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It is probably still incomplete. Another subway is under construction in Tbilisi. ubway in Baku has recently been reported by two sources. One stated, "It was widely rumored that partially completed subway tunnels in Baku had been prepared as shelters. 4ubway construction had been discontinued for unspecified reasons." Four fenced entrances were reported to which access was forbidden.

Reports of other public shelters are few in number. etached shelter of strength comparable to the basement sheltersby prisoners of war was illustrated in the6 civil defense manual,ew of these have been reported built. They are covered with aboutnches of earth. One photographhelter of this type in Riga has been received.

Sizable railway station shelters have been reported from the European Satellites, and two reports have recently been receivedhelter under the Yerevan railway station in the USSR.

5. Party and Government Shelter,

is believed that since World War II most new Partybuildings were equipped with basement air-raid shelterstime of construction. Inew Party building with aconcrete basement was completedartyin Kiev completed8 was reported tooublereports have been receivedhelter-equippedcompleted3 at Degtyarka. One report estimatedshelter wouldersons. at Shakhty and Revda34 allegedly werebasement shelters. asement shelters haveinstalled in government buildings and militarysuch widely separated places as Krasnopol'ye, Tallin, Baku,Voroshilovgrad, and Khabarovsk. Recent reports tell of

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shelters in Ri buildings in Yerevan.

heavy basements under government

Fewhese reports aret it is highly probable that Party and government of/ices have been among the first to be provided with air-raid shelters. Similar reports of government shelters in the European Satellites add credence to Soviet reports.

published accounts of construction ofshelters outside Moscow, combined with reports ofshelters near one Satellite capital, make it probableprotected alternate control centers have been prepared in

Offices and Quarters.

the body charged with supervising civil defensein the USSR, and consistent with its mission of maintainingthe MVD has received special consideration in beingair-raid shelters. The MVD headquarters in Moscow hasbeen reported to have particularly deep and heavy shelterbuilding. In Tallin, the capital of the Estonian SSR, work wasin progress3 to build basement shelters within buildings used by the armed forces* statemilitia, however, basement shelters were reported to beready. MVD barracks, officers' quarters, fireand the like have been reported from various cities toshelters.

preparation of basement air-raid shelters inwas initiated before World War U. Postwar reporting on the

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construction of such shelters comee from Tashkent. Revda. Karaganda Khabarovsk. Asbest, and Sverdlovsk. The shelters are apparently similar to other Soviet basement shelters, although some are reported to have heavier roofs than thenches of concrete cover. features include gas-tight steel doors, ventilation shafts, and, in some instances, escape tunnels. Dates of construction vary from the end of World War II Although reporting is limited to schools observed during construction by prisoners of war. some of these locations arc partially confirmed by being described by more than one source.

ft. Communications Protection.

58. The USSR has made some progress in reducing theof its communications system by developing microwave relay networks and increasing radio capabilities. It has also built someradiobroadcasting facilities and is constructing underground long line cables.

59- Information from the European Satellites indicates that some radiobroadcasting stations and long-line terminals there have been placed underground,ungarian refugee reports having been told of underground radio stations in the USSR. An eyewitness description of an underground Soviet radio jamming station has been receivedompetent Western observer. This massivelystation near Moscowuildingstories below ground, the portions above ground being of heavy construction and having concrete wallseet thick. The first below-ground floor in the larger building contained transmitters; the second, cooling and air conditioning equipment; and the third, generators and maintenance shops. Sires of the buildings were estimated toyeet,yeet, both painted with camouflage colors. Reports ofbroadcasting facilities and auxiliary telecommunications centers

in several Satellites make it probable that more of such installations have been constructed in the USSR.

9. Industrial Shelters.

in industrial plants are reported to have beenin moreozen Soviet cities. There is no reason tothat the existence of these is exceptional. Considering thefor developing and protecting an industrialudgment that the Soviet authorities would provideworkers in important industrial plants. The construction ofenterprises has been ordered in several Satellite nations. Many

MlbUli>2SYrs heavy shelters for industry have been reported by refugee sources to

Hungary.

said thatercent casualties among the general population in Hungary were expected by civil defense planners, whereas onlyercent casualties were anticipated among industrial workers.

One Soviet plant, known to have constructed postwarshelters, is located in as remote an area as Magadan. In thisasement shelter was built The secondetached underground structure, was built3 This is described aseet underground, with cinder block walls aboutnches thick andeinforced concrete roofeet thick, "Labyrinthine" entrances were at either end of the shelter. The size of the shelter is remarkable inasmuch as it could accommodateersons by Soviet standards. The plant was estimated toorkers.

Another confirmed underground bunker was built next to the administration buildingank plant in Khabarovsk. estern visitor has reported seeing air-raid sheltersoscow aviation plant There is good evidence that heavy air-raid shelteris presently being carried on in Soviet industry.

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63. The precise extent of the Soviet shelter program is There is evidence that most state-owned housing of masonry construction built1 has included some provisionhelter area. In addition, there are shelters in factories and in publicand installations. It is roughly estimated that existing shelters couldinimum ofillion toillion of the total urbanillion) and could provide at least partial It is recognized, however, that the availability of shelterwould depend on such factors as the time of day and the day of the week because these factors affect population location. In the light of recent Soviet civil defense instructions which stress the value of basement shelter even under atomic attack, it is expected that the Russians will continue to build and improve these shelters. At the same time, it can be expected that the construction of other shelters, including heavy bunkers, will be continued for workers and certain vital facilities in essential industrial, transport, and communications activities and for Party and government personnel.

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