4
SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER
THE SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD DISARMAMENT
Submitted by the DIRECTOR OP CENTRAL fNTELMGENCE
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onre The Director oland Research. Department ol State; the AtsMant Chiel of Staff. Intelligence. Department ol lhe Army: the Director Ol Naval Intelligence; the Assistant Chiel of Staff.USAF; the Deputy Director for Intelligence. The Joint Staff; and the Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC. The Assistant Director. Federal Bureau ofabstained, the subject being outside of his jurisdiction.
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Data HOT
THE SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD DISARMAMENT
THE PROBLEM
To assess the^underlying motivations of Soviet disarmament policy and theSoviet position on the main disarmament Issues.1
CONCLUSIONS
4 the USSR has laid increasing stress on disarmament issues as part of its peaceful competitionThe most significant factorsthis development are:oviet awareness of the destructive-ness of nuclear weapons, which,by growing confidence that the USSR can ulUmately outstrip the US by peaceful competition, leadsesire to reduce the risks of nuclear war; (b) the Soviet belief that thc exploitation of disarmament Issues can contributeloward the achievement of key foreign policy goalsincluding relative weakening of the West, militarily and otherwise; (c) the attractiveness ofsignificant resources fromto other uses, so long as the USSR's relative military position is not impaired.
To date, however, the Soviet attitude toward disarmament agreements seems to be dominated by several major re-
1 We ui* lhe term disarmament In this estimate Xo describe thc whole complex or Issueswith arms limitations and controls, force redaction! sndnd not ln Uie absolute sense of abolition of armaments.
straining factors, which add to theof reaching such agreements on any basis acceptable to the West Chief among these are: (a) the caution of the Soviet leaders over risking theof their newly gained nuclearby moving too far too fast in anand highly speculative field; (b) their deeply ingrained suspicion that the West Is as yet interested in armsonlyasis advantageous to(c) their basic aversipn toespecially within their ownand (d) their probable belief that the USSR can still gain considerably by propaganda and unilateral actions, at minimum real cost to Itself,
ence wc doubt that the Soviethas yet arrived at any hard and fast position on disarmament issues. The Kremlin is now activelyuclear testnuclear-free" rone In Central Europe, and troop reductions in Europewhich it regards as lending verisimilitude to its disarmament posture, placing further pressure on thc Western position, and
having other tangible advantages. Wc believe it is prepared to make someincluding limited inspection, for agreements on these issues, considering that it will gain more than compensatory advantages.
Soviet readiness to make concessions to obtain agreements on other issues will largely depend on how much the USSR can accomplish by its present tactics innilateral weakening of the West. To the extent that Moscow can inhibit the use and deployment ofweapons and create strong pressures for US withdrawal without furtherit may see Utile gain inits present disarmamentactical sense.
But if thc West's deterrent power is maintained and strengthened, the Soviet leaders will almost certainly become more concerned over the prospective piling up of advanced nuclear armaments, with the heightened dangers of war byIf at the same time they re-rnain confident that they can achieve their ultimate objectiveshe desirability of di-mmishing tlie threat of nuclear war by disarmament agreements may loomIn their minds. In fact they would probably look upon progress towarddisarmament measures as facilitat-
ing the "peaceful competition" strategy itself. Thus both foreign policy andmotivations may lead to growing Soviet interest in expanding the areas of serious disarmament negotiationsorresponding willingness toigher price for agreements than hitherto.
owever, their basic view of Western hostility will impel the Soviet leaders to retain at least sufficient militarypower to meet what they regard as their minimum security needs.we believe that the" USSR will enter any disarmament agreement with the intent at the same time to seekto enhance Its militaryand to achieve an eventual military superiority over the US.*
' The Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence. USAF. believes thatovietto curtail or limit Uie development of their military capabiliUesevel ofrather than to seek Uie early attainment of an overpowering military superiority The Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence. USAF.the paragraph should read as foUowi:
-Any agreement* made by the Soviets in the field of disarmament will be entered into with the Intention of Improving their relaUvestrength and of furthering their drive to. ward world domlnaUon. In addition, anywill In no way lead them to lessen their efforts to achieve an overpowering nuclearcapability at Uio earliest possiblelosely related to tho above Judgment Is the Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence. USAF.expression of paragraph ia which sets forth more fully the reasoning which leads to these judgments.
DISCUSSION
UNDERLYING MOTIVATIONShe disarmament Issue has traditionallyrominent place in Sovietand propaganda, especially since World Sincelong withother steps designed toess
aggressive appearance to Soviet policy.has laid increasing stress on disarmament moves. The most significant factorsthai development appear to haverowing awareness of the destructive-ness of nuclear weaponsonsequent
desire to reduce the likelihood of nuclearrowing belief that lessbehavior would be more likely tofree world unity and resistance to Sovietrowing confidence that the Soviet Union will ultimately outstrip its principal opponent, the US, without recourse to war;elief thatituation of generally lessened tension significantresources could be diverted from purely military to other important uses.
A. Reducing the Risks of Nuclear War
There is little doubt as to the seriouswith wliich tlie post-Stalin generation of Soviet leaders have come to viewuclear war. Thoughssertion ln4 that another world war would mean "thc end of world(not lust tho collapse of capitalism) was repudiated, recent statements by the Soviet leaders suggest that they are well aware that widespread mutual devastation would ensue. The USSR's post-Stalin shift In emphasis from expansion by local aggression to peacefultactics probably reflects at least In part this concern over the risks of nuclear war.
An Important element in the Soviet desire to reduce the likelihood of nuclear war is the apparently growing confidence of the present Soviet leaders that the USSR willinite period outstrip tlie USpeaceful" competition for influence and power. This confidence rests upon Uie rapid growth ofpower and tlie spread of Soviet Influence abroad, and upon successes In the fields ofand technology. It Is further reinforced by the doctrine that Communist victory Isinevitable and by Uie Soviet leaders" belief that they have the will and capacity to realize this goat. This present mood ofmakes them all the more reluctant to see this prospect Jeopardized by the onewhich could spell immediatethermonuclear war.
the same time we do not mean tothat Soviet conduct Is shaped by anfear that nuclear war Is likely. Onthe Soviet leaders probably believe
Uiat thc West Is not disposed to undertakear, and Uiat even if It were, their own nuclear capabilities have already become such that Uie Western powers are highly unlikely to take Uie risk for any but the gravest reasons. They are probably also reasonably confident that they can conduct their own policy inay as to limit Uie risks involved
Nevertheless, Uiey must be disturbed over the possibility of war by miscalculation,arising out of local conflict, or even by accident Among other things, they arethat the West would use nuclearin local war, with the resultant danger of expanded hostilities- Perhaps for thispublished Soviet statements deny anybetween Uie consequences of tactical and strategic use of nuclear weapons, andthat any use of nuclear weaponsimited war is bound to broaden the conflict. These statements may or may not represent the true Soviet belief; ln either case they arc probably designed to inhibit us from such use of nuclear weapons.
The Soviet leaders arc probably alsothat the advent of advanced delivery systems, and the consequent pressure for an ever higher state of readiness on both sides, will Increase thc danger of accident orWhile their recent complaints about SAC bomber flights were largely forpurposes, we regard ihem as at least partly reflecting genuine concern. Finally, the Soviet view of the West is such Uiat they cannot rule out the chanceesperate Western effort to reverse "the Ude of history" by attacking the USSR
Hence wc see such security concerns as being an Important factor underlying the Soviet attitude toward disarmament. The Soviets probably consider Uiat, because of mounting worldwide anxiety over Uie dangers ol nuclear holocaust, and the resultantfor disarmament, thc disarmament issue offers valuable potentialities for reducing thc likelihood of nuclear war, above all bythc use ol Weslern nuclear weapons and by helping to induce their withdrawal from around the periphery of the Bloc.
B. Promoting lhe Strategy of Peaceful Competition
While the Soviet leaders cannot consider thc subject of disarmament without reference to the foregoing security concerns, they at the same time look upon the Issues as an integral and effective element of an aggressive foreign policy designed to expand Soviet influence and power by "peacefulndeed, these two aspects of the subject arerelated ln Soviet political strategy. Forby playing on popular anxietiesnuclear weapons, Moscow seeks to Impede US plans to deploy these weapons overseas; by calling for the liquidation of foreign bases, It hopes to make US tenure of such bases difficult; by stressing the dangers incurred byIn which US forces and nucleararc stationed, it hopes to undermine the unity of Western alliances; by simultaneously declaring itself willing to settle outstanding problems and interested only in peacefulIt hopes to undercut the rationale of Western military preparedness. To thethat these aims can be achieved, West-em will and ability to respond to Sovietare reduced and Moscow's freedom of maneuveris the West increased.the likelihood of recurrent crises in the course of the East-West conflict, theleaders desire to undermine as much as possible Western power to reset.
The mere agitation ol these issues serves Soviet foreign policy objectives, regardless of the extent of progressisarmament agreement, or even toward formalfor one. The Imageeace-loving and construcUve USSR is projected, andwith thatellicose andUS. Through this projection, thc USSR hopes to gain In respectability and influence. Moreover, if the West could be persuaded to negotiate on Sovicl terms, the resultantof detente would, in parliamentary countries, make the maintenance of anmilitary posture difficult, possiblyin effect, to some degree of unilateral Western disarmament without compensatory Soviet concessions or effective safeguards.
Soviet leaders may hope thatof psychological pressureswill eventually forceto negotiate some kinds ofagreements with them. Theyestimate that almost anywould tend to reduceand thus reduce the effectivenessof Western resistance to SovietAgain, it is likely thathopes that some sort of Europeanmeasure would initiate aevents leading toward dissolution ofthe exclusion of US military powercontinent ofhus throughas well as the directly militarya disarmament agreement the Sovietmight expect to improve theirposition and to increase theirmaneuveris the West.
C. Soviet View of the Military Balance of Power
Another key factor in the Soviet attitude is their view of the potential effectmeasures on the balance of military power between the Bloc and the West. The Soviets could calculate that the elimination -of nuclear weapons on both sides would be greatly to their advantage, being confident that they wouldreponderance in conventional military strength. But wethat the Soviets realize that thisis realistically unobtainable, and that, whatever progress they can make towardWestern nuclear deterrent power orits use, they must still calculateajor Western nuclear capability for thefuture. For this reason, among others, we conclude that the USSR will remainto retain and improve its own nuclear capability.
However, the Soviets probably ratimate that the time has cither already arrived, or will shortly, when neither side will be able to attack the other without receivingdamage in return. They may also regard it as unlikely that this state of affairs wilt be basically modified {except possibly through unforeseen technologicale-
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a continued buUdup in more advanced armaments on both skies. While they are seeking toajor Intercontinental missile capability before the US does, we do not believe they can realistically count onable toecisive superiority In overall stralegic delivery capability. On the other hand, as we have already suggested, they may regard the advent of advanced weapons systems as increasing tho danger of war by miscalculation.*
nder these circumstances the Soviet leaders may not see any overriding military objection to certain forms or kinds of arms limitations so long as these would notthe deterrent posture, both nuclear and non-nuclear, which they deem necessary, nor the continued development of the military capabilities which they are determined to Indeed, because of their concern over
Assistant Chief ot Staff, InteUigence. USAF, believes tbat the Soviets' apparent lntenUon to
develop an overpowering military capability
Bnd the potentialiUes they must perceive for the success of their efforts(he above paragraph unacceptable. While Uie statement, "they may also regard It as unlikely that this state of affairs will be basicallys manlfesUytatement of probability, as It ts employed In the development of the paragraph it strongly suggesU or Implies prob-ablUty. To this Implication the Assistant Chief of Stair. Intelligence. USAF, dissents.he does not agree that Uie Soviclsrealistically "count on being able toecisive superiority In overalloviet advances In the field of nuclear weapons and advanced deliverystrongly indicate that the SovieU Intend to build up their military capabilities as rapidly as possible and thc Assistant Chief of Staff.USAF, has been unable io perceive any indication that the Soviets believe their objee-Uve of achieving decisive supertority isAccordingly, he lwlfeves that paragraph IB Simula read as follows:
"Within ihis general context, the SovieUestimate lhat within the near fnture andomparatively short Ume thereafter neither side will be able to attack the other withoutunacceptable damage In return. They probably regard it ax likely that this impending state ol affairs can be basically modllled In thoir favor through an accelerated buildup In more advanced weapons systems."
the possibUity of war by miscalculationof their confidence in their currentconomic strategy, they might see consider-II able value in entering negotiations withpect to the stabilization of the nuclearof powerertain level, If thisechnically possible.
n this connection, our estimates of Soviet nuclearo not indicate that the Soviet nuclear stockpile ls yetevel which the Soviets would be likely to regard asalthough we cannot entirely dismiss Khrushchev's recent suggestions that the USSR may be approaching "nuclearOur evidence oh Soviet nuclear tests indicates that the USSR probably hasufficient variety of nuclear weapons types to satisfy most of its major military needs, While sufficient numbers of weapons toajor strategic attack probably exist, current stockpiles of fissionable material are believed irisufflclent for wide-scale air defense and tactical as well asuses. Moreover, fissionable material facilities are currently being Accordingly, we think it unlikely that the Soviets would wish to stabilize-their nuclear weapons or fissionable materials stockpUe at its present level. In Uie course of the next few years, however, Uie stockpUe may have increasedoint at which the Soviets wui consider stabUizing it by anwith the West.
D. Internal Political and Economic Factors
hile the economic burden of the Soviet mUitary establishment does not appear so great as to exert compelling pressure for arms reduction, the Soviet leaders may well see more profitable uses for some of the resources now devoted to military purposes, provided that Soviet security would not be Impaired. Tlie allocation of production, research, and manpower resources to military usecurtails economic growth and competes with consumer goods expansion andfor foreign trade and aid. Moreover.
'NIK, The Soviet Atomic anuary IWS.
the Soviet leaders. In view of their numerous Other requirements for economic resources, cannot but be concerned over thc growing cost and complexity of modern weapons systems. In this respect they face the same problems as do their counterparts in the West. Finally. If the Soviets believe their own doctrine that the capitalist economies of the Western states are artificially buoyed up by armamentsthey may believe that arms reduction could hasten the ultimate economic collapse of the capitalist world, at the same time as It assisted in Communist economic growth.
do not believe that there are anydomestic political pressuresthe Soviet position onthe Soviet people undoubtedlyworldwide fear of nuclear conflict,on this Issue can hardly bemajor operative force on leadershipOf more significance may bewithin the leadership itself, toshall refer later.
E. The Fourth Country Problem*
we believe that the Sovietsover the Fourth Countrydo not consider that itajorSoviet calculations except insofar asand possibly Communist ChinaThe repeated demonstrationshyper-sensllivity over revival of athreat lead us to give much credenceexpressed concern over Bonn'sweapons. While thc problem ofChina Is not as immediate, wethat Soviet failure lo dato toChinese partners with nuclearbetokens some fear lest thisincrease the likelihood of Chinesewith all thc risks Involved.these cases, thc Soviets have shownconcern over thc risks Lhat fourthpossessing nuclear weaponsuclear war than over the risksin the UK-Soviet nuclear indeed we suspect lhal their hints of
'iscussion of tlie "fourth country" problem, see Uie forthcomingevelopment oi Nuclear CapabllUUt by Fourth Countries.
interest in this issue are based at least in part on their belief that wc ourselves are much concerned.
II. RESTRAINING FACTORS IN THE SOVIET ATTITUDE
In sum, Uicn. several powerful moUva-Uons underlie the USSR's Increasing stress on disarmament issues over the last few years. But several other factors remain to be assessed before we can address ourselves to the key questionshow far do the Soviets desire lo go in reaching agreement on specificmeasures, as opposed to unilateraland propaganda exploitation of the issue?what risks as well as advantages do they see In such agreedwhat price are they willing to pay? Among these factors are the caution of the leaders, their acute fear of weakening thc relativepower posiUon. their strong suspicion of the West, their aversion to Inspection, and their probable beUof that they can still gain considerably by propaganda and unilateral actions at little cost to themselvesall of which add to the difficulty of reachingon any basis acceptable to the West.
Raving so recenUy obtained what they probably regardubstanUal nuclearthe SovieU are almost certainly highly reluctant to risk compromising it by moving too far too fast in an untried and highlyfield. We believe thai they arc feeling their way in an area where Lhe ultimate im-plicaUons of decisions arc highly uncertain.
Powerfully reinforcing this attitude of cauUoneeply ingrained suspicion of the disarmament posiUon taken by the West Khrushchev himself has alleged that ourare designed to enhance our ownposition while weakening that of the USSR. In short, the Soviet leadershipdoes not believe that wc arein reaching agreements on armson the basis of what they believe to be the actual balance of power. In part, of course, they simply do not view the merits of our proposals in thc same light as we do. (Seen some cases where they have partially accepted our proposals, they claim
1
our subsequent withdrawal of thema lack of serious Intent. Closely related to the above two pointsrobable Soviet belief that the West would Interpret any signs of Soviet willingness lo compromise asovercagemess to reach agreement and would press for further concessions from the USSR.
One of the most important obstacles to agreement Is the USSR's basic aversion toinspection within its frontiers. We do not believe that an intention to evade the terms of an agreement is the chief reason for Soviot aversion to Inspection, although this motive cannoi be Ignored. Rather we regard thc chief factors to be their genuine fear of espionage, their deeply ingrained securityand their conviction that secrecy Is an asset. Since they probably regardas far better informed on our military situation than we are on theirs, they must look upon many forms oi Inspection asus far more than them. This Isby their denunciations of our inspection proposals as gigantic intelligence gathering schemes. In addition, they have reservations as to the effectiveness of inspectionin assuring that commitments areobserved. Finally, the Soviet leaders probably also fear the disturbing effectsightly controlled society which might result from the presence of foreign Inspectors within the USSR.
However, Uie USSR has always expressed willingness to consider certain forms of ground inspection, although stressingwhich would minimize contacts with the population. Wc believe, moreover, that their sensitivity on this issue might diminish somewhat wiUi time. We note, for example, thc Increased Soviet flexibility on tourist travel and exchanges, the opening of areas hitherto closed lo foreign visitors, more open publications, and the like. These straws in the wind suggest at least that Soviet fear of ideological contamination is decreasing, and Uiat their earlier fear of letting outsiders see their poverty Is giving way to pride in showing off their accomplishments. The prospective advent of reconnaissance satellites
may also cause reconsideration of Soviet views on inspection.*
restraining factor ln theof negotiations is their probableUiey can still gain considerably byand other forms of pressure, atto themselves. Underlying this Isthateriod of time Westernopinion may force at least someto cut back their militaryas well as to soften theirarms limitations, withoutconcessions. They probably alsoUiat further exploitable Assures willamong the Western powers.
III. THE SOVIET POSITION ON DISAR/AAMENT
Wc doubt that the Soviet leadership. In balancing off Uie various factors discussed above, has as yet arrived at any hard and fast position on Uie disarmament Issue. Indeed we would be surprised If there were not certain differences In point of view among the top leadership groups themselves. In Uus respect, it Is difficult to separate the disarmament Issue from the general post-Stalin strategy of "peacefulf which Sovietpolicy forms an integralMore doctrinaire elements may fear that this entire approach endangers the maintenance of revolutionary elan and the fabric of Soviet control in the Satellites and is ultimatelywlUi the degree of tension and vigilance required to JusUfy thc Party'sIn Uie USSR. These groups,reinforced by most of Uie military, may be particularly sceptical of Uie benefits to be derived from disarmament moves and fearful of the risks which inspection would involve.
To dale Soviet disarmament policy seems dominated by such an attitude of caution, by acute suspicion of Western motives, and by the feeling lhat thc vulnerability or theposition can continue to be exploited at minimum cost to the Soviets themselves. The principal tacUcs involved are broadly those of propaganda, though ostensible and in some cases actual willingness to negotiate Is also
the forthcoming NIES. Implication! Of Certain US Satellite Program*.
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These tactics are typified by thc vagueness and superficial attractiveness ofproposals, most of which seem designed more for propaganda purposes than to lead to agreement. We are also struck by theof such steps as theof force reductions and nuclear teal suspension, which seem designed as much to create pressures on the West throughInitiatives as to lead to negotiated agreements,
As to negotiations, the Soviets probably believe that the West Is not yet ready io agree to arms limitations on any basis which seems equitable to the USSR They see the US as not yet having reconciled itself to the Bloc's enhanced power position, which the Soviets Insist must be recognized. For their own part, believing that time is working in their favor, they may see advantages in postponingnegotiations on broad disarmamentas distinguished from essentiallyIssues like test suspensionuntil thelr posltlon Is further strengthened, especially through the adventubstantial ICHM capability. Moreover, they may expect that tho Western position will be further eroded by this lime.
However, on certain limited issues thc Kremlin ls actively seeking to concludein order to lend verisimilitude to itsand place further pressure on thegovernments' position, among other more specific advantages. In this category wcuclear testnuclear-free" "one In Europe, and troop reductions inEurope, all of which we discuss in detail In thc Appendix. Moreover, the Sovietswilling toertain price for these agreements; In all three cases, for example, they are piobably willing lo accept someof inspection.
While this may be as far as the USSK Is currently willing to go in actual controlled arras agreements, it does not necessarilythe ultimate extent of Soviet willingness to negotiate seriously, particularly as Ume eoes on. We regard lhc USSR's disarmament policy as sUII iniew supported by Lhe flexibility shown The most
recent indications arc the USSR'sof nuclear test suspension and Itsto open technical negoUations onest ban. Even Moscow's complaint about SAC flights, while clearly moUvated by propaganda considerations, is probably symp-tomaUc of its growing concern over the risks of nuclear coriflict, although its handling of this particular issue did not suggest sufficient uneasiness to Impel the USSR to enternegotiations on it.
Ofreat deal will depend on how much the USSR can accomplish by its present tacucs inargelyweakening of the West To the extent that these tactics tend to inhibit the use and deployment of nuclear weapons, and to create strong pressures for US withdrawaland provided the Soviets do not become moreover the risks of miscalculationmay see little gain ln modifying itsposiUon on disarmament, exceptac Ileal sense.
But if the West's deterrent power isand strengthened and the Soviets see only minimal possibilities of unilaterally weakening us. there may be some further change In Lhe Soviet position. As time passes, Lhc various motivations already discussed may exert greater influence to this end. Theleaders wiU almost certainly become more concerned over the prospective continuedup of advanced nuclear armaments, with the heightened dangers of war byThey will almost certainly becomedisturbed over US IRBMthe advent of thc Polaris system, and US acquisition of first and then secondICBMs. If at the same time they remain confident that they can achieve their objectives by "peacefulhe desirability of diminishing thc likelihood of general war by disarmament agreements may loom larger in their minds. In fact they would probably look upon progress toward certain disarmament measures as facilitating Uie peacefulstrategy itself. For these reasons the Soviets might become willing toigher price to obtain disarmament agreements Ihan they have heretofore been willing to pay.
see two Independent factors which could contribute to eventual Increased Soviet willingness to reach disarmament agreements. First, the Soviets may come around more to the point of view that the West Is reallyin some arms limitations on terms which would be regarded as equitable by the USSR Second, as we have already suggested, there might be some diminution in Moscow's traditional aversion to thc presence of foreign inspectors on Soviet soil.
Thus we see some possibility of aSoviet interest ln expanding the area, of serious disarmament negotiations with the West We cannot predict when or on what Issues this might occur. By and large welhat Soviet caution and suspicion on such risk-impregnated Issues will die slowly. If at all, and that any change will be gradual. We alsoariety of factors which might cause Soviet policy to move back and forth from time to time. For example, such shifts might be forced by differences among theleaders, by problems In the Satellites, by reversionough line for Internal reasons.
or perhaps by fear the West is lnl willingness to negotiateign of weakness. We can also expect the traditional hard Soviet bargaining tactics, including great reluctance to show their hand prior to much probing of our position. At the same time, thereood chance of further dramatic unilateral moves, particularly while Khrushchev Is at the helm.
n any event, we can estimate with some confidence the limits beyond which. In the foreseeable future, Soviet policy will not go. They will be very careful not to give more than they get. They will not allow Inspectionwithin limits which are carefullyThird, and most important, the basic Soviet view of Western hostility will Impel the Soviet leaders to retain at least sufficientdeterrent power to meet what 'heyas their minimum security needs.we believe that the USSR wUl enter any disarmament agreement with the intent at the same time to seek constantly to enhance Its military capabilities and to achieve an eventual military superiority over the US.
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APPENDIX
SOVIET VIEWS ON MAJOR DISARMAMENT ISSUES
Control and Limitation of Mass Destruction Woapons
The Soviets almost certainly regardnuclear strength as the chief threat to their security andajor obstacle to achievement of their external aims. Thus to them the key disarmament problem Is that posed by nuclear weapons. Aside fromtheir own nuclear power, the Soviets are seeking to meet this problem by anpropaganda campaigneries of disarmament proposals, both designed to keep the nuclear weapons Issue in the forefront of negotiations. The goal Is tolimate of concern over the dangers created by nuclear weapons, to underline the USSR's initiative in seeking to do someUilng about thisand to Inhibit the use of such weapons by the West.
Cessation of Nuclear Tests. The USSR's recently announced suspension of nuclear tests Ls intended to focus pressure on the Westimilar halt, as part of its broadto stigmatize nuclear weapons andtheir use. Widespread anxieties over thc effect of continued tests and growing Western popular pressures to stop testing made this issue readily exploitable. The Soviets maxi mlzed this pressure by timing theirtoong planned US test series; the timing was also arranged to follow their own intensive test series.
the Soviets have left themselvesresume testing at any time, we believearc actually seeking an agreed testwith minimum controls. Theirput pressure on the US to accept cessation
on these terms largely accounts for thenature of their move. They probably expect that the US and the UK will now be compelled tooratorium.their test program Is not yet as far advanced as ours (and technical motivations exist for furtherhey probably felt that their present test achievements had placed themufficiently good military posture that the need for testing wasby the positive factors mentioned above. Moreover, Moscow wasesire to impede future US testing of improved missile warheads. Including one for the antl-ICBM missile, judging thiswould outweigh gains from their own futureesire to forestall "fourth country" nuclear weapons developmentalso played some part.
oscow has agreed in principle to controls, but there are numerous indications that it will seek to minimize the need for them. We believe that thc USSR wouldmall number of fixed Inspection sites, perhaps with some provision for limited mobility ofBy emphasizing the ease withest ban can be monitored, il is seeking to create the impression Lhat this limitedwill suffice lo detect evasions, and thereby to undercut any Western insistence on more elaborate inspection. If the West were to insistore elaborate system, thewould probably condemn this as demon-straUng lack of good faith and as anscheme. It would probably let negotiations rupture on this issue,Uiat the blame for thc deadlock would attach primarily to lhc West.
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an agreed test moratorium, tbe Soviets would be unlikely to attempt to evade It, at least for someith theof their recent intensive test series, they must be reasonably satisfied with the position they have reached. Moreover, they would have to balance the risks of detection against the obvious value they have seenest ban. We have already estimated that the Soviet leaders would almost certainly regard the political consequences of getting caught red-banded as unacceptable, except In suchcircumstancesleartoreat advantage over thc US or, conversely, If the US hadlearover the USSR. In such cases wedenunciation of the test ban as more likely than attempted evasion.
Ban on Use of Nuclear Weapons. TheSoviet campaign toan on use of nuclear weapons originated as aploy to counter the US monopoly and later great superiority In such weapons. The theme is still being actively employed by the Soviets, and probably would be pushed even harder following agreementestHowever, it must be clear to them that Western agreement to prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons almost certainly cannot be obtained ln any event. Hence, the Soviets may pressore limited agreement or even unilateral declarations that nuclear weapons not be usedut only, if at all, infor an aggressor's prior use of nuclear weapons.
The Soviets have also strongly condemned any attempts to distinguish between theof "strategic" and "tactical"of nuclear weapons, primarilythey want to inhibit us from concluding that we can be free to use nuclear weapons in less than total war. This stand does notthe Soviets from later admitting such distinctions in practice, buttheyit leaves their reaction in doubt,
Nuclear Production Cessation andofey question In estimate
'SeeOT. Feasibitily and LikclOiOOd Of Attempted Soviet Evasionuclear Test Moratorium.
bag Soviet views on ceasing production ofmaterials for weapons purposes and on reducing existing stockpiles ts their view of what constitutes nuclear sufficiency. While we cannot ascertain the Soviet estimate of then* stockpile requirements, we know that they are expanding their fissionable materials production. It is true that certain remarks made by Khrushchev in March indicated his belief that the Soviets were approaching, and may have already reached, sufficiency Inweapons stockpiles; however, morehe indicated that this judgmentonly to large-yield weapons.
the USSR might-enteron cessation of weapons materialwe do not believe that it wouldcease such production or agreecessation until Its minimumhad been met. Moreover,view as to how much inspectionpermitted under any agreement wouldcertainly be far less extensive thanEvasion might depend in partknowledge of our InteUigence on allfacilities, but the Soviets wouldconsider it unnecessary to run thedetection if they had already assuredrequirements.
The Soviets might agree to mutualof stockpUes so long as their relative power positionis the US was at no stage impaired by reductions of their own stockpUeinimum deterrent capabiUty.
Control of Other Weapons of MassThe Soviets consistently treat these weapons (including "radiologicalas distinguished from nuclear explosive weapons) as "weapons of mass destruction" which should be banned along with nuclear weapons. However, they appear to regard thc problem as much less Important than that of controlling nuclear explosive weapons.
B. Control over Advanced Delivery Systems
has made clear thatregards the US proposals on controlspace vehicles as an attempt to limit
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USSR's advantage in the field of rocketry and to preserve the geographic advantage which Its peripheral base structure gives to the US. Hence he has countered by proposing that control of outer space and withdrawal from overseas bases must be closely linked. In Soviet eyes their achievement of an ICBM capability will greatly enhance their military positionis the US by drasticallythe US geographical advantage. So long asubstantial portion of US striking power is dependent on overseas bases, wethat the USSR will insist on linking the, two Issues.
the more distant future, when thestrategic strike capabiliUes of bothbecome truly intercontinental InSoviet calculation of the relativeand disadvantages of agreed controlsmight tend to shift Anwould be the risks of miscalculationIn thc almost instantaneoussecond generation missiles- However,almost certain that they would stillconsidering all forms of strategicsimultaneously, including moanedand naval vessels as well asin this case, the problem ofsupervision would remain afactor In Soviet thinking.recognize that an extremelyapparatus would be required, onbasis. However, thereconnaissance satellites might affectof this problem.
C. Prevention of Surprise Attack by Inspection
a period, Soviettoounting awarenessvulnerability to surprise attack,explain the inclusion in the Sovietof5roundfor this purpose. The subject hasin most subsequent Sovietand Summit conference proposals,in quite vague terms. It may beSoviets have included this item to giveof receptivity In view of thcUS interest in It. Tliey probably consider
that they have less need for such safeguards than tbe West, because of the openness of Western society and the political limitations upon Western ability tourprisenevertheless we believe they are also somewhat concerned.
The Soviets have obviously regarded our proposals on various zones of Inspectionthe Arcticdesigned to maximize our own advantage- Similarly their own proposal form. inspection zone on each side of the East-West_line In Europe seemed designed to maximize their advantage. We arc unable to say what the USSR would regard as equitable zonal boundaries, but we believe that there may be some flexibility in their position on this score.
However, another obstacle to Sovietof various inspection zones,any including Soviet territory, lies in their aversion to inspection, which we have previously discussed. Beyond this, they do not seem persuaded of the efficacy ofin preventing strategic surprise. Soviet spokesmen, including Khrushchev, have lnmonths reaffirmed their view that even the most complex inspection system could not, because of the vast areas and great variety of weapons involved, rule out violations or give warning of an attack deliberately and secretly prepared. Thus, the Soviets probably view adequate safeguards as involving anelaborate inspection system, one even then of doubLfui effectiveness, and one which by its very nature would most completely expose them lo Western inspectors and controls.
Nonetheless, there mayradual shift in thc Soviet altitude toward measures tosurprise attack, particularly if theirover the risks of war by miscalculation mounts. It Is perhaps significant that thc Soviets already appear prepared toreater degree of inspection in Eastern Europe (in connection with their disengagementthan in the USSR. But at best we believe that their initial approach to anyscheme would be grudging andcautious, and confined to an area where they felt they would be only minimally exposed.
D. Limitations on Manpower and Conventional Arms
least in their negotiating position,have shown themselves rathermanpower strengths andcuts. They are doubtless aware ofgreater combat force which theythemselves able to field from anforce level. Of thc various,illion men, theythe lower limit probably in ordera maximum reduction ofIn forward areas, includingof some overseas bases, and also tomaximum from manpower and costfor domestic economic expansion andtrade abroad. We believe thatprobably consider seriously an offermanpower reductions if Ittied to political and other conditionsonly modest controls were involved
Limitations on conventional arms have not been stressed In Soviet proposals orfor some time, although Moscow has made occasional references to theirlhe Soviets probably feel that the West has more to gain lhan they from such
The USSR has frequently calledreeze onercentage reduction in arms outlays, probably largely for propagandaBy playing on Free World popularwith burdensome taxation. It may expect to add to the political difficulties of Weslern governments. Here loo, Sovietto permit effective Inspection wouldajor bar. The Kremlin wouldbe reluctant to reveal the extent to which past budgets have concealed military
E. Disengagement
he Soviets apparently see distinctin certain forms of disengagementprimarily in Europewliich would hasten the retraction of US power from this key area. They are prepared to pay some price for what they probably regard as more thangains. In this connection we regard
their concern over the situation lnand their resultant desire torisks of Western intervention In eventSatellite explosion, as anBeyond this, they are all looof the potential impact onof the withdrawal of USor even the nuclear componentthe threat posed by aGermany undoubtedly weighs heavilyminds, and probably hason their desire to prevent Weslacquisition of nuclear arms andparticularly IRBMs.
We do not believe the USSR or Polandacceptance of the Rapacki plan for barring nuclear weapons from Central Europe. While Polish motives were reportedlydifferent, Moscow probably saw in the the proposal an additional lever foropposition to the NATO nuclear deterrent programseful gambit for Summit discussion. Nevertheless, thc scheme has such advantages from the Soviet standpoint that they would probably be prepared toIt and toood deal in the way of Inspection. Among other things, Moscow would see in an agreed nuclear-free zone In Centralompelling precedent for Western acceptance of further measures along these lines.
We believeutuajly agreedout of conventional forces in Europe would hold considerable attractions for the USSR. They would probably expect it to impair Uie NATO shield withoutweakening the Soviet position, torend toward US withdrawal, and to reduce the likelihood of Western intervention In any Satellite revolt We doubt, however, that Moscow would agreeutual withdrawal of all US and Soviet forces from foreign soil in Europe, despite thc many advantagesIn our view the USSR willufficient military presence ln key areas of Eastern Europe to minimize the risks ofuprisings and underline Sovietto intervene in that event, as well as to mainlain the military threat created by their present forward position In Europe.
nspection would again be regarded as undesirable under either of the abovebut the Soviets have shownto make concessions In this respect. Though regarding the presence of Western Inspectors in the Satellitesikely stimulus
to popular dissidence andomplicating factor in event of another uprising, Moscow probably believes that these inspectors can be sufficiently insulated from the local populace to make these risks manageable.
ECRET
Original document.
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