NUABVo the jolv (Reference title:
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
national defense qf the united static wtthin the meaning of the espionage lav^sc.he transm^s'
-3 SBate:. By:
The Post-Stalinomestic and Foreign
Miscarriages In The Newhe Malenkov Government's
Heavy vh. Light
Confusion In The
A New Tone To
Economic Readjustment In
Continuation Of The Agricultural
Revision Of Agricultural
The Search For New Economic
"Collective Leadership" Afterromotions And
The Kbrushchev-Bulganin Visit To
Xt was originally Intended to begin ttaiB study at the point where Caesar XI, Resignation of Malenkov, left off. It seemed to the author as Tie progressed, however, that It would be useful to go over some of the chronological ground covered in the earlier study for two reasons: in order to Introduce Information rotating to malenkov's demotiononly subsequently, and in order to provide some perspectiveiscussion of policy changes undertaken in the months after It will be seen, that points already discussed in considerable detail In earlierfor instance, the numerous changes in governmentarty appointments made between the time of Stalin's death and malenkov's resignation and thecircumstances of the lattertreated here only sketchily or not at all. On these points the reader is referred to Caesar chapters Nos. 2, 0
FROM THE JANUARY PLENUM TO THE JULY)NTECEDENTS AND AFTERMATH OF MALENKOV'S RESIGNATION FROM THE PREMIERSHIP
The5 plenum of the party central committee and the Supreme Soviet session which followed in February marked the endhase in Soviet policy as well as in the political relationships developed after Stalin's death. At that point the two factors, power and policy, werelinked. Malenkov's "resignation" denoted hisin the struggle for political dominance which had gone on uninterruptedly among Stalin's successors, but it was, at the sameevice for demonstrating publicly and emphatically that important parts of the New Course, with which Malenkov's name was commonly linked, had been scrapped. The ritual of political penance was surroundedtrident propaganda campaign against the consumer goods heresy which, byicture in blacks and whites, tended, perhaps deliberately, to conceal the complexity of the policywith which the regime was confronted and the sources of personal rivalry within the party presidium.
Given the immensity of Stalin's power, it would have been remarkable if "collective leadership"oherent body of policies capable of advancing the regimeand abroad had emerged instantly in The period which followed almost inevitablyertain amount of trial and error. By the endumber of policy difficulties had developed and there had arisen within the partyaction with the power to insist on change. Thereafter, however, though certain of the remedies applied under Malenkov were discarded as fruitless orand the reins were taken out of his hands, thelaid down by the regime continued to testify to athat Stalin's personal despotism had been buried with him, and that the political and economic system which he had set up in the Soviet empire, together with the popular attitudes which it had engendered, needed reform. Though later events were to show that many serious problemsor that new ones had been created, by the timeh party congress opened inhe regime seems to have felt many of the solutions it was seeking had been found and that it was well on the way to overcoming its Stalinist heritage.
Tho Post-Stalinomestic ami Foreign Setting
The view of the USSR's strategic position which shaped the broad lines of post-Stalin policy had already emerged ath party congress in It appeared in Stalin's last theoretical pronouncement,Problems of Socialism in the USSR, which recognized an ebb in the tlcTo of Communist territorial expansion and diminishing likelihood of the immediate overthrow of capitalism through subversion or armed aggression. It seems likely, however, that Stalin's successors knew only in general terms where they wanted to go. Once the danger of publicgainst which tho new regime hadin its first communique, had passed, the firstof business was to agree on and put Into practice some arrangement for the exorcise of the enormous powers which had been concentrated almost solely in Stalin's hands. Thisrerequisite to the launchingew Course designed to release the "hidden reserves" In the Soviet economic machine and its humanwhich had been held back underto create newfor the USSR in the international arena. But group rule had only the dimmest prospects until something was done to eliminate the terror factor from the political equation. By executing Beria and clipping the wings of tho political police, tho collective leaders hoped to freofrom the greatest hazard of political Intercourse among themselves (which, in the "Doctor'sevised toward the end of Stalin's life, threatened to produce a', new purge) and, at tho sameeform ofattitudes by offering to end Stalin's undeclared war against his own peoplo.
This withdrawal from primary reliance on enforcedat home had its analogy elsewhere in the bloc, in an attempt to elaboratoew Soviet-satellitein which economic dependence and ideologicalwere intended to substitute partly for directcontrol and the cement of Stalin's unique
However, the departure of Stalin from the scene and the reduction-ln-grade of the police apparatus on which he had relied so heavily, arge gap to be filled. Despite the citations of precedent and dogma, the question of how, in direct, everyday terms, power was to be shared within the leading group and of how and through which channels consent to tho collective will was to be obtained, remained to bo workod out in practico. The working out promoted personal
rivalries and political ln-fighting at the top as well
as sone Jurisdictional confusion between the frequently
over-lapping organizations of the party and the
lllkoyan toldh party congress that after the previous congress2 "certain ossified forms of ourerend "the loading collective body of the partyew, fresh course,igh policy of high principles, active and elastic, maintainedalm level, without abuses, proceeding from Lonin's firm injunctions on the peaceful coexistence of countries with different social Although the beginnings of the "peaceful coexistence" campaign can be traced back to about the time ofh partyas Mikoyan does here, Stalin's death, nearly six months later, gave the successor regime an opportunity, which It readily grasped, to push aheadew footing. Malenkov took the first step, in one of the earliest public statements of the new regime, when he told the USSRSoviet on "There isingle controversial or unsettled question which could not bo solved by peaceful means on the basis of the mutualof the Interested countries." The first important result of this profession was the Korean armistice, on which negotiations were reopened in3 on terms rejected by Stalinxchange of prisoners).
In general, the objective of this policy was, first of all, to reduce International tension and the strain placed on the Soviet bloc from the dangerous level of the Korean war and to ease the Soviet Union out of the hardened positions of the cold war, positions which allowed little room for maneuver and had had the effect of promotingin the non-Communist world. Its assumption was that, with the removal of the cement of common danger, built-in rivalries would soon destroy the structure of non-Communist alignments. By setting in motion the divisive forces ospied ath party congress, the USSR hopod, in the short term, to prevent the Integrationearmed Western Germany in tho Western alliance; its longer rango objective was to isolate the United States from its major allies, and, thus, to rupture the whole fabric of Western defease.
But, while it strove to appear more conciliatory, the regime did not relinquish Its claims of strength, lest the West conclude that it was leading from weakness. rincipal purpose of the "peaceful coexistence" campaign
was probably to promote acceptance of the notion of mutual nuclear deterrence and thus toafeguard behind which the USSR could move to encourage and exploitin the outside world while pursuing domesticwith fuller concentration. The two facets of this thinking, which has been called "peace at noore displayed at the3 session of the Supreme Soviet when Malenkov announced that the Soviet Union hadydrogen weapon while, at the same time, "If today, in conditions of tension in international relations, the North Atlantic bloc is rent by internal strife and contradictions, the lessening of this tension may lead to its disintegration.**
Presumably, then, the regime expected to drawadvantagesoreign policynewpart from these, however, it had set itself objectives at home which could probably best be pursued in an atmosphere of International detente. However it defined the problom, the regime must have realized (perhaps well before Stalin's death) that the material and manpower resourcos for further primitive forced-draft industrialization were running short and that the Soviet economy waseriod in which the overcentrallzed, highly bureaucratized, and inefficient Stalinist organization of production could not be expected to promote continued rapid Industrial growth. In the faceeveloping manpower shortage and Increased attention to agriculture, it was becoming difficult to maintain the industrial growth rateesired level in theSoviet manner, simply by pouring additionaland material resources into the economy. The purpose of post-Stalin economic policy, under Halonkov and after, has been somehow to find a cure for the sore spot of low productivity and inefficiency In agriculture and to find new sources of growth in the rationalization
of the economic structure and inbe achieved by stirring theof historpor, by appeal to hisandimprovement.*
Miscarriages in the New Course
THe "Malenkov Government's Foreign
The threads of the Soviet Union's domestic andcross and recross so that it is not reallyto untangle the two. In the program whichthe nearly two years of Malenkov's premiership, the focus seems to have been mainly inward. Itbeen one of the shortcomings of the New Course thatto enjoy the fruits of detente before detenteassured.
ost-Malonkov statement on one aspect of this problem, and evidence of its persistence, appeared in Prayda onanuary Denying that the6 plenum was symptomatic of economic difficulties, Pravda asserted: "The point /of the plenum's decisions/ isetreat,ovementlevel of economic development. Inapid growth rate is made possible not only, or so much, by big new investments, but rather by better use. of existing production possibilities,ore rational organization of the job corresponding to the present stage in the building of Communism."
The slogan of "peaceful coexistence" was given some concrete meaning in the Korean armistice and in the Indo-Chlna settlement, and some progress was made toward easing the suspicion with which the non-Communist world viewed the Soviet Union. Under the phrase "normalization ofautious beginning was made toward healing the breach withbreach which, in Stalin's last years, had bo-come wider and wider and had finally led Tito to seekwith Greece and Turkey. In numerous smallerby lowering somewhat the cultural barrier between East and West, and by emerging from the shadows of theregime, besides putting on display the new model of Communist leadership, sought to demonstrate that it was not cast in the same forbidding mold as Stalin.
However, when compared with the gambits attemptedfter Malenkov'sSoviet disarmament proposals ofhe Austrian treaty, the Belgrade reconciliation, and the Summitstepscautious and tentative.
AC ff icial_ as
described the policy ol the Malenkov interregnumpro-gramlesshich led to the loss of the "spirit of attack." Having discarded certain features of Stalinist policy, he argues, the Malenkov government's failure toa substituteprogram gave the impressioneneral retreat on all fronts. This was particularlycontinues, In the concept of peaceful coexistence which, to him, seemed to Involve nothing moreeriod of rest during which the Soviet state reorganized itself Internally. We are, of course, dealing here with general impressions. It does seem to be true, nevertheless, that the Malenkov government, while striving to appear morethan Stalin's, took few.risks in the international arena and, by the endas in danger of losing the initiative. Perhaps Malenkov labored, throughout hisunder certain impediments: presumably, he was obliged from the beginning to defend himself against theof his rivals in the presidium and thus unable to establish unequivocally his own line; there is also some reason to infer that Malenkov, through temperament or leaned more toward discretioness confident view of things than Khrushchev (cf. Malenkov'sith respect to the possibility of mutual nucleartruction). In anyeeling that Soviet foreign policyew edge and drive may well have figured in the change of management in It seems to be what Khrushchev had in mind when he complainedoreigner after Malenkov's resignation that the latter had not been"strong" in his foreign policy.
It is not unlikely that general dissatisfaction with the drift of international events was sharply accented, justore Malenkov's resignation, by the realizationrime objective of Sovietdenial to the Westernof the strengthearmed Westernon the verge of defeat. Unquestionably, Germany figured large in Soviet thinking, not only because of the memories of the two world wars which it evoked, but also because its weight was crucial in the European balance of power. Ratification of the Paris accords by the French assembly in
which cleared away the last real hurdle to West Gormanpresented Soviet diplomacy with one of Its most serious setbacks in the postwar period and added annew ingredient to the strategic picture.
We have no evidence that Malonkov was over called to account for this development. Neither in his resignation letter nor in the available summary of the centralexplanatory circular was this point raised. it was veryontributory, if indirect, cause of his resignation in that It forced the regime to look to its defense position and drew attention to theproblems which were then facing the Sovietuggestion of this appeared in Khrushchev's interview with the Hearst group inhen ho complained that "Churchill and Dulles by positions of strength do notalance of power but rather that one position should be stronger than another In order to enforce its will on the other side." This, he continued, "led to an armaments race with all its dangers and unfortunate economicho point appearedear later when Khrushchevoreign diplomat that Malonkov's demotion had been accompanied by certain economic adjustments, which, he implied, had been stimulated by Western agreement on German rearmament.
Economic Problems at Home
The New Course was conceivedevice for putting new momentum into the Sovlot economy and for drawing popularto the new regime. From its starting point andpromise to raise the output of consumer goods and, thus, tho Soviet living standard substantially "within two or threehe program ledumbor of expedients to the discovery that it hadhole series of unforeseen problems. Within less than two years its most conspicuous elements were discarded, and with them the man who was most nearly the public symbol of its original Tho public was encouraged to believe that the New Course had to go because it had come into conflictasic axiom of Sovlot economic theory, the primacy of heavy industry, but thisropagandists oversimplification of the problem and, In any case, dealt with results not causes. The New Course failed because, at the outset, it overestimated tho capacity and resllionce of the Soviet economy, especially itssector, because It tended to intensify competition for scarce material and manpower resources, because it createdand operative confusion among Soviet cadres, and because, by stimulating expectations which It was, in the end, unable to fulfill, it threatened to damage rather than to strengthen popular morale.
Tho New Course expected to find "new productionprimarily by arousing the "material interest" of the urban worker and the peasant. The goals of raising the production of consumer goods and Increasing agricultural output woro interdependent. An increased flow of consumer goods was Intended to stimulate agricultural production which, in turn, would provide the foodstuffs andraw materials on which increased consumption largely de-ponded.*
Increased output of consumer goods appears to have been achieved, in practice, by giving lightigher priority in the allocation of materials, byof production in certain heavy industries, byfrom state reserves and inventories, by someIn imports to be financed largely from gold reserves, but, primarily, through the expansion of light industry plants on the basis of Increased state investment. Thewas that, according to Soviet statistics,3or the first time7 (when heavy industry was still under reconstruction) the output of consumer goodsat very nearly the same rate as the output of
Measures were introduced to give the consumer the wherewithal for the purchase of the promised consumer goods by raising his money income. 3 the state loan was scaled down by one half and the annual cut in retail prices on consumer goods was twice as large as those put intoin the previous seven years. The peasant, who was so vital to tho success of the New Course, was given additional financial concessionseduction of tho tax on the private plot, the cancellation of tax arrears, and theof obligatory delivery norms and Increased procurement pricos on those commodities whose output tho government especially wanted to encourage.
*Agrlculturo is estimated to provide tho basis for about throo fourths of Soviet consumption.
figuresate of increase in both categories of approximatelyercent 4 the rate of growth in heavy industry was approximatelyercent and in light Industry, approximatelyercent.
Besides offering the peasant the inducement of more consumer goods and financial relief, the government attacked the agricultural problem by increasing its investments in that sector. or example, it was planned to capital investment in agriculture from the budget toillion rubles from theillion rubles allocated in
The measures taken by the regime in Augustncouraged the peasant to increase the output of vegetable and livestock products on his private plot and thus lifted partially the threat to the plot glimpsed in Stalin's Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR. Si-multaneously, however, stops were taken To strengthencontrol over agriculture from the center bythe Machine Tractor Stations, the government's main lever in the collective farm economy, and by increasing party authority in the countryside. These Included atoechanical engineers to the MTS's, to install in each ofroup of party instructors, and to send into the MTS's and collective farms upwardsgronomists and other technicians.
As laid out by Khrushchev at tho3 plonum of the central committee, the immediate aim of theprogram was to raise the output of livestock products, potatoos, vegetables and fruit, primarily by reliance onmeasureseans of raising yields. At this stago, agricultural policy was not only consistent with, it was an Integral part of, the New Coursehole. It seems to have assumed, however, that there was no urgency to the problem of insuring an adequate grain supply. This wasby Malenkov at the3 Supreme Soviet session when he asserted: "Our country has plenty of grain." spoke in somewhat the same sense, though with an added caveat, when he told the central committee in September: "We are in general satisfying the country's noed for grain crops, in the sense that our country is well supplied with bread. We have the necessary state reserves and arewheatimited scale." Agricultural procurements3 proved, however, to be at the lowest level in the Fifth Flve-Year planndew months the estimate of grain needs had been sharply revised. Khrushchev informed
This fact was not revealed6
the4 central committee plenum that "the level of grain production so far has not mot all theof the nationalnd therewith launched the "new lands" program which called initially for0 acres of the area sown to grain. The goal was extended in40 acres.
In his interview with the British scientist John Bernal (published in laten the eve of Halenkov'shrushchev tended to minimize the differences between himself and Malenkov over agricultural policies. He said:
"Thereot of talk abroadeemingbetween the statements by J. V. Stalin ath party congress and by G. U. Malenkov ath party congress about the grain problem In our country having been solved and the decisions of the latest plenary meetings of the central committee of the CPSU which point to the need for Increasing grain production and expanding the grain areas In virgin lands. Actually there is no contradiction here. J. V. Stalin and G. M. Malenkov were quite right when they said we had enough grain to assure bread for the population. Our country was satisfying its bread requirements. Wo have enough of it now, too, and we have tho necessary reserves. But man does not live by bread alone. It is precisely otherof man that Indirectly demand an increase in grain production."
More recontly, however, Khrushchev has alluded on severalto misgivings among certain of his presidium colleagues over the "new lands" scheme, and, since tho June plenume has explicitly cited Malenkov for opposition on these grounds. It is doubtful, however, if the differences botween them wore across tho board.
It has been suggested (most recently by Party Secretary Belyayev, following the removal of Malenkov from the presidium) that Malenkov and Khrushchev differed,atter of principle, on the lssuo of increased yields as against expanded acreageeans of solving the agricultural problem. This, again,to be an oversimplification for propaganda purposes. Halenkov's resignation letter took care to ropresent thotaxey measure for raising yields in the oldor cultivated areas, as party rather than personal policy, and this measure continued in force after his removal. Moroover,
Khrushchev has recognized on more than one occasion,and private, that extensive cultivation isong-term panacea for Soviet agriculture. Inold an agricultural conference:
In order to increase grain production up to the necessary amounts under the existing distribution of crops it is necessary to raise the yields sharply and for this it is necessary to Increase fertilizer production by several times, which requires enormous capital investments in the chemical industry.
But we can achieve this aim evenhorter period of time and with small expenditures of funds, if we pay particular attention to corn.
In the sameoreign diplomat reported thediscussion on agriculture with Khrushchev In
/Knrushchev7 said he was pleased by the good harvest Tn the virgin lands, which meant that Soviet grain requirements for the year were satisfied. However, Khrushchev expressed the view that extensivewas no answer for the long-term needs of theeconomy andeal effort would have to be made re intensive cultivation. This would require fertilizers and the USSR had insufficient fertilizers and not enough factories to manufacture fertilizers. Khrushchev said he hoped something could be done about this, but that the Soviets couldn't do everything at once.*
But, however, the "new lands" program waswhetherget-rich-quick" scheme which could strengthen the political hand of its backers, oreasible stepsolution of the ood possibility that it was the subject of serious debate in the presidium. It might have been anticipated that it would
*The regime's continued interest in increased yields wasin plans to double production of chemical fertilizers under the 6th FYP.
superimpose on the New Course substantial additionalfor financial means, machinery andnd that it might (as, in fact, it did) setompetition for resources which would endanger the New Course'sgoals, it is possible to suppose, knowing what we do about Khrushchev's temperament, that he came tothe agricultural program as more or less his own private campaign and to make more and more insistentfor the means to fulfill It. ossible clue to his thinking was his statement to the Hearst party that "the development of livestock farming is impossiblethe development of heavy industry, which supplies tractors, agricultural machines, etc. tond,omewhat differentesterner reported him as saying in6 "that the emphasis onprogress and productivity of labor was in part dueesire to halt the flow of labor from thetond "that the alternative of continuing the present rate of increase of plant capacity would have necessitated an increase in the industrial labor forceesultant drain from agriculture."
It is notherefore, that as Khrushchev's strength in the presidium Increased he came into personal conflict with Malenkov over how available resources were to be distributed and that the issue came to be drawn for the purposes of political debate in terms of the relative priorities of investment and consumption. This helps toperhaps, why. In resigning, Malenkov was forced to assume responsibility for difficulties in agriculture.
Heavy vs. Light Industry
he basis5 allocations it has been estimated that "the effect of the new lands program on the agriculturalhas been to increase capital investment by about one third and to increase the operational expenditures of the Machine Tractor Stations by about one fourth." With respect to manpower.
a Soviet source states that, "Already in the first half4 the number of workers in agriculture (Machine Tractor Stations and state farms) increasedver the first half"
There Is some reason to suppose that the New Course, .as first outlined by Malenkov, was really designed to do no more than itis,oncentrated, short-term
effort, to correct the "disproportion" between the output of producer and consumer goods, not to deprive heavyof its longer term priority. If this is the case, Malenkov can be taken at face value in his3 speech when he Indicated that he foresaw no conflict In priorities:
Until now It has been impossible to expand the" light and food Industries at the same rato as heavy industries. At the present time we can, and thorefore are obliged to speed up lightwith the aimore rapid improvement in tho material and cultural well-being of thee will expand with all means the hoavye must always remember that heavy Industry is the foundation of foundations of our socialist economy, because without its expansion there cannot be assured the further development of light industry, the growth of tho potential of agriculture and theof the defense ability of our country.
In this he was echoed by'bis presidiumt was assumed, or hoped, apparently, that tho Soviet economy was capable,eriod of two or three years, of increasing sharply tho output of consumer goods while heavy Industry continued to expand substantially, thoughomewhat slower rate than in the immediate foregoing period.**
Khrushchev, ins follows; "Our mosttask in the immediate future, is, without weakening our attention to the development of hoavy industry, tho foundation of foundations of the Soviet economy, toharp upsurge of agriculture, to increase sharply tho production of consumer goods, to supply the population in the next two or throe years with sufficient industrial products and to raise decisively the living f the workers."
Strumilin put it this way: "To raise the level of consumption of the workersercent evenears could be considered all tho greater an accomplishment in that it would notignificant retardation even in the genoral growth of the means of
Some of the increased output of consumer goods was evidently intended to be at the expense of heavy industry.or example, heavy Industry was to receiveercont of total state investments as comparedndercont, respectively, in35 plan, while tho share of the light, food, and localroseercent3ercentlan, falling back toercent in5 plan. Inortion of the investments in heavywere to be used for the production of consumer goods. In the main, however, the increased investment in lightwas to be achievedharp increase in total investment rather than through cuts in heavy industry's share.
Some of the means for this increased investment was probably to come from the general growth of the economy, and from discontinuation of some of the investment-hungry "great Stalinist projects." An additional source may have been sought in some reduction in the shareajorto production, defense. This is suggested by tho fact that explicit defense expenditures4 were plannedevelercent below3 plan, although totalfrom tho budget was to Increase byercent. It is, of course, risky to draw conclusions in termB of the ovor-all Soviet defense picture from this kind of data, sinco direct allocations to the Ministry ofthrough the budget account for only part of tho total defense outlay. Nevertheless, the shift ofiewed together with the progress of arrangements for West German rearmament and the elovation of Marshal Zhukov to the post of defense minister, suggests that defense considerationsajor part in theof economic policy which preceded Malenkov's ouster.
Increased investment under the Now Course and thoin Income of workers and peasants which resulted from the government's fiscal policies, added to the need to halt the flow of manpower from the countryside, enlarged theof labor productivity. Unless the Increase In labor productivity kept pace with the increase in the wage fund the state savings needed for increased investment could not be accumulated. In fact, however, labor productivity failod to increase at the expected rate. It grow byercent4 and at the end of tho year was well behind
the schedule set In the Fifth Five-Year Plan.* In an effort to fulfill its production goals the government was forced to resort to the expedient of increasing the labor force beyond its intentions.
The problem was complicated by the fact that thegoods goals were not fully met, largelyufficient increase in agricultural output did notand, consequently, purchasing power ran ahead ofsupply. The effect of the government's policies was thus to increase demand before it was able to provide the consumer goods to meet it and, therefore, to vitiate the incentive element in its program. 5 with a foreign .diplomat in. Moscow,, Khrushchev reportedly criticized Malenkov directly on this score,that he had "created demands in the Soviet people without having created the capacity for satisfyinguch the same point was made by Kaganovich, who remarkedestern diplomat that "itistake to raise the standard of living too quickly as this producedand lack of discipline among the population." But, though It had failed to meet its goals, tEe program hadhad the further undesirable effect ofrain on stateondition which Bulganin, in his first speech as premier, said could not be allowed.
Confusion in the Ranks
Towards the endpparently, there was aof perplexity as to the regime's aims andJ haseet-'
ing of ideologists andMos-
cow in "When the subject of relative stress on light and heavy industry came up for_ thereituation amounting to 'bourgeois* with every man expressing his own interpretation of the party position. It was complete disorder and the first
to Soviet statistics, labor productivity Increased onlyercent foreriod, whereas realercent. From the point of view of theelation between these rates of growth isunfavorable, because it tends to constrict the surplusfor investment and hence the rate of growth of the Soviet economy.
stepight-winge stressed thatclear directives must be Issued by the partyentral Issue like that of economic policyommunist state."
It was said again and again, once the full-scaleof "rectification" was begun in that the regime had always based its policy on the primacy of- heavy Industry. trictly literal sense, this was true. Malenkov's statement on this point in his keynote speech of33 emained as tho official position throughout the New Course. Nevertheless, the relatively high consumption targets, by virtue of their novelty and the very heavy emphasis they received in must have seemed to many to be the core of the New
Once the regime concluded that it had overreachedin the New Course, the false hopes which had been raised had to be put down and it chose to do so, typically, by calling out the hobgoblin of ideological deviation. Suitable targets were found in the personsumber of economists who had come,through the opening in thefront to propose that (in Khrushchev's words to the5 plenum)articular stage of socialist construction the development of light Industry can and must overtake all other branches of industry."
It remains an open question to what extent the errant economists bad become Involved in the tug-and-pull among high-ranking figures. It is possible that some of them at least had merely tried to find theoretical groundwork for what they supposed was approved policy, and that their greatest sin was failure to foresee an Impending change in line. Indeed, until the consumer goods line seemed to be still intact, though there had been some signs of wavering in earlier months. One of the earliest of these signs was an article by the economist K. V. Ostrovityanov in the4 issue of Kommunist which said that to let consumer goods production run ahead of capital goodwas undesirable in the Soviet economy. ew edition of the official party textbook Political Economy, published in August, once again reaffirmed that, in certain periods, consumer goods production could outrun producer goods output, while three months later, in the Novomberspeech, Saburov also suggested that the New Course
would remain in effoct,* It was curious, therefore, that the slogans Issued for the anniversary did not, as had the slogans issued the year before and at Mayive itoal of the regime "to satisfy abundantly In the next two to three years" the population's requirements in foodstuffs.
In December, signs of the coming shift multiplied.eynote speechoviet construction conference which metecember (the speech was notecember), Khrushchev appeared to stress more than usual the importance of heavy industrial development. Onecember, the anniversary of Stalin's birth, Pravda and Izvestla published commemorative articles, the former's autnorcd by V. Kruzhkov, then the chief of the centraldepartment of propaganda and agitation, andt tor's by F. Konstantinov,rominent publicist. Kruzhkov came down hard on the point that heavy industry was tho bo-all-and-end-all of economic policy, omitting entirely the conventional promises to tho consumer. Konstantinov, by contrast, madeolite bow in the direction of heavy Industry and continued to speak blithely about "forcing the production of consumer goods." This waseanlnful divergence, but it Is less certain that the two nowspapers were consciously at odds with one another. If these two central organs had, indeed, momentarily broken ranks and were lending themselves to the exposition of conflicting viewsajor policyit soems that Izvestla would have been forced to admit its error once the heavyight line had been dogmatically defined.It might have been expected, too, that the Izvestla author would haverice for being on the wrong side, but, to all appearances, Konstantinov hassince the end in5 be was identified as rector of the Academy of Social Sciences, in April or May
aburov said,tart has already been made on practical accomplishment of this /consumer goods7hus Implying that more was to come.
monthly journal Problems of Economics, which hadan article by one of tne condomned economistspologized for its error in Itsailing to appear during tho first two months of
he was added to the editorial board of Kommunlst, and by the following autumn he was in Kruzhkov's former Job as head of Agitprop.
It may have happened that Izvestia- was routinelythe line which bad been inustew one was emerging on the pages of Pravda. The Pravda article-probably
signified that the presidium decisions which meant the end of the New Course had finally been taken. Delay in theof the propaganda orchestration may account for Izvestia's having been, for a time, awkwardly out of tune.
By the following month the line was crystal clearull-scale attack was begun against the advocates ofpreference. The high points were Shepilov'sin Pravda foranuary of "rightnd Khrushchev's still rougher language before the January plenum of the central committee, where he accused certain theoreticians of "reurgitation of the right deviation, regurgitation of views hostile to Leninism, views which Rykov, Bukharin and their ilk once preached."
Thereertain danger, in an ideological sense. In the propositions put forward by the condemned In arguing that the soviet economy had progressedoint where it was not only possible but necessary tolight and heavy industry at equal rates, it may have seemed that these economists were attempting toemporary line of policyogma and, thus, to limit the regime in its right to promulgate economic laws in its own political interest. It is possible, too, that theof professional economists who were cited by name were merely the exposed salientore or less widespread body of thought.
The charges of theoretical heresy were probably, in part, the reflex actionegime long accustomed toits policies in the pseudo-theological language of Marxism-Leninism, and, inign that it wanted no one to miss its propaganda point.
Publicly at least, Malenkov was never tied directly to the heavy-light industry heresy. Khrushchev seemsto have avoided this charge in his conversations with foreigners, though he freely ascribed other sins to Malenkov. Certainly, it would have been incongruous in Communist terms if Malenkov had remained on the presidium after having been publicly stigmatizedright deviationist." However,
party members who were familiar with the contents of the central committee document on Malenkov's resignation were told that "by his emphasis on light industry, he advocated slowing down the tempo of heavy industrynd "termedightist deviation." Thus, the threat of further disgrace was left hanging over Malenkov's head.
The Political Problem
At the end4 there was no lack of substance for policy controversy within the Soviet presidium. The goals of the New Course had proven overambitious. The Investment squeeze which had developed brought the question of priorities to the front and indicated that, as between heavy industry, defense, agriculture and consumer goods something had to give way. The approachew Five-Year Plan period, the impact of international events and significant technological developments on Soviet defense needs, to which might be added the unknown quantity of the USSR's economicto Communist China and other bloc members, are some of the factors which converged toeadjustment of policy then and there.
rime example of this is Malenkov's resignation letter; "One maye said, "that various bourgeois hysterical viragos will busy themselves with slanderous inventions in connection with my present statement and the fact itself of my release from the post of chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, butCommunists and the Sovietwill ignore this lying and slander."
Whether the policy issues were in themselves large enough and deep enough to bring Malenkov down oronflict of political ambitions was the real starting point, seems to be still, three yearshlcken-and-egg question. Itatter of speculation as to howMalenkov was personally committed to the New Course and as to whether he carried the issue of its continuationoint from which it was impossible to retreat. The Soviet loaders themselves had, of course, tried to pictureleadership"ell-oiled machine and to minimize the likelihoodittle too much.* However this might be, it was difficult not to see in the circumstances of Malenkov's resignation, with Its degrading admission of incompetence, in his appointment to an inferior post, and in some of Khrushchev's comments to
foreign diplomats on the subject, an element of personal animosity and revenge. While the circumstances of the policy shift may have calledigh-ranking scapegoat, there was,ontrast between the treatment of Malenkov and the graceful exit from the Ministry ofnd subsequent promotionirst deputy chairmanship of the Council off Mlkoyan, who had been hardly lessin the consumer goods program.
There can be little doubt that Halenkov's political stock had declined considerably between3 and5 and that Khrushchev's had risen sharply. At the time of Stalin's death, there were signs that Malenkov was poised to become the new Soviet autocrat. His starring role ath partyew months earlier had seemed to stamp him as Stalin's most likely heir. Two days after Stalin's death he was named premier of the new He had become, at the same time, the senior member of the party secretariat. Whether from habit or underthe press began what appeared touild-up of the new chieftain, and onarch Pravda published its famous cropped photograph, whichroup scene to the trio of Malenkov, Stalin, and Mao.
Onarch, however, the press announced that onlenum of the central committee had accepted Malenkov's resignation from the secretariat. Khrushchev at that point became its ranking member. Malenkov suggested the reason for this changepeech to the Supremeonource of strength to the leadership, he said, was itsoint which neither he nor anyone else had thought to mention at Stalin'seek earlier. Sometime between these two dates,the members of the presidium had been obliged to sit down together to work out an arrangement for the division of power. If any one event marked the beginning of Halenkov's descent from the apex of power it was thls--the loss or surrender of his pre-eminent place in the party organization, within which, almost exclusively, he had made his mark through the kind of maneuver and manipulation which leads to power in the arena of Soviet politics.
During March and tho following mouths tho government was reorganizedumber of Important party posts worehe guiding purpose was to ease the regime through its postnatal period, but there were also signs of political maneuveringumber of irregularities which accompanied tho process. In March, A. I. Kozlov, minister of state farms, was appointed headonsolidatedministry and I. A. Benediktov, long-time minister of agriculture, was somewhat incongruously appointedto India. After the arrest of Beria, however, Benediktov was recalled from New Delhi, and in September was named toewly organized Ministry of Agriculture and Procurements. Kozlov was, at the same time, appointed to the lesser post of minister of state farms. Also in March, M. Z. Saburov, though retained on the party presidium to which be had been elevated ath party congross, was relieved from Gosplan, which he had headednd appointed minister of machine building. The transfer was reversed onune, and he once again became Gosplan chairman. M. D. Bagirov, party chief in the Azorbaidzhan Republic, wasandidate member of the party presidium in March only to go downuly purge of Berla followers. In April, therearty shake-up in Beria's native Georgian Republic and, in June, L.elnikov was removed as first secretary of the Ukrainian party,ove which there is reason to believe was engineered by Berla.
It is probably not possible to trace all ofingle cause, but Beria's hand was clear in some of them and it Is almost certain that be wasone-too-subtle play for power in defiance of the new, unwritten rules of "collective leadership."
An earlier collaboration with Berla was among the charges reportedly mado against Malenkov at 5 plenum. There Is, Indeed, some evidence pointing to an alliance between the two at various times in Stalin's late years, and the threat of its renewal may well have alarmed the other members of the presidium. Malenkov, however, bad apparently himself turned on Beria and reportedly joined in tho decision which led to Beria's arrest and execution. But while this fact may havo helped to save Malenkov from total
circumstances in which the first post-Stalin regime was formed and the series of reorganizations effected inmonths are discussed in detail in CAESAR 2.
political extinction the threat of subsequent damaging revelations with respect to his Involvement in police terror was kept alive. When, for example,was made In5 of the execution of former MVD chief Abakumov, thereeference to the latter's criminal complicityLeningrad case." The publicof malenkov in the same case after his expulsion from the presidium in7 plainly suggests that tho earlier reference hadarb for Malenkov.
Political neutralization of the policeeneral loosening of the mechanism of repression continued after Boris's arrest: In lateew man was appointed to head the procuracy, and thereafter procedural revisions were introduced to limit the power of thatop-up of Berla adherents began and there wore further purges of high police officials; finally, Inommittee of State Security, presumably subject in principle to col-legial control, was formed.
But Berla's arrest removed the immediate threat to "collective leadership" and opened the way to theof new domestic policies. Within two months of Berla's arrost Malenkov was before tho Supreme Soviet to announce the New Course. The interrelationships of "collectivewere by no means firmly fixed, howevor, and thefor power continued, thoughore gradual and loss violent way. Malenkov had evidently reached bis high water mark at tho August Supreme Soviet. By September, Khrushchev was established as first secretary of the party and was busy laying down agricultural policyarty plenum. Numerous changes in party personnel followed, of which the most important was the3 shake-up of the Leningrad party organization, over which Khrushchevpresided. The result was the removal from leadership of the Leningrad organization of V. M. Andrianov,alenkov adherent, and his replacement by F. R. Kozlov, who subsequently emergedhrushchev partisan. At the4 plenum of the central committeewas again the spokesman on agriculturaltime the New Lands program. In April he put another feather In his cap by addressing tho Supremeovernmental body, on equal protocol terms with the premier, Malenkov. The Introduction, in June, of alphabetical listings of tho leaders' names, ending the previous practice of listing Malonkov first, was In keeping with the "collective" idea, butormalization of Halenkov's loss of precedence. Khrushchev had, In the meantime, begun to accumulate publicity
and prestigo from his vigorous stumping on behalf of the New Lands program and had begun to develop his own style of "ward-heeling." His appearances at party congresses in Warsaw and Prague in the spring4 and his trip to Pelplng as headoviet delegation in September were further indications of his rising importance in tho Soviet hierarchy. By tho end4 he was receiving extensive notice In the Soviet press partly on the basis of sheer activity and partly, it seems, on the basis of an officially inspired build-up. Tho latter was especially evident in an attempt to magnify retrospectively his and Bulganln's personal roles In the war at the expense of the Stato Defense Committee, of which both malenkov and Stalin had been members.* In December he gave the principal addressonstruction conference held In Moscow, thus, apparently, laying public claim to authority in an area outside agriculture.
Fear of Malenkov's ambitions may have assisted the rapid political ascentan whoomparatively secondary figure in In view of what he has shown since in the way of assertiveness and political skill it must now seem unlikely, however, that his backingdertvod simply from an urge in the presidium to sotuffor against Malenkov. With the party as footing and his own native boldnesslub, he began to challonge Malenkov's primacyery early stage and, when thohad succeeded, was able to make his own views on policy stick.
The conflict between the two men seems to havoout to some extent In terms of rival claims toand authority on the part of the Institutionsand government. In part, this was probably aa natural tendency of each to uso the weapons atit was apparently converted along the way Into aand ideological issue complainedC nhathad tried to run things through tho governmentthan through the party. This was also theof Bulganln's pledge, in accepting the premiership,Council of Ministers will also In the futureout tho policy worked out by the Communist party."
4 Trudtalin's death.
-fro 'Veactlvate"^hfi'fa9.rty-^'possible to promote. 3 was'ihe firBt.
' the,Supremeer^ and with, Increasing"
both theoretical and practical, The regime not onlyubstitute .
There 'iorfi g< behindr the policy.
for,the primitive (out, in its way,he "vo:^
clear institutional channel: for,.the transmission of thevested in the centralized state. The variousof cdntrol and persuasion had been personalizedarid the" distinctibhs between them had 'become,extent, blurred. Moreover, after his death, thepolice authority had been limited. Partly as athis, the army gained'Importanceeserve ofits prestige increased. But the party, though itsuniqueness and initiative had -been dampened underthe whole weight of-.theory and legitimacy on itshad in Khrushchev,irst secretary whoit-into exercising its rights and would forcefullyits primacy in Soviet
A New Tone to Policy
With the events of5 the New Course phrases about forcing the development of light industry passed into oblivion. The change was also reflected in aof resources in5 budget, announced to thesession of the Supreme Soviet.
The factors of economic growth, defense preparedness, popular morale, and labor productivity wore stillhowever, even though the Bulganln government had decided, in effect, to enter the circleifferent point. The pressure for rationalization of the economy, and, with the movement away from the Stalinist method of virtually undiluted coercion, the need for some accommodation to the popular urgebetterimproved diet, betterore equitable return on labor, and moreto be dealt with. In succeeding months theumber of new measures which looked in that direction.
-ana wer.econditioned by its foreign policy.* Thef an international setting wbich vould. peralt,the exteo-
soviet .influence without.tee risk.of nuclear war.-
rime objective.ot: that, policy. rief Interlude in which there were signseversion, toof diplomatic
maneuver opened, characterizedreater boldness^'andmobility than the-precedingThe addition of the.word'11
revealing expressionew.strain in Sovieta belief that success camepirit of initiative and. aggressive self-eonf idehce--in which the Khrushchev person- llty shows through. alf year the Khrushchev-Bulga'nln team had undertaken twoo Belgrade andhad begun In earnestoothold-in the Middle East, all of which, though not Inconsistent with the "peaceful coexistence" of the Malenkov government,onsiderable extension of that .policy. -
5 budgethift in the pattern of al-locations to the.llocations to the heavy industry . ector went upillion rubles, an increaseercent over planned allocationslthough budget expenditures within the over-all category "Financing the National Economy" were to rise by onlyercent above the level planned4ercent above actual expenditures. Directfrom the budget for defense were to Increase by nearlyillion rubles, an increase of aboutercent. At the same time, allocations to light Industry were to be reduced6 billion rubles46 billion rubles. In absolute terms this washarp reduction, especially if5 planned allocation is measured against the amount which was actually used up It has been pointed out, however, that "one must properly compare,55 with5 should have been if the post-Stalin economic policies had been pursued." If this yardstick is used, the change in emphasis shows clearly.
Figures on the relative rates of growth of the producer and consumer goods sectors5 shows an oven morechange than was foretold in the budget. The upward revision of the annual production targets, undertaken after the over-all production goals of the Fifth Five-Year Plan
had been met in May, apparently placed additional emphasis on heavy industry. According to Soviet statistics tho volume of output of producer goods Increasedercent as compared with an increase of8 percent in consumer goods output, whereas in thetwo years the rates of growth in the two sectors had been nearly equal. (see footnote, p. 8)
In conjunction with the cutback in light Industry, the regime acted to constrict purchasing power--by enlarging the budget surplus and by canceling some of the fiscalgranted during the preceding two years. The state loan was upped to theevel and the pricegranted annually7 were withheld.
On the heels of the shift in economic emphasis aof propaganda formulas took place. The pressto thunder intermittently against the economicfor several months, but, in the meantime, the enticing phrases of the New Course had been universally replaceduarded promise ofurther development of the light and food Industry."
In both word and deed, therefore, the government bad reduced the consumer's expectationsore reasonable level. It does not follow from this, however, that thehad come to reject entirely the Now Course assumption that Increased consumption was important to higher labor productivity and improved morale. Tho difference between the new policy and the one which had preceded it was, at least in the abstract, more one of timing than of Intent (although the policy debate did not have to be any the less heated fornd there is reason to suppose that the regime regarded consumption as something which could be postponed but not permanently Ignored. onversationesterner in Moscow, Khrushchev used the wordto describe the Malenkov government's emphaslB on consumer goods but went on to predict thatecond or third fivo-year plan from now" would see light industry growore rapid rate than heavy.
An Interesting sidelight on this can be foundravda article ofarch. Apparently the new lino wasin some overzoalous quarters to mean thatwas virtually anathema. The Pravda article, written by Ostrovltyanov, one of the regime's top economic spokesmen, set tho record straight for these people, too, and, in the process, gave one of the fullest expositions of the thinking
press. It is interesting also because of itsof. the. Hewntentr.'
oppositehey began to maintain silence on ;tbq party. and;govoriimont decisions onTng* production of consumer goods,harp ad-vanco In agriculture, onhe light and food industries in proportionhe growth in raw oa'terlaj resources produced py agrTcuTture.
Those economists are Ignorant of the fact that the requirements of the objective economic law of preponderant growth of production of tho means of production can be met only on condition that there is proportional development of all branches of production.-
In tho course of the development of the socialist economy Individual branches may lag, as aof which partial disproportions arise in the economy. To eliminate thesetho lagging branches, Insofar as thematerial prerequisites are created,cTovclop at forced paceertain period of time. Out this by no means contradicts the fact that the firm basis of the general line ofof the socialist economy is the law ofgrowth of tho moans of production.
Continuation of the Agricultural Effort
The searchirmer agricultural base was reflectedurther Increase in budget allocations to that sectorS. The Kew Lands program again accounted for aproportion of the total (soo footnote, p.. policy, in general, now had four primary features, outlined by Khrushchev as follows: "yields in all areas must be increased, harvesting losses decreased, virgin and idle lands reclaimed and the area sown to corn considerably expanded."
,;Thls lasjt', a- program to .increase tne.area sow to,corn0 acrescresnd0 acresas another device for increasing "thfi-sil^y'of livestock'la
aV'ithe.lenuni'of the 'central.'coinmittee> the corn; uir-prpspejxt'-.-
o'f Khrushchev. Speaking to the central comraittee^of his republic onkrainian party leaderhenkp .described_it,as though it were Khrushchev,'s.personal project, stating that "The spread In every possible way of corn growing, as is known to many of"you, has longthe .dream of Comrade N. S. Khrushchev. He helped us to. nderstandf. corn, growing for the ua-ional economy."
An extensive propaganda campaign in support of corn cultivation was reinforced, during the springumber of regional agricultural conferences. Khrushchev was on hand to make long speeches which stressed the regime's insistence on immediate^implementation of the newdirectives. Resort was also had to the incentives device: ecree of5 made it possible for the *easant to receive up toercent of the harvested corn crop in grain or silage.
Revision of Agricultural Planning
Ever since Stalin's death the regime had tried to come to grips with the problem of overcentralization and over bureaucratization of the economy. Under the Malenkovthis had produced legislation designed to reduce the size of the administrative apparatus and the volume of paper work; to effect some decentralization in the economicthrough the creation of Union-Republican ministriesumber of industries which had theretofore been managed from the center; and to give executives below the topgreater authority in plan formulation. The press freely admitted that the topheaviness of the economic structure was an obstacle to flexibility and initiative and that these effects were especially pernicious in agriculture.
ee, Khrushchev had*
Local personnel-aire "quite correct: In -raising -the
planned state guidance over the development of agriculture-at the same time that it released local initiative.'
Malenkov had also addressed himself to tho subjectpeech to the4 session of the Supreme Soviet, where he declared that the central planning agencies attempted to encompass too much detail "without tho requisite knowledge of diverse local conditions and potential" and "such planning creates difficulties in the work of local areas and binds the initiative of local agencies."
With these considerations in mind the central committee and the Council of Ministersoint decreearch, "On Revising the Practice of Planning Agriculture." Theof the decree, in brief, was to abolish the practice of setting both tho output targets and production pattern for each agricultural unit from the center. Thenceforth,the delivery quotas were still to bo centrally the collective and state farms were to work out for themselves the pattern of utilization of acroago and herds. It was specified, however, that this was to be done in consultation with the HTS and was to be subject to review by the local governmental organs.
Although it gave some encouragement to local initiative, provision was also made for ensuring control from tho center with the announcementprilew urban levy was to be raised and shifted to the countryside. Byto0 "experienced members of party,business and engineering-technical staffs, and manual and office workers" were to be assigned to the chairmanships of backward collective farms. This meant that nearly one third of all collective farms were to be given now chairmen, on the prcmlso, as Khrushchev put it in typical fashion, that "if thereeal organizer at the head of every collective farm wo will bo able to bring any farm up to tho level of an advanced fnrmhort time." Although soino provision
with and responsiveness to the regime^.purposes seemsgricultural expertise, A. case in.. certain rigorey, who was converted-from district prosecutor to.', chairmancollectiVe>'farm:iff the Moeoow Oplafit/
^IchdV at >
roted the latter's own ideas on agriculture.
Limited as this revision of-agricultural practice was, there can be seen in it the germs of the much broader scheme of economic decentralization undertaken later,he regime had been confronted for some time with the problem, of more rational organization and there were signs5 that it was even then mulling over further changes. Pravda
reported in May, for example, that at an Industrial con=
ference in Moscow "Comrade Khrushchev devoted much attend.-, o questions1of planning. He pointed out that it was necessary that we plan production not onlyationwide scale but also according to particular economic regions, making wider use of all their potentialities."
similar lihes, Bulganiri told the5 plenum of the central committee:
The principal shortcoming in the activity of our ministries with regard to leadership of industry consists in the fact that they do little work on the direct organization of production, but direct the plants, factories and mines that come under their spheres of competence from their offices, making usearge and multilevel
If the quality of the industry's leadership is to
be improved, the administrative apparatus must be '
brought closer to
*The selectees were to take courses locally and to workrial period on the collective farms, if this had not pre pared them adequately they might be assignedime as assistant chairmen and, if still unacceptable, eventually re jected altogether.
trallzatlon is noth the.one hand, it binders the organization of operativemanagement of enterprises, and, on the other hand, it diminishes the responsibility ofrganiza"tXbns' forork of
Ministries must decisively decrease the types of Items produced by Individual enterprises, free specialized enterprises from turning outfor which thoy are not intended, create new specialized enterprises and expand cooperationand among ministries, bearing in mind theof individual economic areas.
The Search for New Economic Stimulants
In Hay the government convened an Industrial conference in Moscov at which Premier Bulganlneneralof the perspectives of the industrial economy. Heseveral innovations which supplemented thefor decentralization and administrative reorganization and were primarily designed to meet the problem oflabor productivityiminishing labor pool. The appropriate enabling legislation was enacted by the presidium of the Supreme Soviet later in the month.
Increased labor productivity, Bulganln told the conference was vital to further economic growth. ey to this Increase was technological progress and he called for the modernization of Soviet industry, with stress on mechanization, automation, and technological innovation in the production process. There was, heidespread tendency among industrial managers to seek safoty In familiar ways and,esistance to change. Among scientists and technologists there was insufficient appreciation of Westernholdover, although he did not say so, from the xenophobia of Stalin's last years. To remedy these defects he proposedtate Committee on New Technology be set up under the USSR Council ofrecreating an organization which had existed81 when it was absorbed into Gosplan. The committee (Gostekhnlka) was formally established, under tho chairmanship of the late V, A. Malyshevecree ofay
(both efforts of
v/-plans for advancing Sovieto devise r propagating technicalandhe of
ministries In this sphere.
The planning apparatus, Bulganln indicated to thewas toeorganization designed to over-cone two majorthe mechanism was so cumbrous ' bdu^ldri unittfnnual targets until tho plan period was under way, and, conversely, it was so preoccupied with curront business that it tended to lose long-term perspective. Accordingly,was to be dividedtate Commission for Current Planning (Gosekonomkommlssiya)tate Commission oh Long-Range Planning (retaining the title Gosplan). The proposal became law onay. Gosekonomkommlssiya, under M. Z. Saburov, who had been chairman of the combinedwas given responsibility for drawing up the annual plans and overseeing their breakdown into quarterly and monthly sections, and, also, responsibility for assuring the even production and distribution of materials andthroughout the economy. The new Gosplan, under N, K, ,Balbakov, who had been minister of the oil industry, assumed responsibility for the five-year plans; for formulationterm plans for the development of key sectors such as fuel and power; and, more generally, for gauging future economic prospectsiew to determining "at what time the various branches of /Soviet/ industry will overtake the most advanced capitalist countries in per capita production."
This process of organizational manipulation continued with the creation of another newStatefor Labor and Wages of the USSR Council of Ministers under L. M. Kaganovich, who hadariety of economic posts in his long party career and was, likeember of the party presidium. Creation of the committee was an additional response to the problems of unsatisfactory labor productivity and undesirable mobility in the labor force. Its task was to undertake the first comprehensive revision,f the wage system. As Bulganln pointod out at the July plenum, the system had become over the years somethingrazy quilt of frequently revised and ofter disparate norms, complicated schedules of bonuses and piece rates, and did not tako account of technological change.
ackdrop of increased Milltary spendingropaganda attack on the Paris Agreements which had produceda.good deal'of truculent language, thereuspicion
outside the USSR that the accession of thearder line in Soviet foreign policy. Nor was tho obvious ascendancy of Khrushchev particularly,since* he had, till then, given the appearance.
bellicose ^'dootr/iBa-ire" whc^Ucked Malenkov^s' and flexibility. This lmpressloo was strengthened, on the day the new government was announced, by Molotov's harsh foreign policy report to the Supreme Soviet. It heaped one on top of ttie other charges of 'astern aggressiveness and bad faith, contained hardly one conciliatory phrase, and was cappedoast of Soviet nuclear superiority.
At the same time, however, there were signs at variance with this picture of renewed intransigence. Just before the Supremo Soviet mot, the llearst party, then in Moscow, was unexpectedly Informed that it could interview Khrushchev, Bulganln, Molotov and Zhukov. Some of the interviews took place beforeebruary Supreme Soviet session and some after, but it soon became apparent that they were arranged with an eye to balancing the Impression which thechange and Molotov's speech might create In the Vest. At that Juncture, the Hearst partyonvenient medium of communication with the non-Communist world. The comments which the Interviews produced were consistently moderate and seemed toingleassure the West that the USSR was still interested in "peaceful coexistence." One member of the Hearst group has offered thishink the Soviet leaders wanted to offset through conciliatory statements to us the effect of the violent attacks which they decided Foreign Minister Molotov and Premier Bulganln must make against the United States In the Supreme Soviet.
I believe the Intensity of those attacks against us was promptedesire to offer the Russiancapegoat for the decision to curtail the production of consumer goods in order toonce again on heavy industry.
In mid-January the Soviet ambassadors to France, Great Britain, the United States, and East Germany and the Soviet high commissioner for Austria bad beeu recalled to Moscow. Very
i. policyV particularly
Western Europe,ndergoing re-examlnatlon In "the light i; of current domestic and Internationalho divergence between the attitudes displayed in the Hearstand before tho Supreme Soviet may have meant that cross-currents were at work within the regime and that It washoice between "bard" and "soft" lines of policy.
owever, the adauancy and.attJ.lngV displayed be- .
They were to some extont, probably, tho tag-end of theagainst the Paris Accords, which, toward the endad become full of bluster and threat. Much was made In propaganda of the new war danger posed by German In January, propaganda broadcasts warned that, in the eventew war, "all the consequences of atomic warfare will come crashing down on the British Isles" and that the war would "sweep onto the American continent as well." and France were notified that the USSR would annul its treaties of alliance with them if they ratified the Paris Agreements. Inloc security conference had been convened in Moscow to discuss the formal establishmentilitary counterpart to NATO, and at about this time there were signs of renewed pressure on Allied forces in Austria and Berlin.
A further threat was contained in reiterated hints that German rearmament would proclude further nogotiation betwoon the USSR and the West on European problems. In the midst of these tirades, however, there were signs that the USSR was already proparing for the next diplomatic phase. t put forward revised proposals on all-German elections and called for the establishment of diplomatic relationsItself and the German Federal Republic. Onanuary the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet formally ended the state of war with both parts of Germany. int of another Soviet initiative was contained In Molotov's statement on Austria before tho Supreme Sovietebruary, which foretold the negotiations which led to the signing of an Austrian Treaty onay. Even Molotov, presumably, was reckoning with the likelihood that German rearmament would bo formally approved and was contemplating means to hobble its implementation.
Onarch, Premier Bulganin stated that the USSR tookosltivo view" toward the suggestion of great powercontained in President Elsenhower's statement throe days earlior, and thus took the first step, on the Soviet side, toward the July Summit conference. In May tho USSR made a
ing disarmament proposals which'accepted-many, atn the Anglo-French position. The opening of a. new phaseoviet policy was further marked in that month byoviet-Yugoslav meeting "at the highest level" and the first soviet offer of arms aid to Egypt.
Important elements in the post-Malenkov "activist" policy seem to have been present at the. time of his ouster or. -to 'tfre breast-beating in February is, perhaps, best seen not so mucholicy Interlude as an attempt toetting for what was to follow. It was partly for the benefit of the Soviet public, which was obliged to scale downapid improvement of the living standard, andeans of projecting an image of strength and self-confidence to the outside worldoment when the Soviet leadership was showing signs of instability. It was probably no coincidence that at the samemall tempest was stirred up, first by Molotov and thenumber ofround the question of whether "civilization" or only the capitalist world would be destroyeduclear war? Whether this waseiled attack on Malenkov, who had referred to the possible "destruction of civilization"4 speech. Isatter for conjecture.
Molotov's "tough talk" was, therefore, probably notthe expression of his own hidebound point-of-view. Nevertheless, there had already been signs, subsequently that Molotov was not enthusiastic about the foreign policy approach adopted after Stalin's death and had begun to "swim against the stream." His omission from the delegation to
is some reason to suppose that the groundwork for the Belgrade conference was laid before Malenkov's removal. iscussion of this point see belowhe "destruction of civilization" idea was denounced by, among others, Maurice Thorezarch letter to Humanite, by Konstantinov inarch Pravda, and by Voroshilov be-fore the Russian Republic Supreme Soviet onarch.
pelping ina declining in- on Soviet diplomacy. Later in the year, onoccasions, Western diplomats detected whatbe resentment in the usually Inscrutable "stoneconjectured that his foreign policy views had comein the Presidium. Later on, in his Februarywith the Hearst party, he left the Impressionhis words were much the same, his attitude was.more frigid than Khrushchev's, Bulganln's,-Of'-Mbrole in Soviet diplomacy accumulated, as Khrushchevmore and more took public command. He took aat the bloc security conference which met in Warsawand In Vienna for the Austrian Treaty negotiations.the same month, he himself hinted at retirementForeign Ministry. Becauso of his opposition towith Tito, he was left out of the Soviet mission toand at the Summit conference in July he oncea secondary role.
Molotov's whole approach to foreignto the "ossified forms of diplomacy" which Mlkoyanath partyhis view on lntra-bloc relationships were apparently at issue.
However, his dogged resistance to rapprochement with Yugoslavia seems to have weakened his position as much as any ono thing. Tho curious exchange which took placeTito and the Russians in March was evidently anof this policy conflict. In his speech to the Supreme Soviet in February, Molotov had said:
As we know, progress has lately boen made in the relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.
We do not consider that everything has already been done in this respect, but we believe that this no less deponds on Yugoslavia hersolf. Evidently, in these past years Yugoslavia has to some extent departed from the position which she held in the early years following the second world war. That, of course, is exclusively her lntornal affair.
Onarch, Pravda and Izvestiaeportpeech deliveredto the Yugoslav National Assemblyarch. Tito, according to the Soviet newspapers, had
complained tliat "some countries of Eastern Europe" woro saying that "although Yugoslavia is still what she had boon accused of, nevertheless, she has now recognized her errors somewhat and Is trying to reform." "This iso continued, "and naturally it can causo us to doubt tho sincerity of the statements made by responsible leaders of these countries in the course of direct contact, regarding the unjustagainst Yugoslavia Unquestionably Mr._Molo-tpv's formulation regarding Yugoslavia.in his speech to the Supreme*:Soviet' dbietf nw'dorrospond to' fact, and in aomecoincides with these assertions. We consider this an attempt to conceal the facts from his own people, again at our expense.. It is time to describe things as they are and as they developed, instead of stopping halfway towardand raising new doubts among the people."
Two days later Pravdaeply. It denied that the USSR took the position which had offended Tito. It argued that Holotov's remarks onugoslavia were consistent with statements by Yugoslav leaders themselves to the effect8 hadurning point for them, and could not, therefore, bo takenratuitous insult. The USSR, Pravda affirmed, desired further Improvement of relations with Yugo-slavia, but, it said, repeating Molotov, this depended "in no less measure upon Yugoslavia herself."
Tito's speech, taken together with other statements by Yugoslav officials at about the same time, plainly indicated that discussions between Belgrade and Moscow had gone further than was publicly admitted. Evidently, the subject of aconference had already been broached. Tito's speech, in effect, restated his terms foronference, which included withdrawal of8 charges. Molotov's scarcely flattering remarks apparently provoked him intoa further token of Soviet sincerity, perhapsMolotov's "head." The Soviet press replied with something lessull apology but had at least taken note of Tito's protest. Publication of Tito's personal attack on the Soviet foreign minister was, moreover, unprecedented and, if nothing else, showed little regard for his prestige and sensibilities. It is not surprising that one Yugoslav official concluded that Molotov had fallen Into disgrace.
"Collective Leadership" After Malenkov P'romoTiYins auJ Demotions
Id3 the three men who had given the eulogies over Stalin'sBerla andtoowerful triumvirate capable of dominating theleadership. Two years later Berla was dead, Malenkov had boon demoted and disgraced, and Molotov's authority had been considerably reduced. In the relatively brief period it had functioned, "collective leadership" had plainlya substantial readjustment. Khrushchev's rapid and conspicuous ascentommanding place in theprompted speculation that the pattern ofs, when another "dark horse" had moved out front by splitting his rivals, was being repeated. Was "collectivehich had to entail some sharing of power, about toropaganda slogan without real political substance?
In the months after5 thereumber of changes in governmental appointments which Involved porsons at or near the top of the political ladder. There wasmall-scaleof party personnel at the provincial level and below. In some cases, it appeared that Khrushchev was using tho power of appointment to augment his already formidable strength, particularly whore the party apparatus was concorned. The circumstances in which other changes took place, however, suggested that the high-levelat least, were still subject to negotiation in tho presidium.
At the same time, tho idea of "collective leadership"onsiderable vogue In Soviet propaganda, perhapseans of compensating for the implications of Malenkov's demotion. "Collective leadership" tookertain doctrinal legitimacy from having boonLeninisthile Its opposite, the idea of the Infallible one-man leader, was troated with increasing opprobrium. Tho public symbols of individual political power were altered hardly atcertainly far less than In the two years which preceded Halenkov's resignation. Throughout the springontinued to be vocal and remained very much in the public oye in appearanceseries of agricultural conferencesooting of industrial officials. The press, howevor, acted with what appears to have beon deliberateand it was noted in Moscow that Khrushchev seemed, if anything, to be receiving less Individual publicity thanMaleckov's resignation. There was little doubt that Khrushchev had become the single most powerful leader, and tho stamp of his personality and political style on both
domestic and foreign policy was even plainer than beforo; but, for the moment at least, ho was at pains to conceal any inclination torab for total power or to overthrow the "chocks and balances" implicit in "collective leadership."
Malenkov was left In an equivocal position. Thepublic was given no explanation of what had happened beyond that contained in his resignation letter and, as far as observers on the spot could judge, seemed to ro-gard tho event with indifference. entral committee letter,bill of particulars" against the formor premier was, however, circulated among partyact which oust certainly have weakened whatever political support remained to him. ew days of the Supremo Soviet mooting, rumors began to be heard in Moscow that Malenkov was in poor health, which, when added to the clamor over tho "destruction of civilization" issue, raised the possibility that further punishment was in store for him. Nothing came of this then, however, and ho continued toalongside his presidium colleagues at public functions much as before, except that he had.moved down the line of precedence. The disgrace of his public admission ofIncompetence was underscored by his appointment to the second-rank post of minister of electric power stations, and, somewhaty the elevation of Mikoyan, Pervukhln, and Saburov to positions as First Deputyof the Council of Ministers. This left Malenkov the only party presidium member on the government council without that status and carried the Implication of political lsola-
Do this as it may, the promotion of Mikoyan, Pervukhln, and Saburov was also parteorganization of the Council of Ministers designed to strengthen high-level operational control of key sectors of the economy. It paved the way for the appointment of four new deputy chairmen, of whom three were industrial or construction specialists and one anspecialist. A. P. Zavenyagln (diedadong career In construction and heavy industry and hadop administrator of the Soviet atomic energy program, while, another new deputy chairman, M. V. Khrunichev, had worked in the aircraft and other defense industriesumber of years. V. A. Kucherenko, who was bead of the Moscow Construction Administration at the time of hiswasarch) named chairman of the State Committee on Construction Affairs of tho USSR Council of Ministers. Of the four now appointees he seemed most likely
to have enjoyed the personal patronage of Khrushchev, under whom he had served In the Ukraine. Sincehen he began to beat the drums for prefabricatedbuilding sections, Khrushchev hadirect interest in construction affairs, and had had kind words for Kucherenko's work at the Moscow builders conference in The fourth new man, P. P. Lobanov, had been minister of agriculture in the Russian Republic and anpromoter of the New Lands program, in succeeding months he shared the platform with Khrushcheveries of regional agricultural conferences, suggesting that he had been given broad responsibility for the implementation of agricultural policy within the Council of Ministers.*
Following this reorganization, the Council of Ministers was composedhairman, Bulganin; five first deputy chairmen, all members of the party presidium; eight deputy chairmen, including Malenkov, with general responsibility for diverse sectors of the economy; and, beneath these upper coordinating levels,inisters and three officials with ministerial rank.
6 Lobanov was relieved of his Council of Ministers post and appointed President of the all-Union Academy ofSciences, succeeding the controversial agronomist-geneticist T. D. Lysenko.
**At that time Benediktov was appointed Minister of Agriculture and Procurement. eparate Procurement Ministry under h. R. Korniets was established in
hake-up of agricultural administration took place which resulted in the firing of A. I. Kozlov as minister of state farms and his replacement by I. A. Benedik-tov, who had been serving as minister of agriculture. The careers of both of these men, It will be remembered, bad taken somewhat peculiar turns in the months immediately after Stalin's death. (See above p.. They had held the posts of which they were now relieved sincehat Is, from the point at which the agricultural side of the New Course was laidarty plenum by Khrushchev. Since that time the press had frequently found fault with their ministries (among others) and both had beenKozlov is especially bluntKhrushchev at the4 party plenum. There is some evidenceolitical
affiliation between Kozlov And Malenkov dating from the' time
when thuy were both concerned with agricultural affairs Incentral committee apparatus, "but the only evidence-thmf;'
Benediktov had fallen victim to political rivalries inpresidium visv
Qr .reasons.whichstill-obscuro, penedlktoy's post.. he .Ml :iItry oX -'Agriculture', which- would have been;fiumably, among the first to be filled if Khrushchev had had carte blanche, remained vacantarch untilctober.
There were curious political overtonesuggestion of behind-the-scenes tug-and-pull in another shift of second-echelon officials begun in March. Early that month, rumors began to circulate In Moscow that G. F. Aleksaodroy had. been removed as minister of culture, allegedly because of personal misconduct, including use of his official position for "Immoral purposes." Alcksandrov, who had made his namehilosopher-propagandist, hadomewhat uneven career. His ups and downs in the postwar period had to some extent coincided with those lh Malenkov's career, and It has often been supposed that he figured somehowaIon-kov-Zhdanov rivalry. 7 he had run afoul of thepurification campaign when his History of Western Philosophy was, on Stalin's orders, attacked by Zhdanov ior Its "bourgeois philosophical thought." He was removed as chief of the central committee's Department of Propaganda and Agitation at that time but he was appointedumbor of highor academic positions thereafter. He was appointed minister of culture ineplacing P. K, Ponoma-renko. At the5 Supreme Soviet he was personally criticized for the poor work of his ministry in the New Lands area; and soon after his removal, Pravda charged that the textbook Dialectical Materialism, which-ho had edited, was tainted with the consumer goods be^sy.
Aleksandrov's removal was not announced officially untilarch, nearly two weeks after the rumors began to spread. His replacement was N. S. Mlkhailov, who had himself boon subject to shifting fortunes. He had boon first secretary of the Komsomolhen he replaced one of the victims of the Groat Purge, Ath party congress in2 he was oneumber of second-rank party officials appointed to the enlarged partymove which, Khrushchev's secrot speech implied, was preliminaryew Stalin purge of senior leaders. He was dropped from the presidium when it wbh reduced to its former size aftor Stalin's death and was appointed Khrushchev's successor as
The case ofelnikov Is BUilad succeeded Khrushchev as first secretary of thearty,, Like Mlkhallov, he had been elected to the presidium inut In thoe was retainedandidate member, not dropped He lost this post together with his Ukrainian party post inmidst charges of excesses in the Rus-sificatlon and collectivization of the annexed territories of western Ukraine. Subsequently, the reverse of those sins were attributed to Berla to strengthen the supposition that ho hadand in Helnikov's dismissal. Melnikov wasow assignment as" Sovlot ambassador to Rumania Inew weeks of Boris's downfall. Ine was recalled from Bucharest toewly formed Ministry of Construction of the Coal Industry. His earlier career in the Ukraine points to.an affiliation in thesonse between him and Khrushchev and the "latterf s' patron-age may well have had something to do with his return to At the same time, tho fact that Melnikov had not then, nor has he since, regained his former high rank beclouds the question, and suggests that that patronage, if exercised, had had only limited effect.
Following Hikhailov's recall onarch, the post of Soviet ambassador to Poland remained open until theof P, K. Ponomarenko was announceday. eteran of both party and government work, Ponomarenko was amomber of the party presidium at the time of bis
vacancy created by ZManov's death In this po ,
he was appointed Ministerparty
Jewess ITSS."Melni-.or.afrlduceO to candidate standing
At* tho ^tiiBo^olst'the;same- time ho lost hi* place' on the. party secretariat and was appointedster ofn4 he was appointed first secretary of the Kazakh party ui- parthake-up which followed criticism of agricultural administration in that republic. Khrushchev was on the scene for the change and It was apparently expected that Ponomarenko, on tho strength of his executive experience in agriculture,'would pruvldu .effective -direction ut the newly, inaugurated New Lands program In Kazakhstan. There was never anythat Ponomarenko had fallen down on this job. The Warsaw assignmentesponsible one and conformed to tho practice of appointing experienced party officials to tho satellite capitals, but it appeared, nevertheless, to bo below parandidate member of the presidium. It signified his exclusion from the Inneract which was confirmed at the tine ofh party congress, when he was notto the presidium.
Probably the clearest case of the fall from gracemalenkov man" is that of N. N. Shatalln. Since the's Shatalln had worked In the party apparatus and at various times had been Halenkov's deputy in the centralsection which demit with party personnel appointments. Defector reports have consistently placed himalenkov adherent. Heember of the party secretariat in3ove which showed tracesolitical At the time of his appointmentarch he wasandidate member of the central committee. Onarch this irregularity was corrected after tho fact by his election to full membership at the same central committee mooting which received Malenkov's resignation from the Conceivably, tho two events were related, with Shatalln being intended to serve on the secretariatast link between Malenkov and the party apparatus. While on the secretariat, Shatalln seems to haveand In two of Its most vitalappointments and party supervision of thein view of his ties tomight easily have become an obstacle between Khrushchev and firm control of the party apparatus. Ont was announced that he had been appointed party first secretary in the Prlmoryevery far Krai from Moscow. In late6 he lost this post and ath party congress In tho following month ho was dropped from the central
Tho Khrushchcv-Bulganln Visit to Belgrade
tho5 party plenum, Bulgaaia tola tne assembled party officials that the Belgrade trip had been precededwo-year exchange of correspondence between Belgrade and Moscow, initiated by the latter. The fact of such an exchango, commencing soon after Stalin's death, receives somo confirmation from Tugoslav Vice President KardelJ whoondon Observor correspondent in5 that "there had been during tho 'normalization1 period fuller discussions between Yugoslavia and Russia than had evor been described publicly." What the subject of these discussions was is unknown, but it can bo supposod that they beganautious, exploratory basis. Overtly, tho rapprochement developed through the various stages ofhich meant, in general, raising the various forms of selgo which Stalin had applied against Yugoslavia in his futile campaign to overthrow Tito.
Onolotov received theYugoslav charge in Moscow and the appointmentew Soviet chargo soon followed. In June the two countries agreed to restore tho exchange of ambassadors. Thereafter, the border conflicts between Yugoslavia and her satellite neighbors came to an end, tho economic blockade against Yugoslavia was lifted and trade negotiations were oponod, and the bitterbattle was mutually terminated in Moscow and Belgrade. So far, however, Soviet acts and gestures appeared to bo still within the framework of tho post-Stalin policy of detonto.
In the fall4 the USSR first showed anto carry the process further and to explore theof an ideological rapprochement. Inovember speech on the anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution, Saburov appealedenewal of "the ancient bonds of friendship" betwoon Yugoslavia and tho USSR. Later in the month,eception In the Yugoslav Embassy in Moscow, Khrushchev, Malenkov, and Molotovoast to "Comrade Tito and tho Yugoslav Communist party"lear gesture of ideological reconciliation.C
n November or Decemberormal proposalonforence ofpcluded an invitation to Tito to visit Tito,5 and then made the counterproposal thatdelegation should come to Belgrade. These exchanges
apparently also included some discussion of tho terms
oneeting should be convened, for In February,C
Yugoslav officials claimed that the USSR had conceded
J} that It had mistreated Yugoslaviacould be different paths to socialism,ona fide socialist state. Theseidentical with the terms on which thowas to be
Tho Soviet political upset of January-Februaryresultedemporary suspension of The Yugoslavs at first fearod thatalt In the process of post-Stallnwhich they had boen consistently hopeful. march speech, taking issue with Molotov, wasattempt to find out if the winds had shifted,handling of the matter suggests that it wasMoscow In just that way. Another indication ofthe sudden trip to Moscow, soon after Tito'sSoviet Ambassador Valkov. Upon his return tothe end of March, Valkov was immediatelyinterview with Tito. The Yugoslav foreignthat tho inter-
view had dealt with tho Molotov-Tito exchange. At this point, apparently, the concrete negotiations which preceded theay announcementigh-level Soviet-Yugoslav meeting had begun.
Khrushchev's ascendancy, following on Malenkov': and tho decline of Molotov's authority, undoubtedly had much to do with tho timing and form of thewith Yugoslavia. On the face of it, the trip tomoant that the Soviet leaders had agreed to swallow their pride and to pay the price exacted by Yugoslav vanity. But tho USSR was playing for potentially large stakes. To remove from the record this singular example of defection from the Communist ranks and to reverse the trend which had brought Tito onto the fringe of the Western alliance were only minimum Soviet objectives, which, if everything went well, could bo onlarged upon. The dominant elomont In the Soviot leadership ontertainod the hope thatcould be drawn back into the "socialist camp" and felt that this possibility should bo exploited to tho ramatic gesture of reconciliation, publicthat tho USSR had erred in the past, recognition of Yugoslavia's right to certain national peculiarities, and formal reinstatement of Tito into tho ranks of "trueevhings would remove Belgrade's suspicions
and it would then feel an irresistible urge for complete realignment. This, in turn, promised to reduce the risk in the effort, which was to be more fully unfolded ath party congress, to organize the Soviet bloc on looser terms of unity and discipline than those applied by Stalin since the satellite states would no longer have theexample of Tito's independent Communism before
p In his report on the Belgrade conference to the July pl/num, Bulganln is said to have described theission of clarification. Its purpose, howas first of all to prevent the further extension of US influence in Yugoslavia and to assess tho likelihood of her return to the "camp of socialism." The Sovietof Yugoslav socialism made at tho Belgradedid not overlook entirely the points ofbetween the two sides, but there was, nevertheless, as the summing-up at the July plenumendency to stress the degree of sameness and to regard itopeful basis for further consolidation. Reportedly, Mikoyan, having conceded" that Yugoslavia had much inwith non-Communist socialism, went on to point out that in the satellites many eminent Communists had come fromranks, and to conclude optimistically thatwould certainly return to the Soviet bloc.
It was probably not envisaged, howevor, thatwould return to the fold onterms. There Is much to suggest that the Belgrade venture was only partroad effort to reorder intrabloc relationships. since Stalin's death, there had been signs of this in tho replacement of Stalinist gaulelters, many of them police officials, by party professionals In tho USSR's satellite and Chineseprocess Intended to stress the bonds of political sympathy ovor those of The Soviet regime, at the same time, wasfor an arrangement elastic enough to permit the play of nationalistic pressures within the outer band of Soviet hegemony. It was aware that nationalismorce withinoc, thatolicy had suppressed but notti that, ius fe< Iag at home, it should be worn away not battered. Consideration of China's present and future place in the socialistundoubtedlyart in stimulating this China, like Yugoslavia, obviously did not fit into theonolithic bloc made up of the USSRroup o* compliant satellites, and it may have been
more than coincidence that the groundwork (or the Belgrade conference began to be laid soon after the return ofand Bulganln from Pelplng in lear connection between the Belgrade conference and the over-all problem of bloc relations was drawn at the July plenum. According to all accounts, tho various Soviet leaders who addressed the plenum dwelt on the damage which had been done In the past to relations with China,and the satellites by Soviet arrogance and offonscs to nationalist sensibilities. Nationalism, Khrushchevsaid, should be dealt with tactfully and it was current policy of tho Soviet party to take the problem moro fully into account.
Where the satellites were concerned, however,of the principle of Soviet dominance and changes in the forms of its application was something less than denial of the principle. Soviet acknowledgement Inune communique concluding the Belgrade conference that socialism might take different forms in different countries, was, in the case of Yugoslavia and China, merely recognition of an existing situation. But the USSR's political and economic hold on the satellitesso the USSR evidentlythey had beenerbal concession which they were in no position to exploit. On his way back to Moscow from Belgrade, Khrushchev stopped off in Sofia and Bucharest for conforoncos with satellite party leaders at which, according to one report, he made this pointthat what was sauce for Tito's goose was not necessarily sauce for the satellite gander.
The Yugoslavs had somewhat different thoughts in mind when they accepted the Soviet conference proposal. They sensed the danger of being crushed in the Soviet embrace, but in view of their own preachments on "peaceful coexistence" it was impossible for thorn to refuse to negotiate. tho Yugoslav economy stood to benefit from anywhich recognized Yugoslav claims arising from the Soviet-satellite economic blockade. But the key factor forwas Its own international ambitions and its bolief that it could, having closed the rift with the USSR, have -an important-Influence on the'future course of events in the Soviet bloc. With regard to this objective, theinsisted that the process of chango that began with Stalin's death would inevitably continue and should be given every .encouragement.
Tito saw an improvement of relations with the USSReans of strengthening his bargaining positionis both East and Westeans ofole as intermediary, both political and ideological, between the two sides. He aspired toalkan Nehru whose good offices would be sought by the West, the East, and the "neutralists." His attitudelendind of missionary idealism, the latter stemming from his belief that the two great international antagonists were both interestedeaceful settlement and that,asting reconciliation between Soviet Communism and Western democracy could be achieved. Thus it was that onay, the day after announcement of the Belgrade conference, Tito declared that Yugoslaviaoral leader withlace In the world that even the big powers maynd described Belgrade's policy as an attempt "tohird force of world moral strength for all those who love peace and freedom." The root of the Yugoslav conception is found in Tito's phrasehich denoted movement between the two antagonists designed to bring them closer together, and Belgrade's commentary in-connection with theune conference was at pains to reject for Yugoslavia the stationary roleeutral buffer state. It was in keeping with the "bridge" idea that the Burmese and Indian premiers were to visit Belgrade following the conference with the Russians and that the US, Britain, and France were invited to send there special representatives, other than the permament envoys,iscussion of the international situation.
The tugging and pulling that went on between theand the USSR over the question ofarty-to-party relationship was to be re-established was oneof the divergence of purpose and outlook between them. This hadoviet objective in the preconferencebut the Yugoslavs had held out against it. The Russians were persistent, however, and their delegation to Belgrade was headed by Khrushchev, the party chief, though the pretense was maintained that he had comeember of the Supreme Sovietovernmental body. On his arrival at the Belgrade airport onay, Khrushchevthe Yugoslavs hy'dee^ri^
As representatives of the Communist party of the Sovietparty created by the greatwe consider desirable the establishment of mutual trust between our parties also. The most stable relations are established between the peoples of those countries in which the leading forces are parties which base all their activities on the teaching of Marxism-Leninism.
Thisypical Khrushchev gambit, an attempt toomplicated problem by charging straight into it. Tito did not respond to the airport speech and it was reported that the Yugoslavs had emphatically rejected the overture. It wasalso that they gave no definite replyemorandum on party relations, signed by Khrushchev and Pravda editor Shepllov, which proposed that arrangements beparty consultations and the exchange of party representatives. The Belgrade press, furthermore, maintained throughout thethat it was being conducted on aas distinctarty-to-party, basis, and the conference's final declaration was signed on behalf of the USSR by Bulganln, the government head. Nevertheless, the declarationrovision for "cooperation among the social organizations of the two countries through theof contacts, the exchange of socialist experience,ree exchange ofhich, as the Yugoslavs soon admitted, implied some form of interparty relations.
Why all this strange maneuvering? Both sides realized that renewal of party relations was synonymous with theof Ideological Intercourse. The Yugoslavs wanted this intercourse, too, because if, as they hoped, they were going to exert any influence on the "socialistt would be necessary toommonhe language of Marxism-Leninism. At the same time, they had to move cautiously so as not to alarm the West and so as to satisfy themselves that the relationship was not to beon the old one-sided basis of "socialistsubordination of national interests to the purposes of the Soviet state.
illusions than the Russians about the depth of their dif-ferences. The latter, in their haste to get ahead with the reconciliation, appear to have fixed their gaze too Intently on the points of mutual agreement and to have exaggerated Yugoslav nostalgia for the "good old days" of proletarian solidarity. In this connection, however, there is room
for speculation that the USSR was disingenuouslyover the heads of Yugoslav leaders for the sympathy and support of the less wary rank-and-filo.
8 the Yugoslav-Soviet rift had developed in some wayseligious schism. Tito's divergence from Moscow seemed, in the beginning, to have little- to do with the formal points of Ideology and he wasstill In agreement with its fundamentalpremises and final purposes. Nevertheless, he had come to the conviction that once-shared beliefs had been distorted by Stalin, and Insisted on the possibility of various interpretations. The charges of "revlsionsim" thrown at the Yugoslavs later when the reconciliation had gone slightly "sour" were, from the point of view of aCommunist, no less justified Driven by the simple need for survival, Yugoslavia had attempted to find viability In revisions of its internal system and in intercourse with the non-Communist world. This left them at variance with Moscow on two important points: their belief that their innovations should be studied, not merely tolerated, by the Communist bloc,elief that the "socialization" of the world should be seen as aof evolutionary transformation rather than in the Soviet terms of "who shall beat whom?" Thus, while Moscow contemplated the return to the foldtray sinner, the Yugoslavs probably hoped eventually to convert the whole body of bellcvors to their own persuasion.
The July Plonum
Khrushchov and Bulganln reportod on the results of their Belgrade triplenum of the party contralholdouly. The plenum alsoomprehensive report on Soviet industry from Bulganln,tho admission of several new members to the party's top bodies, voted to conveneh party congress innd participated in the censure of Molotov.
The plenum gave only passing notice to agricultural policy, which had been the subject of most of itssince Stalin's death, and turned its attention in-stead to the industrial front. Bulganln's speechore elaborate and definitive statement of tho points raised at tho industrial conference in May. It focused attention on the problem of continued industrial expansion as it pertained to the Sixth Five-Year Plan, which was to be presented to tho coming party congress. Bulganln spoke
in conventional terns about the successes achieved by Soviet industry. He again condemned those who would slow its growth by giving priority to consumption and affirmed that "the general line of the Communist party, directed toward preponderant development of heavywas and remains unshakable." The USSR, Bulganln told the plenum, was "standing on the threshholdew scientific, technical and IndustrialIn this fact, he suggested, lay tho secret of further economic growth on the basis of available resources. Ho proposed an approach alongore rational organization of production, and Increased laborthe bulk of his speech was devotediscussion, in considerableof shortcomings and possibilities in those areas.
The plenum was called on to ratify severalto the party's presidium and secretariat. A. I. Kirlchenko, party boss in Khrushchev's old Ukrainian bailiwick, and H. A.ember of the secretariat who had been concerned in Soviet-satellite affairs, were made full members of the presidium. The secretariat, the highest body for organizational control over the party apparatus and presided over by Khrushchev, was enlarged by three members. One of them, D. T. Shepilov, then editor of Pravda, had already begun to play an active part in Soviet foreign affairs and had only recentlyember of the Sovlot delegation to Belgrade. A. B. Arlstov and N. I. Belyayev were advanced from posts as provincial party chiefs. Some at least of these appointments were presumably in Khrushchev's interest and their net effect was apparently to strengthen his hand prior toh party congress.
The available accounts of the proceedings of the July plenum differ only In detail as to the circumstances and substance of the Molotov censure, which took placeuly. It was decided to take the unusual stop of humbling Molotov before his lnforiors on the central committee,ho had refused to surrender his opposition towith Yugoslavia, even after the proposition hadajority io the party presidium and after theconference was an accomplished fact. The accounts of the plenum givo an unusually cloar picture of Molotov's stubbornness and the very "Stalinist" cast of his thinking,
Khrushchev led the attack and was joined by Bulganln and Mlkoyan. Molotov was loft toolitary defense,
although it is reported that Voroshilov showed someto join in the denunciation. Molotov had keptoar-guard action throughout the presidium'son Yugoslavia, bis critics charged. First, he had been against any attempt at all to improvewith Yugoslavia. lie was overruled but even aftor the Belgrado trip was decided on he argued thatshould bo dealt with exactly as any otherstate." He insisted that8 break had been justified, that the Yugoslavs had been and remainednd ho contended with some foresignt, that any coddling of Belgrade wouldangerous precedent. He held to this positionentralplenum which met Just before the Sovietdeparted for Belgrade and again in the presidium after its return.
Molotov'replied to these charges at the July plenum In an unrepentant rebuttal. He stated his position in the same terms as before, argued that current policy toward Yugoslavia wasnd reminded those present that, among the top leaders, he waB the only remaining "comrade-in-arms" of Lenin. Molotov's attempt to throw the book of dogma at bis critics and the appeal to his party seniority apparentlyensitive nerve and may explain why somewhat later (in an October issue of Koa-munist) ho himself was forced to admit to ideological laxity. At the plenum itself, his attitudeharp counterattack In which the list of his offenses was lengthened to include inflexibility in the direction of the Foreign Ministry, an Insulting attitude toward the satellites, and, finally, defects of character in himself and his wife. Molotov was warned that unless he corrected himself he might be "pensioned."
Although the soveral accounts are not consistent on this point, the censure proceedings apparently endederse reply from Molotov in which he formally stated his acceptance of the accusations against him and agreed to submit to the Judgement of the central committee
Iu many ways It was fitting that the July plenum should have been the occasion for summoningh party congress, which was to meet in6 eight months before tho deadline established by the party statutes-. The theoretical propositions and the main elements of thowhich it would be the congress' duty to confirm had already begun to emerge. Bulganln's statement on industry supplied the groundwork for the new economic plan which was to bo presented to the congress. The congresson "different roads to socialism" was anticipated in the communique which ended the Belgrade conference. The impending denunciation of Stalin was, however, hardlyby the stress given "collective leadership" and the occasional allusionsarmful "cult of tho individual."
In the prolonged struggle for precedence within the top leadership, Khrushchev had clearly gained considerable momentum. Following the extinction of Beria he hadin building an effective combination against Malenkov which presumably Included such people as Molotov, Kaganovlch and zhukov. Now Molotov had boon made the victim of tho
A party congress evidently appealed to Khrushchev at this junctureoans of pressing home hishe would obtain from it solemn ratification of his policies by the party's highest formal authority as well asew central committee. ubsequent paper in this series will examine the period between the July plenum and the party congress in an effort to discover any trond Inor policies which might have flowedurther rearrangement of powor relationships.Original document.