CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS9
3
CIA/RRection 1
factors UiWtlBi sonar KSttXXOflAi capabiutiui Mini Ant-ro-AK hibsius
f CBR Contribution to OWC for)
Tho principal acooacdc probleas facing tbe USSR ln acquiring operational capabilities vith air to air ml*Biles relate not to production of the nla*lie, but to the aircraft and associated early warning and ground control Intercept Klscilc production representsaall portion of the total lnduatrlal effort needed to create an alr-to-Blr nlMlle defense system.
Ve have no direct evidence that the USSR la dov series producing air-to-air alssiles as basic anaaaeot for Interceptor aircraft. ubstantial nuabor of Soviet fighter aircraft equipped vith suitable airborne intercept radar Is now available, and the USSR is pursuing tn active program of improving and extending its early warning and ground control intercept oysteas. The additional training required by sir and ground personnel could beut in parallellosllerogrOQ aod should not retard development of aa operational capability
Wc believe that if it chose, the USSR could rapidlyrogram for quantity production of each of the eatlnated air-to-air misailee, following their successful develupaeut. Having already earia it considerable lnvestoeot Id tbe alrcrsft and associated systems, whieli repnsseii-' eavlea* eco-jondc drain, tho USSR couldubB'-anti-tJ
air-to-air aiulle defease capability relatively soon after Initiation of quantity production of the niaslles reouired. In the absence of direct evidence thatH is mav aerlea producing or deploying air-to-air guided missiles, ve cannot Judge vith confidence hov tho USSR nov vievs the present or future role of these dualled in air defense.
9
ClA/BIlI Section II
A)
TACT0H8 ATTECTiro SOvTST OPPATTOaAL CAPABILITIES
wrni awace-to-ap ogngp kissilbs
(Section tf of ORB Contribution to (BCCC for)
Informationhatft
vas engaged ln at least Halted series production of surface-to-air nleslles and syatens equipaent for tho KJscov defenses as earlyAlthough production and Installation of the ground equlpnent for the estimatedaunching sites In these defenses appears to have been conpieted by the endepeated observations consistently have revealedmall number of nleslles on site at any one tine.
This phencoeooa, together vith the absence of evidenceignificant
orn go capacity, .leads us to conclude that the USSR nay not yet have produced the full number of missiles required for thc kbscov eyatem. We believe that full-ocale produetion of the missile initially intended for the Hjscov system may have been curtailed vblle avalting the availabilityore advanced nlsslleroved operational capabilities.
In addition to the Moscow launching sites and associated equlpocnt.
3 hasubstantial Investment ln at least four and possiblythan six unique and large support facilities eaich arealong the Inner Koscov ring. The function of these facllitlea may be for
ciiiiHu assembly maintenance and recycling, rather than baaic oloslle production. On one occasion Inore than Hyi eIbbIIcs and/or trallera vere observed at ooo of theio facllltlea. Thlo lndlcateaotal of two to three thousand adaslles could be at these facllltlea nt one time. While the amall ranaber of missiles observed on sites cay result ln pert froa the presence at these facilities of missiles undergoing processing, ve do not believe that this vould account for the consistently snail number of missiles observed at sites unless the total number of nineties required for the Ujbcov system is considerably less than previously estimated.
The Itoacov-type system has not been observed elsewhere ln thea completed form even though more than tvo years have elapsedlast site construction in the vicinity of wbscov. Although thereevidence that preliminary constructioness extensive butvas Initiated In the Leningrad areair observationbeen thwarted conolatontly by the USSR
and ve have only fragmentary evidence of the existence of completed Bites in this area. If alte construction at Leningrad had pro (yeanedriority and pace approximating Mjacov, the ground Installations should have been conpleted by Ve believe, therefore, that the USSR may have altered an earlier intent regarding Leningrad, and that the surface-to-air missile defenses of this area probably willystem with greater flexibility end lesa coat than that at toseov.
Wc believe Uiat too dense nod costly fcfctocov missile defense system haspecial case dictated by the importance aad priority of that area to the USSR. quare mile area defended fay the Moacov aurface-to-alr ml nolle ayatea contains not only the center of Soviet administrative and political controlargo scientific research and design bureau complex, but en Industrial concentration vhlch accounts for almost one-fifth of Soviet gross industrial production. While these factors Justify the unique and expensive defense effort applied to the Moscov area, ve believe that for targets of leaser Importance, as in'tbe
case Leningrad, the DSSR has possibly on econonlc grounds alone, a
i
system with greater flexibility vhlch in turncalier cocaaltnent of resourcea.
Within tha next several years, the rapidity of technological chango
and the possibility of rapid obsolescence vill increase tho economic risks
J
Involved la conaittlng large quantities of resources to defensive missile cyetcsaa. Ve have no basis at present on viiicfc to Judge the likely Soviet courec of action la this regard. Our assessment of expanding Soviet iuduatriol capabilities, however, leads un to conclude that the USSR will be abLe to produce end deploy ln quantity the defensive missile systems estimated to be available ineriod. The nuabero produced and deployed will be governed by the Soviet vietf of thc benefits to be gained and the alternative use of the oaae resources for other purposes. We believe that, because of Its special importance, the Koscov area vlll continue to be the Initial recipient of advanced missile defense systems ao they ore placed lu production.
arch io*0
CIA/RR 1
FACTORS AiTECTDC SOVIETCAPABILITIES WITH AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES (Section III of ORR Contribution to CHIC for)
elieve that the Soviet na subsonic alr-to-eurfacelio is now In aerloa produotlon. Hovovar, we havo no direct evidence regarding the Soviet facilities engaged in this production. Tho problems of producing thia alsslle are aiallar to thoeo ancountorod In the production of aircraft. Because of the United cumber of mioulloB carried per aircraft, and tho somewhat United oporatlonul requiromont for Its employment, production of the over-ell quantity required by the USSR should not laposc serious eeonoalc problems.
The USSR hao produced and in continuing to produce consldorablo numbers ofBADGER) aircraft which could provide on adequate base fora oir-to-surfaco capability if tho USSR chooo. Production of the aircraft and associated navigationoctronlc equipment represent tha mnjar portion of the inveatsjant required In estebllohlng this missile BTrrlom. This Investment hao boon made. We cannot Jodgo how manyircraft havo undergone the modification nocouauiy for use with theso missiles, but we do not bolleve that thecation or such modifications would oerlously hinder the establishment of an enlarged operational capability,.
3
CIA/PR flection IV
*actors AFracnua govtet operatiohai.
CAPABILITIES WTfll SURFACE-TO-SURFACE BgLISTIClOSSILES (Section I? of OKH Contribution to OKIC for)
We believe that the USSR haa the neceaaaxy capabilities to produce Idide variety of balliotic missiles, including the ICBM, If it elects to do eo. Our assessment of tbe Soviet ecooccry leads us to conclude that thc USSR poGsesseo the chlllo, facilities and other resources required to carrylseable program of ballistic micelle production and deployment throughout tbe period of thio estimota. Bevly acquired evidence indicates that the USSR probably possesses considerably no re experience -in the actual production of ballistic missiles than vc )iave estimated previously. We cov believe that thc USSR initiated aeries productionhort-range nurface-to-surf ace balliotic oiesllc system as early
' In vies of our est lea te of Soviet over-all production capab ill ties, the principal factor affecting thc ocope and character of the Soviet balliotic alaalle program0 vlll bc toe nature ond timing of declaions made by Soviet planners on bov to employ tbese capabilities. Toe USSR must make basic decisions concerning tbc size of thecapability vhlch it considers necessary to have lu being at given times and the luvestment vhlch it is prepared to make in initialand deployment of mlaelle eye tecs and their replacement vith more advanced types. These decisions vlll have to be modified in tbe
futureesult of progreao In the development of nevera yet cos, aa veil as choagiog International and Internal conditions. We believe that the OSSB has already decided toiseable ICBM operational capability at the earliest possible date. Other ballistic olBflllo systems which the USSR may Judge to be ofriticalhovever, may cot be produced ln large quantities because of the costs involved ond the rapidity of obsolescence. Because ve lack information oc thelch govern Soviet decisions on the production and deployment of ballistic ales lie systems, and on the timing of these decisions, ve aro able to estiaate only in general terns Soviet intentions and to consider several equally probable choices asong alternative, feasible progress. This has compelled us to selecteveral equally likely cholcoo the programs most favorable to the USSR, particularly in the ceoo of the ICBM.ange_Tactical Syatema
Wo have no direct intelligence on the Soviet facilities engaged lo producing the highly mobile short-range tactical missiles shown In the Moscov parade We estimate, however, that tbs USSR la capable of producing these missiles In quantity if it chooses, and could now bare them in operational units- lagular characteristic of the tracked carriers for the tactical raicallos shown in the Koacov parade wbs that, ln each coos, they wire adaptations of existingalso used with core conventional aruaoeuts. Wo believe that thiseneral Soviet philosophy to adept to (lUi&od missile use. wherever possible, already available uquintsent. This procedure vould
he number of dot design, production end oalntc nance problems vhich must be solved, thereby considerably facilitating production and deployment of the weapons.. Systems
esult of recently acquired Information vhlch sheds nev light on older evidence, ve now believe that1 the USSR converted the former ItaepropetrovsX Automotive Plant to the series production ofallistic ml on ilea vhlch had been developed vith German asslotaaca at PlantMnfri and Plant Although ve lack, direct evidence, ve must assume that other industrial facilities uore also converted to the production of the necessary support and associated equlnocnt for this system. The Initiation of series production1 Indicates early Sovietof ballistic missiles aa operational weapons eyetewe andoviet production capability several years ahead of that previously estimated.
While we have no evidence of production rates or tho totalproduced, we believe that this production vas Initiated largelyeaction to tho Korean Bar, and that the resources of the large Dnepropetrovsk facility wore devoted exclusively to ciaalle production froa1 until Inollowing the series of sweeping decrees by the post-Stalin leadership aimed at bolstering Soviet agriculture, atert of the Doepropetrovslc plant was reconverted to production of agricultural tractor j. ractors wore produced at this plant* with output increasing to
to0 per year
Even though tractor production hae continuedigh rate, fragaentary evidence on tha activities of the Dnepropetrovsk facility through8 leads us to conclude that some type ofissile production Is also continuing. Ve boll eve that the large capacity of tola plant has beau divided end that it hasual roleroducer of both agricultural tractors and guided oleailes. This ia consistent with the observed Soviet practice of using part of tbc capacity of armaments plants in peacetime for civilian production, with the civilian portion of the planteserve military production capability.
There ore several factors, apart fron tbe immediate probleco or Soviet agriculture, vhlch may have influenced tho selection of thc . Dneprcpeti ovvUv missile product!ou facility for tractor production ln Chief among these could haveoviot desire to phase out of Bcrloaeapons system that3 vas becceing obsolete ln tho face of nuclear advances and icproved missile systems under development, end was already stockpiled lo greater quantities than vould normally be required tu paacetiae.
Althoughave no direct evidence, vo believe that tbe Dnepropc-trovsa facility ls currently producing an improved version of.l nolle, or perhaps .isslie estimated to have become available for operational use Either of these missiles, or their compooento, could probably be produced uifchoufc drastic changes ln tbe production processes forccrly employed oa
ype oioeiXec. In view of the large portion of toeallocated to tractor production we believe that oerlco production of missilesaking place at considerably reduced rates ccejparod toeriod, with current output probably used for teat and training purposes ae veil as the equippingalted number af operational unite.
Ue eaticate, however, that the USSR poescaoea an eztenslva short-rongo ball latic missile production capacity and trained labor force in reserve, possiblyumber of facilities, and that thc USSR^apable of noes producing.. ballistictelle systems if it chooses. Furthermore, ve believe that the USSR bos military manpower with experience and training in the use of short-range ballistic mleeilas, and has had sufficient time to train existing operational unitsigh degree of proficiency in tha employment of the newer system which could now be operational-
We hove no information oa the current status of the short-rangeallistic wisoilca estimated to have been produced laeriod. Some of these micsilcn undoubtedly have been used ln training troops, and to acme extent others may hove been modified to Incorporate more advanced ccajtononto. We believe that deployment of the2 missiles in tha European Satellite countries, or China,ossibility> and that the advantages which the USSR might hope to gain could even lead to the export of ouc'i missiles to other countries ac Soviet military.. Systems
We estiaate that the USSR probably SOW poaneaeee
q.ballistic missiles, altbouca on thc basis ofve cannot Judge the pre sent ocnle of production orof operational unite oo equipped. He believe that cany ofof production, operational troop training, logisticsthat could hinder thc achievement of an operationala mlssllo syaten of this type, have been overcocxj by theproven Dotoods previously developed for thc ehorter-raage
Ve have no evidence on vhlch toudgment of the scale of Soviet production or deployment of.allisticsystem osfclBfltsd to become available for operational usei' this missile eyotm is on sdcptatioa of.ys tec, htwever, tha USSR probably vould face no ncu serious problems Inand deployment ofystca - . -
isb do not know what production facilities are noir devoted toICBM progroa> nor haveany direct evidence recordingto produce ICBNs end systems equlposcnt ln quantity, knew, hovever, that the USSRighly dove lopedvhlch includes oil the eklllsi aaX facilities necessary forof eucceosfully developed cieeile oystecs. furthermore,ue eotiimie that the USSRsxkeroii'*.!
or valuable eaporleoce ln thc production, logistic and training impacts Of ballletlc miSQllo syotcao acquired as early- The centrejlrad. planning of the Soviet eeonooy vlll permit the USSR tO
marshal economic rcoourceo very rapidly for the quantity production of ICBM capabilityajor Soviet objective, ve believe that the USSR vlll allocate theeceaaary to achieve the eerlioot pooalble operational capability.
Tho USSR vill determine the pens production rata for ICBKs on tbe basis of Soviet planners' Judgments, primarily with respect to Soviet requirements for various numbers of micelles at selected points in time, together with their capabilities to meet these requirements. Those capabilltieo will include not only the production of ICBMs but also launching facilities, production and installation of equipment, training of troops, end C3 tab lif logistic lines-
Ho estimateufficiently high priority will be assigned to nuclear varhoadshat they ulll ne produced for stockpiling on atne-to-one basis for ICBMs intended for operational use. Prior3 these uajficods would be fabricated by essentially band-production methods. In tbe period9 to0 serial production could begin, the rate thereafter being depoudent upon the scale of toe production effort.
evidence Indicates that the Soviet concepts of ICBM deployment Include unoemi-mobile, rail-aupported system. Ue believe that planning of deployment uas being carried out concurrently with tho preliminary ond detailed design of the ICBM and associated ground equipment, and further, that6 hardware design could havesufficiently firm to permit the USSR to enute basic decisions regarding projected ICON deployment. Such deetsioas include the location of operational launch points, general operational concepts, and
logistics. At that time the detailed layout of many decantsoll-supported launch system could bare been determined, and the Implemontatlon ofrogram could have been Initiated. He eon elude that the USSR has had ample time to complete the preparation of Genoa innrwMng focllitica already, and could now be engaged la providing the additional launching facilities needed for future deployment.
The economic resources requiredail-supported system of this type would cone principally fron the heavy machinery sector of the Soviet econoay. Ve believe that this sector is capable ofrogram of this magnitude and character with only minor delays ln the over-all Investment program.
A Soviet ICBM production and deployment program of tho scope necessary to achieve an operational capability rapidly would require the highest order of planning and accoacillchaent. Considering the various factors discussed above, ve estimate that If the necessary decisions hod been made early enough, thc USSR could produce ICBMs, complete launching facilities, and train operational unitsate aufficient to have on operational capabilityCBMs0 (about one year after ita firet operational capabilityndCBMs loI or at the latest iy62.
8
ciA/Rn ry til seeMsjvy
FACTCR3 AWTCnBQ GOV JET OiyRATIOlAL CAPABTXITTES
WTTfl KftVAL LAU7KHED CB/LTED KIBSILE3f ORR Contribution to OJCtC
Ve have no firm evidence of claelle launching end guidance systems installed on ourface vessels or submrtnea of the Soviet naval fleets. There have been laconelualve reports, hovever, of sighting of Soviet vessels lfclch may indicate experimental Installatlonaev selected vessels.
Soviet submarines fitted vith possible miasile hangers and launching ramps have occasionally been sighted in the Baltic, northern and Pacific fleets. Sightings in the Baltic and Pacific areas of nev KotUn-clasa destroyers indicate thc replacement of the after gun mountcatapult" or launching reap on at least tvo such veasels.
In viev of the construction and development in the free world of nuclear-pow-i-uided mlealle, and hunter-killer type aubaarines, together with current trends observed In the USSR, ve estimate that the USSR ta more Likely toevly designed submarine incorporating one or more of the above characteristics than to attempt to convert existing vosoels. Factors that support thia premise are:he sharp reduction which has occurred ln Soviet production of conven-
ttonal long-ranee submarines]he lock of evidencerogram of mnae conversion of conventional long-range typea to guided missile submarines;he extreme difficulty of converting existing subjsarlnea to nuclear propulsion, vhlch suggests that nuclear pover and missile launching and guidance equipment vlll both be provided forew design; k) the advanced stage of both nuclear pover and guided missile development ln the USSR;he Inability of tho present Soviet naval fleet to engage in nuelear-edesllendhlch. le by no means the least important, preventioneterioration of the International prestige offt.
Kany problems face the shipbuilding Industry in the construction of nuclear-povered and missile launching vessels. The application of these new Eye teas, to both surface vessels and submarines. Involves certain basic design changes in the characteristics of vessels of the heretofore conventional types. The principal problem facing Soviet engineers ls that of developing nuclear reactors, missiles, and missile launching aad guidance systems for marine use. econd, but less difficult problem, is modifying naval vessel design to accocDdate the adapted propulsion and weapons systems. There is Insufficient evidence at this time to enable us to Judge tho extent of Soviet success in solving these problems or the probable Soviet course of action ln this regard.
Original document.
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