Created: 4/15/1958

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8 15 April 8








Submitted by the DIRECTORTBAL LNTfcUJGE>'CK The foUotoing intelligence organisations participated In the preparation Ot thlt estimate; The Central Intelligence Agency and the Intelligence organisations of the Departments Of State, the Army, the Nany. the Air Force, and The Jomt Staff.

Concurred tn by thei ADVISORY COMMITTEE oiprilConcurring tpere The Director of Intern-gence and Research. Department Of Stale, the Asslrtant Chief of Staff. IrMOktenee. Department of the Army, the Director ot Naval InlelHgenre: the Atsutant Chief et Staff.gence. USAF. the Deputy Director for IntcXttgenee. The Joint Staff; and the Atomic Energy Commission Representelize to the IAC- The Assistant Director. Federal Bureau olabstained, the subject being outside ol his furitdKtton-



his estimate was disseminated by thc Central Intelligence Agency. This copy Is for thc information and use of tho recipient indicated on the front cover and ofunder his jurisdictioneed to know ImkIs. Additional essential dissemination may be authorized by tbe following oflicinls within their respective departments:

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DISnilUUTlON: White

KaUooai Security Council Department of Slate Department at Defense Operations coordinating Board Atomic Energy Commission Federal Bureau of LuveatigaUon

of Sino-Soviet Bloc by IRBM's Based in Selected1 Countries

Tht* oocuntnt forthrough th7HISTORICAL WVTW PBCGPAM of

*JW1WF- intsjlligews- Agency.



To estimate the Sino-Soviet reaction to anticipated and actual US deployment of IRBMs to various areas around the Bloc periphery during the next two or three years.


For purposes of this estimate, it is assumed that IRBMs will be deployed, either under sole US or shared control, initially in the UK and then elsewhere In the NATO area, including France, Italy, Greece, Turkey, and perhaps West Germany. The effect of possible deployments to certain Middle and Far Eastern countries (for example, Iran, Pakistan, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines) is also considered. The magnitude of Initial deployment is assumed to be four missile battalions ofeapons each to the UK and six to ten additional battalions elsewhere.


We believe that the Bloc leaders would regard US deployment of IRBMs assumed in this estimateubstantial addition to Western capabilities. But they areto conclude either that this actionhange in US intentions or would basically alter the relative military strength of East and West.

hus we believe that the Bloc, while taking vigorous diplomatic andmeasures aimed at preventing or delaying these deployments, and making them politically costly, would not resort to the use of force to do so.


Appraisal of US Intentions

he Soviet leaders have almostlong foreseen deployment of IRBMs around the Bloc periphery. They probably interpret the vigor with which

thc US is now pressing this program as an effort to offset Soviet ICBMduring the interim before American ICBMs become available in quanUty. They probably also see in it an efiort to bolster the capabilities of NATO in order

to reduce pressures within somecountries for accommodation or tendencies toward neutralism. Further, they probably look upon the IRBMas indicating that the US intends to continue to refuse disarmament on Soviet terms and is maintaining its efforts to deal with the USSRosition of strength.

Soviet apprehensionIRBM deployments, we do not believe

that the Soviet leaders will interpret them as involving sohange in US intentions or in the East-West balance of military power as toajor shift in Soviet policy. They will be mindful in this connection of their own presentpower, and, if our estimates of their ICBM progress are correct, they will calculate that their own ICBMwill have reached considerableby theubstantial IRBM threat to them develops. They areto conclude that the US wouldpursue more aggressive courses of action or initiate general war.they will reckon that, even if the assumed IRBM deployment did notimilar threat would later develop from naval-launched IRBMs and US-based ICBMs. In the light of this appraisal, and because of continued Soviet respect for existing US deterrent power, wethat the USSR would not attempt to prevent IRBM deployments by such risky measures as the use of force.

Bloc Appraisal of Military and Political Consequences

the Soviets haveample evidence of theirprospective US deployment ofthe periphery of the Bloc. Mili-

tarily, the Soviets would regardUS deployment of IRBMs as aaddition to Western nuclearcapabilities (see map for IRBM coverage of the Bloc from twelve selectedven though it did notalter the relative strength of East and West. Deployment to the UK alone would bring within missile range the USSR's two largest cities, many othercenters, and many of the home bases of Soviet Long Range other NATO countries,Greece and Turkey, wouldexpand this coverage. If IRBMs were deployed to certain Middle and Par Eastern states as well, all Sino-Soviet Bloc territory would be brought within rangearge but sparsely populated area of the central USSR (seeoviet planners would recognize that each additional deployment, even if it largely duplicated previous coverage, wouldtheir defensive problems.ther things IRBM deployment would put greater urgency behind the requirement for an anti-missile capability.

n our view the Soviets are alsoover the political impact of IRBM deployment on NATO and possibly other US alliances. The Soviet leadersfear that IRBM deployment, by strengthening deterrent capabilities in Western Europe, will make Westernless vulnerable to military fears and therefore less susceptible to poUtical and psychological efforts designed to play on their anxieties. The Soviets might also estimate that, in the long run, IRBMs in the territories of US allies would probably come, in fact, under the sole control of the recipient countries. For this reason they might look upon thc Initial US

IRBM deployment as marking anstep toward growth of anEuropean nuclear capability. The achievement ofapability would, in their view, further reduceEuropean susceptibility to Soviet threats and would increase the number of countries able touclear war.

The USSR would recognize that even under conditions of US control thewarning time available in the case of missile attacks and the consequent pressures for quick reaction create angreater risk of misinterpretation of warning signs resultingecision to counter-attack. Thus they will foresee an increase in the risks of war byIn addition, if other countries obtained an independent missilethe Soviets wouldurther Increase in these risks. However, wethat the USSR would regard these risks as unavoidable and would rely on its own deterrent capabilities to enforce caution on the West. The same factors would probably also act to induce caution on the part of the USSR.

We believe that Peiping would also be seriously concerned over the consequences of US deployment of IRBMs. In general it would fear lest the increase in over-all US deterrent capabilities impose some additional limits on the courses of action available to the Blochole. Init might fear that the increase in over-all US deterrent capabilities would reduce Soviet willingness to supportIn eventrisis in the Far East. Moreover, Peiping would be worried about its own vulnerability to IRBMs stationed in the Far East in view of its present lack of any counter-capability.

Bloc Courses of Action Prior to Deployment

a result weontinuationmajor Bloc effort to prevent, limit,least delay US IRBM deployment,this, to make it politically costlyWest. In this connection thereactions in variousand other countries arevulnerabilities which the Bloc isGrowing popular awarenessdestructive power of nuclearof Soviet capabilities foris accentuating fears of nuclearAmong many it is nourishingallied to this fear, thatis essential andbe jeopardized by such measuresIRBMs. In some casessubstantial rifts in nationalmay be widened. Moreover,program is construed as*to Soviet claims,ubstantial body ofthe neutralist countries, that the USwith military competitionto Soviet concern for endingwar.

exploit these opportunities,is employing andide range of tactics,both blandishments andIn our judgment, however,will at leasthile relyon its broad campaign to relaxtensions, while at theseeking to bring about USfrom overseas bases andthe WesternIn Soviet eyes, thisalso serve to counter theUS IRBMs; indeed, theiris probably an additionalimpelling the USSR to press it. The

object ls tolimate in which thc rationale for IRBM deployments would be obscured, or their use, if once installed, would be inhibited.

Primary Soviet reliance on thisis suggestedomewhat less bellicose approach thus far to thc IRBM issue than that of last year's campaign against thc stationing of US atomic units abroad. The clement of intimidation, while not absent, apparently has been subdued In favor of stress upon Soviet sincerity Inelaxation ofwhich would make unnecessary US deployment of IRBMs. Major efforts are being concentrated upon creatinghopes for top-level negotiations,agreements, or various forms of disengagement. For example, thcare pressing for establishment of nuclear-free zones which would, among other things, serve to block IRBM deploy-monts to tho areas concerned. Astactic, the USSR has announced the unilateral suspension of nuclear weapons testing. These efforts aretolimate of opposition to Western military moves on the grounds that they would destroy the chanceseneral relaxation of tensions.

The element of intimidation will tend lo come more to the fore, however,these other approaches appear to be ineffective or where special opportunities exist. The Soviets may issue warnings so worded as to make it difficult for the US and its allies to determine whether or not they were meant to indicate an intention to resort to force. They will also try to capitalize on the view expressed inand elsewhere that the deployment of IRBMs is an asset only to thc US and

a liability to the country where they are located.

his dual approach will be applied throughout the NATO area. In the UK, attempts will be made to exploit theof the Liberal and part of the Labor party to IRBM acceptance aa well aspacifist and neutralist agitation. Similar campaigns in France and Italy will be spearheaded by their largeparties. Appeals will also be made to neutralist elements in Greece. In the case of Turkey. Moscow will probably use blunt and simple threats.he USSR has already demonstrated particular concern over thc nuclearof West Germany, and will react more vigorously to the prospect of IRBM stationing here than in the case of any other NATO country. Not only doescontinue toevival of thethreat, but it senses in West German political dissension particularfor forestalling action. The methods which will be employed are alreadymtimidation of the Westand encouragement of popularovertures to the politicalwarnings to neighbors that German irredentism could pull all Europe into atomic war; and threats that accepting IRBMs would make reunificationperhaps combined with hints that the USSR might otherwise become more flexible on this issue. Also on theside, the USSR is offering an atom-free zone and other forms of

utside the NATO area, the strongest Soviet reaction would probably be evoked by the prospective stationing of IRBMs in Iran, owing to Soviet sensitivity over this area and because the Soviets would esti-

mate that Iran was highly susceptible to mtimidatton. In the case of Pakistan, the Bloc would probably focus on threats of inevitable involvement in any East-West war, and on exploiting the strongly adverse Indianroposal to station IRBMs in South Korea or Taiwan would be used as the basis for generating general Asian pressure on the US tofrom such deployment. Theof US Matador units on Taiwan was moderately exploited along these lines, and with only limited effect. Aagainst deployment to Japan or the Philippines would be aimedat neutralist and anti-American sentiment, together with reminders ofretaliation in case of war.wouldajor part in these Far Eastern campaigns.

The USSR will also attempt to induce third countries to exert pressures against IRBM bases. Throughout Europe, Soviet propaganda will playegacy of anti-German feeling and argue that IRBMthere would precludeNeighbors of potentiale.g. Yugoslavia, India, the UAR, will be prodded not only with thc general arguments employed elsewhere but with reminders that the missiles might involve them in general war or even be turned against them.

Despite these opportunities, the Bloc leaders probably expect that if thc US persistently seeks IRBM bases around the Bloc periphery it will eventually obtain substantial and in many areas multiple coverage of the Sino-Soviet Bloc. They might expect to makeostly to the US, in terms offoreign reactions. They would

hope that, even where their efforts todeployment were unsuccessful, the scars left by the deployment controversy would be assets for future exploitation.

Subsequent Bloc Courses of Action

s we have already suggested, actual or imminent deployment of US IRBMs might tend to heighten Soviet fears of war by miscalculation and lead the USSR to conclude that its freedom of cold war maneuver was being somewhat narrowed. We believe that the Soviets, in view of their own growing deterrent capabilities, would not regard such deploymentby itselfas involving sohange in East-West power or in the risks of war by miscalculation as toajor shift in the Soviet attitude towardsMoreover, they would still regard themselves as retainingleeway for political maneuver, aimed in part at hamstringing possible use of IRBMs.arger context, however, US deployment of IRBMswhentogether with other developing US militaryhe likely US acquisition of ICBMs and naval-launched IRBMsmight be looked upon by the USSR as adding sufficiently to the risks already inherent in the East-Westconfrontation as to influence the USSR tooresition in disarmamenthcof whether or not thesewould haveumulaUvcon Uie Soviet disarmamentinvolving, as it does, many factors

'The Director of Intelligence and Research,of State, believes that this sentence tends to prejudge an Important estimate which Is to be considered inH-5B. He therefore believes that the lasl two sentences should be omitted.

considered in this paperwill bo examined in our forthcoming SNIE

he deployment of IRBMs mightthe urgency attached to various Soviet offensive and defensive counter-measures. In addition, the USSR might announce the stationing of missiles in Eastern Europe, though keeping control firmly in Soviet hands. However, it might better suit thc Soviet peace campaign to "claim instead that, although sorely tried, the USSR refused to be provoked Into countermeasures which would stillincrease the dangers of war.considering the range and deterrent power of Soviet ICBMs and other nuclear strike capabilities, the Soviet planners might not consider it militarily necessary

to station long-range missiles ln Satellite territory. Therefore we do not think that deploying IRBMs to NATO wouldlead the USSR to make similar counter-deployments in Eastern Europe, although the anti-deployment campaign will contain hints ofesponseew token deployments might beout for bargaining and psychological purposes.

n the case of Communist China, IRBM deployments to the Far East would strengthen the pressure which Peiping is probably already exerting upon Moscow for the allocation of advanced weapons. In response to these pressures, the USSR might deploy advanced weapons toChina under arrangementsSoviet control.

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