Created: 11/26/1957

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cia/hb a



General Economic Capability.

Based oa oux estimta tbat tbo development ofBN capabilitySoriet objective, vu believe that the EEBB vill seek, to achieve an earl; operational capability vlth tale aystea, and that it la prepared to accept rlaka in the allocation of resources for this purpose.

however, that the OSSR

possesseshighly developed industrial base which includes all the skills and facilities necessary for establishing quantity production of successfully developed' lie ays teas. ICBM Prodnctlon.

Tbe centralised planning of the Soviet ecanoay vill penult the USSR to very rapidlyecoaoalc resoarcea far the quantity production of ICBK syateae and ec^paent. Boviet lndostrisl resources can be focused on the production of the Major cosmonanta of the ICBH; that is the engine.

guidance systea, control systems, warhead, and alrfrsae. Each of these coapeassate can be produced on separate, specialised facilities en abasis. In order to alnlaixe delays, tbe parallel planning of production ond aseeafaly of cosponeats is necessary; porta suet be

must bo made and aaocmblcd so that the new version of the basic component can be put into missiles of current as well as past production. The more rapidly tbe production program is pushed, tbe more likely are bottlenecks to develop and the more frequent are cootly changes. These delays andre leas likely to occur In the airframe and engine than tha guidance and control systeauj. The USSR must weigh the coot of these delays and replacements against the advantages of getting operable miaeiles early.

In light of extensive Soviet experience with shorter range ballistic missiles, we believe that the likelihood of large lossea duerash production program is not very great. Cm thie basis we believe that the Soviet* view of the advantages of achieving an early operational capability will cause the USSR to aarshall tbe necessary Industrial resourcesery big iorlty, and that it will pursuerograa forand deployment Of tola weapon as soon aa successful development appearsCO 1CBM Program.

Re have estimated the scheduling and resource allocations requiredigh priority ICBK production, construction and training programCBM's deployed onard sites. The figure Of jOO ICBM'e was selected arbitrarily and we bave not attempted to define it as an optimum or minimal quantity. Although ve bave do direct evidence that the USSR Is actually planning

to carry out this precise progrse,xamination peralte toe aeeeoaaeat of tbo econaalc capability, feaalblllty aod implications ofrogram. Vlth this in mind and ou the basis of our estimate of the Soviet ICDN test

program ve haveetailed production time table for the delivery

of upCBM's to completed launching sites.

During the course of tbe ICBH flight teat program various componento or subsystems such as propulsion, airframe, control,ill prove their adequacy to meet design specifications. Aa the design of each is proven, its design vill be "frozen" and production drawing and specification, as veil as detailed production plans, vill be prepared. Many of tbeae steps vill have been taken prior to completion of the full flight test program-when the final element of the ICEM system design is proven, the design of tbe systemhole vill bemmediate steps will be taken to initiate series production,uild upre-selected peak rate of prodnctlon will begin.


The USSR will determine tbe peek production rate for ICBH'a on the basis of Soviet planners1 Judgement .primarily with respect to their require-ments for various numbers of missiles at selected points in time together with their capabilities to achieve these requirements. These capabilities will include not only those for tbe production of ICBM's but also those for the construction of sites, production and Installation of eeulpment, training of troops and establishing logistic lines, we believeeak rate of shout kO ICBM's per month is compatible vlth the highCBH

prograa examined hero. eriodonths from the beginning of series production will be required to build upormer BU production rateonth,onthly rate oferies produced ICBH's. This period of time could be comprcooed only under all-out mobiliration conditions. Basedigh priority buildupate of koonth, and continuing production ot that rate ve believe that ICBM deliveries will be compatible with the (avcuJ^ilityN'df operational sites. In addition to the ICBM'a delivered to sites, many missiles will have to be produced for testing, training and logistic backup; tha total number ofroduced mighty the0 are delivered to sites.


Detailed planning of ICHM operational base* undcnihtcdly woo teieg carried uut concurrently vita tba preliminary end detailed design of tbe

ICBM syvteo. Inot tbe time hard vere design was sufficiently

firm to permit ths Inltlstloo of construction of launching facilities at the Soviet ICEH test range, basic desleloos could bave been made regarding projected ICBM deployment. These Include decisions regarding the location of operational sites, and general operational concepts taoflaattaaj the logistics; from these the detailed layout of many elements of tbebase* could have been determined,rogram ef site construction aad equipment Initiated.

In order to take full advantage of this capability to develop and produce ICES'a, operational sitae, logistic support and trained troops aust be provided. Although ve have no direct evidence of Soviet ICBM launching alia construction, ve conclude that tbe USSR baa bad ample time to complete tbe construction of some launching sites already, and could nov be engagedarge scale construction effort to provide the additional launching facilities needed to deploy tbo ICBK's it plans to produce.

We believe that Soviet criteria for operational employment of its ICBM could have Included tbe following provloioas:

a. ery high Initial salvo capability In order to achieve aaxlaua neutraliratiem of widely diapersod OS retaliatory capabilities.


concealment of launching ultes.

sites capable of vi tha tending nuclear attack.

transport oe tbe basic means of logistic support.

Based on these criteria, ve haveoviet program for site construction and IflBH deployment which isoot with our estimate of the times at which various quantities of ICBM's could be available. Postulated Operational Site System.

We have estimated that the OSSR eouldCBM's to operational sites byo. With this estimate as our base and on assumed hardened underground launching configuration, the magnitude of the facility,and manpower requirements can be understoodeasure of the resources whichr would hove to invest.

The postulated ICON system consists ofixed underground launch sites hardened to withstand Overpressuresach launching site consists ofrnnffring positions and adjacent storage, maintenance end checkout areas, and an underground guidance station. Each of the underground launch positions contains one missile erected end anothertorage area' prepared for firing. Separate underground launch control centers, crew quarters and fuel storage tanks ore located near each launch'position. The entire eyetesi is serviced by rail. The support eree contains those functions related to housekeeping, maintenance and adjal nlatratiou.

The initial cost of constructing and equipping each launch olte (Including mlsdlles) Is estimated to be aboutillion doll araotal coat ofillion dealers for theites in the system. The ICBM launch sites which hare been postulated ore highly sophisticated with respect to operational effectiveness, low vulnerability, and high degree of concealment If the USSR were to inalement this pro gram, it would have to devote large quantities of construction resources sorely needed in other branches of the Soviet economy- Tne USSR may not consider soystem wortharge commitment of resources snd may be compelled to accept something less.

ess refined system were chosen with far less concealment, lower operational effectiveness and higher vulnerability (say, ability to withstand overpressures ofhe total initial cost would beillion dollars for theites in the system. The difference in cost betweeneiel system leillion dollars and the savings are almost entirely In the cost of construction. The initial coats of bites harder thansl system but softer thenai would rangeillion dollars; forite system, hardened tosl, would costillion dore.

The time required forite might vary. monthssi Bite5 monthssl site depending on the effort put Into construction end tbe location of the site.


Io the assumed eitee system, the basic manpower requirement for each launch pooltlonrew ofen, six to eight of uhem are support pemcmncl. Each undeiground guidance positionrow ofen including three support personnel- The site manning concept is baaedrew duty period of two weeks durst loo. At the end of this duty period tbe crews are relieved by new crews who bave been stationed at the support area. Thus, each launch site requiresaunch position crews and two guidance site crews. otal system ofaunch sites, the requirement wouldaunch position crewsCOO men,uidance site crewsen. Training.

The training of these personnel is considered in two distinct phases. First, training takes place on tbe level of individual specialists. This type of training canear or more, and takes place at schools and industrial and test facilities engaged ln the ICBM program. Tbe second phase is concerned with grouping tbe individual specialists, technical personnel and non-technical personnel into an organizational unit required for both launch and guidance. This type of training can be accomplishederiod ranging from eight to twelve weeks and produces crews who possess only the minimum of operational training necessary to man the sites. After assignmentiteonths to one year will be required to train

tho crews In order toifib degree of operational proficiency. General Economic Assessment.

A Soriet ICBK prodnctlon and deployment program of the scope estimated

thatrogram is within Soriet economic capabilities, and that tbe USSR could have mode the nacesaary decisions to Implement it. Our

of ICBM's and systems equipment in quantity, and the acquiring and training of troops, are less likely to be limiting factors on the ICBH program than the cons traction of nuneroua Launching sites with marl mm operational effectiveness, low vulnerability,igh degree of concealment which would require large quantities of resources sorely Deeded in other soctoro of the economy. We cannot Judge whether the USSR would consider aoaunch system wortharge comaitment of resources, and, therefore, whether it might accept something.lcae.

We estimate the USSR couldirst prototype ICBH, with all major elements flight testedimited degree,ccpleted operational site bynd that about ten of these prototype missiles could be in the hands of trained troops at oneew operational sites In the latter half We believe the USSR ls capable of having the followingof operational ICBM's deployed at completed sites snd In the hands of trained units by the dates Indicated:


o99 to00 to0


0 Kovembar7

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(OOT Projoct


Eotlaotod Soviet icm Production Cspobllltlao

Wo bare no direct information regarding the production fadies devoted to tho Soviet ICBH program; however, we do know the OSSRighly developed industrial base which Inclodea all the afrllla end fucilitlea necessary for the quantity production of ICBH yyrtosis. Va believe that these Industrial resources will be mars bo lis*irst priority bosla to support tbe Soviet ICBH program.

Two altomatlvo Soviet ICBW produotion and allocation prcgrnna are considered. Tbo first alternative (A) as suns that tbe ICBH under developeant loew design with little direct extension frca the ehortor range ballistic Btsslle programs. It therefore, willomprehensive flight tost progrssi oforiseo prove out tbe deolgn. This program aseuxas that tbe missile "know how" acquired by the ussr frcDi its shorter range missiles will enable it to carry out the flight teat program; without interruption due to major technical failures. Tbe flight teat program includes earth satellite vehicles which we eseuas-

contribute toOM teat program.

Tbo second alternative (B) asanas* tbe ICBH design under development

la largely an extension froa the shorter range ballistic nlnulla programs

and thatr vas confident enough of success to cccsslt production

resources early, Initiate launch site construction and equipping, end lo

general risk these resources on the assumption of success. In alternative

boutdsslles would be flight tested to prove ou. tbe Barrlnge of

the many already proven cceiponento end systems adapted froa rrevious programs.

There ere certain key antes ofIn tbe ICBM program.

irot ef those la tha dale when tho flret Soriet prototype ICTH,imited operational capability, le delivered to an operational unit. Thie flret prototype adealle, provided eaeentlally for troop training, and additional prototype adaellee delivered thereafter could be used for military porpoees. The second key date le tbe date af "designhat le, tbe date when the decision le node to ehlftroduction statue to carles projection. Tbe third key date occurs whanrototype ICBM'a could have been delivered to onaov operational sites.

The estimated dates of attaining these Important objectives In tbevMi two eltematlvea are aa follows:



prototype at operation site:




Of December

end of8

dates Indicated:



ICBM'a In9


CBM'e by0

CBM'a In9

CBM'a In9

ICBM'a In0

ICBM'a in0

Tbo bo estisated alternative Gcvlot ICBM production and deployewnt progrnaa are baaed on on assessnent of Soviet industrial capabilities tlaa-phnaed vltb theno antra tod by Soviet earth satellite* aod ICBM test launching*. Ve therefore consider thca ea sound estlantae of over-

all Soviet capabilities ln this field. Whether the USSR carries out

elther of thaee program depends on Soviet intent, end the rigor with which the DSSB say choose to exploit the capability we estiant* it possesses.

Attached are two charts showing tho schedules end flows for ICBM production, teats, deliveries to sites and site coRpletlono under si terrand B.


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Each aoterlak ropreeenta an unallocated nlaolle In consideration of degradation and spare factor*.

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of ORB Contribution to CIA Draft

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Irrrnandm of JI Crtobor, "Cbxocn In Soon* of*

GZOE Soviet

Attached la tba'Cfifi contribution called for in tbo rexexancai* noocorexdxax. It la for inclusion ln CIA draftuich vill bo fcorearded to CKIC for it* An CKB repxeoentatlTe vill attend toe OOC dollfc^inrtlooe ca7 end vlU rmovlaa detailed acpport for tbereached In (ft ir. cootributioo.

K.-tln6Directorend .feporta

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CBS Cbotxibotiotl to CIA lYcpoMd QcmIX ofox OKIC'


Uc hero ao cUrvet iirfornctlnoproduction>

cj devoted to tbo eovlrt ICH* progrwj bovora,lfiblj cewelopedbac whichafcilla seal ffccUlUos DOccaoary for tb* <jMsntlty prodaeticeiarvtcos. Accusled tbat tbeo* ra*Mroo= ere ittrahedlod onpriority bhela w* oaikwtoUVS oouLd bare tba

c^ealltles of cotarctlonal leaf* laf tred nits by Um dates iedloeVdi

90 by Ooptotf>sr ICBTa by Vreabtr TTtfi-ereetteits Birther tba* tbo fire* prototypeturvlngcv-sratixcel capebUltr could bo sAUra-cdS- lsalletroop

tradatug, ead eddlLiuoalea liedcliverod

comla b* mmd for military pmrpoaeaj by tba com of 1 total of ton amok aiaatlaa comla bo la alarm et oneov ijiillniiol el tarn.

Be balleve tbe OKfe Le capable of flight teetlmc atwet JO(Imclmalmc aaath aaaoUlto vahloLea which me menrarrlhmta to the ICM teat mroarem) by that eod of lOJoj at ami ohleaten fraeme" ewvielimi comla be eaate emd eerleo paeaof ejiiellimml ICBTt UltlataA. roeavjtlea seite of ao art mat lea sea- eaaottibe muBleaed by0 emd by tba mil0 omomtammmjtlamal eltee felly eomlmaee aaa aanamd

tbtrnaaarletmtaaamafctaa endmraejrem

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