arti3
SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER
POSSIBLE SOVIET LONG RANGE BOMBER
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE iN RILL
Submitted bv lhc
DIRECTOR OFI T
The fallowing intelligence orga lllsaarticipated in the preparation ot this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the Inlelligence organisations ol the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Atr farce, and The Joint Staff.
Concurred In by the
LVTELLIGKNCC ADVISORY COMMITTEE
. Concurring xoert The Director of InteDs-gtnce end Research. Dtvtmmt of State, the AinsUnl Chief of Staff. Intelligence. Department Of the Army; tke Director af Navalhe Assistant Chief of Staff.USAF: the Deputy Director [or InteUigence. The Joint Staff; and the Atomic tnergy Commune* Rtprtientattve to the IAC. The Assistant Director. Federal Bureau of Mcesti-gctuia. abstained, the sutteet being outside of hi* jurisdiction.
CHANOC WOLA38
a DKiAssifxo Class changed to NCXTDt-virWOATE: _
All It
1
T3 9
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rhlte Bou.se
atlonal Security Council epartmeni of State epartment of Defense Deration* Coordinating Board orolc Energy Commission -deral Bureau of InTcsUg&Uon
POSSIBLE SOVIET LONG RANGE BOMBER DEVELOPMENT,
THE PROBLEM
To estimate what new long range bomber types the USSR may develop foruse over the next five years.
CONCLUSIONS
USSR will probably introducebombers into operaUonal Long Range Aviation units. Research and development towardmanned bomber weapon systems is under way in the USSR, but theof specific new long range bomber types is Inconclusive. (Paras.)
During thc period of this estimate, the USSR may introduce into operational units one or more of the following:
fl. Improved versions of the BISON jet heavy bomber, having better range and altitude capabilities;)
ew subsonic heavy bomber, which could probably be available for operational use, havingcharacteristics somewhatthan those achievable by improving the BISON, especially with regard to range;
ew medium bomber, which could probably be availableupersonic "dash" capabilitiesange roughly equivalent to thatin an improved BADGER.
he USSR probablyontinuing requirement for and is working toward aircraft capable of both supersonic speeds and two-way operations against allin the continental US. Theof both these characteristics would require advanced airframe design as well as high-energy chemical and/or nuclear propulsion. Chemically-powered aircraft with such characteristics will probably not be available for operational use in the USSR until afterlthough prototypes having significant propaganda impact may appear earlier.uclear propulsion system for supersonic aircraft will require andevelopment and test program,extending well
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a high-priority program, asuitable for nuclear propulsion of subsonic aircraft could be available* )
We believe that the USSR hashigh prioritypace-flight program encompassing work onhigh-altitude flight, manned earth
satellites and manned space vehicles. It is probable that experimental manned rocket aircraft for extremelyresearch are now or soon will bein the USSR, but an operational hypersonic (over Machlide vehicle will probably not be achieved until some years
Considerations
As stated In, we believe that tne USSR willtrong long range bomber force, including both medium and heavy bombers, at least until it hasubstantial nuclear delivery capability with more advanced weapon systems. Evenbombers, especially advanced types, will almost certainly continue to play arole, with emphasis on those functions for which manned bombers are particularly suited, such as attacks on small hardened targets, damage assessment, and
Thus we believe thc Soviets have arequirement for improved long range bomber systems capable of penetrating US defenses and of conducting two-wayagainst all targets ln the continental US. To assist ln the penetration of defenses, the USSR will require that operational bomber designs be capable of employing ECM, decoys, air-to-surface missiles, and other specialized equipment For the same reason, the desired
"The Assistant Chief of Stall. Intelligence. USAP believes that this conclusion does not give due consldcraUon to the possibility of accelerated Soviet developments In nuclear propulsionnow2 in doing so. it does not give enough weightactor of particularto US securitythe USSK, through determined efforts and concentration ofhas proved that It is capable of unusual technological accomplish men ts. He believes, therefore, the paragraph should read aeigh priority program lhe Soviets mayuclear powered subsonic"
performance characteristics of improvedlong range bombers will include Increased speeds, as well as capabilities for very high or very low altitude penetration. For two-way intercontinental operations, Sovietforces will require either aircraft with very long unrefueled combat radii or anrefueling capability, with compatible tankers.
The continued slow rate of production of the BISON Jet heavy bomber, together with an even lower rate of producUon of the BEAR turboprop heavy bomber, suggest that Soviet planners may not be satisfied with present versions of these bombers. The BISON and BEAR, which went into series productionepresent the level of Soviet airframe and propulsion technology as of thes. We now believe that the performance characteristics of the BISON are somewhatour original estimates. They may not measure up to Soviet expectation.'
Despite the lagging Soviet heavy bomber program, the USSR has continued to expand certain facilities associated with largeaircraft. Major new construction has been reported at most Soviet airframe plants
current estimates ol Uie performance char-acterlsUcs of operaUonal Soviet long range bombers are presented inevisedf the ANNEX to: MAIN TRENDS IN SOVIET CAPABILITIES ANDimplified table of performance characteristics, for purposes of comparison amone present and alternaUve future Soviet long range bombers for operaUonal use2 Is presented as an ANNEX to this paper.
mm
o no RET
the past lour years. Construction at bomber plants has been characterized by large, high-bay buildings; estimateddates at various plants range6ome of this added capacity isto be for the production of the large transports developed over the past few years. During the same period, the USSR hasthe construction or expansionumber of miliury airfields Runways of well0 feet In length have beenin several areas.ew of thc potential bomber staging bases in the Arctic.
USSR has adequate research andcapacity for more advancedbombers. We estimate thatin aerodynamicsill permit thc design andof airframes capable ofhypersonic (above Machlight.propulsion capabilities during theprobably support bomber developmentsubsonic and supersonic regions. We also believe thatis now actively developing highfuels and nuclear propulsionfor aircraft Experiments areon structural techniques thatmore advanced and efficientwc believe that the USSRnot be able to develop forduring the period of this estimatecapable of both supersonic speedtwo-way Intercontinental
Evidence of Now or Improved Long Range Bombers
Soviets have made efforts tomodels of long range bombers,them to inflight refueling andnavigation equipment, and tothem for transport use. Some of thein BISON production, at least untilwas probably accounted for bydifficulties necessltaUng extensiveof thc airframe. Enginenoted In the CAMEL transport7
'See Uie characteristics ofedium bomber In the ANNKX.
presumably reflect similar work on the BISON and BADGER, which employ the same basic engine.
incee have received some fragmentary information which could beto new Soviet bombers. Among these items are the following: several observers in the Kola Peninsula area in October reported seeing large, high-speed aircraft of delta-wing configuration; an enigmatic Red Star article in December described the test flight ln "high latitudes"colossal" jet heavy bomber, which allegedly covered andistance exceeded only by one other type of Soviet bomber. An analysis of thc October sightings does not establish whether the observers saw known soviet aircraftew type. The Red Star article wasvague as to Just how new thewas and when the flight occurred. The article could relate eitherompletely new subsonic bomber or to one of thc USSR's existing heavy bomber types, possibly modi-fled (see paras.. Otherdata suggestarge newodified existing bomber has been undergoing flight tests sincen sum, the above evidence could indicate that new types of long range bombers are nowin the USSR, but it is msufficlent toirm conclusion that this is the case and it is inconclusive as to what specific types arc under development. We therefore remain largely dependent upon estimated Soviet capabilities and requirements in assessinglong range bomber development.
Bomber Development for Operational Use2
he USSR wiU probably introducebombers into operational Long Range Aviation units. Since the evidence of specific new long range bomber types is inconclusive, we remain largelyupon estimated Soviet capabilities and requirements In assessing the USSR's bomber development programs. Sovietand development establishments are probably working on various alternative ap-
preaches to Interim nuuincd bomber systems, and past experience has indicated that the USSR may display experimental or prototype
aircraft which will not be developed further
into series producUon models.
mprovement of Present Types. The USSR could atni elect to Improve the BISON by normal refinements, especially InSoviet planners probably are notwith the range of this aircraft, whose two-way capabilities against Uie continents US now appear to bc marginal, even withand staging from advanced bases In the Arctic. The BISON'S combat radius could probably be unproved0 toith inflight refuelingeduced payload commensurate with probable Soviet Improvement in nuclear weapons technology. This combat radius would give it greaterflexibility but probably sUll not antwo-way Intercontinental capability. Target speedsnots and targetof0 feet could probably be achieved. Increased capabilities to penetrate to target areas could be achieved through the use of ECM, decoys, defensive armament and air-to-surface missiles.
Improvement of the Bison would bewith Uie efiort the Soviets devoted to getting Uie BISON into scries producUonelatively short Ume, and with their frequent pracUce of settlingeapon system and producing it in large quantiUes. It would permit the most efficient buildup of heavy bomber producUon and would imposelittle drain on Soviet aviation research and development resources, which could thus be concentrated on more advanced aircraft. The same relatively modest developmentcould somewhat improve thccharacteristics ot the BADGER.
Sew Subsonic Heavy Bomber. On Uie other hand, if thc USSR had an entirely new subsonic heavy bomber in advanced flight-test status by the fallreliminarywould probably have been started in4 and Uie aircraft could probably be ready for operational use9onsidering the estimated state ol thc art In
the USSR during Ihis Ume period. In conjunc-Uonequirement of. refueled combat radius for adequate coverage of the continental US. we believe that such an aircraft, employing improved turbo-Jetcould probably achieve target speedsnotseet. The use of turbo-tan engines would result in slighUy greater range capabiliUes. at some sacrifice In speed and alUtudeeavy bomber of Uie type described would possess generally the same advantages and disadvantages as the BISON relative todefensive capabilities during this Ume period, but its greater combat radius would permit much more flexibilityoviet decision to press ahead withomber would Implywith thc growth potential of BISON and BEAR.
ew Supersonic "Dash" Medium Bomber. The USSR has been working on militarycapable of supersonic speeds for aof years. Considerable progress in delta-configuration supersonic fighters and"dash" light bombers was apparent ln the display of prototypes6elta-conflguraUon fighters are probably now -in producUon. There arc also (airly reliable indicaUons of Soviet development of Jetwith thrusts well beyond those ofengines.ogical next step wouldedium bomber capable of supersonic "dash" at speeds up to about. Wc believe thatroject may have been started by Ifrototype couldbe flown8 and the first operational aircraft be available' An aircraft of this type might have been the subject of the7 sightings in the Kolahich case the project might be sufficiently far along to permit first operatiohalas early The speed andcapabilities of this type alrcralt would provide It great advantages over presentlong range bombers in its ability toto target areas. Its range would be roughly equivalent lo Uiat achievable by an
'This aircraft ts designated "MB-Ol" InS7.
0
ith one inflightand staging from the Chukotskiit could probably conduct two-way operationsew targets tnUS and one-way operations against all US targets.
ir The USSR may introduce one or more of the above types into operational units asmanned bomber systems. In theheavy bomber field, either an improved BISONew jet heavy bomber would help thc USSR cope with the geographicit faces in the application ofair power against the continental US. The supersonic "dash" medium bomber would probably be considered by Sovieteplacement for or supplement to the BADGER. On the other hand,thatew subsonic bomberupersonic "dash" medium bomber would add substantially to Soviet capabilities foratiack, the USSR may have elected not to develop either or both these types to the point of operational use, but may be proceeding directly to thc more advanced types discussed in the following paragraphs.
Development for Operational Use2
Soviet aviation research and development establishments are probably already working toward considerably advanced mannedthe development of which will require solutionside range of technicalThese include aerodynamic heating and other problems associated withflights at extremely high speeds, theand producUon of practical,chemical fuels, and/or the development of nuclear reactors suitable for aircraftAt present, three avenues of research and development toward advanced manned aircraft seem open to the USSR. Sovietof any or all these avenues may become evident during the period of this estimate.
Supersonic Chemical Bomber. Thehave probably undertaken preliminary design studiesully supersonic, chemical-powered heavy bomber. If this project were activelyrototype could probably
be flight'tested, using conventional fuels, late. Among the critical problems the USSR will encounter are those of high-energy chemical fuels, as well as Inflightof this type of aircraft. Sovietshow that the USSR has considered liquid hydrogenropellant but has found it unsuitable at present foroviet scientists haveand studied boron compounds In an extensive research program, and haveachieved pilot plant production of dt-borane. an Intermediate step in theof more desirable boron fuels. While we have no evidence of the testing of boron in lurbo]ets, ramjets, or afterburners, the Soviet needigh-energy fuel to permit the achievement of both supersonic speeds andranges leads us tooviet program In boron fuel development, which could probably make It available for limited operational use inIts first use is likely to be restricted to afterburners or ramjets, because of limited availability of fuel and problems of toxicity, engine design, and combustion product
NuclearAircraft. We believe that Uie USSR also has an active nuclearpropulsion program. Judging fromby leading Soviet scientists andthe continuing appearance of semi-technical popular articles on this subject,ew technical articles on subjects directly related to nuclear aircraft propulsionWc have not Identified any specificprogram, but the USSR's capabilities in reactor and shielding technology, highmaterials, and engine and airframe technology are sufficient for thc conduct of an advanced program in this field
We therefore estimate lhat the Soviets are probably now engaged in development and testing ot reactor components andThis effort, ifigh priority, could result in the developmenteactor suitable for nuclear propulsion of aubsonic
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15
he ability of such anto fly extremely long distances at very low altitudes would makeseful vehicle for some military missions. The attainmentuclear propulsion system for aaircraft will require an extensiveand test program, probably extending well
he Soviets, for propaganda and research reasons, may have undertakencrash" basis touclear power plant which could be carried in an aircraft. If this is the case, we believe they couldlying test-bed airborne appreciablyehicle could have at least one nuclear power unit providing useful thrust during some phase of the flight.
Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence. USAF believes that this effort. Ifigh priority, could resultubsonic nuclear propelledreaching test flight stageSee footnote to paragraph 4.
ypersonic Aircraft. We believe that the USSR has attached high priority to aprogram encompassing work onhigh-nltltude flight, manned earth satellites, and manned space vehicles. It is probable that experimental manned rocket aircraft for limited exploration of extremely high altitude flight problems are now or soon will be flying in the USSR. One outgrowth ofrogram mayypersonic glide vehicle capable of reconnaissance and possibly weaponsehicle of this type would receive an Initial rocket boostufficient altitude and velocity to enable It to glide through the upper atmosphere lo its target. In advanced stages of development It could return to ils base by encircling the globe Initial flight-tests of the manned stage ofoviet vehicle could take place byut an operaUonal vehicle couldnot be achieved until some years
'P
ANNEX
SIMPLIFIED PERFORMANCE COMPARISON
Current and Alternative Future Soviet Long Range Bombers2
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OIT1MUM MISSION PROFILE'
reserves are level, and aircraft
(Calculatoi in accordance with USpec except that reduccu to pcrct aofinutes loiter at sea Ic operal* at altitudes permitting maximum radius/range)
ALT EHUTURE DEVELOPMENT
Take-off weight (lbs.)
Radiusb. payload one refuel'
Rangeb. payload one refuel*
Target Speed (knots)
Target Altitude (ft.)
19S7
175
7
M
0
7
S00
0
0
'
Bomber
'
'
0
elected for comparison on this simplified SMdSSj fttS Sod'^usc
craft, with the exception oflSfiO Heavy Bomber for which no details wecre^Cfcom<JntlDIeercent In-
nglnes. The use of turbo-fan engines would result in slightly greater range capabilities, at some sacrifice In speed and altitude capabilities.
ptnoaich" speed is estimated
Original document.
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