THE LIKELIHOOD OF ANTI-US DEMONSTRATIONS DURING DR. EISENHOWER'S CENTRAL AMERIC

Created: 5/27/1958

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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AKDtrH

SUBJECT: The Likelihood of Anti-US Demonstrations durin* Dr. Eisenhower's Central Aneriean Teur

1. WQ believe that, alrost certainly in Qua! _Fanoraa, nnd possibly elsewhere, the Coaamists end associated anti-Aaorlcan groups will take art van tape of Dr. KUtcn Elsenhower's presence cn his Intended tour to stare demonstrations designed to discredit both the United States and the local covemncnts friendly toward the United States.

2. The denonstratiens in Lisa and Caracas on the occasion of Vice President Nixon's visits to those places were well or- -panlted nnd effective. Although undoubtedly Conmunlat instigated, these deraonstrationa did five expressionopular sense of grievances against certain phases of US policy, and tho general feeling that with our preoccupation with Europe, Asia and Africa, South America has bean relatively neglected. Tho host povon>-manta were, of course, embarrassed, and federate opinion deplored tho excesses ofhe general public reaction,ACJED

has been that the shock brought South American problems to our attention si nothing else could have done and hence nay have long range benefits for the South American countries. It ia likely that this fact Is understood in Central America and that in ato of the Central American countries disgruntled people would take thc occasion of Dr. Elsenhower's trip to Join Communist demonstrations to bring their case likewise vividly to our attention. From thc Cofsmnlst point of view, the demon-etrations in Lima and Caracas were stemporary success though they did surface Cocnunist agitators and alert thcelements to tha extent of the Communist danger. The Communists will almost certainly plan to repeat the Venezuela-Peru type of tactics srainst Dr. Eisenhower in Central America, and will find followers outside of their own

favorable for Cpmmist-inspired nction. In Guatemala thothat President Ydigoras wjuldtronghas boon disappointed. Leftist, including Coanmist, political strength is growing rapidly. Thc socurity organisation

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has bean disrupted by tho change of administration. There Is no effective control ever tho return of Conrainist exiles. Dr. Elsenhower's visit will comaonth in which student disorders are traditlcnal. Tho students are alreadyver unrelated Hitters. Certain rrievances against tho United States arc already well established ln the public Hindi the alleged US roleU In tho upset of Arbenz, US support for Latin Aaericsn dictatorships, US "ec-noelc iKperlalisn" as symbolized in the nines of ths people by the United Fruit Company and other enterprises. Today, the Cowmnists would have no diffi-culty in finding people eager to demonstrate against tho United States In Guatemala.

h. In Panama,rful ultrp-natlonalistic politicians arg already carryingustained agitation against the government for the softness of its attitude toward tho United States,for its failure to assert Panaea's claims to sovereign rights in the Canal Zone andhare ln the gross Income of the canal. There is already considerable popular irritatiro asnlnet the United States over these Issues, over US delay in fully in-pleeentlng the Renon-Elaenhowcr Treatyndeneral

deterioration of tho ecmonlc situation. Moreover, there have recently been sericus disturbances among the normally volatile students. Thus ultra-nationalist and Communist agitators could readily exploit existing unrest among the students and the unemployed to stare demonstrations against the United States and the local government on the occasion cf Dr. Elsenhower's visit. The fact that Panama would be the last stop on the itinerary would in case of hostile receptions earlier ln the trip make demonstrations there the more likely.

The governments of tho area, except Guatemala, are understood to have riven assurances that they can and willany demonstrations that may occur. The attitude of President Tdlgoras of Guatemala has been highly equivocal. WMlc unwilling to admit that he cannot control the situation, he is disturbed about the visit and its timing and has privately suggested that Dr. Eisenhower's visit might well be postponedoreseason.

whether tho governments of the area actually can and will make gcod their assurances is another matter. Hone of their,ufficient Intelligence capability to be sure of being

able to anticipate Communist tactics in detail. Theof Guatemala andave recentlrchange" in adninisiraticn. Provided that Dr.to avrdd close contact with the rubllc. It ishe could be protected fron the personal indignitiesVice President Nixon was subjected. However,cf anti-US sentiment probably could not beespecially in Guatemala and. _

will" missions/to areas where tho poopleto the United States for concrete aid cr readjustment

of policies deemed to be Inimical to the interoste of the country concerned are likely to become mere and moro counter productive. Surely this will be true unless the missions are equipped to bring some alleviation of the causes of complaints or at least are ready toeal hearing to the ecaplalnts, real or fancied.

extent of the protests or disorders which mayto Dr. Milton Eisenhower's trip is dependent uponwhich cannot be fully evaluated in advance of thowhich have been discussed in this nemorandum to the extent

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of available information; naaely, the determination of the.host governments to make tha most effective possible use of the se-

curity forces available to then (vc have already consented upon the inefficiencies of these forces in certain of these countries to tend secondly, whether or not directives will go_

disrupt the trip as vas done in Peru end Venezuela or whether they will prefer at this stare tterely torotest but to avoid overt incidents. We are rather Inclined to believe_that at least ln Guatemala and probably in Panama, the CoRRunists will be Instructed toigorous effort to disrupt the trip.

9. It remains to be noted that if, for the protection of Dr. Elsenhouer, it became necessary for local security forces to employ violence against the population, or to call out the armed forces, especially if there were bloodshed, the credit of the United States, in the area and throughout Latin America, would be adversely affected.

ALLEN W. DULLES Director of Central Intelligence

Original document.

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