Created: 3/4/1958

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The fallowing intelligence organizations participated tn the preparation of thii estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organisations of the Departments of State, the Armp, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.

Concurred in by the


archoncurring were The Director ofand Research, Department of State; Ihe Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence: the Assistant Chief of Staff.USAF; and the Deputy Director for intelligence. The Joint Staff The Atomic Energy Commission Representative la the IAC and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the sublect being outside of their furUdlclton.


estimate was disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency. Thisfor the information and use of the recipient indicated on ihe front cover and ofunder his Jurisdictioneed to know basis. Additional essentialbe authorized by the following officials within tbeir respective departments:

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of Naval IntelUgence, for the Department of the Navy

of IntelUgence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force

Director for InteUigence, Joint Staff, for thc Joint Staff

of InteUigence. AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commission

Director, FBI. for the Federal Bureau of Investigation

Director for Central Reference, CIA, lor any other Department

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NaUoDci Security Council Department of state Department of Defense Opara'.ions coordinating Board Atomic Energy CotninlssloQ Federal Bureau of Iuvtaligatloa

mis- documac baa Daauforhxough th. HISTORICAL*UK Mil" th. CaatrU intaUioaacacv.




To appraise the intensity and scope of dissidence and resistance in the Sino-Soviet Bloc, and to estimate the resistance potential in times of peace and war.

Like itshis estimaterief appraisal of the causes, nature, and extent of anti-regime dissidence andwithin the Sino-Soviet Bloc, It is based upon eleven country studiesby the inter-agency ResistanceCommittee established by the IAC. These studies, which analyzeand resistance in each country of the Bloc, have been noted but notapproved by the IAC; they arc appended as annexes to the estimate itself.

In the estimate and the annexes, the following terminology is used:

Dissidencea state of mind involving discontent or disaffection with the regime.

Resistancedissidence translatedaction.

Organized resistanceresistance which is carried outroup ofwho haveommon

"Nib iO-SS. "AnU-Communist Resistance Poten-Ual In the 5Ino-SoTlet2


purpose, agreed upon leadership, and workedommunications system.

Unorganized resistanceresistance carried out by Individuals or looselygroups which may have been formed spontaneously for certain limited objectives, without over-all plan or strategy.

Passive resistanceresistance,or unorganized, which is conducted within thc framework of the resLster's normal life and duties, and involvesnonperformance or malperform-ance of acts which would benefit the regime, or deliberate nonconformity with standards of conduct established by the regime.

Active resistanceresistance,or unorganized, which expresses itself in positive acts against the regime. It may or may not involve violence, and may be conducted openly or clandestinely, it may take such forms as intelligence collection, psychological warfare,guerrilla warfare, assistance in

escape and evasion, open defiance of authority, or preparatory activity for any

of the above.

With the progressive consolidation of Communist control, however, activehas in general tended to lake less the forms mentioned above, and to be

expressed more in such forms as strikes, demonstrations, and open manifestations of intellectual and other dissent. While in many cases these activities are not wholly motivated by anti-regimethey nevertheless have anti-regime connotations.


and Intensity of Dissidence and


Dissidence continues to be widespread in the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Improvements In living standards and such relaxation of regimeas took place during the last three years have been, except perhaps ln the USSR, in sufficient to reduce substantially generalSave in semi-independent Poland, nationalist anti-regime feelings in Eastern Europe are ns strong as ever. In addition to common grievances, various populationhattMir special resentments, such as those o' jieasants towards collectivization, workers towards Communist labor discipline, intellectuals and students towards enforced ideological conformity, believers towards anti-rcligious measures.

The scope and intensity of dissidence. how-ever, varita widely from country to country One uf the most important distinctions in both peacetime and wartime resistanceIs whether or nnt the regime Iseprpssiiilin: the national rather than an alien Interest Kxcept among certain of Its own national minorities. Uie Soviet regime lia* succeeded in identifying itself among it--own poiHilattonegitimate nationalBut Communist regimes in the Farave made somewhat less progress in this respect, and those in Ka&iern Kit rope, again excepting Poland, have Culcd almost completely. In thc divided countries, the existenceunctioning alternativeI'vcreises some nltracllnn whirl;i. lo increase dissidence, bul thistoajor factor only In Bast

Germany. Other variations ;iri resistance potential arise from dlflerences In national character, in historical traditions, in economic conditions, and ln religious attitudes.

n the last (ew years most Bloc regimes have sought to reduce popular discontent and to narrow Uie riJls between Uie regimes and their peoples. The leashing of Uie Soviet secret police, Uie decoUecUvization of Polish agriculture, and efforts to Improve living standards are cases in point. These policies have had some success. On Uie other:hand, the very trend toward relaxation of control* and resulting confusion as to regime policies have given greater scope to overt manifests tn-Mi; of discontent. Sharp criticism arose, for example, among Moscow writers andintellectuals when theooser application of controls.

i I'nliiitd,se of police terror and serious splits within the Communist parties permittedto swell into active resistance,ass scale. In reaction, the Bloc regimes have tightened their controls, and ir Hungary after Lhe bloody suppression of the revolt the regime reverted lo harshe Bloc leaders have striven tonj unity, to Circumscribe Uie range ofcriticism, and to provide various reminders ol iheir physical power.esult,active resistance Is negligible in thc Bloc at tlic present time.

Resistance Potential in Pcticeliinc

During the nexl (ew yenrs. conditionsc piobably will not improve surttcicnUy lo

v tr i? K

reduce dissidence significantly in mostof Uie Sino-Soviet Bloc. This dissidence wiU probably conUnue to be expressedin various forms of passivenoncompliance with regime orders, economic malingering, other low-risk ways of expressing individual opposition. So long as the regimes do not revert to all-out repression, there Is also likely to be some continuation of those forms of active resistancestrikes, demonstrations, open expressions ufhave characterised the past few years. In particular, suchare likelyarts of Eastern Europe. In Communist China, some disturbances by peasants and ethnic minorities are also likely.

Moreover, many Bloc regimes recognize that uie cultivation of popular support and the eliciting of broader initiative wouldnot only economic betterment but some degree of UbenuixaUon of controls However, they also recognize that such steps increase the difficulty of maintaining party unity and complete control over the populace. Thus they will probably accede to popular pressures only in those cases In which they regard il as relatively safe to do so. Bui any relaxation of controls will tend to give dissident elements opportunities to press their grievances inways.

Further, each regime's problems may be increased and complicated by developments elsewhere ln the Bloc and influences from the Free World. The repercussions of the USSR's de-Stallruzation campaign and thc events in Hungary and Poland have agitated dissidents throughout thc Bloc, In some cases to the point of stimulaUng various forms ofIntra-Bloc variations In ideology and policy have contributed to dissatisfaction and ferment among intellectuals and students. As contacts with non-Bloc countries increase, unfavorable comparisons will arise. Incampaigns against dissidence, while primarily concerned with its domestic sources, must also contend with unsettling influences from abroad.

The difficulties of dealing with dissidence, various forms of resistance, and foreignmay lead to policy vacillations between

"hard" and "soft" lines or lo intra-partyThese developments might evoke greater resistance acUvlty. This activity, however, would tend to be directed towards the elimination of specific grievances rather than to the overthrow of thc existing regimes, since the latter course would seem highlyunless thereerious prior weakening of parly and police.

For these reasons wc regard majorof active resistance as unlikely,these cannot be excluded In certain volatile situations in Eastern Europe.local outbreaks will probably recur, but they will almost certainly be wlWiln the capa-biliUcs of security forces to repress. The regime's countcr-wcuponsprimarily the monopoly of physical force (coupled with an evident willingness to use it)ear-monopoly of means ofwill remain formidable. In Poland the regime has shown less reliance on these weapons,rimary safeguard against violent resistance is the widespread recognition, to which the Catholic Church lends Important support, that It would provoke Soviel intervention. Here, as elsewhere In Eastern Europe. Soviet suppression of the Hungarian revolt and the absence of Western assistance havethe futility of violent resistance.

Emigre organizations of former Blochave, in general, lost efTecUve contact with their homelands and are little known to Bloc populations. Virtually all of them have suffered from internal bickering, and many have been penetrated by Communist agents. Emigre" groups do not significantly contribute to resistance potential, and with raretheir leaders would not be welcomed to positions of power after liberation.

Resistance Potential in Event of General War

the outseteneral war.act to diminish sharply thein most of the USSR and toin Communist China, Uiough incase Uils would depend more onof thc conflict. In the Farany increase in resistance potential


would be only marginal. But In the satellite states of Eastern Europe, as well as In certain minority areas of the USSR andChina. the Baltic States, Georgia, Western Ukraine,he outbreak of war would rekindle hopes of liberation and immediately increase the resistance potential. This potential probably would be highest in Poland, Hungary, and East Germany. Wc believe, however, that unless thc tide of war ran sharply against the Bloc and its military and security forces were significantlyresistance activitiesara-military nature could be prevented or at least confined to manageable proportions.

While wc conclude that resistanceprobably would notajor factor so long as the outcome of the main conflictdubious, resistance activity probably could be expected, especially in Easternin thc form of intelligence collection and transmission, aid to Western personnel in escape and evasion operations, and minorThe level of such activity would vary considerably, because of differences inpotential, and alsoesult of the amount of outside assistance available and the location of battle lines.

Only conjectures can be made concerning the Impact on resistance activity of the use ot nuclear weapons. Much would depend on such factors as the extent and locale of the attacks, the types of weapons used, thecaused, the extent to which regimewere disrupted, etc. Among population

groups suffering direct losses, survivorswould first be stunned, then concentrate their energies exclusively on problems ofsurvival. In areas sufficiently distant from attack to be largely unaffected,might increase as dissident elements found Uiat Communist controls had been weakened; on the other hand, they mightthat nuclear weapons were so decisive that extensive resistance was irrelevant orGroups outside the attack area but sufficiently close to be caught in thechaos would be subject to all these effects. It Is possible that, in certain cases, attacks against selected targets might weaken the regime's anU-rcslstance capabilities more than they impaired resistance potential.

hc question of responsibility for Uieof general war probably would not substantially affect Uie will to resist the regimes in thc Bloc countries. Nor would the nationality of attacking forces be likely, in the majority of cases, to have great bearing upon the cooperation offered by resistanceExceptions would be cases in which long-standing national anUpathles mighttn an important degree with anti-regime. (a) German forces InPoland, and the USSR; (b) Yugoslav. Greek, and Turkish forces In Bulgaria; (c) Greek, Italian, and Yugoslav forces inand (d) Japanese forces in North Korea and Communist China. On Uie other hand, in lhc divided countries anti-regimemight increase if military forces of the non-Communist government were used.







These Annexes were prepared by the Resistance Intelligenceof the IAC. They have been noted but noL approved by the IAC. The cut-off date of the information contained In these Annexes



Thc conUnulng low standard of living in Albania since the Communist take-over4 hasajor factor ln thc general dissidence prevalent among the greatof the population. The Communist take-over In Albania was greatly facilitated by the promises made by theNational Liberation Front during World War II of basic economic and political reforms which would grant the people "freedom, bread, andhe program for political independence from foreign rule and forof social and economic conditionsynamic appeal, particularly among thc intellectuals, youths, and poor peasants in central and southern Albania where living conditions were wretchedly poor andexploitation by the local feudalwas the rule. But afterears of rule the Communist regime not only has failed to fulfill Its promises of providing thc Albaniansecent standard of living but has Imposed an economic system ofoppression, and exploitation lhat was unheard of even in the period of tlieEmpire. Thc government hasadmitted that attempts to improve the availability of foodstuffs have met with little, if any, success, and that during certain periods of the year the food situation becomes very critical.

Pc.litically. there are two basic factors which account for the widespread hostility the greal majority of Albanians bear toward the present regime. First, the Communist ideology has for nearly all Albanians aSlavic connotation and is thereforewholly alien. It is. moreover, regarded as merely another instrument through which the Slavs can dominate the country Just as the Ottoman Empire was resisted for fivebecause of its alien traditions and

poliUcal and social institutions, so today the Communist regime is opposed as equally alien even though its leaders are native Albanians.

3 The second factor is the ancient traditions of and beliefs ln individual freedom and the haired of centralo pastin Albania, either foreign or naUvc, has been so ruthless as Uie present one inIts will on the mountaineers in Uie north and the peasantry in central and southern areas. Individual freedom has beensuppressed; the closely knit family pattern has been virtually destroyed; andlife, around which most social andactivities have evolved in the past, has now been placed under the control of localfunctionaries whose chief task is not lo serve the villagers but to carry 'out the unpopular program and policies of thc regime. The greatest opposiUon to the regime has originated among mountaineers and villagers, wliiit? iiiroitds into tln-lr cnintiinic and family life by the central authorities.

eligion does not seem to have played arole in the dissidence that has developed against thc regime. There are two basicfor this situation. First, religion inhas found it difficult tonited front to Communism because the population isinto three denominations: Moslem,aboutercent of the population.Christians,ercent; undCatholics, aboutercent. The regime has fostered and exploited this division.aside (rum the Catholic clemenl, the Al-baniunihole are not devoutly religious. Their religious sentiments arc expressedin ancient traditions and tribalrepresenting something essentiallywhereas the three exisUnghave? often been associated with spheres of foreign influence: the Ottoman Empire, llie Greek Church (which dominated lhe

Albanian Orthodox Church, and the Italian Influence through thc Roman Catholic Church. The regime had littleto convert the Moslem and Orthodox Churches Into Instruments of Communist rule. The Roman Catholics, however, having expressed somewhat deeper religiousand strong opposition to Communism, have been subject to severe persecution. In fact. Uie regime has destroyed thc Catholic Church as an independent Institution.

hile the regime was able to eliminate or subdue thc three principal religiousin Albania, it has not been able loUie religious feelings, beliefs, andof the Albanian people. Despite anti-religious propaganda and repressive measures, the Albanians continue to attend churchand maintain their customs and beliefs. Thc Albanian peasants In particular,nearlyercent of Uie0 population, not only refuse to work on religious holidays or wedding days, but have been known to slaughter hundreds of rams to be consumed on such holidays In violation of government restrictions. In some sections of the country where threats and pressure have failed, the regime has used force against what il considers an ancient practice damaging to the present economy.


6 Dissidence toward the regime apparently remains strong among all classes With Uie possible exception of Uie higher governmental and Party bureaucracy, Uie rankingimited number of intellectuals there is no group which derives real benefit from the regime The denigration of Btalin has had hardly any eflect on the Albanian Communist lenders who continue Uieirrule without the benefits ofarge numbers ot the population arc still in jails and laboi camps.

he Peasantry. Albania isountiy of peasants and villagers, whoroup comprise Ihe largest and mostanli-Conununlst element in the country. As stated above, during the war the Commu-

nist movement found considerable support in the south among the poor and landless peasants. This group profited by the so-called agrarian reformsut shortlybecame thoroughly disillusioned andThe principal reasons for itsas well as for that of nearly all the country's peasants, were Uie crushing taxes, the heavy obligatory delivery quotas, and the low prices paid by the government forproducts; the seizure of livestock; thc Imposition of "voluntary" (forced) labor; the imposition of the agricultural collectiveand the oppression and terror practiced by thc Communist security^ police. Thepeasantierce Individualist, proud or his past independence; he knows nothing of, and cares less for, the subtleties of the Communist ideology. However, despite their opposition to lhe regime, the peasants have been unable to stem the tide of total collecti-zalion of agriculture Uiat Is presently being conducted by Uie regime. This deep peasant discontent accounts for much of thepotential in the armed forces, among the youth in the countryside, among' peasant* who have been drafted for work in industrial projects and mining, and among other groups of peasant origin still having contact with friends and relatives on the land.

outh. Albanian youth, both rural and urban, began resisting thc_Italian occupiers immediately aflcr the latter-invadedr. Later thc CommunisLs, carnou lla&inc themselves in the National Liberationnd using patriotic slogans, deceived large sections of the country's youth and drew them under its banner. Thus the youth be came the backbone of the Communisttn Albania during lhe war. However disillusionment began to set In soon aflcr the

the ') .

l! Hitrue political, SOCiBl and UCO mimic aims0 Communistad ceased lo bp effective among thc great majority ol the youth, especially in thebecause of first-hand experience withlabor and because of widespread economic want and Inequality which youth saw in the villages.

Workers andelatively small number otwho have risen from the ranks topositions In the nationalizedthe laboring class in Albania hasunder the Communist regime.low; prices are generally high; andgoods arc cither in short supplyexpensive, There isto meet the high work normsachievements of shockworkersre stringent restrictionsjobs and heavy penalties foror breaking of work discipline; some(forced) work must be performedlaborers; frequent political meetingsare compulsory; various deductionspublications andmade, etc. Like most otherworkers have shown signs ofare looking forward to thc day offrom the Communist regime.class may be included the low-leveland civil servants, all of whomto the same general restrictionsobligations as the laboring class.

and Clergy. Theof pre-Communist Albaniaolder elements who since the beginningcentury had worked for the creation ofcouniry, and of youngerwere brought up during the periodrevival after Worldndwith Weslern culture and Ideas.lhe younger intellectuals, mostlygovernment officials, armyjournalists, who in the perioddisgusted wiih the behavior of Kinghis ruling group and with the feudalgradually tended to the left.War II they became the backbonenational liberation movementtlie Communists managed to seizeaf the country. Other intellectuals,opposed the rise of Communism andof ihem fought actively againstcontrolled PartisanKombetar (Nationalhcanti-Communist organization duringwas founded by nationalistamong intellectuals, both old and

young, who had the vision to foresee thethat would befall the country in the eventommunist success.arge number of anti-Communistwere either driven out of the country or imprisoned or executed when the Communists assumed control, there are still strongamong those remaining who aredissatisfied with the regime and who look toward liberation. There ls only aof intellectuals In Albania today who could be relied upon completely by the regime.

As noted above, the Moslern-and Orthodox clergymen have been cowed into submission by the Tirana regime and the Catholic clergy almost completely eliminated. However, smouldering hatred exists among most of the remaining clergymen, particularly theand theyefinite resistance potential

Armed Forces. Morale in thc Albanian Armed Forces Is low and the majority of the men probably feel hostile toward the present Albanian regime. This hostility arisesfrom basic dislike of the present regime and from resistance of individual Albanian conscripts to military control. Moreover, the ranks in thc armed forces derive chiefly from peasant families and as such have the same antagonism toward thc regime as their elders in thc villages. For this reason the army ranks appear to be considered tiy the regime as unreliable. This is indicated by the fact that units of the armed forces have never been employed lo stamp out guerrilla bands. Most of the permanent commissioned andofficers, comprising perhaps one-third of the total armed forces strength, were selected because of their apparent loyalty to lhe regime. Nevertheless, during the past two years, there has been evidence al someamong high-ranking officers, some of whom were dismissed. The demobilization late5 and early6onsiderable number oi officers considered unreliable by the regime not only embittered those affected but alsoemoralizing effect on others still In the service This substantialpotential, however, is not organized and has noL been focusedniform objective.


eliable reports on the people's attitudes in Albania indicate that more thanercent of the country's population is disaffected with the Communist regime. The intensity of the anti-regime feeling rangesather mild, chronic irritation on the part of disillusioned Communists and Party sympathizers to ahatred on thc part of those persons or groups who have been directly harmed by the regime. With the exception of the national and most local Party leaders, some members of tbe top bureaucracy, and Uie security forces, there Is at present no group, including Uie Party rank-and-file, which escapes the police terror of the regime or derives material or other benefits from it. Nor does thehave hopesetter future under Communist rule. There are many hidden enemies of the regime, despite the constant efforts of the secret police to root them out. Thc suppression of certain groups, which are considered by the regime as past redempUon, and their Internment in labor orcamps, only adds to Uie widespread ill feeling.

lthough there are signs of hostility toward thc Soviet military and civilian experts in Albania, derived from their preferential treatment and higher wages, there is nothat the population holds thc Soviet Union, whose armed forces played no part in imposing Uie Communist regime on them,responsible for their present plight. Hostility appears to be directed chiefly against the native Communists. Even the morepeople hold Uie central authorities(or Imposing an alien Ideology on Uie country. There appear to belew Albanians who are fully aware of controls and pressures exerted on the regime by the Kremlin, In the countryside hostility is directed almost wholly against localand governmental functionaries who implement the regime's policies. It isUiat the vast majority of escapees from Albania arc villagers, not former members of the bourgeois class or of the bureaucracy. The village escapees know little if anything aboul Communist ideology.


The Soviet-Yugoslav declaration of June5 recognizing the existence of "different roads to socialism" and the denigration of Stalin in Uie spring6 gave rise to serious frlcUons within Ihe Albanian Party's topbut there is no evidence that lhcat large was affected in any measur-able way by Uiese events. The Soviet-Yugoslav declaration encouraged nationalist-minded members of the Party's Centralto request that thc Partyore Independent policyis. Moscow and to advocate the liberalization anda-tion of Party life and thc "establishf friendly relations with Uie West as well as the East. These men were at once deprived of their army ranks and dismissed from their Party and government posts

The denigration of Stalin also had serious repercussions In the Albanian Party andln further purges innumber of Party intellectuals,and army officerseeting of Uie Party Committee of Tirana pressed for Uieof all Party groups who had been purged prior to Stalin's death, requested that relations with Yugoslavia be normalized as soon as possible, attacked the lop Parlyfor Its rigid Stalinist views, belittled the economic "successes" of the regime, and asked that measures be taken at once toand liberalize Party and state life. Prompt and severe measures were taken against all dissenters, but difficulties within and outside Uie Parly continued.

anti-regime sentiments ofbolh Communist andto have been fanned by therapprochement, the Polishthe Hungarian revolution. Thesehad some positive effects on thcresistance potential. But UieUie insurgents In Hungary resulted inamong thc Albanianand strengthened Communist morale,Free World, in Uie Albanian view, didto oppose Soviel power.



Although no general unrest andwere reported in Albania immediately alter the death of Stalin, special security measures were taken by the regime. Security pursuit battalions continued their punitive expeditions against those regions suspected of giving aid and comfort to resistance bands. The activities of the small, scattered, poorly-organized-and-equlpped bands in thenorth began to diminish3 and5 had become virtually nonexistent, However, there have been reports of small, isolated guerrilla bands in areas near Tirana which in the past year have attackedof local People's Councils and killed Party, government, and police officials.

No organized resistance group is known to exist today in Albania. Activities reported from time to time, such as assassinating local Party leaders and governmental officials,army and state transport trucks and security units, setting fire to cooperative warehouses and slate depots and factories, and committing sabotage, are probablyof local individuals or of personsinfiltrated from abroad.

There are signs that some unorganized resistance, both active and passive, continues throughout the country. Open hostility toward lhe regime has been manifested chiefly in complaints about the cost of living and shortages of food. Riuls reportedly occurred late6 and early7umber of cities protesting againsi economicbut these were easily suppressed by lhe security forces. In certain areas in Lhc north the people are said to have pillaged grain depots of the tonives, workers at various mines and factories staged token demonstra-

of food and low *ages; students at some high schoolstracts ugainsl lhe Lop rulers, and anti-

nnd Albanian leaders were written or drawn

(ir. interest in

raising productivity Peasants' resistance to collectivization consists mainly of failure to comply with the regime's measures lo increase agricultural output or to meet quotas. AH

classes fall to pay. or try to avoid paying, taxes. Youth has largely resisted Communist indoctrination, and thc people defiantlyto practice religion. Tne stagnation of the Albanian economy probably stems fn part from this attitude of passive resistance.


by emlgr6 groups to organizewithin Albania have failed.lines of communication existgroups and the Albanian people.jealousies and bickering havevarious emigre parties andalms of the NaUonal Committee forAlbania had been to guide andto Communist tyranny and toAlbanians abroad to give effectivethe resistance The committee,dissolved in6esult ofandewlhe Free Albaniaunder thc sponsorship of Uie FreeCommittee, shows no promise ofHowever, there arethat Greece and Yugoslavia,latter, continue Lo infiltrate agentsfor purposes of subversion.also be some substance to thethat in the spring and summerthe Yugoslavs recruited formerCommunists (or Uie purpose oflhe present Albanian leadership andil with pro-Yugoslav Communists.of this kind was exposed by the in


Albanian Armytrengthand in addition, the regime hasilitarized securityTroop elements, distributedalong lhe Greek, Yugoslav,borders,fen are organizedTroop units which arcihc country, with thcconcentration in the Tirana area.lo these militarised forces, the Com-

munist Government controls an overt and covert policing apparatus totalingen. Thus, theontrol ratio ol one soldier,or agent (in addition to countlessfor everylbanian citizens. In addition, the regime has instituted thepolice controls used in all Communist countries: identity cards for all citizens overears of age. travel permits along border areas, as well as work and residence cards. Through these measures the regime hasin cowing the people and Instilling inense of insecurity and total fear. The effectiveness of these measures is attested by thc fact that open organized resistance has been practically wiped out in the past few years and that passive resistance during the same period has been reduced. Albania,most of the other satellites, took noin thc post-Stalin era to reduce police terror or relax internal tensions. Toany attempts from outside the country to foster dissidence among the people, severe penalties are imposed on anyone implicated in aiding and abetting diversionlsts. These penalties also apply to anyone found listening to anti-regime radio broadcasts or possesung propaganda material received from outside thc country.


here is no likelihood, at present, of any spontaneous uprising in Albania such asin Poland and Hungaryhe Stalinist regime has taken rigid measures to nip in thc bud any manifestations ofwithin the Party or of deviationism among intellectuals, students, or other groups. Moreover, Albania, unlike some of the other European satellites, has not tinkered with its security apparatus, which still follows the standard Stalinist methods of completeHowever,evolt break out. the regime's security forces could probably suppress it, unless the population secured arms and the uprising spread generally throughout rural areas. The Albanian Army would be of doubtful loyalty inrisis,idespread popular revolt activelyby the army could noi be suppressed

without active military assistance fromBloc


Under present conditions, dissidence has no capability of developing Into successful organized resistance. Should an attempt be made to establish organized resistance, the regime would take thc severestand control over the whole couniry would be even more repressive.umber of external and Internal developments could increase thc level of the currentresistance and dissidence. Economic and political successes in Yugoslavia andcouldelling effect on certain groups in Albania, especially intellectuals, professionals, some managerial elements, and students. Internally, the continuingdeprivations and the acceleration ol agricultural collectivization could increase the disaffection of the workers and peasants,of the latter who are potentially the greatest threat to the Communist regime.

There were signs that resistance andtn Albania decreased after the Geneva summit conferenceut an upward swing was noted after thc Hungarian revoltoreover, the denigration of Stalin and ihe Soviet-Polish difficulties encouraged certain tactions within thc Patty to attack the Albanian Stalinist leadership and toliberalization of Party and governmcni life. Such deviations were, however, quickly liquidated by the Tirana rulers.

A substantial improvement of the people's living conditions, which at present Is not in sight, could lessen the will to resist among certain elements, especially thc working class and the civil servants. Conversely,could be expected to increase should the present very low living standards deteriorate further.

There arc at present no signs of anyot security controls in Albania; in fact, the regime Ls calling for increasedand peilecting Of the security policein older to stamp oul what little


Is Iclt in the country. In theeventelaxation of security controls and police terror, the people could be expected to seize the opportunity to give vent to their smouldering, pent-up hatred and might even attempt to organize open resistance against the regime In the countryside, in particular, lhc peasants would begin at once to defy the local officials and refuse to fulfill quota obli-


M Any external assistance to potentialgroups in Albania could be expected to increase their ranks and ability to fight, and to widen their popular support.bands in the country, particularly In thc north, were strong in thehen moral and some material support were given them by neighboring Yugoslavia and other Once this stopped, the bands' activities cameirtual standstill


All evidence Indicates lhat the Albanians expect liberation only through the outbreakeneral war. Therefore, shouldar break out and internal controls be weuk-encd, dissidence and unorganized resistance could be expected to Increase, especially ifelements could be organized andmaterial support and tacticalfrom Uie West. Thc peasantry Incould be expected to become more recalcitrant about obeying the government's economic orders.

In the evenl of general war, the possibility of sporadic, but ineffectual, military action on Ihc part of resistance elements exists.effective military action could beonly if substantial arms nnd direction *erc supplied from abroad and if substantial elements of lhc armed forces defected and llx* to the mountains. Without such(rum abroad, any sustained military activities by organized resistance groups rould not be expected to continue for longbecause of the terrain and tha tradition ul Albanians for guerrilla warfare, small bands could manage for an indefinite period tosabotage and harassing activities, Al-

though poor communications and difficulties in coordinating activities, of resistance bands would seriously impede large-scale escape and evasion operations, possibilities do exist for assisting individual and small group escapes. Also, intelligence collection could be arranged through thc infiltration of small groups of well-trained officers to work closely with the guerrilla bands.

The reaction of Albanians to an invasion of their country by Western armies wouldcertainly depend upon the composition of these armies. Invasion by Italian, Greek, or Yugoslav armies would probably be met with general hostility because In the past such armies have destroyed Albania'sHowever. Uie Albanian people probably would offer all possible assistance to invading forces under NATO command even if these forces included some nationals fromenemy nations. In the event of such an invasion, it is likely that there would be considerable defection to the invading army from thc Albanian Army (although probably not from thc security forces) IncludingMoreover, assurance from the West of thc preservation of Albania's independence and territorial integrity could, in the event of an open East-West conflict, unite thc vast majority of the people against the present Communist regime as they have never been united before. Only the hard-corewould be likely to erfcr stiff resistance, especially in guerrilla warfare, in which they are preeminently qualified by theirand wartime experience in rugged let-rain.

The effect on Albanian resistanceof the use of nuclear weapons byforces would depend on which sidethem and the manner ni which they are used. It is conceivableuclearlimited to Soviet shore bases, to tactical use during actual operations, and to the scats ui power could be so designed as to eliminate the major military resources and controlof Uie regime without incurring popular hatred or destroying resistance potential. Such an attack could produce an opportunity for indigenous resistance groups to take over

control of the country if outside help were available.'

f non-Bloc forces sponsored lenientpolicies ln Albania, the people would cooperate with the occupiersespecially If

"The representaUvc of the Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence.rmy, does not belicTe that the effect on resistance potential of Uie use of nuclear weapons In Albania would differ substantially from the effect on Bulgarianpotentialuclear attack on that(See Annex ll. para.rmy wouldfor this paragraph: 'if Albania were the targetuclear attack, resistance potenUal probably would be adversely affected. The de-siructionemoralization resulting from such an attack probably would be such that thewould concentrate on survival"

control were gradually turned over to local officials. As word of such liberal occupation policies spread to remote unoccupied areas, some Albanian tribal chieftains wouldcooperation with the occupiers and harassment of Bloc forces. If supplied with arms and explosives, these bands couldsignificantly with the activities of Bloc troops. They could also collect somefor non-Bloc forces and assist them in evasion and escape.

spirations of individual factions forleadership would probably not adversely affect resistance activities during the war and might indeed intensify UierrT But clashes among factions and leaders would almostdevelop after hostilities had ended.



Bulgaria has been traditionally morelinked to Russia thun any other Eastern European state, and consequentlyfeelingas distinguished from-is not as widespread and intense asAlthough much of the legacy ofderiving from the Russian liberation of Bulgaria from Ottoman rule6 and from German control4 has been dissipatedesult of Soviet domination since World War

traditional ties with Russia have tended to check the development of hatred of Russia and of its culture as such. This contrasts with the situation in nations such as Poland and Hungary, where national antagonismRussia has been traditional. Moreover, there are no Soviet Iroops in Bulgaria tonational pride. Antagonism created by Soviel military and other advisors who are present is probably limited to the relatively few Bulgarian functionaries with whom they come Into direct coniact Soviet advisors reportedly keep to themselves and do notwith Bulgarians Soviet military per-vmnel wear civilian clothes. Nevertheless, the regime's economic policies and programs arc regarded by the ma|orlly of the population as furlhering the interests of the USSR rather ihan those of Bulgaria.

* Serious economic problems have developed since Stalin's death In7 the regime admitted Uie existence of urbanestimatedersons orercent of Ihe nonagricultural labor force. An urban housing shortage hasbecome acute. Agricultural produclion.remains the mainstay of the economy,still below prewar levels, as evidenced by lhe 'act that temporary bread rationing and awheat loan were necessary to tidead harvestG. Therevealed In0 thai national

income had declined and that7 would be considerably less than

Thc populationhole, however, ap-pearsdisposed to suffer the currently depressed standard of living and tends openly Lo express its dissatisfaction only when'economicbecome acutely unbearable. Realising this, the regime has moved to allay economic discontenteries of limitedrelief measures: family wagehave been tripled; compulsory deliveries of certain agricultural Items have beenand wage Increases ranging from eight toercent have been granted to industrial workers. In order to relieve urbana series of make-work projects have been Introduced with Soviet assistance, and0 young people have been sent to work in the USSR and Czechoslovakia. Recentby Wcslern observers In Sofia claim that thc regime's economiclight improvement in livingand an alleviation of economic discontent in the summeriTlng conditions, however, are still below prewar levels and eco nomlc discontentajor source of dissidence.

Politically, dissatisfaction with totalitarian Communist rule ts widespread. Theresents Communist control andoi all phases of life through the so called "mass" social und cultural organizations. Bulgarians have long been accustomed torule bul never has such rule been so oppressive as under the present regime The regime lacks popular support and maintains Itself in power through police slate methods and Lhc ever preseni threat of Soviet military intervention.

5 Although organized religionotential

inntrumenl for resistance, It Is not, at Ihis

time, an ImpurLanl source of dissidence in Bulgaria Although regime efforts lo convert younger people to atheism have embittered parents, the regime has refrained from any intensive religious persecution. Harassment of religious leaders has been limited to non-Orthodox faiths (Catholic andhich represent an insignificant proportion of the population, and has been directed against alleged subversive tics of religious leaders with Western countries rather than against profession of religious faith. On thc other hand, thc regime has openly endorsed Eastern Orthodoxyto whichf the population belongsas thefaith. Tlie regime was Instrumental in healing the schism between the Bulgarian Exarchate and thc Patriarch5 and later raised the status of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church to the patriarchal level. Moreover, the hierarchy of theOrthodox Church completely cooperates with the regime. Members of the lower clergy, although believed to be largelyhave resigned themselves to Communist rule and refrain from making anti-regime statements Currently Jewish. Moslem.and Protestant religious leaders alsowith the regime.

raditional hostility toward Yugoslavia has served lo check the spread of Titoism inBulgarians would not welcome Titoiberator, In view of traditional suspicion of Yugoslav motives. Tito's nalional brand of Communism and other ideologicalhave had little influence amongCommunists. Thc regime's policy of close tics with Moscow enjoys thc support of anti-Yugoslav elements in the Party who fear thai rapprochement with Yugoslavia would result in territorial encroachments.Communists have not forgotten Yugoslav efforts, prior to the Tito-ComInform break, to secure control of Bulgarian Pirln Macedonia by incorporating il into the Yugoslav federal republic of Macedonia.


easants Bulgarian peasants, steepedradition of individual farming, resent the regime's collectivization program. Compris-

ing someercent of the total population, the peasants arc numerically an important dissident group andource of political opposition.1 "adrive culminated in local outbreaks of armed peasant resistance. The regime's latest collectivization drive began5 and alms at virtually complete collectivizationewercent of total arable land IsIn thc socializedlthough there has been no open peasant resistance asiscontent in the countryside is still widespread.

In recent years theas gone to great lengtlis to persuade former agrarianleaders to renounce their ties with the late Nikola Pctkov, agrarian leader executed7 for treason. It has had little success, however, and Dimiturormer right-wing agrarian leader, has especially inspired the peasantry with his stubborn refusal lo renounce his past opposition activities.Itact that the agrarian character of Bulgarian society serves toagainst the organization of dissidence into an effective resistance movement.'is difficult to organize among athinly distributed throughout theThe absence of large urban centers is also an Imiwrlant consideration, Inasmuch as resistance has been traditionally organized by urban Intellectuals and workers rather than by peasants.

Youth Thc disillusionment and antipathy of young people probably represent the most serious failure of the regime to eliminatesources of resistance, sinceadmittedly iclies upon the Indoctrination of the younger generation to assure theslubillly ol its regime. Significantly, there is considerable dissatisfaction among students with courses on Marxism-leninism. However, the government made it clear that it will resolutely oppose studenl demands for the abolition of these courses. Party and youth leaders were urged to re-educate young people who had come under the Influence of bourgeois Ideology and propaganda

ntellectuals Ferment amongespecially among writers and artists.

has been evident since Stalin's death. Inome two months prior to the denigration of Stalin, Stalinist leader Vulko Cherrenkov severely castigated certain writers (or attempting lo undermine Parly control over literature and urged that deviations Irom the Party literary line be "strangled In the embryoniculgarian writers whoopenly to advocate removal of Partyimmediately followingh CPSU Congress were quickly rebuffed. Inulgarian writers, attracted by an earlier version of0 flowers" theory, were ltold lhal Communist Chinese Ideologists did not mean that "weeds and noxious plants" would be allowed to bloom among theof socialist realism. However, despite repressive measures and warnings by thercstiveness among writers has

arty Members. There is evidence ofamong thc Party rank and file, who apparently have been disillusioned by thefailure to democratize Party life.among lower-echelon Party members is admitted by the Bulgarian press, which complains that disunity has existed In some lower Party organizations since therevolt. In7 the regimeampaign to cleanse Parly ranks of "careerist and alien" elements. Dissidence in the higher echelons of Party leadership (at the Politburo and Central Committee levels) takes the form of rivalry for power. The purgeolitburo member and two Central Committee members inor example, was indicative of auch rivalry. Thus far,top leaders have subordinated theirfor the sake of unity

rmed Forces. Although In thc summer6fficers reportedly were purged from the army, apparently fortendencies, dissidence. at ihis Umc.beUeved virtually nonexistent wilhin the Bulgarian armed forces.hole, arc less prone lo dissident atlitudes than is the general population. The Permanent cadre, constitutingf the total miliiary strength, consists cf commissioned and noncommissioned officers

who have demonstrated their reliability; many of these are Communist Party-members. The0 of whom are inducted Into Uie Army annually, reflect the attitudes of Bulgarian youth generally, although persons of demonstrated antipathy toward the regime are screened out or consigned to thc labor troops Once they are Inducted, military discipline and persistent politicalmilitate against the intensiflcaUon and spread of dissidence. The condlUons oflife In Bulgaria, while extremely poor by Western standards, arc in general acceptable to thc typical recruit.

Workers. Industrialthe favored class of the regime,with low wages and poorconditions. It is unlikely that recenthave signlnCanUy offset IhisUrban unemployment has furthertheir discontent. BulgarianpoliUcal and economicCommunist-dominated trade unions,function is to enforce laborthan represent the Interests OfFrequent criticism in Uiepress of the failure of trade unionsclose tics with the workers isof the hostile attitude of workersCommunist trade union officials.union congress scheduled foras reportedly postponed becauseby workers lhat they" be allowedUielr own union officials.


in Bulgaria has notincreased since Stalin's death. RankParty members, writers and studentsexpressed their discontent after theParly Congress, but repressivethe regime effectively curbed suchDuring thc Hungarian revoltdemonstrations reportedlyapparenUy failed to arouse olherthe population. All available evidencelhat the majority of thc populationthat armed rebellion against anstate, backed up by Sovietwould be futile without effective mili-

tary support from outside. Unquestionably, the failure of the Hungarian revolt has served to strengthen this attitude. Only aworsening of economicreak-down of the authority of thc central Party leadership and itsapparatus, couldeneralIf localized disturbances arising out of economic conditions assumed largerand resulted in bloodshed, the current attitude of popular passivity could change to that of active resistance. Much wouldon the ability of the regime to curbdisturbances without exacerbating the hatred of thc population.

The regime's relatively stable leadership has been instrumental In checking the spread of dissidence. No Bulgarian leader has shown any tendency to champion greater autonomy from Moscowas Gomulka didand top leaders appear agreed that essential internal controls should be maintained. Elementswith the regime's failure to liberalize internal life following the denigration ofwere unable topokesman for their cause among the leaders. Certain journalists and writers who openly called for more drastic destalinization were sternly rebuked.

Nevertheless, the ordinary citizenbegan to enjoy relatively greater freedom. Arrests for minor political offenses ceased and Bulgarians became less afraid of expressing anti-regime opinions in public. Minoroffenders were released and forced labor camps began to close. Inentral Committee decision promisedpowers and responsibility for local governmental organs, more cflcctive curbs on police abuses, and debate in the national parliament. Thc Central Committeealso rehabilitated individuals previously purged from high places for Titoism.

The Polish and Hungarian upheavals, however, reversed this trend and the police state atmosphere of the Stalin era wasIn earlyhortly after the suppression of the Hungarian rebels, the regime carried out precautionary arrests of unreliable elements and began to reopen forced labor camps. The regime urged the

population to report persons making anti-regime statements lo the authorities, andpatrols in Sofia and other cities-increased. By7ersons reportedly had been expelled from Sofia.

dissidence In Bulgaria Isboth the native regime andThere is little likelihooddUtinguish between Sovietand local Communist rule.Communist leaders, who priorWar II spent many years of theirin the Soviet Union and evencitizenship, are regarded as moreBulgarian. Bulgarians appear totheir depressed standard ofto Soviet domination and to thethe regime. Dissidence Is alsoat Communism per se, since it Iswith the regime and Sovietsome Party members and membersintellectual class may feelerversion of truemajority of Bulgarians are opposedin general.


Generally, active resistance activities have dccUned since the death of Stalin even though there are indications of some increase ofamong the Party elite. There is no present available evidence of any .organized resistance against the regime, either on aorocal scale. Reports alleging activities of such organizations have remained unconfirmed. Whatever resistance there is. appears to be entirely limited to the passive and unorganized variety.

Passive resistance is found among the peasantry, workers, intellectuals, and youth The clergy and members of the former middle class do not figure prominently in passivePeasant resistance Is displayed by failure to meet agricultural delivery quotas set by the regime and neglect of collective farm machinery. Malfeasance by collective farm officials indicates an attitude ofif not opposition. Occasional active resistance in the form of sabotage has been reported but such reports are difficult to

: Whatever sabotage there is appears spontaneous and not the work of any group.


*In Industry, workers resort to slowdowns absenteeism, are careless with mainte-SSpce and handling of equipment, and fail to rSJ-et norms. While it is difficult to determine whether such acts are due to Inefficiency or arc jnanlfestaUons of passive resistance, thewith which the Bulgarian presssuch matters would indicate the latter.

assive resistance among youth Isby complete lack of interest In theof the Communist-sponsored Dimitrov youth organization, deliberate failure of courses In universities in order to avoid work assignments to unpleasant areas or Jobs, and failure to attend Party meetings and other youth activities of the Fatherland Front. Young people also, on occasion, manifestdevoutness.

writers and journalistsaccused by the regime ofwriting about contemporary lifeto eschew political controversy.get articles and short storiesof the regime published ln thefrom discussions of literarythe press, heated debates and differencestake place at meetings of theUnion.


Bulgarian emigrenumerous contacts with persons inthere is' no evidence that theya posiUon to organize resistanceBulgarian emigre movement is dividedand opportunism, which havereduce its potential to inspire resistanceThereeneral feeling thathave been abroad too long to keepwith conditions and "currentBulgaria and consequently cannotleadership. Recentagainst the emigreby voluntary returnees, hasto further lower Bulgarianemigre orgaitiz

Georgl M. Dimitrov, representingwing Agrarians in exile, is, Uie onlyknown to have seriously attemptedcontacts inside Bulgaria. Hishowever, has been confined toof followers through sporadicand personal correspondence.mounted about five cross-borderwith the assistance of Westernservices, to contact local Agrarianasking them to start organizingday when the Communist regimeThe Dimitrov organizationaloriented toward eventual-assumptionby his party rather than-towardeventual resistance to thehas condemned Uie operations ofand intelligence agencies aimed atinternal resistance.


Followingh CPSU Congress, the Bulgarian regime refused to grant anyconcessions. Voicing its allegiance to the principle of "socialistt resumedand arbitrary arrest and deportations. While callingew spirit In art, iton conformance to "socialistequesting constructive criticism by Parly members, it silenced or expelled ail but the most platitudinous critics. Stalinist type oppression will probably continue to beeven though it will exacerbate already existing grievances.

The powers of the police have not been significantly restricted. During theof thc Hungarian revolt, the regimeappealed to the population to Inform on individuals guilty of anti-regime statements and activities. Sincenreliable elements from Sofia and other large towns were expelled. Soda citizens, marked forto the countryside, were visited by the police after midnight and given two to four hours to leave the capital. Even Partyand oUier persons formerlyreliable by thc regime were among those expelled.


Thc regime could successfully suppress any localized revolt. Thc Bulgariansecurity forces consist0 well-trained, loyal men, evenly divided between Frontier Troops and Interior Troops. The overt and covert police organizations bring thc total strength of the security apparatus, exclusive of the armed forces,0 persons. This figureontrol ratio of one trained operative, policeman, or militarized security force man to everyoulgarian citizens, not taking into'account the informer network. The efficiency and quality of the police system appears good and there is no indication of disloyalty in thc police forces. Although certain elements of the ordinary police (such as the traffic police) were placed under local control inhere has been no major reform of theInternal security apparatus which might lessen its effectiveness in suppressing local resistance. Frontier and Interior Troop strength is believed to have been cut, but these reductions are not believed to haveaffected the efficiency of the stateapparatus. Moreover, the Bulgarian police system has not been discredited byof past "errors" as in the case of some other satellites. Following the6 Plenum's restoration of "socialistand the quiet repudiation ofarty purge, the securityinimal loss of efficiencyfrom confusion over the new line and the eclipseumber of security officersIn the earlier extortion of falseand other malpractices.

In the highly unlikely eventational uprising, however, the Bulgarian securitywould need the support of theArmy and, If thc conflict threatened to prolong itself, the support of Soviet forces. Top Bulgarian Army officers and commanders would remain loyal lo the regime, and lower ranking officers and enlisted men wouldmaintain discipline and seek to suppress the rebels unless they were convinced thater trulyationwide popular

movement. In the event that rebel efforts promised some success and some lowerofficers and men turned over- their arms or Joined the revolt, Soviet Intervention In force would be inevitable.


Assuming conditions of peace and barring widespread revolts in thc Bloc, there is little real potential among any elements infor effective organized resistance to thc regime. Unorganized and passive resistance will probably continue to manifest itself, but under present conditions the population will increasingly feel that their position Isand that aid from the United States or any other Western power is unlikely. Local outbreaks of resistance born of desperation with economic conditions, particularly among the peasants, might occur from time to time,eneral spontaneous revolt such as occurred In Hungary ls unlikely, given present conditions and the temper of the population.

Whether or not passive and unorganized resistance activity will increase depends on the ability of the regime to cope withproblems, Thus far it hasillingness to grant limited economicand the Soviet Union has shown itself ready to render assistance for the solution of economic problems, which would make Itunlikely that the economic situation will deteriorate sufficiently to bringarked increase in this type of resistance.

There seems to be little possibility ofor change in resistance activity by the general population under foreseeableof peace If no Party upheaval occurs. The principal opportunity for maintaining at least some resistance potential ls through Western propaganda,eeling of hopeense of direction among the people. This may prevent complete apathy and cynicism and encourage the expression of grievances and demands by every semi-legal-method, sopirit of resistance can be maintained and molded Into the strongest possible Instrument of pressure upon theregime.

Although any marked Increase Intensions would have the effect of raising topes of eventual liberation from the outside. Bulgarians would still not be disposed toliberation by themselves. Ideological 2nd factional disputes, whether ln the bui gariaii leadership or in other Communisthave had little impact on resistance Ln Bulgaria, Bulgarians undoubtedly envy the greater freedom of Poland from Moscow's domination but have shown no disposition to Snulate that country. Possibly Bulgariansll doubtful of Uie permanence ofstatus of greater autonomy.

ertain degree, the casing of security measures would actafety valve. Arelaxation of essential internal controls, however, mightrecarious situaUon unless It were accompanied by measures to remedy the basic causes of dissidence. It would be particularly dangerous. If, at Uie same time, an alternative poliUcal leader or faction emergedLiberal" force.for Uie abolition of all oppressivewould mount, and it ls doubtful Uiat, under suchtrongly pro-Soviet regime could maintain Itself in power without Soviel military support.

RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN WAR SS. Under conditions of general warfare the resistance potential of the Bulgarianwould increase considerably. The ruling Communist minority would be underpressure from the antagonistic majority ofituation which wouldresult in more forthright action on the Part of elements now passive and would theaten the political stability of the govern-"wul. Such instability would give rise todoubts on the part of manyin thc Party and state apparalus aboul the future of Communism, especially if Soviet defeat became apparent. Politicalwould emerge, with the result lhat Uie Potential for widespread effective action wculdharply enhanced. Nevertheless,* resistance activities could not be tntensl-Initially. Only if Western forces appearedbe winning, would the Bulgarians engage

ln espionage, sabotage, and oUicr harassing acUriuesbut not to Uie extent that might be expected by Uie people of other satellites under similar circumstances.

any type of war in thethere would be almost no possibilitymilitary acUon byAs in World War II,If supplied with arms andtheUc down somethrough sabotage of rail lines andplants. Bands of guerrillabe developed, but they.would bedependent upon outside support. Ifforces consisted of such* traditionalas Turks and Greeks. Uiedo very Little to assist them. If lhebeing fought by Western forces on,to Bulgarian territory, themight aid enemy forces by supplyingby destroying lines ofand by sabotaging Soviet BlocInstallations. As indicated above,of such activiUes would depend onof Uie enemy and uponfrom outside. However, theprobably not participate In evasionactiviUes unti: enemy foices wereBulgaria, and even then would weighinvolved very carefully. If militarywere taking place wiUiin Bulgaria orwithin Uie Bloc, Bulgarianwould be increased, and ifappeared to be winning, there wouldanU-regime activities. If Uie Blocappeared to be winning, thehave less capability and lessto help the West.

of tactical nuclear weaponshave little effect on Bulgarian re-

"The representative of the Axnlnlant Chief or filarl, Intelligence. USAF would add UieII Is possible that reslsUnce groups could carry out limited Independent militaryif tbe following three condlUons prevailed: (a) disruption or diversion of themeans of Internal control, (b) developmeni Ingroups of effective leadership andand receipt of outside material rapport, and lei assurance of early direct militaryand relief.

sistance, unless Bulgaria was toargetajor nuclear attack. The human and material destruction and socialuclear attack on Bulgaria would eliminate the population's poteniial for resistance.,

esistance elements would make littleto assist Greek. Turkish, or Yugoslav military forces even If they were identified with the West, unless theseinorityorce under United

'The representative of tbc AuUtont chief of Staff, Inteuigenee, USAF would add theIt Is conceivable that nil air attack could be so designed as to eliminate thc major sources of iho military and control strength of thewithout incurrlnc popular hatred orresistance polcnUal. Such an aircould produce an opportunity for Indigenous reslstnnrc group* lo take over control of thc country.

States or other Western command.assurance that forces of countries other than Bulgaria's traditional enemies would be assigned occupation duties In the country would be necessary.

ccupation policies of the attacking forces wouldrucial effect on all resistance capabilities. To be effective these policies would have to reflect the aspirations of the Bulgarian people for national sovereignty and the overthrow of communism. The aims of individual resistance factions^ for post-war leadership ln Bulgaria probably would not seriously impede Intelligencer evasion and escape, and military capabilities. However, political ambitions of some resistance leaders could affect political warfare operations, if the resistance leaders were supported by anfollowing.


Bin the years following the Communist EJte-over ln mainland China, the regime sup-wessed organized resistance. During this wjod, the regime failed to gain the positive support of large segments of the population and created widespread apathy andIn the course of the past two years this situation has been aggravated. The vol-nrae and Intensity of dissidence has increased HgnificanUy. particularly among thethe intellectuals, and some youth, most of.whom were formerly Inclined to accept the regime at least passively. Despite thishowever, there has been no significant organized resistance or active resistance on iotherurely local level, with theexception of Tibet, where dissidence Oared into armed rebellionorcing Important shifts in the Communist time-table for this area.


1 Among thc most important causes ofare economic grievances. Thepolicies of rapid Industrialization,modernization, and socialization have required thc diversion of substanUal resources, which have been secured through demanding Increased productivity while greatlythc benefits accruing to Uie people. In consequence, workers and peasants have been frustrated in failing to achieve promised levels of real income and well-being, whileand businessmen resent the loss of their properties to thc state nnd the reduction ta their income. Politically. Uie systemd regimentation and tight controlspect of life ls generally resented,In varying degrees among different groups. Finally. Communist efforts to changesocial concepts, such as that ofily hierarchy, have created considerable

ill will. In contrast to Eastern European satellites, however, resentment of close tics with Uie USSR isaUon-wide factor although it does affect the atUtude of some groups.

Communist regime ls-now engagedgigantic effort to remake "China'sandodern. Industrialhaseries of sweepingand economic changes, includingto reshape education and tomedia for controlling andlhe populace. Thebrought to bear by Uie regimedisruption of traditional socialhaveidespread tensionNot all these "strains andUie result of, or can be attributed to,system. Large segments ofhave remained indifferent,many others have adopted aattitude; still others are willing toregime because they believe itsand policies havc_improvedposition or prospects.of Uie population feel theyrather than lost since Uie defeatKuomintang. Thus anti-regimewith differing conditions and amonggroups as they are affected by


The land reform ofthe landlords andamong the tenant, poor, and somepeasants. Theseercent of the total peasantwlilch, in turn, constitutes the bulkChina's population. Manythese peasants probably believed thatfrom reform, and dissidence didlo be widespread except at times of

agricultural crisis, such as the crop failurehe regime's sudden rush Intosocialization, following Mao's speech lnas largely completeduring this process, there were only fewof rural opposition, but by the endeasant dissatisfaction was againThc peasants resented theand inefficient management of theand/or collectives. They disliked having to Increase their labor for the state, since this seriously affected the sideline occupations that traditionally contributed to their income. They were disillusionedthe regime did not fulfill its promise of an immediate rise in income.

Reports on Chinese peasant dissidence are relatively convincing. Peiping has admitted widespread peasant withdrawals fromin some areas, and has reported minor peasant uprisings In several increase of peasant discontent will depend largely on whether the harvests are good or bad and on the willingness of theto let the peasants enjoy more of the fruits of their labor. There is no uniformity ln the pattern of discontent, and regionalwill continue to vary.

Intellectuals. At the time of ilsthc regime enjoyed passive acceptance by, and in some cases thc active support of, many of the country's intellectuals. However, despite continuous efforts to "reform" thetheir attitude toward the regime has steadily deteriorated, exceptriefhen the regime tolerated some degree ot Intellectual diversity.the effect of the "Hundred Flowers" policy has recently been negated by the "anti-rightisthich has been directed more at the Intellectuals than at any other group. Disaffection among Intellectuals has centered on lack of freedom lo undertakeresearch or creative activity not approved by the regime, on thc Communist Party's domination of all significant aspects of public activity, and on inadequate materialand Inappropriate employment.

Dissidence among the Intellectuals Issignificant because their skills and

experience arc badly needed by the regime. Many of those who have been attacked as "rightists" have achieved relatively highIf often nominalpositions In such field* as government administration and education. The vehemence of the regime's attack againsi intellectuals during the latter half7 testifies to the Communists' concern over the implications of opposition in this group. How successful the regime will be In Its efTorts to "reform" and "educate" the intellectuals Is still uncertain. Recent events haveincreased thc level of dissidence among Ihem. Of equal importance is the probability that these same events, by bringingtrengthening of controls over theand curbing their influence, will greatly reduce their Inclination and opportunities to translate dLssidence into resistance.

Youth. Initially, youth, and especially students. Included some of the most ardent supporters of the regime and it appeared lhat dissidence among them was minor.efinite decline in enthusiasm for theseems to have occurred. This ls the. result mainly of the regimentation, prosaic tasks and living conditions which face most youths during the present period ofIn contrast to the expectations created by thc establishmentNewhe Korean hostilities, Uie spread of Chinese Communist influence in thc Asian-African area, and the socializaUon period. DissatisfacUon with their strlcUy controlled curriculum and their prospects for further education and for suitablehas been evident. Generally being sen siUve to Ideological matters, youth wu also influenced to some extent by de-Stalinlzation and the Hungarian uprising. Suchhas in several cases erupted intoriots. Although dissidence among youth may not be widespread at present, Iterious problem because it opens to question Uie fundamental Communist emphasis on the early molding of opinion.

Former Businessmen. When the bulk ol remaining private commerce and Industry was socializedhere was virtually no ovcrUy expressed opposiUon from the former


However, it was clear in the jflmU-rightist struggle" that the regime did toot consider the "bourgeoisie" resigned to 'current conditions. Except in certainrial-commercial centers such as Shanghai, and except for connections with other groups jach as the intellectuals, the "bourgeoisie" now has negligible political or economic power. Dissidence among former private businessmen, while widespread, is thus significant only to tbe extent that It Limits the regime's ability to utilize their technical and managerial skills. Former businessmen possess talents which "cannot Jet be matchedewrained generation, and their dissatisfaction with the regime, and the consequent distrust at them by the regime will be an adverseof some but not crucial Importance In the economic development of the country.

rmed Forces. In the active Chinesemilitary service there Is virtually no dissidence and no likelihood of resistance. This is reflected In current low desertion rates and is the result of close Party control of ali levels, careful selection of personnel forservice, constant indoctrination andof all military personnel, highly preferential treatment of military personnel, constant attention to officer-enlisted civilian relationships, and prompt action to ease or eradicate tensions and other problems. Ex-Nationalist defectors and other disloyalhave been eliminated from the service; equipment, food, clothing, and shelter are available ln generally satisfactory quantities by Chinese standards; thc pay and leaveis improved; and terms of service are set by law. Therelose relationship between armed forces and the civilian component ofPeiping regime. Thc top militaryare all Party veterans andhold high Party posts. The majority ofrank and file of the armed forces belong fther to the Party or the Young Communist league.

JI- Militia. There are severalhe People's Militiaa heterogeneous poup whose functions, training,ocial standing vary throughout the jj^try. It is probable that there are Militia fibers who are dissatisfied with their role

and resent having to give up their spare time to unrewarding work. Tlie great majority of thc Militia, however, probably'arc loyal to thc regime. Dissidence among this group is more apt to reflect their status as peasants rather than their para-military position.

eterans Thc denwbllization of eve: Gve million men from thc armed forces9 hasizable population group who face many problems. In at least one province demobilized servicemen have been blamedfor trouble ln rural areas. Thethereforeroup within which there are dissident feelings and within which there isertain amount of potential resistance and possibly some actual resistance. Many veterans are disgruntled and unhappy because they have been forced to leave the comparative security and prestige of service life for the much more difficult lifeeasant. Additionally, numbers of them wanted to work In the cities after discharge but were forced to return to the rural areas where dissatisfaction has arisen overhousing, and acceptance given them by the villagers. At present, dissidence among veterans ls not Intense and ls not likely to developerious security threatthe veterans, trained in the use of arms, experienced In guerrilla warfare, and bound togetherommon background,otentially scrious_security

ommunist Leadership. The Chinese Communist Party and regime hasunusual cohesiveness and unity at its highest levels. With virtually the soleof the Kao-Jao affair. thc regime has adjusted policy differences and other Internal disputes without recourse to drastic purges and without evidencingamong disgruntled leaders When Mao dies or retires from active leadership, some diminution of party unity can be expected, with struggles for power among the senior party leaders who would probably collectively succeed Mao in his various seerns unlikely that even Mao's death woulderious leadership crisis that would critically affect the party's cohesiveness and effectiveness.

1 *

lower levels of the Communist Party there appears toertain amount ofseldom Intense enough to be called dlsklcnce. Rural cadres are particularlyto occasional misgivings. They are often forced toeasant-level life; they miss Uie companionship and culturalavailable in urban centers. Blameallure oi Uie regime's policies is often laid to them dlrecUy. They find themselves caught between the millstones of Peiping's policies and the realities of their immediateand there is evidence that some of them occasionally identify themselves more directly with the peasants than with Party demands. Dissidence In thc Party is likely to become significant only if Uie regime has major ceo nomlc reversesissidence within other major groups becomes acute

Government Bureaucracy. While key positions ln Uie bureaucracy are held by Party members, thereubstantial number of non members In it who are rewarded lessbothaterial and psychological sense, and who accordingly are more prone to be dlssatlsflcd with Uie regime. Criticisms ol thc regime by non-Party persons inonsiderable degree of resentment in the bureaucracy over Uie preferentialof Party members and the Party'sto grant authority to nonmembers At the same time, many such personsested Interest In Uie regime which may par-Ually negate any dissident tendencies. In Uie future, thc level of dissidence in this group will be largely determined by Uie Parly'sto improve its methods of working with lhe group.

Religious Groups. Organized religious groups have been significant sources ofchiefly In minority-inhabited areas of Communist China, most notably In Tibet und In some llul (Moslem) areas. In China proper organized religion is not of great numerical importance because Uie great majority oftake an informal, eclectic view of religion. adopUng elementsumber of religions without formal adherence to any. Despite their relatively small membership some of Uie organized religious groups in China proper are nevertheless significant as sources ol dissi-

dence and passive resistance. In some cases Uie regime's moves against religious groups or adherents has aroused resentment Membersumber of religious groups conUnueresistance against Uie regime despitedrives against some religious groups (particularly Catholics) and Communistto organize religious adherents into front organizations Uiat are susceptible tocontrol and that support lhe regime's(fronts for Buddhists, Moslems,Catholics, and Taolsts have been

Superstitious Sects. In addition to lhe above, certain seml-religious scefs, including such secret societies asuan-tao, have figured in Communist admissions of unrest and local rebellion. Ihese sects with an ideology based on elements of various religions and superstitions have been subjected toCommunist suppression efforts, but probably continue to existocal level in many rural parts of China, where theysucceed from time to Ume in organizing minor peasant rebellions through appeals to magic and superstition and throughof various peasant grievances. None of these sects, however, appears to have retained an effective national or even regionalor following.

Minorities. The ethnic minorities in China traditionally have resisted Hi ietendencies of Uie predominant Han Chinese. In actual practice Uie Communist regime has continued Uie engulfment of Uie minorities by the Han Chinese. Thishas led to dissatisfaction among the minorities which, ln turn, has producedefforts to curb "great HanAside from Tibetspecial case where lhe dissidence has flared Into active resistanceUie extent of disaffection among minorities is not known, but the frc-quenl reference to the regime's corrective for "great Han chauvinism" indicates that some exists.

Former Overseas Chinese Thereersons In mainland China, concentrated largely In Kwangtung and Fuklen provinces, who are considered


Chinese" by virtue of previous resl-pDce abroad or as "Overseas Chinesebecause they have relatives abroad. Members of this group have been treated with greater leniency than the rest of thethey have received preferential rations, Snd have occasionally been excluded from gome of the most onerous consequences ofocialist transformation.some dissidence probably exists in this group; accustomed ln the past to an above-average standard of living and moreabout the outside world, theyresent various'aspects of Chinesepolicies.

Urban Workers. The urban workers are cultivated as the mass base of thc regime. Despite preferential treatmenthas developed among urban workers In some areas and, in several cases, has resulted in strikes. While many factory workers now have more job security and material rewards than In pre-Communlst ass's, there is resentment of thepressures, such as high work norms, and dissatisfaction that livinghave not improved more rapidly.dissidence among urban workers docs not appear to be widespread nor intense. As In the case of youth, however, dissidence among workers is regarded with the utmost concern by the regime on ideological grounds.

Former national Government Officials. Of the National government officials who did not escape tomall number arewith the Peiping regime, more are probably still in prison or in labor camps, and stlil more arc retired or not fully active. The collaborators work for the regimeimely shift of allegiance to the Communists before or when the regime was established or because their valuable technical Skills have earnedpecial position. Sonic or this group probably resent theof the Communist Party and may be dissatisfied with conditions. But they would be cautious about exposing theirbecause of their own past history. The honcollaborators in many cases have been branded as enemies of the regime from the Ruining They unquestionably are dissatis-

fied with their present condition, but to an even greater extent than .the collaborating group, must suppress their feelings.

ibetans. Thc Tibetans for centuries have used every means at their disposal to resist the Imposition of political, military,or cultural controls by whatevergovernment has been inajority of them has continued to resist all efforti of the Chinese Communist regime to bring Tibet under the centralized control of Peiping. This has been true not only of thc Tibetans living in what the .Chineserefer to as the Tibetutso of the seminomadic Tibetan tribes who uve in Tibetan areas now included in the provinces of Tslnghai, Kansu, and Szechwan. Among the causes of Tibetan resistance have been resentment at Chinese interference with Tibetan religious activities. Communistof Tibetan youth, attempts toTibetan society, food shortages andand Pckping's failure toromise to release certain imprisoned Tibetan leaders.


hile It may be possible, on the basis of the preceding analyses, to make anin general terms of thc major sources and areas of ill will, the Intensity of dissidence in Communist China and thejdegrec to which it may be transformed into actual resistance remain largely matters of conjecture. It ts logical to conclude that some degree ofexists at almost every level ofChinese society. However, this does not mean that such dissidence can develop into resistance unless the control capabilities of thc regime were greatly weakened

hc regime's policies and practices,the "rectificationavea number of factors causing III will At the same time, the regime has developed and exploited thc growing pride of thepeople in their country's achievements, particularly their military strength and their new international prestige. As in the USSR. Communism was imposed on the people by Indigenous elements in the face of seemingly

overwhelming odds rather thanoreign power. These points are recognized, mainly by members of thehe bulk of the people are illiterate peasants and know little of and care less about ideology and na-Uonal policies. They are preoccupied with local affairs. Theyegime by the extent to which it exploits them. However, in thc vast majority of cases, dissidence Is not translated Into organized, active resistance. Sometimes it has led, and may lead In the future, to unorganized passive resistance which Is more difficult to detect and tobut has far less potential than has tho revolutionary mood in some Easternsatellites.


Events following Staun's death and the uprisings ln Poland and Hungary0 had relatively little influence on the level ofln Communist China. Peiping's unique status in the Communist world, Its geograplilc location, Its different problems and the newness of ils revolutionaryprecluded any necessity to follow thc Kremlin line. However, events since the20lh Party Congress In6 did have some impact even though thc Chinese Communists successfully minimized the shock of Stalin's denigration. Whatever confusion existed apparently contributed only slightly to dissidence or resistance and was to some extent alleviated by official explanations and by claims lhat the Chinese Communisthad avoided the pitfalls into which the USSK had slipped.

4here were two peaks of resistance activity in mainland China. Tlie first, in4 andas occasioned primarily by the poor harvests4 and led to the drive againstpersonally ordered by Muo Tse-tung In lhe springhe drive did not reach the proportions of earlier similar drives, evenases ofand "economic sabotage" weredealt with4 andt was credited by lhe Communists with creating the preconditions necessary for popular accept-

ance of the wholesale collectivization andcampaign inaugurated by Maolnhe second peak. was occasioned by poorshortages, and disappointingfollowing collectivization andIt has not occasioned aagainst "counterrevolutionaries,"to be one of the underlying causescurrent "rectification" drive. Inperiod was marked by considerableactivity by the Tibetans, culminatingbut somewhat localized rebellion

upheavals In Poland andhad some effect, as the Peipingadmitted.esult, theln order to forestall possiblegranted that "contradictions"accelerated the "rectification"experiment partially backfired andwas forced to revert to itsof controlling public opinion,contributed to discontent lnof some non-Party people.shifting of policies may also haveconsiderable disagreement amongBut thc main significance ofdevelopments on the question ofand resistance lies In thethe Chinese Communist leaders nowbetter appreciation of the extenttrengthened determinationby forceful means if necessary, anyovert manifestations of this


already intimated, resistance lnChina was not appreciably affecteddeath of Stalin and subsequentthe course of such resistance wasby local conditions. Exceptiribal minoritiess estimatedno organized resistance of ascale existed in Communist China atof Stalin's death. In some areasgroups may have survived from thethe Communist takeover, bul theycertainly few and small.



A lew incidents of active, organizedurely local basis have occurred, example, it is probable that uprisings against local authorities occurred lnUurJang4eemingly, was considerable popular participation jn.thcse Incidents, and arms weregainsi government authorities and )ps. Additionally,6 there were ible reports, some of which were admitted y. the Peiping regime, of revolts in western lwan. an area outside of Tibet, but popu-by Tibetans. Persistent reports have been received of the spread of these upris-to Tibet proper, and of the use ofy the Communists to quell the dls-Itnrbanccs. At least one revolt was reliably ire ported6 In the Uangshan Yi Autonomous Chou, an area populated by the *Y1 minority rather than Tibetans, in what is mow western Szechwan.

n organized resistance group lnhe Mimang, presumably had Its origin at the 'time of the Communist occupation ln latebut did not come to the fore untill. The numerical strength of this group Jls not known. Tlic Mimang probably does not engage In specific training, the effectiveness Of the group depending on the naturalof these people towards guerrflla-typc warfare. The group's appeal stems from the antipathy Tibetans feel toward Hanand their loyalty to Lamaism which binds them together ln opposition to both the Han and fellow Tibetans who have cooperated with the Communists. Except for suppliesfrom the Chinese Communist military forces, thc weapons of the Mimang arelimited to ancient rifles and homemade weapons. They probably operate ln fairly small groups largely againsi targets of

SL Another organized anti-Communist Chi-hese resistance group consists mainly of emi-pes In Indian border towns. It ls believed ?hat the Dalai Lama's brother. Qyalois connected with the group. This groupe supporting some of thelvities in Tibet.

(b) Unorganized Resistance

Unorganized resistance on the China mainland has appeared sporadically but there is no Indicationefinite pattern of such activities oroncerted efiort on thc part of the population against the regime.spontaneous acts of resistance have taken place but remain localized, limited to certain social, minority, and religious groups. Thcy have nevererious threat to tho regime although It has at times led the regime significantly to alter some of Its

Resentment of the peasants against thc compulsory cooperative system has expressed itself In such forms of passive resistance as withholding taxes, refusing to participate in government sponsored programs to increase agricultural and livestock producUon, and to withdrawals from cooperatives.onsiderable number of provinces failed to meet their tax Kiangsu Province alonegrain to their members without allotting any for Uie public tax.

Oeneral dissatisfaction among urban workers over unsatisfactory working(such as the speedup system andrequired overtime) and againstliving conditions (such as poorand lack of consumer goods) has taken the form of strikes and passive "resistance.slowdowns, absenteeism and extensive use ofnorganized activeIs Illustratedeople's Daily report of7ases of sabotage orsabotage In factories and enterprises in Canton.

Unorganized resistance among students has taken Uie form of sporadic strikes and riots. In Uie early autumn6 onlyuttudentseiping University attended what was supposed to be adiscussion of the "Political Current Events Report."

Dissidence among intellectuals wasby Intensive criticism of theregime during theand contend"


(not classified as "'countcrr evol ulion" by thend by occasionalto Hong Kong. Nevertheless, thewho make up the "democratic" minor parties that collaborate with the Peipinghave In those parties unique instruments for maintaining contact with one another, oven though they have no mass following and are llmiled to major cities. Some Individual Intellectuals have apparently utilized these parties and other contacts to build up small personal followings. However, it appears that in almost all cases, dissident Intellectuals hoped to use such contacts not to overthrow the regime but tomoderating" or "restraining" influence on it.

One of the most persistent problems for the regime Is resistance to the Communist program by many of the non-Han Chineae minorities, particularly In thc border areas. In addition to resistance by the Tibetans, the Communists have admitted uprisings also among the Turki peoples of Slnkiangnd inndamong the Hui (Moslems) of Kansu at unspecified periods. Minority areas Include some of the most remote and inaccessible parts of China, areas from which even rumors are slow to leak to thc outside world. Pelping's concern with minority dissidence is reflected in the general moderation ofpolicies in minority areas, and In the continuing warnings in Chinese Communist propaganda against the error of "great Hanhe most significant factresistance in minority areas Is not so much the occasional outburst of rebellion, but rather the fact that the Communists have established effective control in some areas which for centuries have been breeding grounds for rebellion againsi ChineseIn the past few years the traditionally troublesome area of Sinkiang has beenregularly to visiting dignitaries from Moslem countries, indicating that whatever rebellious activity may persist is al most local ln extent.

Except for the secret sects, thc Huland the Tibetan Buddhists, there haa been no recent significant, active resistance to

the regime by religious groups. However, the basic divergence between Communism andadherence manifests Itself in passive resistance by many of the religiousthroughout mainland China, reflected In continuing arrests of religious figures and in the restrictions imposed on such groups as Catholics. The regime has attempted to deal with this passive resistance by organizing Communist-front organizations of Moslems, Buddhists, Protestants, and most recently, Catholics and Taolsts. While these attempts have been partially successful, some passive resistance continues among these groups.

he "rectification" campaign which spread throughout Chinaonsequence ofpeech on contradictions Inndicates that the Communist Party has taken serious cognizance of the existence of widespread antagonism toward the regime although thc Communist leaders appear to have initially underestimated this antagonism. Peiping is fully capable ofinternal security, however, andfor an uprising along the Hungarian lines are unlikely to develop In thc foraecable future. The fact lhal the regime has made minor concessions to counteract dissidence, such as the recent withdrawals of Chinese civilian cadres from Tibet and the relaxation ot some policies in the face of peasant unrest, does not mean the regime is incapable ofthe masses. In the overall picture, resistance in its various overt forms appears to be of minor significancenot accurately reflecting the large extent of underlyingThat dissidence expresses itself In apathy and lack of positive response to the regime's programs however, and constitutes one of Pelping's chief problems. The principal significance of such dissidence and rcslst-inc* as presently exist or is predictable inChina lies not in any revolutionary threat to the regime itself but rather in thceffect it may have on thc regime's policies. Lack of popular cooperation may delay the achievement of some of thc Chinese Communists' objectives, particularly In the economic field, and may force theodify some policies. In particular,issidence may reduce agricultural production

and hamper the regime's efforts to collect agricultural surplus. This ln turn, by its effect on food supplies, would increase dissl-genec in urban groups.


Mii'Theremall group of Tibetans, in felimpong, India, composed of persons who nave fled from Tibetome mem-Eers of this emigre group are former high-raruung officials, and others were members of we Dalai Lama's retinue on his trip tohe winter. This group has reportedly tried to obtain aid from the Indian government, both in removing the Chinese Communists from Tibet and in grantingto the Dalai Lama. These attempts have iieen unsuccessful, although there is athat thc recent Chinese Corrtmurustto postpone the socialization of Tibet may have been somewhat influenced byfrom India and other "neutral" countries.

he more thanillion Overseaswho Inhabit the various countries of Booth cast Asia do not seem to beignificant part in guiding or aiding resistance activities in the homeland. There is abond between the Overseas Chinese and their ancestral land, and undoubtedly they are proud of the emergence of Chinaorld power, even though they may be opposed to Communism. These Chinese abroad continue to send back regular monetary contributions to their families on the mainland, and until recently thereubstantial flow of young Chinese back to the mainland for theirThis flow has declinedhere is no evidence of Overseas Chinesewith, or aid to, any resistance group in Communist China.


The Government of thc Republic oi China pn Taiwan is the most important group of |gnesc outside of the China Mainland anda limited potential to guide and assist ^stance groups on the mainland. They Qavc well organised and equipped military

units numberingncluding all services. Although these forces pose no real threat to the existence of the-Chineseregime, they are able, with outside support, toertain amount ofpressure along the central cast China coast. Although the Nationalists conduct small-scale ground actions, propagandaand other air operations, and hurass Uie Communists by artillery and naval patrol acUvlty, they are not capable under present circumstances of maintaining major military operaUons on Uie mainland or of providing signlfleanl military support to other dissident or resistance elements on the mainland

The most persistent category ofactivity to appear innews and propaganda ls that ofsubversion. Infiltration, espionage, and sabotage. Most of this activity Is reported to be concentrated in thc coastal region ofChina, particularly in thc areaUie Nationalist-held offshore islands. Communist charges concerning NaUonalist acUviUes almost invariably deal with -single agents or small groupsalf dozen or less, who are usually said to have surrendered or been apprehended almost immediately after being landed. The Communists have avoided implyingidespread Nationalistmay exist on thc mainland or that the Nationalists have organization^ orlines to resistance groups that may be active, and there ts UtUe Informationto determine Uie extent of populartoward NaUonallst efforts on the

In northern Burma, and alsoos and Thailand, former Chinese Nationalistnumberingontinue to exist. Although Taiwan hassevered all ties with these elements, it Is believed Lhat Lhe Chinese Nationalists still maintain contact with and provide limited support for Uiese units. While thesetroops possess limited capabitiUcs and prcxcnUy confine their activities totheir existence, they must,be consideredotential reaistunec group.


characteristic response of trieto dissidence has been to combatthe propaganda and administrativeof thc vast interlockingIt also has beenalternate pressure and relaxation andconcessions when expedienton the other hand, almostbeen dealt with by uncompromisingby the machinery of the policeaddition to an extensive policethe armed forces, the repressiveof the regime has been extendedystem of occupationalurban residence committees, andThe existence of thisapparatus, the incessant programand propaganda, thetravel controls, the rigid control ofand radio, and theot people in every walk ofthe disappearance of earlierand the lack of present organized


Communist Chinaolice state, and It is difficult to draw clear distinctions between Its military forces and Its security forces. The powerful People's Liberation Armyumerically the largest army In the world, with an estimated strength of two and one half million men,trong politicaldating back to the days when the army and the Party were one. The People's Armed Policy (PAP) numbers more.

A part of the stated mission of the PLA Is the maintenance of internal security. The nature of PLA organization, and theof the PAP under the Ministry' of Public Security imply that thc detection andof dissidence and minor resistance activityunction primarily of the PAP, while only major, well-organized resistance requiring relatively extensive militaryin the field wouldarget for PLA activity. To accomplish such missions

the PLA has Public Security regiments and divisions as well as its regularly organized ground, air, and naval forces. -The Public Security units are small, lightly armedof their regular counterparts and have served in regular military operations, They are, however, well suited for operations in the field against irregular forces such as might be organized by resistance movements. The effectiveness of the PLA In maintainingsecurity Ln China has been outstanding.

In addition to the PLA and thc PAP, the People's Militia appears to have-an Internal security role tn rural areas. Its members are subject to part-time duty, and most are poorly armed and trained. The effectiveness of the militia lo suppressing resistance activity is probably very low. However, lt undoubtedly servesairly useful group in maintaining surveillance over the peasantry and reporting possible dissidence or other suspicious activity to local Communist authorities.

Moreover, the security forcesery close relationship with the mass organizations which link the formal government and Party agencies with the various social groups in thc population. These organizations,embership of many millions, extend thecontrol down to the lowliest local neighborhood organization In tlie towns and to the cooperative level in the rural areas. Street and Lane Committees function asof the police apparatus in urban areas.


peacetime, organized resistance toregime has virtually noignificant scale. Withexception of the Tibetan revolts,in Communist China in recentin reaction to specific localinternal security controls willto prevent potential resistanceorganizing. Tlie same strictconfine unorganized resistance totypes of action largely of a


Resistance activity Is handicappedumber of key factors. The Party, army, and police are loyal to the regime. Dissidentalthough widespread throughout the population, with few exceptions, lackor communication with one another and generally lack the necessary appreciation of each other's problems and grievances toIn active resistanceider scale. There ls thus no presently identifiable basis for an anti-Communist front known lo exist ln Communist China. Dissident students and Intellectuals who might conceivably provide leadershipesistance movement, as they have In past periods hi Chinese history, are disillusioned and demoralized. TheFlowers" period probably brought forth the maximum effort and even that effortcertainly cannot be repeated In view of stringent measures.

he main factor that might affect thepotential in China is thc state of the economy. Improvements ln economicsufficient to permit more liberalIncentives would decrease popular ill will,eterioration of economicwould Increase resistanceeneral economic crisis could conceivablyconditions under whicharger scale could develop andresistance be considerably Intensified. Even Inase, however, it could not be assumedevolt would be possible on more than limited local levels, where thecould suppress it with dispatch. In the special case of Tibetan resistance thereto have been at least some degree of organization, motivated not solely by local grievances but alsoevulsion against Communismatred of the Chinese Invaders.

f there is little potential for activeIn Communist China at present, there Isubstantial potential for dis-"Wencc. The Communist program ofinvestment in heavy industry willto leadreat measure ofand disillusionment throughout the Population and particularly among the However, Communist countermeasures

and devices for persuasion and force arewell developed to enable. Pclplng, if it continues to demonstrate the-flexibility of policy it has exhibited to. date, to confineto manageable levels and to prevent outbreaks of resistance in other than Isolated, local Instances. Nevertheless, dissidence will probably continue toimiting factor for the regime's program. The significance of dissidence lies notevolutionary threat to the regime, but rather in the effect it may have on the evolution of the regime's policies ond the country's future development.


he extent ol resistance in Communist China would depend on the nature andof the war. If the regime's military operations were successful, or the Communists could make it appear that It was, Peiping probably could rally many dissident elements lo its side by an appeal to Chinese nationalism and xenophobia. In this case, dissidence would probably remain inactive and covert, as it did during the Korean war. If the regime suffered military setbacks, it is sUll doubtful whether resistance forces would be capable of strong and effective Independent guerrilla action, even with help from abroad, unless Peiping security controls and propaganda facilities were seriously weakened. Underof fairly impressivemilitary successes, anti-regime operations in Communist-controlled territory would probably still be difficult, with the population generally avoiding the risks Involved in organizing for or engaging In outright rebellion, or in assisting non-Communist Intelligence or escape and evasion efforts. If the tide seemed to be clearlyagainst thc Communists, major defections from the Communist cause might be expected, and isolated and individual resistancewould Increase. But even under these conditions most types of resistance activities behind the Communist lines requiring an organizational effort would probablyinor factor at least Initially because or the time required to organize and train theelements. If the warro-

longed one, passive peasant resistance might become particularly significant by affecting the regime's food supply.

ituation develops ln which resistance elements could emerge, they wouldumber of basic difficulties inapability to harass the regime throughand political warfare activities, including sabotage. To provide any resistance efforts of military significance, groups would require effective leadership, coordination and material support. Moreover, the effort to develop such an organization would take placeountry where the bulk of the population is not prone to political action but rather tends towait and see" policy. Because of thisattitude, it is believed that lodgements In such strength as to assure early directsupport and relief would be required. By tlie same token, however, the averagedoes not want to offend those who may succeed in taking over control of his country, an attitude that may under someassist In escape and evasionand intelligence collection efforts

The nationality of the attacking forces would make some difference; Chinese forces from Taiwan would probably meetair amount of popular acceptance, while Japanese forces would probably arouse the traditional antipathy against Japan, particularly in those parts of Chinaradition of guerrilla resistance against the Japanese. American participation would enable the Communist regime to appeal for popular support on the basis of Chinese nationalism and xenophobia, bul would not be likely to antagonize potential active lesislance elements. Furthermore. US

i ci

that the atlack is likely to be successful. The nationality Ol Other Asian or non-Asian forces would not be of major psychologicalThr really decisive psychological lac-lor would not be the nationality of lhc forces engaged, but the prospect of military .success or failure.

5V. The use ol nuclear weapons ir. an attack againsi the Chinese mainland which severely crippled the regime's control mechanisms

would create an opportunity for someresistance. Initially at least, asearlier, resistance efforts would be handicapped by lack of organization, and in this case, the disruptive nature of the attack would almost ensure that any actions would be localized Moreover, It seems probable that the regime's local control agencies will rally to maintain their position and willhreat to lhe establishmenttrongorganization. To the extent that nuclear weapons were used -tor more tactical purposes than total destruction of thccontrol mechanisms, the" problems in organizing effective resistance described above would obtain.1

Existence under st'lngcnt Communist control has created among the masses ofa great tolerance to harsh authority. It is probableelatively strict occupation policy would, by comparison, seem preferable to regimentation under Communism so long as no heavy demands were placed on lhe local economy for food, clothing, andiberal occupation policy, especially one which provided for the relief of the needy, would undoubtedly tend to foster increased resistance activities in unconquered areas

B is doubtful lhat the attitudes andof either regimes or resistance groups ir. other Sino-Soviet Bloc countries, with thcexception of Soviet actlonsT would have any strong effect on resistance potential. Basic contributing factors lo this are the lacK of an cfticlcm rcalstunce organization in China, tlic isolation of resistance groups

Since this study hu repeatedly demons:rated tne existence ot widespread d'.sudcnt elements UirOLChout ibe populationa vast reservoir oi emeieenl resistance leadershipxist* imone former business elements ofischarged Irom the aimyhe rrpif-tentative Of the AuliUnl Ctitet ot SUft.USAF. believes UV conclusion Is JuUi-fied that Uie elimination ot selected target*to the military and control strengths of Communist China bjm!i1 >ultaiii rtiirupUor. would greatly promoteri of dissident elements ratherdiscourage such acUon

China, and the lack ol communication groups in other countries. In the case [European bloc nations, the isolation result-Jfrom distance and terrain and racial and ltural differences add to the unlikelihood it cooperation of any sort would eventuate.

esponsibility for the Initiation ofwould not materially affect, either at the outset of hostilities or subsequently, thcand consequently the capabilities ofand groups willing to engage inactivities.



Even though thc old Czechoslovak Republicore vigorous democratic tradition than any other Eastern European country and was strongly Western-oriented, Communist strength was greater ln Czechoslovakia than In the other present satellites. In the last free electionsommunist candidates gotercent ot thc votes. Since8 coup, however, the Communists' drasticol Czechoslovak political andlite has alienated many one-timeand even many Party members-Today,urface appearance of calm and stability, the Czechoslovakharbors considerablethoughdissatisfaction with the regime and with the USSR of which the regime ls one of the most faithful servants. Thishas been accumulating and becoming more apparent since the death of Stalin

Among the factors that have tended to create ill will arc thc following: The regime's subservience to the USSR and the resulting wbordlnatlon of CSR Interests to those of the USSR; the efforts of Uie regime to reshape CSR society in Uie Soviet image with theadulation and copying of everyUilng Soviet, falslflcaUon of history, repudiation of DaUve traditions and severing historic and cultural links with thc West; Uie belief Uiat the CSR is being economically exploited by Jke USSR even though the living standard Ishigher than In other satellite states.f civil liberties and excessive interference

the citizens' lives; the persecution of leaders as well as the harassment of the detention of large numbers of Weal prisoners in Jails and forced laborand Uie all pervading atmosphere of ;rcion. lawlessness and hypocrisy which ttactcrizc the regime's activities.

one significant non-Czech minority,resent what seems to them anof power and privileges byespecially Uie concentration ofin Prague and Uie dispatch ofand technicians irr Slovakia.thisrievance oMongUie Communist era, theof the regime to remedy thisUie liquidation of thc "bourgeois"aggravated thc already existingon Uie part of the Slovaks. TheUie Czechs for having allowed Uieto seize power, and the Slovakhave always been weakerln actual influence in Slovakia thanCommunists.


Intellectuals and students. Writers, who have been restive under rigid Party controls on literary expression, are among Uie most dissatisfied of thc social groups. Theyresent the lack of liberalization after Stalin's death. Regime controls were openly challenged at the Writers' Congress innd some writers, especially in Slovakia, have not capitulated lo the Party's demand for conformity and obedience. University students drew up an extensive list of political demands in6 wliich were ignored by the regime. While there has been no student trouble since that event, this group almostharbors anti-regime views. Like many young people In Czechoslovakia, they resent the excessive regimentation of life underand may on occasion be disinclined to caution and passive acceptance of theregime.

Youth. The average young person in Czechoslovakia hasroteeUvewhich enables him to live relatively

comfortably under the present regime and to

more Uion minimum Interference In bis dally life by the Communist authorities. There ls.izeable element of young people who resist all efforts at regimentation and besides adopting exaggerated Imitations of Western dress snd other external signs of disaffection will on occasion engage in riots and scuffles with the police. The regime has recently cracked down on this group in what waservous reaction magnified by last year's Hungarian events. Thisand lack of discipline of youthfrom thc Stalinist system prevailing in Czechoslovakia hasroblem for years. These elements are made up of less educated young people and arc essentially negative in their motivation. Although they wouldbe quick to join in any disturbances such as clashes between student demonstrators and police as ln Hungary In6 orstrikers and police as at Poznan. they arerimary danger to thc regime.

Professional people, managers. Middle-ranking civil servants, professional men,managers and engineers, arenot only with thc working of the regime as it affects them In their careers but also with the general nature of the regime,its subordination of nationalto those of the USSR, Its bias ln favor of political reliability rather than efficiency, its general crudity, dishonesty, and lawlessness. Though this dislike of the very nature of the regime Is found In all segments of thethe professional group seems to be most sensitive to It. Yet thero is perhaps more willingness in this group than in most others (except industrial workers) to accept aregime provided it were cleaned up at various levels, committedumane and national-minded socialist program, and acted more independently of the USSR Since this is not the case, disillusionment increasingly engenders dissidence.

Peasantry The farming populationto compulsory delivery quotas. But its resistance is ctiaractcrizcd by apathylowdown In thc required deliveries. The accelerated tempo of collectivization over recent years is chiefly the result of increased regime pressure which has overcome peasant

resistance- This weakening resistance has been exacerbated by the rapid aging of the rural population. Very few young people are staying on thc farms, drifting into industrial jobs Instead.

Industrial toorkers complain about long work hours, low real wages, poor housing facilities, and shortage in and high prices of consumer goods. They dislike the stringent labor discipline. There have been reports of scattered strikes ln heavy industry andbut none apparenUy serious. Despite their complaints, Industrial workers have not been openly rebellious and, under presentare not likely to engage in active resistance.

Armed Forces. The permanent cadre of cornmissioned and noncommissioned officers gives continuing support to the regime, some from conviction and others frommotives. Thenducted annuallyross section of Czechoslovak youth and probably reflect the general popular dissatisfaction with Communist rule. However, obviouslyindividuals are not inducted Into the Armed Forces, and conditions of military life and stringent political controls prevent Uie expression and dissemlnaUon of dissaffection among the troops. Personal dissatisfaction with military service may be expressed not only in terms of the soldier's usual grievances, but alsoislike of Soviet type of training and political indoctrinaUon. However,this discontent seldom overrides the normal military obedience to authority and there are no known Instances of groupof military orders, the reliability of the Armed Forces In case of emergency is open to question. The militarized security forces (Frontier and Interiorecause of their very close screening of recruits,constitute the most reliable elements of the Armed Forces. On balance, it is highly unlikely that military personnel would offer active resistance to the regime under present conditions.

Religion. Religious believers resent Uie regime's policy of interning church leaders and doing everything possible to hamper the

normal functioning of the churches, to Impede religious education, and to harass thc faithful. In itself, this resentment does noterious threat to the regime, but Lnwith other factors helps to keep dissidenceigh level, especially in Slovakia.

il. Slovaks, being predominantly Catholic, historically at odds with the more advanced Czechs, individualistic and nationalistic, have alwayspecial problem to the Communist regime. Not only is there ina stronger anti-Soviet sentiment but also there has remained thc traditional anti-Czech feeling.esult. Communism has had considerably less success establishing firm roots In Slovakia than in thc Czech lands, and It continues to have difficulties In organizing loyal Communis Ls on the grass roots level as well as In obtaining faithful adherence by Party members to central directives. Many of the unconfirmed but plausible reports of unorganized and modestly organizedrelate to Slovakia.onsiderable potential for resistance exists in Slovakia, but its apparent lack of organization and focusthe centers of Communist powerIts actual effectiveness, -i


lthough dissidence is more pronounced In Slovakia than ln Bohemia-Moravia, there Is Little evidence of active resistance in cither area. Communist securily controls have not changed significantly since the death of Stalin; they are still so pervasive that people ire alrald to voice criticism of regime, let uone engage in open resistance. Moreover, lhe events in Hungary have only deepened lhe conviction that Soviet troops, while not at present stationed in Czechoslovakia, wouldlo the assistance of the regime to put down any revolt that could not be handled locally and that Uiere is no hope of Western help.esult, the population at no time ?as in the reckless revolutionary mood which fharacterlzed Poland and Hungaryexpressions of dissidence found nopopular response. Thc regime has not havered since in lis firm attitude, and the Population has refrained from overt expres-

sion of hostility other than grumbling about restrictive policies, extensive governmentand living conditions in general.

It Is true that dissatisfaction with the regime Is found ln all segments of thepopulation, even among PartyBul dissidence is not translated Into widespread strikes, riots and publicexcept for occasional trouble with young "hooligan" elements. It Is confined largely to verbal criticism of the regime and fairly mild demand for change on the part of certain educated and articulate segments of thc population, notably .writers, university students, and some Party groups Lnministries. These dissident groupsfor the moment to be biding their time, waiting for more opportune external andconditions.

In general, the Czechoslovak populationhole is notood to defy the regime and press for revolutionary changes. Thereeep-seated fear of the risks involvedhange on the part of those who have lived through thc upheavals caused by the German occupation and the imposition of theregime in its place, and who havethe absence of Western intervention in Eastern Europe. These people fear not only the painful loss of life and property in auprising but also the possible loss of Jobs and various social benefits, andprolonged period of uncertainty and political upheaval.


the surface appearance ofstability, dissatisfaction of thepeople has been accumulating andsince the death of Stalin, mainlythe regime did not move towardTherelight relaxation of policean improvement of the standard ofbyt had become clear thatleaders did not Intend tobasic concessions, either Internallygreater freedom, orore independentUie USSK. The population is dissalls-

fied with this unyielding attitude on the part of the regime, but appears unwilling to doabout It. Some open expressions ofin6 were quickly countered, and, at the Party Conference lnt was firmly stated that no furtherwould be made ln response to demands for poliUcal liberalization

regime has been able to copewith dissidence largely becausehas been confined to small groups andkept from spreading to broadUie popuiat ion There has been aranks under pressure of events amongand hence no opening whichexploited by dissident elements. Norany weakening of the authorityof Party and police controlskind which permitted similardissidence in Poland and Hungary tostronger and more the Communist Party Itself Issustained campaign againstthe efforts made to deny UieMao's theories on socialism toshow Uiat Uie leaders continue toreason to doubt the loyalty andof thc mass of Party members.regime strives to maintain strictorthodoxy as Uie official policy. ThisevidenUy receives full support fromcore members of the Partyhence Uie regime has been able tothe kind of dcviationlst thinkingup immediately after the


are no known organizedin Czechoslovakia, nor liavc therefor many years. There Is, however,amount of passive, unorganizedmosUy in Uie form of attempts todiscipline, non-attendance alfailure to pay dues toand similar derelictions.are not always poliUcal. Therecases of acUvc resistance bylargely in the form of violentand even murder of Communist function-

aries by one or more aggrieved individuals, and sometimes in Uie form of support byfor Western InteUigence. -


the death of Stalin, materialby emigres to Internalhas been non-existent, as hasany other external source. Noexist at present for getting suchinto Czechoslovakia. EmigreInternal resistance has been equallyexcept to the extent that one orgrouping of the Czechoslovakhas succeeded in gaining acceptanceviews by some Western propagandahas then incorporated such aIts efforts to reach the CzechoslovakA considerable body of evidenceUiat Western broadcasts areIn Czechoslovakia and thatpamphlet form does receive someare also Indications that Westernhave both adherents and critics


regime has maintained intact itssecurity controls. The threatorgans to Uie people Is being keptrepeated announcements of theeminding would-beUiat Iheir activities are doomed toApart from the regular armedregime's security apparatus consistscentralized units, all under thcof Uie Ministry of Uie Interior. ItsIs estimated at from HO.OOQloThis strength figure doesersonnel whotime in various civilian militiaaddition, many thousands of peoplepaid and unpaid agents and Informerssuchonsiderable contributionmission of maintaining the security ofUnder Uie Ministry of Interiorfollowing majorGuard (PS) and Interior Guard

otal strength0 meninto militaryhe secret policeith an estimated strength of


utidespread net ot agents and Informers;he Public Security Corpstrength0 which Includes as its largestthe regular police. This apparatus ls supplemented and supported by an elaborate system of population registration andcontrol.

Czechoslovak regime conductspropaganda by press, radio andagitation for the purposes ofvilification of Western Objectives,faith in Western "promises" as futileetc. The regime eagerly exploitsof refugee activity which may beas advocating that the onlythe post-war economic and social systemreturn to conditionsonditionsno longer be satisfactory to what Lsa majority of the population.regime plays up the continuing Czechand fear of the Germans, claimingend of Communism in Czechoslovakiatbe return of Germanexploitation of these themes fallsof the regime's objectives ofthe population to enthusiasticthey help to keep alivewith the West and theperiod of German occupation and tomay contribute to the manyinhibiting resistance. Moreover,in Czechoslovakia arethat their standard of living, while low.

higher than that of neighboring satellites.


Czechoslovak security forces arcof preventing an expansion orof resistance activity by any localelements, organized oreven if security controls were relaxed,people were less cautious in voicingof the regime, they probablyIncrease their resistance activities, atLn the Czech lands.autious people, and it isthey would be more Inclined to waitby external powers than to fight

for it themselves. However, the Slovaks areifferent temperament, and it Is possible that some of them would renew their partisan activities against the regime in the eventecurity relaxation.

in the unlikely event of apopular revolt, the regime wouldcertainly be incapable ofwithout Soviet help, insituation, the regular armed forcesnot be considered reliable, and thcwould ask for help from the Sovietunits of which arc availableareas of the Sovlet.Union andGermany, Poland, and Hungary.


So long as Soviet power remainsthe regime's security controlsand the present standard of living unimpaired, organized resistance has virtually no potential.ignificantof internal controls occurred and possible Soviet intervention were precludedajor internal crisis within the USSR or heavyinvolvement elsewhere, the prospects for organized resistance remain poor. Theeffectiveness in eliminating all sigriin-cant organized underground and partisangroups, the prevailing view thatcannot be achieved ^without direct Western assistance, and thc regime's pervasive controls serve to inhibit the evolutionopular resistance movement.

Passive resistance along lines alreadycould assume greater proportions and extend to frequent acts of economic sabotage if the regime were forced to revise drastically downward its present level of efforts, tohousing, consumer goods, and food stocks. Further political or military crises in other Bloc countries might then actatalyst for spontaneous disturbances in Czechoslovakia. Unorganized passivewill probably continue but within rather narrow limits. Isolated instances of unrest.

.such as occurred in3 and inre possible but of no long-range significance. Neither are the limited capabilities of intel-

A 2

and students lo pressure the regime for liberalization because the Communist leadership ls quite able to suppress suchor keep them within easilyproportions. Thereare possibility that the intellectual ferment might affect the Communist Party bureaucracy, but thelackeader of thc Gomulka type will almost certainly leave Czechoslovakln the hands of the unrelentingThus present evidence does nota basis for expectation that unorganized resistance will become anything more than an irritant to tho regime.


In the event of war between Bloc and non-Bloc states, the Czechoslovak regime would immediately intensify its security measures. This would initially restrict the populace from participating in resistance activities. It would also give them time to observe the progress of the struggle so that they couldore favorable position with the prospective victor. It is not likely thatwould develop If It wore apparent that Soviet forces were generally gaining and would continue to control Czechoslovakia and the areas adjacent to it, and that there was no immediate prospect of the arrival of Western troops. It Is likely that Ln case of war the Czechoslovak security police wouldtake drastic precautionary measures,Interning or even deporting to the USSR thousands of known or suspected anti-Com-munlsls. In these circumstancesmall number of courageous people could be found who would be willing to risk serious resistance activity, such as sheltering Western airmen or escaped prisoners, mainly In rural areas and Slovakia.

On the other hand, were It apparent that Soviet forces were generally losing andetreat of Soviet power from Czechoslovakia and adjacent areas was imminenl. there would be an increase in resistancereakdown of Communist police controls as Communists fled or simply failed to carry out orders. Resistance elements would engage in industrial and agricultural

sabotage activities; with outside help, they would undertake intelligence collection,and evasion operaUons and- otherUiat would be detrimental to Uie Bloc. At Uie aame lime, skeleton undergroundorganizations and guerrilla bands might begin to operate. Good possibilities for guerrilla type operaUons appear to exist in the mountainous areas of Slovakia. Inthereimited basis for cooperation between Slovak, Polish and Ukrainian anti-Communist groups by virtue of their common access to the Carpathian mountain ranges, past cooperation among them, and bonds of ethnic kinship. Since Soviet troops would be deployed In Czechoslovakia in Uie event ol war. an effective partisan movement probably could not develop unless substantial Western assistance was made available, and theircoordinated with Western military op-eraUons.

In caseajor breakdown of Soviet military power ln Uie area, It Is possible thai elements of the Czechoslovak Armed Forces might switch sides, even undertakingaction against the retreating Soviet forces. More likely, however, woulden era! breakdown of military organization as Communists and nan-Communists fought each other, deserted or simply stood by idly till Western forces arrived.

The nationality of attacking forces would probably make little difference, provided it was made clear Uiat Czechoslovakia wouldIts present frontiers and be restored lo full independence. The presenceub stantial number of Germans among Uie at tacking forces Is likely to have noticeablepsychological effects at least in the Czech lands Most of the people of Czechoslovakia probably would not be concerned with the responsibility for initiating hostilities because they look upon war as Uie only means ofliberation.

lhe extensive use of large nuclear wenp ons on Czechoslovak territory would greatly antagonizeople, and the survivors would concentrate their efforts on self-preservation rather than assisting either side in the Strug gle. Such adverse reactions might be reduced

but by no means eliminated if tacticalattacks were limited primarily toand government control targets, isolated from larger populated areas. In the latter case the will to resist might be Increased since such attacks could diffuse and lessen thcstrengths of the Czcchoslovakian regime.


ccupation policies formulated by theWestern powers, designed tothe territorial Integrity and national inde-

pendence of Czechoslovakia, would almost certainly enlist Czechoslovak cooperation and stimulate resistance In areas still undercontrol.

o Individual resistance factions forleadership are known to exist inCertain emigre groups may desire to establish leadership, but their unpopularity among their countrymen would makeoal unattainable.




L Popular opposition to the East German regime continues to be widespread. It lsby resentment of the regime's police state methods which, though changed in the employment of outright cruelty since thc death of Stalin, have remained essentially the same in repressing political freedom. It Is further aggravated by economicand the failure to raise the standard of livingevel comparable to that of West Germany. Most of all. dissidence is directedegime which ls regarded as the tool of an alien power, representing the interests of the USSR and dependent on Soviet support for Its continued existence. This was clearly demonstrated when only the Intervention of Soviet occupation forces prevented the East German rc|;inir irom disintegrating during the3 uprisings.

The character of popular disaffection in the "Get man Democratic Republic" (GDR) is Bhaped,onsiderable extent, by contacts between the people of the GDK and those ln the West are much more free and ficquent than are contactstt,eof other satellites and the West. Moreover, the East Germans are tied to West Germany by common bonds of national identity and by the hope thatunification wil! mean liberation from Soviet -Commust rule.esult, nearlyEast Germans do not identify themselvesthe GDReparate country and do pot look upon the GDR us permanent.

Soviet occupation of East Germany cannot J* disguised It underlines the puppet rc-fchhe's complete dependence on the USSR and thus prevents it from permitting any modifi-fc*tlon or the system nul approved by the gremlin.raditional disdain of *hc Slavs, combined with experience ol Soviet

brutality, tends to equate Communistrather than MarxistSoviet overlordshlp. Meanwhile, the existenceuch larger prosperous West German state confronts the ODR regime with therebuttal to any claim of representing the interests of the German peopleholeesult, the leaders of the Communist SED (Socialist Unity Party) and the government are generally hated and detested

conomic privations, even though lessened by concessions made after Stalin's death,to afiect nearly every East German, with the exception of the Party elite, highofficials and leading intellectuals. These deprivationsin the face of West German abundanceare made particularlyby the regime's compulsory ideological indoctrination and by lis attempts to orient German culture eastward.astconsider themselves as belonging to the West andct believe their culture to be superior to that of thc East. Thc regime's anti-Church activities have also contributed to popular ilissallsfaction. =

5 In the wake of Soviet polin mi gyrations. East German dissidence has fluctuatedresignation and the desire for revolu tic nary action The eventsC' caused considerable unrest, compelling the regime to take extensive precautionary measures These measures, coupled with subsequent So vie; efforts to stabilize the position of thc USSR and Internal tonal Communism and thesses, ical or apparent, of this campaign have piobably cautioned East Germanelements. Nevertheless, thc potential remains very great, not only among thc duV

h CPSU CgnKreis, CPSUin June and Oclohor. the emrrcence ol CnmulK^ In Poland, the Hungarian levoluliun. andecemberof Iho Chin CM Commu

mat Paris

affected groups listed below but also among many rank and We members ol the Party and its mass organizations, the governmentwhite collar workers and theIt has been estimated lhat not more thanercent of the populationsupport the regime, and it is almostthat such support Is confined to people whoersonal stake In its continuation. Sincehen the refugee registration program was initiated ln West Germany and West Berlin, at least two million persons have fled to the West, about half of them underears of age.


Industrial Workers. Disaffection andin the GDR are endemic in thecenters. More than one-third of the wage and salary earners Ln the GDR areworkers. Aboutercent of them are employed in the nationalized industries. Soviet hopes that these workers would become the ideological and social foundation ofauthority ln the GDR havehe sharp trend oflabor loward Communism during the Weimar Republic moved back toward thesocial-democratic channels which are tied to strong but free trade unions. German social-democracy has been evolutionaryrather than revolutionary and. therefore, has been traditionally the target of intense Bolshevik hostility. Since thcof free trade unionism Ls still very strong, the fact that under the GDR the unions have become instruments of government control has greatly contributed to the workers'Furthermore, the workers areover low wages, high work norms, substandard living conditions, insufficient food supplies, lack of consumer goods, ever-present ideological propaganda, forcedat political rallies, and imposition of alien Soviel labor methods.

Youth, from which the regime hadto obtain strong support, has proved to be as disappointing aa labor. More than one-third of the East German population, about seven million persons, are under 25

years ofeneration disillusioned by Nazism and therefore thought to be ready for the acceptance of Communism. But there is evidence that the majority of youth Isor hostile to the regime. The influence of parents. Church affiliations, older workers and non-Communist teachers, and thcof the West still militate against the success of the Communist youth program. Nevertheless, although thc majority of East German youth almost certainly are not loyal to thc Communist regime, they, like their elders, have been unable to organize their opposition to the regime. Youtlrhas shown opposition primarily in Individual actions, especially flight and nonconformity. Most outspoken in their opposition probably were students who demandedin vaintheof compulsory instruction Ln Uielanguage and in Communist ideology, thc right to organize freely, and easier access lo the West Whether there will eventuallymall leader group of more mature young peopleore effectivepotential, or whether resistance wiji remain limited to passive expressions ofwill depend on the stability ofleadership.

8 Armed Forces. There Is considerably less evidence of dissidence in the East German Army than in the strongest among those whofor service under any ofHhe various forms of duress commonly employed by the regime. There Is undoubtedly lessIn thc permanent cadre of commissioned and non-com missioned officersconstituting someercent ofanamong Uie two-yearMost of thc latter, however, are former members of Communist youthwho have been specially selected by Party boards throughout the country because of Iheir presumed reliabilityor at least the absence of any evidence of disloyalty onart Military organization and discipline and constant surveillance make any spread of dissidence within the force difficult.since the physical conditions ol service life have improved, they no longer serve a* primary sources of resentment toward lhe

present Communist government. In general, these same considerations apply to thesecurity lorces (Border Policehere Is believed to be less dissidence in these forces than in tlie Army, however, because of more careful screening before induction.

No actual organized resistance has been noted within the Army or militarized security forces- Morale and discipline within the Army are only fair, however, and Instances of inattention to duty and individual acts ofarc frequent. Forcefulto military and governmental authority probably would not occurignificant scale except in extraordinary circumstances, such as widespread domestic revoltar in which Western forces (particularly if these Included West German contingents) were about to invade East Germany. In lesssituations, such as local disorders, the East German Army probably would give no more than nominal aupport to the present regime.

Butinessmen. From the outset of theoccupation of East Germany, it has been Communist policy to eliminate thc middle class as an independent political factor. This policy has been applied most ruthlessly to the economically stronger elements of theIt has been considerably modified,when applied to those groups whleh the regime needed for political or technological reasons Although there ls still some private enterpriseusinessmen almost certainly realize that they haveemporaryand will be eliminated ln due time. While thc outlook of these elements Isanti-regime, they are almost certainly bound to remain cautious, inclined to passive resistance only if they see no risk.

Professionals and Intellectuals. With the exception of some artists and scientists who

'Frivale industry produced percent of the German total by the end of IBM The turnover of private retail trade In the GDR. amountedilently less thanercent of total retail trade turnover In 1SS6 In the whofe-aale business, the share of private enterprise had sunk to Irsserceni by thc end

have been offered and haveighly favored social and economic {xnltlon and who thustake in the continuance of the regime, the vast majority of the Intellectuals have remained anti-regime Many of them have withdrawn from professional life and others have become noticeably less productive.ew liave escaped to the West, but others have remained in East Germany in an effort to maintain German cultural traditions without surrendering to thc Ideologicalof Communism. In view of the respect and influence which intellectuals and artists generally enjoy ln Europe and particularly In Oermany, their resistance potential lsthough largely intangible. This does not mean that all those who oppose theare also anti-Communist; the case of Wolfgang Harlch is representative of persons who hate tlie regime and detest Soviet over-lordshlp although they would go alongational Communist type of government Nevertheless, in spite of the advantages offered to those Intellectuals who are willing to collaborate with the regime, most of them will remain opposed to Communist methods and many will, as the occasion arises, express this opposition directly or indirectly through their media, or. alternatively, either by("innerr by flight.

hurches. Of6 million inhabitants of the Soviet Zone and the Soviet Sector of Berlin, aboulillion areand two million Catholics. Both church groups have resisted Communistand immorality, each according to its own institutions and its own traditional attitudes to the state and to governments. Generally speaking, however, the ideological andstruggle of the SED regime against thc churches has not been as intense as thai of the regimes In Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. Thc SED regime has not wished to attack excessively thcchurches In the Soviet Zone because of the impactolicy of total persecution would have on their ownillions) in Uie Federal Republic. Secondly, tbe Lutiieian/Kvangellcal churches aredecentralized within the Soviet Zone and therefore do notohesive


challenge lo the policies of Uie SED regime. This coincidence of SED policy goals and traditional Ui theran/Evange lica! atUtudes of cooperation with existinghas resultedifficult but tolerable truce between the two ln which each tries to erode rather than explode the powers of Uie other. For Its part, the CaUiolic Church is too small to have much influence ln the Soviet Zone.

arly and Government Functionaries. Al-though Uie regime has strenuously attempted to maintain ideological conformity among its supporters, there is evidenceleavageUie working level in government and Party and thc central authorities.those persons who were more recently drawn into Uie Communist apparatus have had difficulties in adjusting themselves to the conflicting pressures Imposed on Uie one hand by the rigorous demands of Uie central au-thoriUcs and on Uie other hand by therejection of the regime. This conflict has affected not only persons sensitive to popular feeling but also those Influenced by idealistic elements in Marxist doctrine, who havedisillusioned or frustrated by Uieof achieving anything consistent with their concepts of the general welfare Some dissatisfaction has appeared among the lower ranks of functionaries and others on whom the regime relies- This has beenin numerous defections of partypolice, local government officers, and active as well as former members of Uieand military forces who have fled to West Oermany. However, the treatment accorded In Hungary to security officers and otherfunctionaries during0 revolt by the populace has tended to makefunctionaries in East Germany close ranks behind Uie regime.


espite the great extent of disaffection in tho GDH. dissidence, wllh the singleof thc3 uprisings, hasitself only ln defection, transmission of intelligence, passive resistance (without significantnd anti-regime propaganda activities. In thc second halfnitially under the growing impact of "de-Stallnltu-

Uon" and lateresponse toPoland and Hungary, considerablemanifested Itself, especially .amongstudents, and workers InIndustrial enterprises. Thisreached its peak during Uie earlyof thc Hungarian revolution. Withof the Hungarian revolt,intensity of discontent and ofprogressively dissipated until, bywhen communal elections werethe GDR without majorregime had demonstrated again Itsthe *

Uie ease of access "to theWest Berlin and West Germanythe organization of someoperating from these areas.encourage cautious covertmain objects are anti-regimekeeping flies of persons Inand assisting families of thctrack of crimes committed bykeeping alive the spirit ofand gathering as much InformationThey discourage, however, overtresistance which stands little chanceharsh retaliation.


only conspicuous resistance Insince the death of sBllnprising. Although there doesto have been any central guidanceuprisings, they followed Uie samethus showing the uniformityfeeling and producing aaction among East Germans notor since Caught unpreparedextent of the disorder, the Eastcould not contain thcwas forced to call on Russian forcesthem The readiness of Uie Sovietslo Uie regime's call for helpobject lesson which Uie East Germansheart. While there is no reason toanU-regime feelings in East-GermanyIn Uie slightest sincetemper since lhat time hasof restraint. Thc population Is apparent-

resigned to the fact that the Communist regime is there for some time to come and that any active resistance to it is foolhardy as long as Russian troops remain In occupation.except for Individual acts ofoccasional small-scale strikes,ew student demonstrations, resistance3 has been limited to the passive variety, with flight to theregarded by manyeasure of last resortserving as an essential safety valve.

Some dissidence has arisen In university and Party intellectual circles sinceh CPSU Congress and the ensuing de-Stalihiza-tlon program. Thc temporary ideologicaland the anti-Party trends which resulted from the Stalin denigration caused confusion In Party thinking, an outbreak ofnd widespread ferment among intellectuals. SEO spokesmenthat they were determined not toevents in East Germany to proceed as they did in Poland or Hungary. Large-scale precautionary measures were taken toany outbreaks. These measures were almost certainly helped by efforts In West Germany to stave off any hopeless revolt.

It Is Improbable that the Intellectualto Ulbricht and present SED policies holds any real danger for thc regime as long as Ulbricht retains the support of the Soviet Union. It ts to be noted, however, thatthe regime's measures, the intellectuals, though they may have been intimidated and silenced, have not been reconciled, as isby the flight to West Germany on7 of Professor Alfrededicated Communist1 and one of the GDR's leading intellectual figures.


organized resistance groups ofare known to exist today inAnti-Communist groups basedGermany are active in the GDRthe cooperation both ofand of small numbers of politicallyEast Germans who meet regularly tonews. But organizedof the type which that term usually

denotespartisan or guerrillabelieved entirely lacking. .

There are indications "from almost all areas of East Germany of unorganizedlargely passive in nature. While all segments of the population appear to manifest passive resistance in one form or another, the stimulus to resist appears to come primarily from student, intellectual and upper working class strata. Dissidence also has been noted within the Party and Party-affiliated groups, thoughesser scale. At times ofunresthe Hungarian revolt) and major policy changeshe advent ofhereefinite and perceptible increase in widespread passive resistance, as well as an appearance ofsporadic overt opposition.

The present SED regime is universally detested by thc East German population, of which it is estimated that less thanercent would vote Communistree election. The people generally resent the government's police state methods and high-pressureits economic regimentation and failure to sufficiently raise the standard of living, its alien character and subservience to the Soviet Union, and its positionajor obstacle to German reunification. One of the most obvious indications of the general dislike of the regime which exists among allof East Germans Is the> persistent flight of East Germans to West Germany and West Berlin.9 until the endt Is estimatedersonsequal to almostercent of the presentof the GDRhave expressed theirby flight.


ivided country,emigre groups do not exist in thethey do in relation to other orbilHowever, passive resistance inis stimulated, and to anby anti-Communist.groups basedGermany or West Berlin, such asBureaus (Ostburo) of Westparties, especially thc SocialParty, the Investigating Committee of

Jurists (Untersuchungsausschxiss Freiernd the Fighting Group Against Inhumanity (Kampfgruppe gegenn West Germany and West Berlin, their activiUes are largely based on direct contacts with Individuals and Involve providing information, advice and material support. Their activities in East Germany consist chiefly of large-scale clandestineof various kinds of literature, in' eluding their own publications, and theof information on events ln the GDR.

These organizations strive more to mam-tain the spirit of resistance than to sponsor acts of sabotage or other forms of activeThey generally take the line that active resistance at this time Is futile althoughresistance ls possible. This accords with official West German and NATO policy which forbids Uie incitement of the East German population to revolt. This policy waseven during the height of earliersuccesses6 when these groups, Uie Bonn government and Individual West Germans with contacts In the GDR warned that on no account should active resistance against Uie regime be undertaken since it would produce no useful results and could only bring renewed disaster to Germany.

There is no evidence of non-German groups or individuals offering guidance oraid for resistance activity apart from the limited efforts of the ICFTO* (working through West German trade unions) and several Russian emigre" groups based in West Gennany. such as NTS (NaUonal Solldorlsts) and TSOPE (Central Association of PoliUcal Immigrants from the USSR).


East German security apparatusby the Ministry for Stateand the Ministry of Interior. Thcthc covert organization forand negating resistance andorganized or unorganized. Itan extensive and elaborate systemand surveillance, and usesand provocation as primary meanscombatting, and forestalling anti-

regime activities. The MfS also conducts campaigns to discredit the West German anti-Communist organizations with East Germans and to harass them in West Germany. The MfS also attempts to penetrate these Western organizations and to subvert their members.

The role of the Ministry of Interior has variedesult of the continuousof the East German security apparatus. Already in control of the civil police, itfurther security responsibilitieshen the militarized security forces were subordinated to it.

In addition to standard devices oftravel controls and informer nets, the regime uses such measures as the employmentpecial party militia to help suppressIn factories; discriminatory taxation; the transfer of suspect workers and employees; and Uie arbitrary classification of failures to meet assigned production quotas, regardless of cause, as economic sabotage. Thepractice of Imposing severe penalties for the most minor infractions is another effective means used by the regime.

The primary deterrents to uprisings in East Gennany arcarmed forces, stationed throughout the country. The regime itself controlsrained uniformed men, equallybetween military and police forces, whose very existence tends to Inhibitactivities. In addition, thc Kampfgrup-pen (Auxiliary Shop and Factoryrganized following thc3 riots to prevent such disturbances from recurring, is being strengthened and intensively trained. It has held ostentatious antlriot exercises in various cities, with Uie obvious intent ofUie people.


capable of suppressinglocal uprisings, the East Germanwithout the aid of Soviet "forces,unable toajor revolt.government probably could depend onminority in the MfS in case of trou-


none of its military and police forces are Sonsidered completely reliable. Some mem-Mrs would probably be reluctant to fight against their own countrymen, and ln case of widespread revolt, might well defect to the side of those ln opposition to thc regime,on the exact conditions whichHowever, theoviet line divisions tioned ln Bast Germany would be available swift intervention to suppress any large-scale revolt. But barring an unforeseen change in the temper of the East German population, which remembers the SovietIn3 and more recenUy inno revolt is likely to occur as long as these Soviet forces remain In East Germany.


There arc no known organized resistance groups in East Germany. However,resistance is still rampant. ItItself primarily through flight to Uie West, Uie eruptions from Ume to time of minor strikes and slowdowns, studentor other incidents. Dissidencethe Party and intellectual circles maybut Uie regime's demonstratedof dealing vigorously with suchas well as Ulbricht's firm control of the Party apparatus and his explicit Sovietwill probably prevent such intellectual ferment from becoming any real danger to the regime.

Capabilities of anti-Communist groups based in West Germany and West Berlinmainlywidespread distribution, either Dy balloon or by mall and hand-to-hand methods, of anti-Communist, anti-regimeUnder given circumstances, appeals by these Western-based groups to the East German population calling for activemight be heeded. This, however, wouldajor change in Westernfor West German and NATO policy now forbids incitement of East Germans to vio-knee, and these groups adhere rigidly lo that policy.

in the absence of organized resistance Sroups. any increase or change in resistance

potential must come from Uie unorganized dissident elements in Uie population. The3 uprisings showed what Uie East Germans are capable of when sufficiently aroused. But as long as Uie stability of thc regime remains unshaken and Soviet troops remain In East Germany, any attempted new form of, or Increase In, Uie level of resistance activity runs Uie grave risk of counteraction and suppression by the regime's security apparatus.


In case of warfare between Bloc and non-Bloc countries on East German territory, large numbers of Soviet troops would beto retain control of Uie GDR, thereby tying down unils which could otherwise be used against attacking forces.esult, initially, there would be little change inactivities otherrobablein acts of sabotage and attacks on local Communist functionaries. There wouldalso be attempts at espionage, subversion, factory slowdowns, failure to cooperate on agricultural projects and, in isolated cases where topography permitted, small guerrilla warfare against thc Soviet would take time, outside support and thc emergence of strong leadership capable of organizing andentrallyresistance force before opposition groups could become effective. Theof such groups wouldazardous task while thc Soviet Bloc remained In power. If and when the Communists appeared to be weakening, thc East Germans would intensify their efforts to sabotage supplies and materiel, to disrupt lines of communications, and to collect and disseminate intelligence to the non-Bloc countries involved in Uie encounter. On the other hand. Western defeats would immediately leadeduction in Eastresistance activities.

Tlie nationality of attacking Western forces would be immaterial to. the Eastsince these forces would be regarded as liberators. For example, the employment of French and Italian troops would not adversely affect resistance capabilities.

If the military action took place Ln East Oermany. the attitudes and actions ot regimes and resistance groups In other Bloc countries would be of little significance. If the military action took place elsewhere within the Bloc, the East Germans could expect littlefrom resistance groups in otherhiefly because resistance groups of other satellites would probably be preoccupied with their own national objectives. Nevertheless, Ln spite of distrust or fear of the Germans, the possibility of some resistance cooperation between elements In East Germany and other Soviet satellite countries cannot be entirely discounted if liberation from the Soviet yoke is at stake.

East Germans probably would not favor nuclear weapon attacks even though their hatred for the Soviets and the regime isIf use were made of major nuclear weapons, the resulting mass destruction and dislocation would virtually eliminate any effective forms of resistance activity. On the other hand, if circumstances permit use of tactical nuclear weapons. East Germanswould accept their effects on theas an unavoidable cost of liberation. Under these conditions resistance capabilities outside of areas immediately Involved would not necessarily be adversely affected, and, In-

representative of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF. would addonceivableuclear air attack could be so designed as to eliminate tbe major resources of the military and control strengths supporUng the regime without Incurring popular hatred or destroying resistance potential. Such an attack could produce an opportunity for thc East Germans to take over control of the

deed, thc opportunities for Western-assisted resistance groups to seize local, control would be materially

Thc Soviet occupation of East Germany has prejudiced the people permanently against the Soviets. More liberal occupation policies by the Sovietsar would be regarded simply as an opportunity forHowever, occupation of some parts of East Germany by NATO forces wouldanti-Soviet resistance activities in unlib-erated areas.

There Is no Information available onresistance factions ln East Germany which might aspire to post-liberation

representative of thc Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence. US Army, notes the presence In East Germany of six Soviet armies, includingine divisions, whose neutralization wouldextensive use of nuclear weapons, and therefore thinks this paragraph should read as follows: "The East Germans would not favor the use of nuclear weapons on target* in Bast Germany. Initially,uclear attack of any scale, active and erlecUve assistance to the West would not materialise because of theand uncertainty of the populace and the absence of pre-organized, strongly disciplined local resistance groups. Subsequently,potential would be determined by thcof thc attack, the emergence of native resistance leadership and organizations, theof material support fromjhe West, and the unpredictable ultimate reaction of thcto the use of nuclear weapons. Ifand physical deslmcUon were notand If resistance organizations could be developed and given substanUal assistance by the West, an opportunity could arise for East Cerman groups lo engage in anti-Soviet




he Hungarians have always considered themselves the last eastern outpost of the West and an Integral part of Western tivtllza-tlon. Culturally, the eastern Hungarianfrontier has been the traditional dividing line bcLween German and latin culture on the one hand and Slavic culture on the other. From the viewpoint of religion, Hungarythe farthest outpost of Romanin Southeast Europe. Politically, the irganizalion ol parliamentary assembliesonstitution preceded by several cen-aines the establishment of similar Western-lype governmental institutions and parties In Eastern Europe. Being non-Slavic, non-Orthodox, and highly Individualistic, the Hungarians are predisposed to side with any id versa ry of Soviet power. Thisfirm even before World War II. became particularly intense5 under the excessesoviet military occupation, and even,on-reprcsentaUvc Hungarian Communist minority was imposed upon the anti-Communist masses andisolation from the West set in.

J. Among the lactors which created, andan Indefinite period of time continuepopular hostility loward the regimeattitude stemming

t lhat Ume. Hungary's greatest self-liberating effort was frustrated by Invading Russian armies. Significantly, numy of thc slogans of0 revolt alluded to thai earlier uprising, and many of the icttons of the rebels were patterned aflcrnthai time. SUI1 another element Is Jotcd in the luct lhal for two decadesWorld War II. lhe climate of Hun-tarlan opinion was dominatedollective jense of frustiation created by thc huge losses *hlch lhe country had suffered underorldeace treaty. II lostercent of Ils territory andercent of

its population to Rumania.Yugoslavia. Hostility againstbeneficiaries of those lossesexist despite official Communistclose friendship among Uie People'sm

Further contributing to -the deep-rooted difficulties of the Communists are distasteful popular recollections of the country's) sanguinary Communistairly strong social democratic tradition among the workingersistentof new leadership potential because of Indifference toward Communiston the part of youth and shaky military morale of conscripts of anti-Communist peasant parentage.

Of at least equal importance Is Uiestandard of living. Work norms are high, wages are low. housing Is poor, and food Is scarce. Soviet exploitation of theeconomy was bitterly resented Since the revolution shattered many segments of the Hungarian economy and sbice there are no real indications of economic liberalization, tlie economic factor of dissidence remains strong.

5 Thus the attitude of the overwhelmingof thc populationsomeercent, If lhc recent general uprisinguidethe regime ranges from hatred to apathy. The characteristics and altitudes cited above arc buttressed by opposition to agricultural collectivization, stress on heavy industry to the detriment of consumers' good* production, cultural and psychological Soviet nation, anti-religious policies, regimentation of workers and the use of forced or quasi-forced labor, and Uie thwarting of various aimsationalisUc coloration. Therevolution6ull sralc demonstration of thc degree and kind of anil-Communist and anti-Soviet poteniial of tlie Hungarian people.



bc majority of industrial workers, seme of whom were among thc few original supporters of Communism,ajor dissident element They were foremost among thc forces battling the Communist suppressors in the days of the revolution. Along with lack of national independence and personalthey resent the limited attempts. If not the outright refusal on the part of the regime to satisfy the desire for more consumer goodsigher living standard, the perversion of labor unions, the lack of safeguards againsi "speed-up" work without adequate Incentives, unsafe and unsanitary working conditions, arbitrary penalties, activities of laborharsh work discipline and exhausting work methods.

hc Intellectuals who have sparked theagainst the regime, continue toa resistance potential out ofto their small numbers. They resent the suppression of freedom of expression, thcfrom the West to which they feelbound, the Intellectual deteriorationacade of educational and cultural pretensions, and the generally low level of Hungary's Intellectual life within the Imposed framework of an alien and inferior pattern.

Youth. One of the most conspicuousof the regime has been Its Inability to secure the support of youth. Communist youth organizations have been plagued for yearseneral apathy toward Tarty work. The participation of numerous youths in the uprising was impressive; even teen-agebattled the Soviet forces withheroism. Youth resents the Party-Imposed discipline, the compulsion to absorb an alien philosophy (Marxism-Leninism) and to learn the Russian language and theof gaining access to thc Western culture complex.

The peasantry, although probably asroup as any In Hungary, can hardly be counted on to furnish activeresistance. The best key to the role they are likely to play ln thc future may be their behavior during the recant revolt, whenspontaneously supported the Insurgents

by delivering food supplies, but did not enter thc fighting to any extent. While theirare doubtless basically unchanged, and while their resentment of governmentcontinues, lt Is possible that some of the opposition has been blunted by regime concessions, such as the decmphasls of

rmed Forces. Beforeonsiderable resistance potential waslo exist within the Hungarian armed forces. Indeed, the Hungarian armed forces all but disintegrated during theonsiderable portion of the military, officers as well as enlisted personnel, either refused to take acUon against the rebels or sided with the anti-regime forces to whom they gave weapons and with whom they fought side by side.areful screening ofpersonnel was initiated by the Kadar regime. Only those were to be retained who were considered unlikely to foment trouble and who were not known to have participated in thc revolt against the Communists. The same criteria were applied to the newinducted ln7 (andto the additional class scheduled forin the fallnd to theGuard organization which bas been newly created. Nevertheless, in spite of alland the strictest surveillance, it would be Impossible for the regime at thLs lime to organize any forces that arc free of dissidence even though,esult of careful screening, there ls probably now somewhat lessin the military establishmentther elements of the population.

he clergy, while it continues to exertinfluence among the people, has been showing signs of decreasing willingness to sharpen, or even discuss, outstanding Issues in thc Church-State relationship. TheBench of Bishops, particularly adroit in pre-revolt limes in applying betwccn-the-line* techniques In sermons and statements, seen" to have decided to exercise the utmost caution for the lime being. Thc resistance potential on the Church leadership level generally, both Catholic and Protestant, appears to be atowest ebb in years.


ven before6 revolution, there was strong resentment against Soviet control and influence, but the effectiveness of the security system limited Hungarian resistance tounorganized manifestations. Othersuch as physically and psychologically exhausting work norms, material want,political activities and unfavorable topography further discouraged activeOn the other hand, passiveIn Hungary appeared to have been more widespread than elsewhere In the satellites.6 revolution was almostpontaneous explosion which was aseven by Hungarians, as it wasIt demonstrated the Intensity of 'anti-regime and anti-Soviet feeling ln the face of overwhelming odds. But It cannotrecedent. Its inevitable outcome servedarning to active registersthat except under extraordinarysuch ventures are bound to end InIt did show, however, the depth of hatred of Soviet and native Communist rule.

regime's awareness of theof the basic reasons for dissidenceby the intensive drives ofit carries on with the announcedeliminating "all vestiges" of the revolt.violent and sanguinary uprising, theshowed themselves to be almostin their hatred of the Communistthe Soviet overlordship, and its localThc Kremlin and theare now. even more than before,hostile population In Hungary, and thethis hostility may subside Is not in


dissatisfied under thcregime during the Stalin era, thepeople expected majorStalin's death. However, theprogram adoptedmeliorated

ew of thc conditions at the root of the lespread dissidence. Relaxation of police. and mitigation of peasant regimrnta-appeared lo heighten popular demands

rather than reconcile the population to the regime.

nitially, liberalization seems to have had little effect on resistance. Passive resistance continued, as did Isolated instances ofactive resistance. There was noof anti-Communist organization and there were no instances of mass anti-regime action such as ln East Germanyn Poznan In the summerr even the Czech studentinowever, there Isevidence that afterh Congress of thc CPSU, parts of the population, especially workers, perhaps encouraged by the example of the "revolting" Party intellectuals,and unbihibltcdly criticized Partyand local functionaries in group meetings at the local leveL But there ls no substanUal evidence Uiat violent resistance was thenby any significant group.

ery Important manifestationass scale, though unorganized, was the spontaneous turnout of manyof Hungarians on the occasion of Rajk's reinterment early ins ato the nationwide uprising Uiat took place some three weeks later, thiswas significant In Uiat thc Hungarian people, at least in Budapest, at one strokeconscious Uiat their sentiments were fundamentally Uie same. -Years of suffering at thc hands of undercover security police, agents provocateurs, and informers hadthe Hungarians so Uiat no one felt he could trust any other individual. Themade them aware that untoldof individuals shared the sameupon which they were willing to act. even against Uie wishes of the regime.

ithin certain sectors of thc Party, lhe comparatively liberal policies of thc3 gave riseelief (expressed by the writers and other intellectuals) that modification of Communism toward greater freedom and humaneness was not onlybut feasible. The Nagy experimentUie beginning of organized opposiUon by the intellectuals inhisbecame Increasingly vocal and far-reach-

ing in its demands, especially afterh Congress. It ls unclear to what extent the opposition of Communist intellectuals and their collaborators to the Rakosi-Gero regime can be construed as resistance against the Communist system. It is unlikely that any substantial group of these avowedcontemplated the overthrow of theor plotted violence. In fact, themaximum program had more inwith political concepts of Western social democracy than with Communism.of their program would have meant the end of Hungarian Communismne-party dictatorship subservient to the Soviet Union. The fact that the intellectuals approved the prospectson-Communist Hungary while thc revolution was successful, docs notmean that they had consciously striven for these objectives in the preceding months. Thc evidence suggests rather that theirand more consistent aims were limited to freedom of creation, Le. freedom from Party press censorship, and did not extend to the destruction of the Communist system.

This intellectual "revolt"nique link between an Important body of the Communist Party and the population at large. For the first lime people began to read the Communist press voluntarily and withInterest. The grievances and hopes of the writersesponsive chord within the population, and hope arose that changes for the better could take place, particularly since Influential Party members werefor them.

Ferment within the Party, caused by the factionalism between Rakosi-Geroand new liberalizers (adherents of the Nagy-lype Communist program) can hardly be classified as resistance. Neither faction was anti-Communist In the sense that lt envisaged the end of Marxist-Leninist system, though nationalistic impulses, explicitly or implicitly anti-Soviet, presumably motivated many of the liberals. However, as in the case of the dissension represented by the opposition of thc intellectuals to the upper hierarchy, the split In the Politburo indirectly stimulated theresistance potential by the confusion it created. It must have been evident to the

population that the Party could no longer claim monolithic unity. The confusion which thc vagueness and zig-zagging of the Party line bred throughout the lower levels of the Party emboldened ever larger sectors of the population to challenge and defy Partyand to hope for and demand far-reaching changes ln the direction of humaneness,freedom, Independence, and improved living conditions.


Even though its translatabjjlty Into action is undoubtedly far more limited than before, resistance potential may well be considered to be nearly as high as it was in the monthsthe uprising. Popular distaste for the regime and the entire Communist system is evidenced in various ways. Workers engage in slowdowns, absenteeism, and poor quality production, despite the regime's application of incentives on tho one hand and punitiveon the other. Party and government functions are poorly attended, and the Party, now reducedembers, has had to admit the prevalence of skepticism andamong its own members.

Reports of organized resistance have been received continually since thc Sovietof the Hungarian revolt in Some of the reports received shortly after the revolt, have been verified and can be taken as evidence of organized1 resistance in thc early months Since that time, however, reliable information has beenmore and more by reports of dubious validity. The evidenceecline in the extent of organized resistance. Thisis probably due to thc increasingof government countermeasures and to some extent, to loss of hope for immediaU* success in these activities. Moreover, in the generally fiat terrain of Hungary, majoresistance could not long survive. Nevcrfiw less, the hiding of arms, one of theeasons given by the Kadar regimeifying many arrests, has beeneveral sources who claimedrable part of the small arms, givenungarian Army elements to revolution^ groups, were still missing.

nother lerm or organized post-revoltwas the general strike latehen workers finally returned to thetheyirtual sabotage In the form of an evidently well-planned display of Inactivity. As late ashis organized opposition apparently circulated such slogans as "Long Live Free Hungary. Long Live Imre Nagyl"

uring November. December anda strong organization ofajor source of active opposition to the Kadar regime. Although the regime dissolved thc central and regional councils in6 and the local councilshere was firm evidence during7 that their spirit of resistancerofessional awareness of the importance of organization remained high. Members of these councils have volunteered thethat they were changing tactics from overt to covert opposition. Early In January, theyidden radio transmitter for use in emergencies, facilities forache of arms, and annetwork embracing the wholeLater in the same month, they also claimed to be supportedetwork of poUtical parties and an organization of



he majority of the writers, grouped in the Hungarian Writers' Federation, showed signs of organized opposition up to the springrafting resolutions and voicingOn the Kadar government. Thisforced the regime to "suspend" thc Federation's activities onanuary and to dissolve it onpril. Arrests of writers have been announced from time to time. Many of the leading writers appear to have gonesilenceefusing to writethe Communist-approved publications. Although in the autumnhis "strike"

signs of weakeningsuch as the forced signing o! theeptember manifesto Protesting the UN debate on Hungary[Wse still warrants considerationactorotential resistance

Under these circumstances, considering 'he general exhaustion and frustration of the

people,esult of the unsuccessfuland in view of the strong security measures of the Soviet-sponsored regime, no organized resistance can be expected in the near future. For the time being, at least, thc simplest and safest method by which the citizen can resist Is by carrying out his workuperficial manner and only externally complying with regulations, consistent with self-preservation and personal security.


he existenceizeableemigration hasource offor Communist Hungary In the period since World Warigorous repatriation campaign is being conducted to alleviate this situation. Emigre efforts to broadcast anti-Communist material from thc West have found some response in Hungary and have assisted in strengthening the morale of the numerous dissidents there. In general,Hungarians have tended to ignore emigre activities or to be critical of their leaders. Although some insurgents In late:6 called for the return of certain emigre leaders, especially pre-Communlst Premier Ferenc Nagy, their absence during long years of national plight was generally resented. The manifest inability of pre-revolutionary emigres Lo exert any influence on theliaslow to their organizations in the Free World and it is=not likely to be forgotten in their homeland.he Hungarian Veterans Comradeship Society (Magyar Harcosok Bajtarsian emigre organization of Fascist leanings under General Andros Zako, was considered for some years as mililantly favoring Hungarian liberation fromrule. That it gave actual assistance tonce groups inside Hungary, however. '.,i K was thoiiglit

to be disintegrating. An attempt to activate the group by proposing to stage an Invasion was made, by General Zako, soon after the6 revolt, but the .proposal was not taken seriously by thehe MHBK is not believed to have adherents capable ofesistance effort inside Hungary

re- and post-revolutionary emigre groups, though acting mainly outside Hungary and not yet effectively united, have plans which may have the eflect of strengthening theresistance potential In Hungary. Also, numerous individual members of the pre-rev-olutionary emigre group In the Hungarian NaUonal Council, as well as Uie newer emigres in Uie Hungarian Freedom Federation, claim to maintain potentially useful contacts In Hungary. However, it remains doubtful Uiat Uie present basic disposition of Uie Hungarian people toward resistance could beInfluenced by emigre organizations.

f thc emigres Identified with Hungarian iwlltlcal parties, Uie Social Democrats,abroad by Annaember of Imre Nagy's coalition cabinet during theare believed to have Uie strongest political resistance assets in Hungary today. She probably has retained most of her large personal followingespected political leader. It ls also probable Uiat late6 Uie Social Democrats and other political parties, including the Smallholders, took steps to insUtute dual leadership at home and abroad to prepare for underground work


n order to obliterate the liberal trends and nationalist spiritheetermined and apparenUy sue cessful effort to eliminate all discernible focal points of resistance. Repression has proven elf cell vc, insofar as it has reduced or thwarted thc danger of any renewal of overt resistance, but it has failed to eradicate passive resistance and recalcitrance. During the immediate post-revolt period, and again in Julylie regime resorted to domestic deportations. Until recenUy It has madeefforts lo publicize the trials and Uie harsh sentencesarge number ofin order to impress Uie people with its strength The old AVH (Secret Police) has been reconstituted; now called BACs (State Securityl operates ruthlessly and with apparent efficiency under the Ministry of Interior. The CentralCouncil, almost the equivalent of agovernment during lhe early phase of Uie

uprising, was ouUawed on Decemberie Writers' Union was banned iny April, the leaders ofrotestant churches were forced to reaffirm their support of Uie Kadar regime; cn MayheCatholic Church not only announced its adherence to Uie regime by joining UiePeace Council but also formed anpeacepusithin Uie Church Itself, and on Augusturely political statement, first of Its kind, in support of Uie regime (attacking thc UNon Uie Hungarian uprising).


he Armed Forces which disintegrated during the revolution, have been gradually reconstituted. They appear to remain,recurrent screenings, technically weak and of doubtful reliability. Thc present strength is estimated. Inthere0 militarized Security Forces,0 of whom are Frontier Guards. Morale of Uie armed forces be low but Uie Securily Forces are probably somewhat less disaffected than thc Army. Furthermore, inarty-directed Workers Guard, probably mod-cUed after the Easi German Kampigruppen. was formed in order to prevent outbreaks against the regime in thc industrialIt is not known how wdl organized or trained these elements are but it can bechat the regime has selected for this role only those it considers to be the least susceptible to dissidence.

lie Hungarian security forces have made progress In re-establishing their pre-rcvolu-tionary efficiency and organization. However, it will undoubtedly take some time before these security forces approach the level ofand training achieved before in* revolt And it willong time before the organization responsible for [unctionsassigned to Uie State Security Authon ly (AVH) achieves Uie reliability of Uiat ap liaratus. The securily police have had some difficulty in restoring its extensive infornici system, which in fact probably hinders lb* attainment of its pre-revolutionary ellcctivC

ness. They cannot be expected, and never were considered able, toevolt of any significant proportions, since this exceeds .the normal function of the organization. The present regime could not suppress an outburst 'of any significant proportions with themachinery now available to it Theowes Its continued existence to theelements of six Soviet line divisions which are stationed in Hungary.


esult of the uprising, many agents were killed, many others left the country, and still others were unwilling to continue serving, at first two former AVH officers reconstituted the AVH as thend earlyhree new officer regiments were reported as consisting largely of former AVH men in officer uniforms. That local armed forces were principally composed of former AVH members and Party functionaries was also reported inheprogram seems to have proceeded rapidly ln the following months with thcof policy-level personnelto the Rakosi wing reported again in latelso by May and probably earlier, the informer system, backbone of the AVH system, had been reorganized to some extent, and attempts were being made to recruitrebels as spies and informers.nit" was not heard again. The new secrcL police, at first referred to asMinistry Security Police, or Special Police Establishment, soon developed into thc present SACs (State Securityhe widespread and growing volume of arrests of "counter-revolutionaries" up to the summeray indicate the increasing efficiencyhe secret police, f.


^ Under peacetime conditions, passivewould undoubtedly increase if thereubstantial relaxation of polices. Such circumstances might even render Sn eventual crystal ligation of some organized

resistance possible. However, no suchappears likely in the foreseeable future. Even If lt did occur, tangible developments would materialize only after an initial period of undeterminable length, during which the population could convince itself that thewasactical devicea trap. Strong police control, Sovietdisillusionment over the lastingof open resistance in the light of the recent experiences, and the absence of visible prospects of outside assistance will limitefforts in Hungary, Jor thefuture, to minor and sporadic acts ofand sabotage. Thc regime may besuccessful in neutralizing all focal points of organized resistance; in the absence of war, even without sizeable additions to itsoviet-supported apparalus seems quite adequate to prevent the development and spread of any Important organized

Nevertheless, there probably still exist some resistance nuclei which have beenenough to evade detection. They may be able for some time to maintain contact security, and to cache arms and otherSimilarly, they couldmall number of acts of sabotage and produce propaganda leaflets. Their possibilities forenewed uprising seemgiven the genera! attitude andcondition of the "majority of the population and thc systematic efforts on the part of the regime to destroy any remnants of expectation and hope which prevailed before the October uprising.

More difficult for the regime to cope with is the resistance potential of the intelligentsia. Evidence suggesLs the possibility of some form of organization among anti-regime students and intellectuals. The latter haveorm of passive resistance in that they do not produce for the regime's propagandaTheir capabilities probably do not extend beyond this form of resistance, since the regime-sponsored publications do notexpression of their real views openly or by "Aesopian" devices which they usedbefore the revolution. Students will

probably continue to defy the regime byingenious nuisance devices. Neither group seems to have the opportunity, which existed before the revolution, toink between their own aims and aspirations and those of the population at large.

active resistance,use of arms hidden during andrevolution, may occur from Ume toIs unlikely to be of more than localUnorganized passivewill conUnue to be widespread.capable of sabotaging or slowing downand agricultural production and,disregarding thc regime'source of embarrassmentas well as other Easternleaders.


Under conditions of open warfare, alack of massive popular support would undoubtedly actreat hindrance to the regime and to its Soviet mentors even in the performance of Uie relatively minor tasks Uie regime could expect to be assigned. In Uie initial stagesar, thc Hungarian regime would increase its security measures, and it would be difficult for the people to engage ln effective resistance activities. The populace would attempt to slow down both Industrial and agricultural producUon. It would try to disrupt transportation and communications, and would probably manage to publishagainst Uie Soviet war effort. Some men anticipating induction into Uie Armed Forces would hide in an attempt to avoid service. Most Hungarians would watch for opportunities to aid the forces opposing Uie Bloc more actively and many would bide their time,hance to go over to thc enemy. However, large-scale desertions and organized resistance activities would not take place until basic Soviet weaknesses in the field became manifest or at least one majordefeat was inflicted upon Soviet forces.

The regime has tried to recover al) arms and other supplies hidden by Hungariansand afterG revolt, but there still remain considerable quantities of hidden

small arms scattered throughout the country. They are almost certainly Insufficient,to permit largo-scale or effective armed resistance. Thus, Uie capability of Uie Hungarians for anti-Bloc military activityargo extentfor sabotage would be largely dependent upon supplies of arms, munitions, and explosives from outside.

In Uie initial stages of war, the majorof dissident elements of thepopulace to Uie Bloc's enemies would be acts of sabotage and intelligence collection. There would probably be little opportunity to assist in evasion and escape measures, but if channels for transmission could benon-Bloc forces could expect to bewith complete descriptions of Soviet activities inside Hungary.

If actual fighting were taking place on or near Hungarian territory, Hungarianelements would Intensify their efforts It would not matter to them which sideto be winning; their efforts would be concentrated on assistance to the enemies of Uie Soviets. As Uie actual conflict drew closer to Hungary, opportunities to assist in evasion and escape efforts would be multiplied Familiarity with Uie topographic features of their own country and with Soviet search techniques would enable the Hungarians to facilitate the escape of enemy soldiers. to the scene of battle would make it easier to pass intelligence to Uie enemy h" supplied with radios, Uie Hungarians would probably provide intelligence information more rapidly than non-Bloc forces could r* plolt it. If supplied with arms and special equipment, Uie Hungarians could beo organize guerrilla bands which,it-and-run tactics, would be able to ticnumbers of Bloc troops and a* deprive the USSR of some of its forward ope' ations based in Hungary. In the event' stantlal Soviet reverses In war, all major laf tors and forces of the recent revoltxpected to conic Into playcale andn intensity probably oven larger than thatast fall's explosion. Thc validity of tw* assumption Is made secure by thc continuing existence ol every major factor from *w

popular opposition to Soviet occupation and Soviet-sponsored Communist rule stems in Hungary. W

The nationality of attacking forces would notactor adversely influencing theand extent of resistance operations and capabilities. The attitudes and actions ofgroups in other Bloc countries would probably strongly influence the Hungarians-Cooperation with resistance groups In other Bloc countries would develop after the initial uprising and particularly if other resistance groups could help supply the Hungarians with arms and equipment. Also, circumstances surrounding thc Initiation of hostilities would not affect resistance capabilities. Theprobably would approve the initiation Df hostilities since theyar as pro-riding the best means of liberation.

Hungarian hatred of the Soviets is sothat the people probably would accept the use of any Instrument of war, Including Duclear weapons, against Soviet forces in Hungary. However, the physical destruction and social dislocation resultingarge scale nuclear attack on Hungary could beto virtually destroy Hungarianfor resistance.uclear air attack could be so designed as to eliminate the major resources of the governmental and political strengths of the regime, Hungarian resistance capabilities would not necessarily be adversely affected. Thus, an opportunity would emerge for Hungarian resistance groups to take over control of the country If the followingconditions should prevail:f effective leadership and coordination

in resistance groups; (b) provision of material support; and (c) assurance qf early direct miliiary support.

Occupation policies of Western forces would notrucial factor affectingpotential and capabilities so long as these policies were pronounced to respect and aid in the accomplishment of Hungarianfor freedom. Independence and the end to Soviet domination. Thus, enlightened occupation by non-Bloc forces would Intensify thc Hungarian desire to be helpful.capabilities for assistlngjhe occupying power in areas of the country which were not yet taken would be enhancedooperative attitude on the part of the occupier.

Questionsuture regime and of the specific character of agencies to bein the liberation are likely to beby the people as secondary In relation to liberation Itself. The question of Germaney item in Communistis to be viewed in this light. Although many fundamental and even irreconcilable differences exist between thc German and Hungarian mentality and character, theaffinities of the two peoples arc basedommon Western heritage. Also, into the situationisRumania, and Yugoslavia asto in paragraphungary has noclaims against Germany. However, if armed units of countries toward whichare now hostile, participated in efforts to liberate Hungary, lt may be assumed that such units would be welcomed.

f igflfIB



he principal sources of Ill-will in North Korea are the regime's drastic Industrialand expansion effort and the agricultural collectivization program, which, following the extreme suffering and demands made" during the hostilities, have placed an extraordinarily heavy burden on the North Korean people. Additional factors tending lo create or stimulate dissidenceival Korean government In the South offering an alternative focus ofhe continued presence of large numbers of foreign troops within theast and potential future factional rivalries in thc North Korean ruling hierarchy between the dominant pro-Soviet elements and the"Yenan" faction,he latent clash of interests and competition between theUnion and Communist China for control of North Korea which these factional rivalries reflect. In most other respects the objectives, overall approach, and systems of control of the North Korean rulers are the same as those of Communist regimes elsewhere, and most of the specific factors creating ill-will arc the same. However, because of the cultural and intellectual backwardness of theagricultural North Korean society, tlie North Koreans' extreme Isolation from the Outside world and their complete inexperience with free, modern, nndheir resistance, present and potential, to Communist domination is less intense than among the satellites with experience and contacts In the modern world.

urther important reason for dissidence has been the imposition by the regime of 3Ppressivc burdens on the populace, such as heavy taxes, forced contributions to political Jhd social organizations, forced labor, directIndirect pressures to turn fanners intolaborers, farm coll<-clivization.of consumer goods, high production

quotas for Industrial and farm workers, and military conscription. During the hostilities, loss of life and property and other direct and Indirect suffering brought the populacetate of almost complete exhaustion. Though more than four years have passed since the hostilities ended and North Korea has received aid from the Sino-Soviet Bloc; the warthc reconstruction program, and the maintenanceilitary force exceeding that at the beginning of the hostilities exacts heavier contributions from the reducedthan those required before the

nother factor contributing to dissension in North Korea Is Uie close supervision and control exercised by the regime over all facets of personal life. However, Stallnist-typets no longer needed except forpurges of Party members andfunctionaries- Agricultural landlords. Christians, middle class elements, and other anti-Communists who did not flee to South Korea in the early years of Communist control generally are being controlled through"social" organizations andls being meted out bytreatment and surveillance rather than through persecution. Alsoagainst and under close surveillance is thc large minority of thc population whowith the UN forces during their occupation of North Korea, or who are closely related to members of any of these suspect groups.

4 Tlie existenceival Koreanasserting jurisdiction and seekingol the Korean peninsula alsoear ing on dissidence. The appeal of lhe KOK to North Koreans has been minimized to some extent by thc antagonisms Inevitablyby the war. by NorUi Koreanvilifying Uie Republic and contrasting the situation in the north and south io the

disadvantage of thc ROK, andack ol sympathy lor the Rhee government.there exists considerable sentiment for the ROK In North Korea even though few North Koreans in the present situation would be willing to assume the risks involved In actively supporting the ROK.


Dissidence, unhapplness and hopelessness exist to varying degrees In almost everyof North Korean society. However, the extent of such feelings hi terms of resistance potential is difficult to estimate. It cancertainly be presumed that dissidence Is limited to relatively small numbers in the various socialhenomenon which Is partly attributable to the fact that more than two million persons who might havethe resistance potential, have fled to South Korea since World War II.

Dissidence is Intense among the smallof the Christian and former middle-class groups and in the suspect elements of thc populace Uiat arc kept under surveillance and arc treated in discriminatory fashionof their relationship toThe farmers remain basically out of sympathy with the objectives of the regime. As recently ashe regime listed as one of its major tasks in Uiefield thc "socialist transformation" of the peasants' thinking, which it characterized as "lagging far behind their socialistTwo post-armistice policies areimportant causes of ill-will among the fanners: wage increases and othertreatment granted to industrial laborers and Uie government's program of agriculturalow nearly completed The industrial laborers, too.are generally unhappy and frustrated, butesser scale than the farmers. They are treatedrivileged group in contrast to the fanners, but are subjected to oppressive labor requirements. Army morale isonly fair despite indoctrination, though dissidence is probably mild in the Air Force and thc Navy which are much smaller and more select services.

s industrialization proceeds the regime will become increasingly dependent on the middle ranks of the government bureaucracy andtechnicians. Facedhortage of such personnel and without adequatefor training them at home, Uie regime has sent several thousand students to theUnion and Eastern Europe for further education. The Inevitable comparisons made by these young people between conditions hi North Korea and in other parts of Uie world based on personal observation and increased access to reformationrofoundly shocked some and have undoubtedly affected all. Several North Korean students whoto the West commented Uiat Eastern Europe appeared toaradise inwith their homeland. Korean students in Hungary joined the revolutionary forces in October and6 and have since been returned to North Korea. These young technicians might also servehannel for introducing into North Korea the ideological ferment which has swept Uie Soviet bloc sinceh Congress of thc CPSU but which apparently has as yet had little effect on North Korea.


espite widespread dissidence the North Koreans are inclined toward hopelessness and apathy rather than active prospects for reestabllshfhcnt of nonCommunisL control aver the area havethe will to resist appears to haveDissidence is seldom voiced and even less frequently acted upon since the regime provides severe punishment for any infraction of its laws and regulations. Although there art* geographic areas, particularly in the rugged, mountainous terrain of North-central Korea, in which dissidence could be mani-tested by guerrilla activity, there arc no known guerrilla groups in existence,dissidence ls ofow intensity ss toopular movement. Only ifommunist control apparatuses, wereand the regime seemed on'the vergecrumbling under outside pressures,ubstantial minority probably bearticipate in resistance activities with


of success. But in the presentactual resistance on any significant scale is unlikely and in fact virtually

uch resistance as does occur in North Korea is primarily directed not atper se or at Soviet domination but at the NorUi Korean regime itself. Ideologicalareajor contributingin creating dissension in North Korea, and. except for the small remnant of the Christian community in North Korea, apparenUy few people strongly oppose Communism as aNor is there much opposiUon to Soviet domination which is exercised through an ostensibly "native Korean" regime. However, there is at least some opposiUon to those North Korean policies which appear to favor Uie USSR over Uie needs and desires of Uie North Koreans themselves. This opposiUon is almost certainly stimulated by the strongconsciousness of the Korean people and their long history of resistance to external domination. Although the presence ofhinese Communist troops in North Korea has undoubtedly aroused someand nationalist sentiment, it does not appear lo have caused widespread discontent among the population at large.


orth Korea does not appear to have been aflecled directly by the events which followed lhe death of Slalin. Rather. It has been Sniggling with its reconstruction program following Uie cessaUon of hostilities Changes In the regimes policies were the result of tn-arnal rather lhan external developments. Even in relation to developments elsewhere In lhe Sino Soviet Bloc. North Korea has re-nalnrd surprisingly isolated.

he regime has not relaxed its rnhablllta-Jon nnd development programs and hits not Jltcred the policy of giving priority to the levclopmenl of heavy industry. Neither thc toviet criticism of the "cult of personality" Wr the Chinese Communist "hundred flow-policy have been echoed in North Korea,Hungarian revolt was not extensivelyin the North Korean press, and the

scale and character of theoutbreak wereand distorted. iU-efTect on Uieof rebellion in North Korea has probably been minimal, although Ihe return of students sent lo Eastern Europe may Inject anferment previously lacking.


Guerrilla activity In North Korea, which was extensive1 immediately following the withdrawal of UN forces from Uie area, steadily declined during the remainder of the hostilities as lhe battle line stabilized. At Uie time of Stalin's death, which preceded the signing of the Korean armistice by less than five months, virtually all guerrilla bands, which had been most numerous ln central Hwanghae Province just north of Uie present demilitarized zone, had been driven onto thc off-shore islands, where they presumably have since been liquidated. Guerrilla activity in the latter stages of Uie hostilities appears to have been sustained only where It was linked with Uie UN command; asldo from such groups, resistance activities after theregained control were minor.

Since the conclusion of the armistice, guerrilla and other resistance activity appears to have declined almost to Uie vanishing point. Some small guerrilla groups wereto have been holding-oul in theareas of Hwanghae andon-gan Provinces as recenUy asut their continued survival is doubtful. Active resistance appears to be limited to thedistribution or leaflets and mutilation of Communist posters, some intelligenceand rare instances of sabotage and assassination of members of the North Korean aimed forces, apparenUy on an unorganized basis No organized resistance groups are knowne tn existence at tlie present time

M. Unorganized passive resistance Is probably fairly widespread in North Korea, particularly among thc farmers, whose failure to Identify themselves with the official-policies and aims has been acknowledged by thc regime Such passive resistance, however, is probablymore by apathy and unwillingness to expend effort in accomplishing Uie tasks set

by tbe regime thaneliberate effort to obstruct those taskslowdown. Student elements probably retain Uie best resistance potential as do relatives of persons adversely affected by regime long as thc present regime remains In power, even unorganized resistance has only dim prospects.


presence In South Korea ofof North Korean refugeesstrong attraction for their compatriotsUie North andotentialleadership and guidance in the eventresistance In thc North shouldfeasible. However, although therecontact between Uie members ofsplit between Uie North and therelationship appears to have littlesignificance. The ROK Is known tointo North Korea, but there isUiat there has been contactresistance groups ln Uieless any support to them.


North Korean securitythe Ministry of Internal Affairs,in addition to its adrolnlstrativepolitical police, security guards,railroad constabulary police, andpolice. Through strictspeech, press and radio listening,constant local surveillance, thekeeps alert to any Indication ofTravel controls are very thorough,in Kaesong and the rest of thelo the Demilitarized Zone.of persons who have gone to Southparticularly watched andThere has been considerableof persons resident in Kaesong andof unrest Families of medicalparticipated in the Hungarianrepotted io have been imprisoned.


the majority of Northdislike the regime and respond

apathetically to Its demands and appeals, they are effectively controlled by Uie Soviet-trained security apparatus and by the^ omnipresent cadres of Uie Korean Labor Party. There is every reason to believe Uiat the regime would be capable of suppressing opposition from any internal quarter without Soviet or Chinese Communist aid.

controls which had beenat the time of Uie Armistice in Julymade more rigid at the time of therevolt. The number of securityhas been sizably Increased;the border and port areas, Injheeven stricter travel control. Nohas been reported, thoughreater feeling of mtlmldatlon.there has been on Increase ofof the coast during the last year.


Assuming continuation of the armistice, resistance in North Korea Is unlikely to pc of much significance. At best It mayimited source of intelligence. Organizedgroups apparently have been unable to sustain operations against the regime and have little prospect of greater success in the future. Unorganized passive resistance may increase In Uie future if Uie economic burden on individual North Koreans increases or ifarc relaxed. ubstantia improvement in the standard of living throughout North Korea would probablydissension signiflcanUy. Barring ic-sumption of hostilities in Korea, however,is generally unlikely to be translated into active resistance,

Prolonged and open unrestSSR,eakening in the Soviet system, would undoubtedlyrofound eflect on North Korea, should such event* become known by any sizeable number ofMoreover, the existence of anti-Sovie' pro-Communist Chinese elements has been confirmed, and Uie historical" evidenceKorean inclination toward China is StronE enough to suggestwitch from polid" supporting the USSR to those favoring Co"1'


China might occur. Such an event however, would probably notery marked departure from the present state of affairs and It Is highly unlikely that any pro-ROK or US group would be able to exert any significant influence.


nder conditions of open war, North Korean resistance potential would probably Increase somewhat but would still be limited to Isolated Instances of sabotage, some passive resistance defections, assistance topersonnel in escape and evasionand some Intelligence collection.action by resistance elements without external support would be virtuallyIncreased domestic security measures and externa] bloc support for the regime would make organized resistance highlyexcept Immediately ln front ofnon-Communist forces. Nor could North

Korean troops be counted on to defect since they are considered politically reliable.

The circumstances surrounding theof hostilities would have little effect on resistance potential. The same Is true of the use of tactical nuclear weapons against selected targets. However, If large-scalewarfare were used, the possibilities of effective resistance would be negligible.

The nationality of any Free World forces would not matter provided that no Japanese forces were employed.S-type military government were Instituted, by occupation forces, staffed by ROK personnel andWestern support and guidance, most North Koreans would probably accept It and resistance In areas still under Communist control might be stimulated.

The aspirations of individual resistance tactions for post-war leadership probably would not be of great significance.



conomic pressures areajor factor ln creatine dissidence ln the-Democratic Republic of Vietnam" (DRV, North Vietnam). The levies, regulations, and controls of the regimeeavy burden on the population, especially when compared with economic measures ln South Vietnam Agricultural taxes,evy of aboutercent of paddy yields, deprive peasants of almost all surplus output, while localface stiff taxes calculated to prevent tbe accumulation of wealth. In addition, the dearth of trained technicians of all kinds, bureaucratic unwleldiness, and the disruption of normal trade channels have tended to hamper economic growth. Living standards although slightly Improved since the signing of the Geneva Agreements are still low; rice yields are poor; and population pressures are great. Other important factors In thc crea-of resentment are the regime's rigid ice-state restrictions; thc bloodshed and hardships ln the rural areas, caused regime's agrarian reform policieshe past three years; Its continued use of "irlaUc methods; its persecution of cer-soclo-economlc, minority, and religiousIts disruption of theamily ties of the Vietnamese; and the Bucncc in the DRV of the Chinese, who have ig been feared and disliked In Vietnam.

fOfncrally, the popular appeal of the re-^e, following the military victory over the and4 Geneva Agreements, has ihed in recent years largely for the rea-mentloncd above. The inherently re-nature of the Communist regimencreasingly clear lo the Vietnamese 'since Geneva, and this revelation prob-Jbas shaken the allegiance of many of its Sorters. The steady consolidation of'go Dinh Diem's anll-Communlst gov-Jfnt in Soulh Vietnam, where levies, reg-

ulations, and controls are less stringent than hi the North, has provided an Irritatinglo the North Vietnamese regime for the allegiance of Its citizens. To combat thisthe DRV seeks to direct popularagainst Diem's government, which it portrays as an American- puppet, and against the United Slates ilsclf, which it claims has taken over France's colonialist aspirations In the area, is perpetuating the division of thc country, and Is responsible for most of the area's economic difficulties.


atholics. Thein the DRV (roughly six percent of the population) probably constitute the largest single concentration of actual or potential dissidents ln the country. The generalof Vietnamese Catholics to Communist rule has been demonstrated on severalSoon after the division of Vietnam in. for example,from North Vielnam sought refuge in South Vietnam. More recently, the fact that the6 uprisings In Nghc An Province occurred in primarily Catholicindicates lhat those who remainedure far from reconciled to the DRVCatholic dissatisfaction with the DRV's treatment of thc church has been stimulated by the contrast with the favored position the church occupies in South Vietnam, where Diem and many other leaders are devout Catholics. Nevertheless, church leaders In lhe north have not encouraged ovcrl resistance to the regime, evidently an effort to ensure the church's survival. Although they haveDRV encroachments upon the church's prerogatives, they apparently have sought to avoid openly hostile acts that presumably would result In even more stringent DRVmeasures


Minorities. The Vietnamese have traditionally disdained the tribal minorities who, for their part, fear and dislikeribalpeoples in North Vietnam areby the regime toource ofMade upariety of groups such as the Tho, Nung. White and Black Thai, Muong, Meo, and Man, they are located chiefly Inand mountainous regions in the northern part of North Vietnam and along the western boundary with Laos. DRV authorities have placed tight restrictions on entry into and egress from many of these areas, while they have sought to bring the tribes under controlombination of force and persuasion. Communist cadres assigned to these areas have often increased tribal hostility,to some reports, by disregarding tribal hierarchies and customs. The tribal peoples, however, are disunited, and lack modern weapons.

The Peasantry. Many of the peasants (who make up perhapsercent of thefeel dissatisfied with theesult of the DRVs agrarianprogram during the past three years. Sincehere has been extensivein DRV media of the agrarian reform cadres for arousing popular resentment,the Lao Dong Communist Party's foundations, and causing tension ln theRegime attempts to correct thehave generally not been successful,While present resistance hastaken the form of violence, apparently spontaneous and unorganized, in most cases rural dissidence seems to have been expressed by failure to respond to the regime's agrarian program or by general apathy. Fear and hopelessness appear to characterize theoutlook, and deliberate efforts toDRV policies arc rarely made.

Intellectuals. There are indications that some dissidence exists among intellectuals in North Vietnam, especially those who were French-educated and French oriented.the latter halfhc regime, copying the Soviet pattern of admitting errors andliberalized" policy to correct the errors, somewhat relaxed its censorship and

allowed criticism of DRV policy in various newspapers. These papers, non-Party but still supporters of the regime, quicklythe acceptable limits of criticism and were suspended inthe rapidity with which someresponded to this one opportunity to air their grievances Is an Indication that theefforts to win over this group have not been wholly successful.

and Merchants constituteof dissidence on an individualthey have not been nor are they likelyleaders of effective resistance.reportedly engaged inspeculation, and tax evasion,to the regime's poor


Although there have been widespreadof dissidence, the North Vietnamese generally do not seem to feel impelled to active resistance. Few have ever known anything other than marginal living standards,government, and Insecurity; they also arc extremely war-weary following the years of fighting in theccordingly they seem toarge capacity for enduring privation and repression, and many haveapathetic. Moreover, the strength of thc regime's conlrol apparatus and thelackeans for armed resistancemake potential resistance elements even more discreet. Outbreaks of violence that have occurred appear to have beenunpremeditated and unorganized flare-ups.

Most dissidence in North Vietnam seems directed primarily at the DRV regime itself Catholic dissidence and resistance activity probably Is directed at Communism per se, although the distinction between the regime and thc ruling Ideology probably is notdrawn. There have been no reports of any ill will directed specifically against Soviet oi Chinese Communist influence, even though fear and dislike of the Chineseupplementary motivation for resistance.


does not seem to have been anychange in the basis and intensity ofin North Vietnamesult ofpolicies adopted after Stalin's20th Soviet Party congress, thePoland and Hungary, and theideological differences andother Communist parties do nothave had any lasting impact on DRVgovernment circles.


From the time of Stalin's death to* the signing of the Geneva Agreements aboutonths later, most if not all organizedactivity in North Vietnam involved groups associated with the French andforces engaged in hostilities with the Viet Minh. After the Geneva Agreements, however, most of these groups either withdrew from DRV territory or were rendered virtually Impotent by DRV control measures. Fairly continuous but minor conflicts seem to have occurred between small groups of tribal minorities and DRV forces in tlie areas now known as the Thai-Meo Autonomous Zone, Vict Bac Autonomous Zone, and theZone. Vietnamese Catholics seem to haverominent role in numerous local anti-regime disturbances during the last half6 and the first halfhe most publicized and probably most severe outbreaks of resistance were those that occurred ln Nghe An Province inlthough this uprising was followed later by scattered anti-regime disturbances in other localities, no general resistance movement evolved.

No reliable information is availableany organized resistance groups that may now be operating in North Vietnam Presumably some members of Catholic lay organizations which existed ln North and Central Vietnam prior to the Genevahave remained. These organizations, such as the Catholic Socialist Party {Dang

Hoi Conghe Youth Movement for Devotion to the Country {Thanh Nten Pkung Su Quocnd the Catholic militia, which prior4 included0 members, jnighttructural basis forresistance activities among the Catholic

minority. It is possible also that smallof several antl-DRV political parties and labor groupsnotably-the Nationalist Party of Greater Vietnam {Dai Viet Quoc Danhe Vietnam NaUonallst Party (Viet Nam Quoc Dannd Uie Vietnamese Confederation of Christianwere acUve ln North and4 probably are still located in those regions, and retain some subversive potential.

resistance groupsthan ten percent of Jjhe DRV's totaland clearly lack the capacity toorganized, active resistance.resistance Isassiveextending from criticism of UieIntellectuals to apathy and failure tosupport Uie regime by peasants.resistance against Uie regime'swill probably continue to Impedegoals. There have been recentexpressions of discontent amongover low wages and excessivelynorms. Dissatisfaction .'alsoaU classes of Uie population withgoods shortages, Uie Communistcontrol system, and theayslabor levy for all able bodied adults.


Uie border controls of Uieits efforts tougged andborder area, considerablepersons cross thc borders, includingare allowed to smuggle certainA steady trickle of refugeesreach the South from the Catholic areasand northern Central Vietnam, andbe assumed there is considerablethe Catholic refugees in Southand their families and compatriotsNorth. There is no evidence,guidance and assistance are atoffered by Catholics ln thc South togroups in the North. Thereto be contacts by Southservices with individuals inareas in Uie North, but there is nothat aid or guidance Is being givengroups there.



The DRV regime haa foreseen most actual and potential centers of resistance, and has adjusted its counter-subversion tactics Into meet the individual requirements of each resistance center. The 'Tcople's Army of Vietnam,'* one of Uie regime's majorfor suppressing resistance,ell-organized and mobiletroops. In addiUon, forces designedfor internal security, under theof Uie regular army.orces responsible forocal militia,0 responsible for local security. Borderregiments of Uie regular army along Uie Laotian border and along Uie demilitarized zone aboveh parallel arc known to have security responsibilities.

The DRV maintains strict controls over travel, documentation, press, radio and other media of expression. Party penetration of aU mass organizations, social, and religious groups enables Uie regime to keep informed of Uie acts and attitudes of Vietnamese on all levels of society. With respect to Uie ethnic minorities, Uie DRV utilizes Uie system of penetration by Communist cadres of Uie same ethnic stock and background. There Is some evidence to indicate that Uie regime has made use of Chinese Communist cadre-tralnlngIn the Kunming area In Communist China for its work among minority tribal groups. It has alsoarge school In Hanoi for giving instruction andto promising members of ethnic minorities. An over-all literacy program has been started, both In tribal dialects and in Vietnamese, which incidentally makeand organization controls more


long as the regime's leadershipand determined to check extremely difficult for futurebecome organized and to grow in forceInsofar as is known, actualresistance groups arc not united and

have no background of common action against Uie Communists; their interests (except for their anti-regime outlook) do not coincide: and they have HtUe power. Moreover, through its security and surveillance systems, the DRV Is capable of effectively controlling whatever sporadic resistance activity arises ln either Vietnamese or ethnic minority areas.some sympathy reportedly was shown by army troops to Uie resisting villagers at the time of Uie Nghe An uprising, Uie military forces are believed loyal to Uie regime.


this Ume, II seems unlikely Uiator unorganized resistance to theattain sufficient magnitude orImpede seriously the realization of Itsgoals. The DRV has firm control offorces and can throttle anythreat to its existence.small and independent guerrillaexist in the remote areas of Northwhere control is extremely difficult,litUe likelihood Uiat an amalgamationvarious dissident groups could result.


If hosttUUes were taking place outside Vietnam, the resistance potential within Uie DRV will probably increase, but only by minor proportions. It would probably be limited to annoying acts of sabotage, intelligenceand assistance to anti-Communistin various forms. Independentaction without external support would probably be suicidal for anti-regime elements unless thc DRV security apparatus were greatly weakened.

In the event of hostilities within North Vietnamese territory, resistance activity would probably assume more seriousespecially If external assistance and encouragement were provided. Assistance to attacking forces would most likely take Uie form of sporadic uprisings which, however, would have little chance of becomingin scope because of thc extremely poor communications. Aid in escape and evasion


could be expected throughout most of rural Vietnam. Assistance would bein the southern areas, among indigenous Catholic groups, and among other minorities, particularly the Meos. Resistance forces,small and un-coordinated, would still be able to disrupt and reduce the over-all strength of thc regime. The intensity of active local resistance generally would depend on the success of local military action by attacking forces.

he nationality of attacking forces would probably influence the willingness ofgroups to act. Tribal groups which have been helped by the French for many years would be most receptive to French invaders. Vietnamese would prefer to aid otherthe most and the French Uie least. Participation of Nationalist Chinese might seriously Jeopardize resistance and createtoward the occupation.

A military government administered by Vietnamese tn ethnic Vietnamese areas would probablyalutary effect on resistancerench occupation would beby the majority of the Vietnameseand would adversely affectpartisan warfare. The occupationof the attacking forces would affectresistance capabilities. However, any occupation government of long duration, ad-rninlstcred and controlled by other thanwould probably be unpopular with the people of the occupied area.

Thc circumstances surrounding theof hostilities would have little effect on resistance potential. The same is true of the use of tactical nuclear weapons against selected targets. However, ln case of large-scale nuclear warfare, the possibilities ofresistance would be negligible.


vents6 have made thc pattern ol dissidence and resistance in Poland far more complex than lhat In the other Easternsatellite nations. There arc anti-Com-muiusts who do not oppose Gomulka; within the Party there are Communists who da Thc population is basically an ti-Communist and anti-Russian, yetolerates Gomulkaother possibilities look even lessThc Roman Catholic Church Ls basically anti-Communist, but Cardinal WyszynsklGomuika's appeals for sobriety, hard work, and thc nationalist aspects of hisSUlinist elements within tlie Party are die-hard orthodox Communists, yet they use every means to tear Party control away from Gomulka. "Revisionists" within the Party swear fealty to Marxism, but they resist Gomuika's narrow definition of thc "Polish road ton short, Poland is aof dissident elements held together by strong nationalist sentiments, bitter memories of Soviet destruction of Hungarian freedom, the Roman Catholic religion, and the strong personalities ot Wladyslaw Gomulka and Cardinal Wyszynskl.


espite Gomuika's successes inmany sources ofumber of factors still operate to build popularThe most important of these ts Uie failure of thc regime to fulfill the hopes placed Inn6 Thc populationhole has been disappointed Uiat there has been no automatic Improvement In thcof living. Workers especially have been shaken by the cold realities of Uie post-October economic situaUon, and the more politically minded among them arethat workers' councils failed lo become real instruments uf worker control of industry.

Writers, journalists, Intellectuals, andhave been disillusioned to find thebounds of freedom of expression to be narrower tlian Uiey had hoped.

The Gomulka regime's policies themselves have created additional sources.of dissidence. The reduction of thc governmental and Party bureaucracies hasew source ofamong former bureaucrats who have been forced to make radical readjustments in their personal livesonsequence of the loss of their economic and social position. Encouragement of private handicraftas part of Uie program designed toconsumers' goods production and the encouragement of private shops in trade and services to supplement the existing socialist network have stimulated black marketing, profiteering, and speculation and corruption. This in turn has led to Uie growthlass of "newho have aroused the enmity of the authorities ondonsiderableof the population. In Uie formertcritories now under Polish control,suspicions toward and thc previous regime's discrimination against Uiepopulation haveonsiderable degree of resentment among the people who resided in these areas before World War II, as well as among Ihe remnants of Uie former German population

Given Uie basically anti-Communist and anti-Soviet attitude of the to be found In every element In Polish society Although Gomulka has considerable personal popularity, he has been unable to transfer this popularity to lhe Party hc heads and Uie system lie represents.


although appreciative ofUiey have made under Gomulka,to the regime's long-term objective of

reconstructing agriculture on socialist lines, and also to thc continuation of compulsory deliveries, no matter how low the delivery quotas. The Influence of the Church isstrong in the countryside and helps to deepen tho peasants' distrust of Communist policies and objectives. The revival of anti-Communist influences within the ranks of the United Peasant Party (ZSL) hasatter of major concern both to theof the ZSL and that of the Polish United Workers' (Communist) Party (PZPR).

Industrial workers haveeries of strikes and threats to strike which haveeature of Polish life ever since Gomulka's return to power.none of these labor conflicts has had the political Implications of the pre-Gomulka outbreak in Poznan, they do represent an open expression of dissatisfaction with the regime's wage policy. The outbreaks against civil authority which have becomeof Polish life since Gomulka's return, seem to draw considerable strength from the ranks of young unskilled or semiskilledThese people Andangle with the police affords them an opportunity to express their amorphous protests against the regime In general as wellhance to express their contempt for the police. Special groups of workers who have suffered loss of employment or loss of status as the result of Gomulkaarc particularly agitated.

Among intellectuals, dissidence arises out of the regime's efforts to gradually but firmly reduce the limited freedom of expression which,hort time, had been permitted to contribute materially to6 changes in Polish politics. Thc increasing strictness of controls over the press has heightenedamong the writers and journalists who played an important rale in the upheaval6 and their aftermath and whose strong opposition to the USSR and the Soviet system of pre-Gomulka days was matched only by the Hungarian intellectuals. But while the latter have been suppressed, the Polish intellectuals coniinue, within increasingly narrow confines, to militate against the imposition oflimits on the freedom of expression.

Closely associated with this group are the students who broke from the Communist fold ln6 and are especially resentful of any attempt to force them back into it. The inability of the Gomulka regime toiable successor to the Polish Youth Union, which folded up under the impact of the events oftrikingon the regime's failure to command the confidence of Polish youth. Likewise, the riots in Warsaw at the beginning ofhich startedtudent protest against the suppression of the Influentialpaper Po Prostu, mdicatedThow tenuous are the ties of loyalty which bind the students to the regime.

In addition to the Gomulka faction, there are elements ih the Party which aspire to an even greater degree of Independence from thc Soviet Union than Gomulka has achieved and others whicheturn to sterner and more far-reaching Party control over all phases of Polish life. The first groupthe "revisionists"for the most part arewhile the latter groupthefor the most part are old-line Party workers of long experience. Thehave no real organizational base but find their strengthommunion of ideas with the larger group of Intellectuals,and students. Then thc other hand, have no popular support, but find strength in the cohesion whicrcxprlngs from long-term service in and familiarity with the Party organization.ime after theof Gomulka they had the added material advantage (but popular disadvantage) of open Soviet support.

Roman Catholicolitical organization, is entitled toas the only organizedresistance group in thc country:and basic objectives are opposedespoused by the Party and it haspopular support and aorganization. It is true thatVivendi of DecemberI95Ca long period of outright politicaland intimidation directed by thethe Church. The Church has Inwith thc Party the aim of defending

i? nnnr-T

national sovereignty and Poland's claim to former German territories now under (ts control. Nonetheless, Church-Statehave continued to be marked by conflicts of interest, though for the most part these have been kept within negotiable limits and have been threshed outoint Church-government commission which meets

he army generallythc discontent pattern ofesser scale. The army'sand loyalty to Uie regime considerablythose of thc populace at large, andno evidence of any focus ofOn thc other hand, there is lnarmed forces, as in any group ofsignificant potential for resistance.conditions, this potential cannotIn the first place, the militaryare loyal to the regime; secondly, theenthusiasm for Gomuika'sfrom the Kremlin has not entirelyFurther, the military rank andbetter housed, clothed, and fed thancounterparts and are kept busyactivity. Polish troops wouldobeyivil revolt againstregime could not be expected tomuch support from the army If suchremained localized If Sovietwith Gomulka in quelling any typehostilities, Uie army wouldflght In an effective unified mannerside of the Gomulka regime. On thcwere the Gomulka regime tomilitary forces on any issue, thewould side with the regimeSoviets as an effective unified army.


high level of dissidence ingave rise to the Poznan riots ofand led to Gomuika's return to powerhas been considerably reduced byefforts to eliminate some of thcsources of dissatisfaction, and byto make common cause within appeals to Polish nationalIn contrast to the pre-Gomulkathe dissidence of Uie Polish population

focused on thc Communist regime, thesymbols of Soviet oppression, and Uie hated secret police, there are no comparable focal points today. However, -the poorconditions will probably persist in the foreseeable future andource of deep-seated dissatlsfacUon which may give rise to acts of resistance. Unless Uie regime uses increasingly forceful measures ofUie intensity of dissidence is not now sufficiently high toavorable setting for resistance activity.

thc absenceroad popularfor resistance activity In Poland, it Isthat the most effective.organizedoperating Uierc today'takes adifferent form than Uiat foundin Eastern Europe. The RomanChurch expresses Its resistance forpart at Uie conference table of Uiecommission. Itstarget is the regime, from which Itto obtain more concessionsperformance on concessionsIn these negotiations Uieconsistently played an aggressivethe government has been defendingWithin Uie Party, Uie mostorganized resistance has beenUiehoopposed the Gomulkatarget is Gomulka and theirto obtain control of Uie Party In orderto Stalinist policies once the Party are opposed toto repressive measures characteristicStalinist era. ConsequenUy, Uieythe Stalinists in Uie Party butoppose all evidence of Stalinismsee in the Gomulka program.


death of Stalinie falland the reorganization of thcsystem4 signaled thethc4 to Octoberbecame most marked amongin general and Party intellectualsThc regime's rigidity inand Uie continued suppression ofbecame the specific targets of open

on(iii nm.

criticism. Moreover, the Parly's "centralconsisting of moref the most active political workers In the Partyshowed signs of dissidence. Growing relaxation in Polish life served to Increase rather than diminish dissidence amongand Party apparatchiks Theofh Party Congress of the CPSU further tatenslfled dissidence within the Party,ecrease ot police terrorthc open manifestation of popular opposition to regime policies ln the Poznan uprisings ofhe extent ofby elements upon which the regime was supposedly based paralyzed lis power ofand prepared the ground for thechanges within the regime which took place In

lus first year In power,in reducing both the basis forintensity of dissidence ln Poland.liminating terror as anof public policy and substantiallythe size and authority ofeducing the size of theand Partywarfare against the Churcha modus Vivendi withthe decollcctivization of agriculture;from political life thoselike Marshal Rokosaovsky who wereglaring symbols of Sovielreducing lhe Influence of thoseleaders most subservientestoring to publicpersons who sufferedchieving Sovietof Polish sovereigntyegreeof Polishthe bankruptcy of the0 and starting toerrors


the existence of small,groups is acknowledged by thcfrom time to time, there have beensignificant anti-Communist resistance groups operating in

Poland since Uie death of Stalin.umber of cases such groups appear to be organized by people associated with Worldon-Communist and anti-CommunistorganlzaUons. They are small and uncoordinated. While they have an anti-Communist orientation, their objectivesbe precisely defined. Their activitiesto consist largely of Uie printing andof anti-regime propaganda or Uie conducting of campaigns of intimidationagainst specific local PartyMany of these organisations appear lo be on Uie borderline between organized and unorganized resistance and many areno more than just criminal gangs.

ithin the Parly itself theufficient degree of cohesiveness and community of purpose to be viewed as on organized resistance group In Uie sense that it Is opposed to Uie Gomulka program. The revisionist "faction" has no organization, nor any clearly defined program, but it acts within the Partyressure group forbberaltxaUon. currently opposing curtail ment of liberties already conceded or granted The basic conflict within Uie Party is notthese two extremes but rather between Uie Stalinists who favor subservience to the USSR and thc rest of Uie Party which favoii, Polish sovereignly. Among Uie elements favoring nutlonal sovereignty. Uie revlslonisls are those least concerned wiUF Its realistic limits, while the elements surroundingare most anxious not to exceed them Gomulku's efforts to take this conflict out of Uie limelightwhere It has been since the Central Committee's Seventh Plenumfirst by appeals to Party unily and more recently, by threats of expulsion, hav so far failed

iihin the ranks of Uie regimc-allKd United Peasant Putty (ZSL) thereiniiia-conflict between those who support the PZP" and those who wish the ZSL to pursue an W' dependent course responsive to peasant wishes. II is noi clear whether-the dissident* have enough organizatianat strengthtllule an organized resistance group. Th* scanty evidence available indicates Uiat tb')'

conirol the local organization in ities; but their activity appears to be the lines of unorganized resistance ich operates lo lower the efficiency of the In cooperating with the PZPR


There have been some manifestations of dissidence since Gomulka assumed power. Their significance hi terms of resistancevaries considerably. Tn most cases, it would be difficult to ascribe these disorders as Indicators of polilical resistance. Forthe widespread existence in Poland of alcoholism,ribery, stealing in Industrial plants, and olher forms ofIs for the most part not politicallyand It is questionable whether they can be regarded as indicators of dissidence even though they might unintentionally spark new disturbances. Even the riots following the suspension of the newspaper Po Prostu In earlyhough politicallywere not an impressive showing ofdissidence:f0 Warsaw students participated the first two nights, leaving thc field to thc police and rowdies the following nights.

The relaxation of restrictions on travel to the West has given Poles some opportunity to engage hi unorganized resistance byand transmitting intelligence material or by defecting to the West. Defection, with subsequent cooperation with foreignorganizations, has been the mostform of unorganized resistance utilized. Polish officials have seized the opportunity to defect while abroad on official business; Polish seamen and fishermen, air force members, and members of civilian flying clubs have utilized the opportunities open to them to defect; other Poles continue to leave Poland illegally by crossing inlo East Germany and thenceWest Berlin; and. finally, slightly over one percent of Polish tourists who visited Western Europe7 failed to return home.

General relaxation after years of police repression has served to increase greatlyof localized, unorganized, and gener-

ally non-political attacks upon civilAt the same time the markedmainly political ln nature, on the Polish scene has decreased the Intensity of dissidence and has deprived It of clear cut focuses with nationwide applicability. The surprisingof realism recently shown by the Poles in judging their country's precarious position has served to blunt the stimulus for


groups have played noIn guiding or assisting resistanceIn Poland. Although some emigreencourage defection and resistance,no evidence by which their efficacy canEven prior to the reinstatementthere was no known contactPolish emigre elements in the Westresistance groups in now, Poles in Poland reportedlythe majority of emigres are out ofthem and neither know nor representsentiment of the Polish people.-'the Poznan uprising probably havethis conviction. Evenin Poland are believed to give litUeto thc Ideauture governmentof present Polish emigre leaders.


the pre-Gomulka period theregime in Poland relied mainly uponof repression and terror to preventSince thc advent of Gomulka, thehas sought to inhibit resistance byor reducing some of the morecauses of dissidence and byLnay as to avoidpolitical resistance. In handlinglhc regime has usedlias been necessary to maintainwithout employing measuresinflame the population. Thealthough reduced in size andand deprived of Its resort to terror,to inhibit the development ofactivities. It is estimated atthc ordinary police, thc militarized


forces, and the military security police, as well0 internal security agents. These forces are considered to be quite efficient.


he regime has shown that lt is capable of maintaining its authority in the face of civil disturbances uncomplicated by politicalor in the face of disturbances in which political considerations are relatively minor. It could probablyevolt if it were localized and could be dealt with decisivelyew days. Moreover, with the two Soviet line divisions In Poland and many more posed along the frontiers, Soviet intervention may be expected if the regime seemed to be unable to copearge-scale uprising. This very fact, of which most Poles are aware, would actowerful deterrent so that only in extraordinary circumstances, such asnow be foreseen, would large-scale(throughout Poland) be expected.


eneral reaUgnment of securitystarted shortly after thc period marked by Stalin's death, Deriya's execution, and the disclosures of Jozeformer Deputy Director off the defunctof Public Securityincereturn to power, thc regime has made concessions to popular feelings throughchanges in organization, personnel, and nomenclature within the security apparalus. The MBP was dissolved in6 its successor, the Committee for Public Securityas also dissolved and its duties of protecting the state from espionage and terrorist activities wereto the Ministry of Internal Affairsepartments of the former secret police (UB) which had been responsible for foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, and internal activities, were probably transferred lo thc MSW. Other UB departments wereand many former UB employees were transferred to training programs designed lo equip them for work in olher fields. Local units of the People's Militia were given re-

sponsibility for the few remaining functions of the secret police.

overhauling of thc securitythe events ofncreased the possibility for theof dissidence. Nevertheless, the arrestof Poles serving as agents forand American inteUigencethe reformed security apparatus Isefficient ln Its efforts to ferret outindividuals and groups seekingadvantage of thc new situation toresistance activities. There Isrnoany change in popular attitudesesult of the reduction In sizeof that arm of the regime.


long as thc regime continuespolicies, the power position ofremains essentially unchanged, andfrontier problem unsettled,of significant activein Poland is unlikely. Tntalinist-type of repression,is more likely to express itself inindifference than ln organizedthe regime's currentengage in open warfare with theor with its intra-Partyit likely Uiat the resistance ofwill be conductedevel thatmassive retaliation by Uieunder existing circumstances, itlhat there will be any expansiontypes of organized resistance acUvityIt also seems unlikely Uiatbe any significant increase in the levelactivity byhc Church and Party faction*

-v. operating within

imposed limits.

lie potential for unorganized resistance, active or passive, is considerably greater than it was prior to the substantial reduction in tbc forces of the security police and thc curtail' incut of Ihcir authority. On thc other hand, the incentives to engage in such resistance have been greatly reduced as the result of


reforms and by growing apolilism among all elements of tlie population.resistance ls not likely to take on now forms. Thus, if thc regime remains unable to improve economic conditions, an increase In the level of Intensity of unorganizedin the form of strikes, poor worktheft and corruption, and political non-conformism or apathy might be expected. If thereurther tightening of control measures, resistance activities would probably be Impeded, but dissidence would rise. It should be noted, however, that currentand the unorganized resistanceit represents have circumscribedfreedom of action in organizing Poland to serve Communist ends. The danger to the regime inherent in popular dissidence has prevented Gomulka from effectivelycertain unorganized or informallyresistance activities, such as strikes, demonstrations, passing of intelligenceto the West, and overt but discreet anti-Communist propaganda In Uie press and by Uie Church.

he effect of an Increase in East-Weston resistance would depend on thcof the tensions and the regime's response to them. If the tensions led to thc regime's acceptance, real or apparent,iminution of Polish independencereater degree of Soviet domination, il is likely that resistance activities would Increase, particularly ifwith an increase of repressive measureseturn to prc-Gomulka policies. If,Uie tensions were ofature Uiat Poland's national existence would appear to depend upon loyalty to the regime, resistance activities wouldeneral Increase in tensions would probably lead to increasedon the part of the security forces, and. this, even without thc imposition of repressive measures against thc populationhole, would probably resultecline in active unorganizedarked decrease In tensions, on the oUier hand, achieved by mutual East-West accommodation, would probably give thc regime greater opportunity .to Introduce more flexibility in its policies and .afford greater opportunities for Individualactive resistance to thc regime. At

the same time,ubstantial decrease In ten -slons were accompanied by Increasing trade opportunities and greater ease In obtaining foreign credits, lt could enable Uie regime to offer the population some material benefits to sustain their hopesetter future. All these factors would serve to reduce dissidence and resistance.


The anti-regime resistance potential In Poland in time of war would depend upon Uie nature of the,war. Polish involvementar on the side of the Soviet Union against Uie West would be unpopular and would raise Uie level of dissidence, especially If the Soviet Union commenced hostilities and if Polishwere not directly involved ln thcHowever, if hostilities were not begun by thc Soviet Union or if Uie war seemed lo threaten Poland's Independence, sovereignty, or territorial integrity, Uie level of dissidence would in all likelihood decrease, if not cease altogether. The inclusionarge number of German troops ln Invading forces would help the regime ln that it could reduceand rally support by equating Uieforces with Hitler's armies.

At the inception of hostilities between Dice and non-Bloc states, the regime would intensify Ita security controls, butwould probably still_be able loacts of sabotagehe USSR were suffering reverses. Polish guerrillas would tie down sonic Bloc troops, destroy supply dumps, disrupt lines of communications, andindusUial and agricultural output.would also be made to assist Uie enemy in evasion and escape activities, and to collect intelligence which would be useful to non-Bloc planners. Without outsideguidance, and material support,they would constituteelatively minor nuisance to Uie regime.

Chances for organized anti-regimewould appear to be particularly favorable if military developments indicated thc immi ncnt collapse ol Soviet power and thewere offered for real PolishUnder those circumstances, organized resistance might consist of Independent, local-

ized attcmpU to dislodge local Communist authorities. Efforts of this type would most likely be made first ln Tillages and country towns where the authority of the Party is weakest, and ln former German territories where Western forces might be looked upon as liberators by the indigenous population. Whether such resistance activities would lead to the appearanceenuine liberation movement or whether they would merelyin the total breakdown of law and order would depend upon the circumstances at the time. Organised, centrally directedinvolving military action along the lines of World War II's Armia Kra^owa (AK) ls hardly conceivable unless it were precededomplete breakdown of Polish authorityoviet occupation. Although theentrally directed resistancewould seem to be possible only under special circumstances, the tradition of the AK would probably continue to be strong ln Polish minds. However, various forms ofactive or passive resistance would appear to be more likely than organised resistance. Given factorsigh level ofa considerable amount of assistance to the West might be expected In thc production and distribution of anli-rcgimc propaganda, the harassment of some especially obnoxious local regime officials, help In evasion and escape operations and.esser degree. In intelligence collection.

he Poles are sufficiently sophisticated militarily and politically to accept the use of nuclear weapons In future warfare as anreality. If Poland were Involveduclear attack, the peoples first reaction would be determined self-preservation. If use were made of major nuclear weapons, themass destruction and dislocation would virtually eliminate any effective forms of resistance activity. On the other hand,uclear attack were so designed as tothe major resources of military and political control strengths, such an attack would probably be accepted as an unavoidable cost of liberation, would not necessarilythe will to resist, and could present anti-Communist Poles with an opportunity to take over control of Uie country.'

Occupation policies of Western forces would notrucial factor affectingpotential and capabUlUes-'so long as these policies were pronounced andto respect and aid ln theof Polish aspirations for freedom,independence, and the end of Soviet domination. Such enlightened occupation would Intensify Uie Polish desire to be helpful and stimulate resistance activities In areas of Uie country still under Communist control.

Fear of Germany has traditionally played an Important role In determining theof the Polish people. The.Poles thus would be extremely apprehensive over Uie use of German forces In Polish territory, as well as over postwar territorial adjustmentsis Germany, and this factor mightig-nificant negative effect on the anti-Sovieteffort. However, this effect cannot be usefully measured at this time since It would depend on such presenUy unknown factors as the nature and degree of the GermanUie announced war alms of Uie Western powers with respect to territorial settlements, and Uie over-all mlUtary situation.thc nationality of attacking Free World forces would probably not influence Uie willingness of resistance groups to act. nor would the responsibility for initiation ofgreatly affect resistance potential.

"The representative of the Asslstaht Chief ol StafT. Intelligence, Army, would substitute the following:

-The Poles are sutnclentiy sophisticatedand pobticatty so that they accept the use of nuclear weapons In future warfare as ar. inevitable reality. If Poland were Involveduclear attack, the people's first reaction would be determined selt-prescrvaUon. As coordinated groups were developed, they probably would take all possible steps to strengthen their native eovernuienl and to eliminate any Stalinist or authoritarian remnants. CondiUoncd by their bitter experience in4 Warsaw uprising and thc immediate postwar resistance period, however, the Poles probably would not attemp1 to Initiate independent anll-Sovlet militaiyuntil their forces had received substantia' commitments (In terms of materiel "andas well as political support) from Uie West The extent ot their assistance In theseprobably would be dependent on the amount of damage auflered In thc nuclear strike-


FACTORS OF DISSIDENCEasic cause underlying popularIn Rumania is the failure of the regime to Improve the people's economic well being. Soviet economic exploitation In the postwar period, nationalization of Industries, Uieof private trade, economic regimen-taUon, and inefficiency of the state economic enterprises have reduced large sectionsow level of subsistence. TheIncluding workmen In supposedlytowns, give every appearance ofpoverty and gloom.arge part of Uie peasantry Is dressed In rags. Theascribes the shortages, particularly of food and fuel which before and even during World War II were In abundance, lo exports required to meet obligations imposed by Uie Soviet Union and to poor planning by Uie government. Knowledge that food and fuel shortagesountry rich in oil, forests, and agriculture are due to government policy has further increased the people's resentment of both the regime and Uie Soviet Union.

2 The basic poliUcal factors in the anti-regime feelings of lhe Rumanians stem from their historical enmity toward Russia and Communism, their non-Slavic, traditionally Weslern orientation, and their disapprovalovernmental policy which seems counter lo Rumanian aims of national Independence,integrity, and continuance of Western-oriented culture. Rumanians have notthat thc USSR, after World War II, rc-annexed Northern Rukovina and Uessarabia. drove out the King, and delegated poweruppet regime under absolute Soviet control. Regarding their countryirtual Soviet colony, Rumanians have almost certainly Identified Communism with their traditional fear of Russia. Moreover, Individual liberties 'lave been completely suppressed; Uie tradl-Uonal family patterns have been destroyed;

and village life, around which most socialoliUcal activiUes evolved ln the past, has now been placed under Uie control of localfunctionaries whose chief task Is not to serve Uie villagers but to carry out Uieprogram and policies "Of Uie regime. However, despite Uie strong anTi-Communlst feeling of the vast majority of Uie Rumanian people, Uiey do not possess an activetradition and are generally apathetic in the face of adversity.

he Rumanians have alwaysevout people, considering religious Institutions asajor role In their lives. Theneeds of Uie people were satisfiedarge number of churches and monasteries. The various religious organizations functioned primarily for the benefit of their followers rather than of any special poliUcal or racial groupings, and their secular activities were generally Incidental to the fulfillment of Uielr spiritual aims. Therefore, the transformationy Uie Communist regime oforganizations into instruments offor its programreat blow to Uie population Subsequent measures, such as thc complete destruction of Uie Unlule Church, and the reduction to virtualof Uie Roman Catholic Church bynearly all its leading clergy, had aeffect on the people.

rior lo Uie advent of theumanian education andwere oriented wholly toward the West.redominantly Romance language and considering themselves modernof Latin civilizaUon. lhelooked to Uie Weslern countries,to France, forultural, and social guidance; the French language, along with Rumanian, was until the end of World War II compulsory In Uie Rumanian schools-French schools, operated either directly by the

French Government or by private andInstitutions from France, were regarded as the best in the country. However,8 the Rumanian Government had closed all French and other Western-operated schools and had taken stringent measures to ellm-late Western culture from the country,Soviet influences in their place. Through various measures the regime has transformed educational institutions intocenters, designed to eliminate Western cultural patterns and to suppress freedom of thought and expressions.


easants. Of all the groups in Rumania, the peasants, who compose over two-thirds of thc country's population, constitute thcresistance potential. They have opposed the regime's agricultural policies, not only by widespread passive resistance, but on many occasions by hostile action as well. The bulk of the peasantry cannot reconcile Its ownwith those of the regime and continues stubbornly to oppose the tatter's agricultural policy. The traditional attachment of thc peasant to the land, his deep-seated ambition toandowner andight which he regards as inalienable, hisover disruption of his simple way of life, and his traditional refusal to become organ-bed are in opposition to the entirepolicy of the Communists. The peasant has been difficult to discipline, and he has often openly protested against policiesto regiment him. The various non-collectlvlzed rural groups, arc suffering most at the hand of the regime. The collectivized peasants, who have been drawnight controlled network, would run great risks ln active resistance, they can. however, resist passively with relatively little danger ofby thc bureaucratic maze of collective administration

6 Industrial Workers. In spite of thepast policy of favoring industry over agriculture, thc Industrial worker has not benefited much. In many ways his situation Is inferior Io lhat of the peasant who can al least evade deliveries to some extent and who

ocal food and fuel supply. Theworker surfersepressed standard of living, poor housing, food shortages,ear of possible unemployment. He Is forced to work hard for low wages, often underconditions. Most workers are probably aware of the fact that the products of their labor are often destined for shipment to the Soviet Union. Consequently even those who Initially supported the Communist regime have become disillusioned. Workeris manifested in reluctance to Join the Parly. The Communists ln theory derive their chief support from the working class, but the Rumanian Worker's Party has had little success in improving its "socialby recruiting factory labor. Thediscontent is to be found among the work-ers of thc state railroad system; at one time these were the staunchest supporters of the Communists, furnishing thc Party with such top leaders as Gheorghiu-Dej and Gheorgheho were among thc instigatorsloody railroad strike

outh. Rumanian youth, particularly0 students of higher schools, are among thc most outspoken opponents of the regime Family tradition and the individualisticof youth have encouraged opposition to Uie regimentation enforced bygroup control. Several imporlatilucharest Yoytii Festival,6 Polish uprising and the" Hungarianhave stirred young people to express open disconlcnl, particularly thc ethnicTheir demonstrations againstin general and Marxist-Ienlnlstin particular brought comment cvrn fromumber have defected from groups traveling abroad even though their political reliability had beenhecked by the Ministry of InternalTlie Party and its youth organization (Union of Working Youth) arc seriously concerned over the continued interest of studentshings Western, and there is much UlUdJ* of youth In both agriculture and industry fw absenteeism, thievery, immorality,and failure lo work toward the aims of regime and the Communist ideology-

Military. Soviet authorities have become increasingly careful, In the past several years, to refrain from flaunting their military forces and advisors in Rumania. Although some Rumanian soldiers may resent their presence and authority. It is probable that professional military personnel are not averse to accepting the modern weapons and equipment being supplied by thc Soviets, even though they hardly believe the Communist-nourished legend of the historical bond betweenand Rumanians. Although Air Force personnel arc presumably more carefully screened for political reliability than are Army personnel, dissident elementsstill persist. Most military deserters have been Air Force officers, and these havegeneral discontent in their service branch. There seems to be little dissidence in the Army's permanent cadre, which Includes0 well-indoctrinatedSomewhat more dissatisfactionexists among noncommissioned officers and those enlisted men who are held over for an extra year of service. The two conscript classes of0 men each, largelyfrom the rural areas, arc on the whole more disaffected than thc rest of the Army, although thc most obviously unreliablein each age class are not taken into thc Army.

Among the forces of thc Ministry ofAllaire, the state securily policethc most fanatical supporters of thePersonnel of other branches, such as lhe border guards, are for the most pari not ardent Communists and are not devoted to the regime. Mast of lhe members of these formations are conscripts and many of them, dcspilc screening, share the anti-Communist feelings of the general population. Morale among the border guards is low. In the police force, attitudes ranging from tolerancewn anti-Communists to positive acts of disloyalty have been responsibleurges. Nevertheless, while on lhe whole Jbe loyalty of Rumanian armed forces is guestionabie. there has been no evidence of Actual resistance xvithin the Rumanian Army Er the militarized security forces. Morale anil helpline are not high. Apart from political

resentment of Soviet control, Rumanians are not militaristically Inclined and theydislike the service as such.

Minorities. Ethnically Rumania is the most heterogeneous of the countries in the Satellite area, with minorities comprisingercent of the population. Groups ofGermans, Jews, and others, who for the most part form sizeable islands within Rumania, look to other countries for political and cultural inspiration, thusotential fifth column, luats desire tothese minorities, the regime hasto their discontent by attempting to wipe out their distinctive cultures and by using minority bistitutlons and languages asfor the propagation of Communism. These minorities have probably become stronger ln their ethnic group loyaltyesult of such inroads and of theattitudes manifested by their parent nationalities in West Germany, Hungary, and Israel.

Intellectuals. Rumanian intellectuals, particularly men of letters, have been restive under tlie Communist ideological yoke, bul thc Party has successfully stifled any open expression of opposition. The only major demonstration of open resistance to Partyin6 when latentfinally eruptederies of writers" and ParlyimmediatelyThe intellectuals realize thai they have litlle future unless they support the Conr lo do SO Thepportunity for advancement and creative freedom hasumber of engineers, professional men. artists, and dancers toon their visits to countries outside lhc


ligc and material benefits, havethemselves to the regime and have achieved leading positions, but for the most part they secretly harbor intense disaflection.

arge extent, members of theadministration, factory officials,and engineers, who comprise the upper middle Class, stillestern outlook. They arc opposed to Communism bullo work for the governmeni in order lo

exist. They pay lip service to the Party, even though they wouldenewal of contacts with the Western world. As in the past, they have been able to adapt themselves to political upheavals and Internal changes. In view of the small size of the Party when It came to power ln Rumania, the Communists have had to employ many non-Communlst opportunists in positions of importance. Despite their high rank, officials holding technical positions in the state administration and economichave little voice in policy and, for the present at least, are in no position to change the course of events In the country.

Religious Groups. The various religious organizations In Rumania do not at present engage in resistance but have been forced to cooperate with thc regime in order to survive. Because of Rumania's history of foreignmany of the churches long ago adopted an attitude of accommodation to the civil authority in order to ensure theof their activities. Religious faith in the country, however, ls more vital than in the past. Churches of al! denominations are heavily attended, and religious enthusiasm is markedly greater than before World War II,orm of protest againsi the regime. People of all ages attend services, including even young men in miliiary

Rumanian Workers'heWorkers' (Communist) Party probablyelatively small percentage of convinced Communists among Its members. Only those working as professionals in thcmall number of workers in Special categories arc sincerely attached to the Party and to the regime. Despite Uie purge ofembersO

uauuiuaie mcmoersj sun contains aof opportunists who arein personal profit and advancementmere subsistence. Nevertheless, theot opportunists in its midst:

present time. The expulsions of the past

years have even served in some measureunity. There are no signs, ofdeviation ism among the top leadersextent of factional maneuvering inis not serious. Party chiefhas maintained his positionthrough the period ofand since the purge of top leadersVasile Luca, ando one of sufficient stature orto endanger his position. Athe intellectual faction of7 in no way affected the status


Of all the disaffected groups and classes in Rumania the peasantry ls the mostThe Hungarian minority isas dangerous to the regime, as are the students and intellectuals. Other groupsubversive potential are the industrial workers, lower governmental officials and thc "classhat Is. private tradesmen, former members of the professions, largeand Industrialists. Together these comprise someercent of Rumania's total population6 million. Tlie regime has been able to limit their ability to resist, but it has failed to win their cooperation, and their passive resistance has been effective inachievement of the domesticof the government. The Rumaniansative facility for passive resistance They have not been misled by thc intense propaganda of the regime, and have shown themselves particularly adept at bribery, graft, and black marketing in accommodating themselves to conditions created by the'Ihc intensive hatred of the Soviel and q( the native Communist regime is S'.ich that under certain circumstances.. breakdown Of internal security. Open strife within the lop leadership, or general revolts and disorders in the otheror actual resistance activity could be created, provided the risk did not appear too grca'.

Thc vast majority of thc Rumanian Fc pie -tend to hold both the Russians and tiic native regime responsible lor their present plight. Thc most intense hatred is directed

aaonn 9

Uie former, since Soviet Influence ind control of every facet of life arc more ximplete and immediate than anythingbefore. The presence of Soviet armed lorces in tlic country has served as anIrritant.


In the past several years, there hasoticeable decrease ln the number ofguerrilla actions ln Rumania, owing duefly to attrition, to thc Increased efficiency of the security forces, and to the disinclination of the country's rulers after Stalin's death to relax the stringent Stalinist controls. There are no known resistance groups In Rumania .today, but partisan activity throughout the jraole chain of the Carpathian Mountainsto be reported. Some of the groupsto as resistance elements are probably nothing more than roving bandit groups,of escaped criminals and lawlessof the population. There are persistent reports, sometimes admitted by thc regime, that security police and militia have beenagainst "terroriit bands" throughout Ihe mountainous regions of Rumania. Other reports bidicate that In some instancesunlii In tlie area have been called upon for assistance. Nevertheless, there Is evidence lhat partisan activity has been virtuallyout during the past two years

There has, however, been no noticeable decrease of unorganized and passive resistance. Expressed in thc form ol economic sabotage.

ona me*

strikes, local disturbances, passive against grain deliveries andiat the government provide im-Mug conditions To some extent, the tial unrest of satellite neighbors has the Rumanian intelligentsia but the same degree as in Poland or even rinuny.

c is evidence that Stalin's denigra-cndcrerl widespread confusion lu the links of tlic Rumanian Parly.the Politburo. But First Secretary Ghe-ghlu-Dcj and his cane followers have from to Ume intimidated Individual Party Mionarics. thus cheeking any effective re-Sauce to thc leadership.

he failure of thc Hungarian revolttoepressing influence on Urge segments of tbe Rumanlan^peoplc. Theseems to have been created Uiat Uieregime is there to stay andale similar to Uiat of Uie Hungarians would befall Rumanians if Uicy revolted. Thchope for liberation seems to be at Uie lowest ebb. It is not, however, completely extinguished, as continued passive resistance demonstrates. Students continue passivethrough such means as displaying Intense Interest In Uiings Western andWestern to Eastern or even native writers. Students and Intellectuals devoted considerable attention to Uie theories ofCommunist leader Mao Tse-tung, but probably no longer regard himentor In the questreater measure of


AcUvc resistance since Stalin's death has been confinedew isolated cases ofdemonstrations for higher wages andliving conditions and to studentui several universities during therevolt. The general pattern of these manifestations was uniform: Inspired by news from Hungary, students demanded economic improvements and abolition or reduction of compulsory courses in Russian and Marxism-Leninism. When more basic anti-regime feci -ings were revealed in meetings betweenand university Party officials, troops and police were summoned and some youUts were arrested and subsequently tried. Isolatedof tension among workers at this time were also evident There appears to have been unrest among railroad workers in Bucharest, who reportedlyesolution offor the Hungarian workers.

In recent yeais Irss and less has been heard of guerrilla activities even in the most inaccessible areas of the country, although eleinenut of thc former National Peasant Party and Iron Guard may still exist.activities are now largely limited to disorganized, small-scale, virtually futile acts of sabotage and oUicr minor activities bydriver, lo desperation. As in tlx

such open resistance activity could only take place in thc Carpathian and Transylvan-ian ranges, which furnish the protection of rough terrain and which border on the areas inhabited by German and Hungarianlargely peasants, who have ln the past aided guerrilla bands. In the postwar period isolated guerrilla bands have been active chiefly ln thc Brasov-Zarnestl section, the Fagaras range, Uie Dorbruja wasteland along Uie Black Sea coast and thc nearby Danube Delta swamps, Uie Bristlta-Nasaud section, and Uie Bihor Mountains.

the Held of passive resistance,well suited to Uie Rumanian character,continue to take advantage ofTheir lack of disciplineintensified; Uiey have shown theirby abenteeism. sloppiness andEfforts by thc regime tothese conditions are oftenbribery of willing officials (anpastime) and by padding theof hours worked. Thus Ingrainedinefficiency ls compounded byor pretended ignorance.offenders cannot all be jailed; Uieypunished only by loss of salary onof nonfulfillment of norms.there are indications Uiat Westernmedia such as VOA, BBC andand West German radio stationsto be popular and to exertIn keeping alive Uie hope forliberation. Thc people arc reportedrelied on Western InformaUon onIn Poland and Hungary andUS statements, sometimesto discuss the contents ofbroadcasts.


Uie Communist regime camethere have been three principalwhich have claimed to representof the Rumanian people and toand assistance to organized andresistance within the country.results of these groups especiallythe past several years have been negligible

or non-exLstcnt. Factional strife within Uie groups has completely vitiated themallying point for any kind'of resistanceinside Uie country.

Rumanian NaUonalhas Uie official blessing of formerIs reduced to Uie role ofwith other cmigr6 groups, andaning symbol ofotential channel for WesternThe League of Free Rumanians,group of Uie Rumanianmaintains offices- in many ofcountries and also liaison withgroups. The other major politicalinterested In promoting Internalls the militant Legionnaire, orgroup. Itong history ofand clandestine activity withinand stands compromised ln Uie eyesRumanians at home for Its fascist,and anti-Semitic position.


The regime's measures to frustrate any attempts by resistance groups to threaten ils stability have been helpedumber ofwhich are typical of Uie Rumanian scene: lack of traditional revolutionary spirit; lack of potential leadership which could organize effective opposition; general popular fear of police terror; habits and attitudes ingrained under foreign domination for centuries; and reliance on foreign powers for liberation Moreover, the people realize Uiat the regime has at Its disposal strong police and security forces and the support of Soviet troops and Uiat tt will not hesitate to take prompt and effective measures against Party andindividuals who show Uie slightest sign of deviation or rebellion.

Following the Hungarian revolution, the Rumanian regimeluctuatingicy of appeasement and enforced controls However, since the shake-up of thehierarchy Int has beco^ apparent that the regime's agitation and propaganda agencies have Increased thf'r manipulation of group and individual

and aspirations in order to keepc

firmly under control. The objective ol the regime appears to be to organize workers, peasants, intellectuals and students intodisciplined groups and tothe public to believe not only that the regime will endure but that the Westernregard it as established and respectable.

regime has passed new lawscertain crimes, considered minor in(auch as hooliganism,icense, short weight,Inumshable withrather than fines. New laborbeen set up, and It is believed inthat individuals are being sentencedcamps for one to three years.reports indicate that ln theare sometimes arrested andsecurity organs rather than by theand courts; many have been tried,and transported to prison withindays On the olher hand,been made to alleviate such basicgrievances as starvation wages,agricultural quotas and Industrialhave Included raising ofmodifying delivery quotas.bonuses and old age pensions.of the Rumanian people is atesult of police arrests, higherand persistent alarmist rumors.


Rumanian security apparatusMinistry of Internal Affairs has anstrength, made up of thecomponents: State Security Policeand; and Militiahis apparatus is believedto maintain the present regime init will almost certainly continue toof coping with any small scaleactivity. However, it probablybe able to deal with an uprising suchin Hungary without theSoviet troops. The presence of twodivisions, which could be reinforcedorder, and thc memory of theof the Hungarian revolt will be

major factors enabling the Communist regime to maintain its hold on the country. With the exception of those higher officers who are good Communists, and have survived Uie purges. Uie reliability of thc Rumanian Armyen) in case of uprisings ls questionable.


Under present circumstances no level of resistance potential in Rumania has Uieof developing into successful organized resistance. The regime and the Soviet forces in Uiat country are capable of taking the severest counlcrmeasures against any attempt to establish organized resistance.umber of Internal and externalcould Increase Uie level of Uie current unorganized resistance and dissidence.the continuing economicand the acceleration of agriculturalcould increase thc discontent of the workers and peasants. Also, any signs of friction wiUiln Uie top Party and government hierarchy or of relaxation of police controls would encourage certain segments of theto become more vocal against thePaternally, disturbances In the other orthodox satellites or political and economic successes ln Poland and Yugoslavia couldelling effect on some groups in Rumania, especially students and intellectuals.

From5 Summit conference to Uie Hungarian revolt, it was evident in Rumania that the lessening of East-West tensions had adversely affected anU-reglme resistance. Conversely, with Uie increase of these tensions after the Hungarian revolt, unrest Increased considerably. Including open demonstrations by students and by some workers andconfusion within Uie Party. There is also evidence Uiat many Rumaniun Party and government officials sympathized with the Hungarian revolutionaries and Uiat the revolt had produced deep confusion in the Party. While the purge of Chisinevschl and Constan-tinescu tn7 did not affect Uie basic stability of Uie regime, it did create someand confusion within the Party ranks. Additional ideological disputes in Ru-

mania and elsewhere In thc orbit could be expected lo increase confusion andwithin the Party and to encourage the resistance of the more vocal antl-reglmesuch as students, but In view of the general apathy of the Rumanian people In general, no build-up ot popular demands which might result in widespread revolt Is to be expected.

a further deterioration of thebad economicelaxation of security controls,spontaneous unrest. Since such acan hardly be expected.continue to be prevented from openlytheir dissidence. Thus theircan only take the form of active orclandestine opposition, ranging fromsabotage to listening to foreignassaults on individual policemen orto the voicing of popular grievancesminor strikes to slow-downs InAt best, such activities will retardof the regime's politicalprograms; at the least, theya nuisance value.


thc inception of war between Bloccountries (local or general) thewould Impose more stringentwhich would precludeactivities. If thc struggleintense that the Bloc nations had tosecurity lorces to other tasks, or ifforces were within thc country andtowinning, many Rumaniansin espionage, sabotage, andactivities against thcil would be almost impossibleelements to undertakeRumania's geographical locationthe USSR, in addition toperament of lhc peopleof spirit to resist and the fear offurther Ices of their limitedwould lend to restrict anyThe topography of thc couniry,would loud itself to guerrillasmall bands of partisans could retardof Bloc forces by sabotage of lines of

communications and industrial plants.widespread, effective military action could be undertaken only if'substantialof the armed forces defected and took to the mountains. In such an event, peasants could be expected not only to assist thc fighting forces but also to augment theirconsiderably. Outside support, especially in war materiel, would be needed by thegroups In order to continue active for any length of time. Nevertheless, small guerrilla bands could manage to operate over anperiod In sabotage and harassment.

Possibilities exist in ftumanla forassistance to Western military forces in both the military and political fields, were they to invade that country. Desertion to the West of large segments of the Rumanian armed forces would ln all probability occur, particularly If Western invading forces were Initially successful; the anti-Communistcould also be expected to engage in economic sabotage and other harassingResistance elements in Rumania could facilitate thc Infiltration of agents-by the West for intelligence collection and other Operational activities. Successful escape and evasion of Western personnel ln Rumania arv possible but would depend largely on thcand area of the war. The fortunes of war could affect the degree of resistance,most Rumanians could be expected tc resist Soviel

The Rumanians probably would make some distinction ln thc nationality of the Western forces. Their past political andties with France and Italy might make these countries more acceptable as allies, and. in turn, increase the Rumanians' will Ui resist The attitude of Yugoslavia. Turkey, and Greece wouldefinite effect on Huma niantentlal. If these countries jcincd in tlie conflict at its beginning, Uie Rumanian resistance groups would be encoui-aged toore active part. Anumber of military units could beto desert to Yugoslavia. Also,to Soviet forces in neighboring Bloc countries would encourage opposiUon to Uioscumania.


Although thc people of Rumania would Dot approve the use of nuclear weapons on targets ln Rumania, Western employment of nuclear weapons in that country couldery significant psychological eflect on thc people and could influence their attitudesthe attacking forces. Attacks on urban areas resulting in heavy civilian casualties would prejudice most Rumanians against the West. Such adverse reactions might beif nuclear attacks were limited to areas Important to the Soviet war effort and were accompaniedoordinated political ^war-

fare campaign. If nuclear attacks wereon military targets isolatedpopulated areas, the wilf to resistincreased since such attacks couldlessen the control strengths of theThc Rumaniansong historyforeign domination. Therefore, itcertain that they will continue tovirtually any type of occupation.occupation policies woulddecrease their will to resist but would,whole, have little effect on their low


lthough dissatisfaction with variousof thc Soviet system Is widespread, the gulf between such dissidence andexcept among certain nationalis greater In the USSR than in any other Bloc state. Such dissidence as exists In the USSR does not necessarily indicate opposiUon to Communist Ideology or the Soviei system. It isanifestation of discontent over Uie neglect or denial by Uie regime of popular needs or desires. Since Uie death of Stalin, dissidence ln Uie Soviet Union appears to have decreased, except in some of Uie recenUyareas. There has been grumbling and criticism, particularly followingh CPSU Congress lnut, on lhe whole, most of this criticism Ls notnor does it seem to envisage Uie overthrow of Uie Soviet state. On the contrary, there has unquestionably developed during Uie past fouridespread identification with Uie Soviet national state and many of Its Institutional features and Uie people have come to identify Uie Soviet state with the Marxist'Leninist ideology which has shaped its character. Moreover, thc successes of the USSR during and after World War II, and particularly the security reforms, economic Improvements andachievementsavea pride In the Soviet state and have almost certainly strengthened Uie loyalty of the population toward the regime, againthe recently acquired WesternGenerally. Soviet citizens appear to feel Uiat their lot has improved and is going to improve further Therefore many of them, especially the hard-core followers of Uiegospel, are probably quite willing to accept privations in thc name of SovietSuch are thc premises for anof dissidence in the USSR. They do not

rule out Uie existenceesistance potential but they obviously put itevel thatconsiderably from lhat of Uie other Sino-Soviet Bloc countries.


he people of the USSR have had to endure extraordinary hardships for many their standards of living and Uie relaxation of political terror3 have served to decrease Uie intensity ofand considerably whittled down, if not eliminated for Uie time being, actualpotential. Thus, while Uie improvement of living standards has lagged far behind the over-all rates of economic growth, there isthat Uie Kremlin now favors suchmainly in order to increase tabor productivity, to remove the stigma of poverty from Communism, and to generate moresupport by Soviet citizens. Heavymilitary requirements, and technological developments will continue to have priority but, barring unforeseen complications, thc present regimes economic reforms andproduction will at least give thcthe reassurance Uiat something is being done for them. Many probably feci already that they are better off now than they have been for years. Discontent arising fromcauses Is likely to diminish as consumer welfare improves over thc next several years, although this effect will be partially offset if expectations which have been aroused bypromises are disappointed and ifwith Western standards grows.the spectacular successes of Soviethave almost certainly strengthened the allegiance of the people to the regime and are probably attributed by many to Uie Soviclitself. Therefore It should not necessarily be assumed that closer contacts with thc West would inevitably generate more dissatisfaction


the Soviet rank and file, which may have come lo believe that Uie eventual supremacy of the USSR ia certain and Uiat ultimately Uie Russian people will be better oft than Uie peoples in Uie free world.

There remain, however, some causes ofUiat may continue to create dlfficul-Ues for the regime. One is Uie agricultural collectivization policy. Russian peasantsoverwhelmingly opposed to it, especially so the peasants in the newly acquired Western territories who have lived under Soviet rule onlyealizing this, Uie Kremlin has introduced reform measures that may pacify many peasants and at Uie same time raise their output With the older generation dying out, Uie younger agricultural workers will probably not have asesistance potential, at least as long as Uie USSRgenerally successful in stabilizing and furthering Its economic and poliUcal position. Another problem is thought control. The party, more powerful than ever, continues to control virtually every facet of human thought. Adherence or at least lip service to Uie Party-sanctioned theories, laws, methods, and esthetic positions Is required eventually of all The loosening of intelljctualduring Uie past few years hasertain amount of pressure, but Uie Party has made it quite dear, after Uie "thaw" set in, Uiat lt will not tolerate deviations.are no longer liquidated, however, they are "persuaded" to return to Uie rightful path. While most of them return totheir public repentances appearand they probably nourish theirin secret perhaps more intensely than before.

The most disgruntled elements arc almost certainly Uie naUonal minorities. The rein-troduction of the policy of russification which began in Uie thirties has created ill willthe Russians, especially since some of the minorities were incorporated into orby the USSR against their wishes.some of thc more blatant forms of russification have been abandoned by the post-Stalin regime, the basic policy has been retained. Russification now involves Ihc spread of Uie Russian language and culture

throughout Uie Soviet Union, praise ol the Russian people as Uie leading nationality Ln Uie USSR, and the impositiop of Russian administrators and officials La key posts throughout minority areas. Anti-Semitism, though not as rampant as in Uie years just before Stalin's death, is still widespread and the regime not only does little to combat lt but by its attacks on Zionism actuallyIt.ore detailed discussion of Uie more Important minority areas, see thc appendixes on Uie Baltic, Ukraine and


Forced Labor and Exiles. There may still be as manyorcedboth political and criminalin prison camps and annumber of exiles who unquestionablyroup that harbors Uie strongest resistance potential. Although Uie number of poliUcal prisoners has been reduced and prison conditions amelioratedie forced laborers still live under very harsh*and the exiles are denied many rights and opportunlUes accorded ordinary Soviet citizens. Resistance potential isin these elements, as reflected Ln the Vorkuta and other labor camp strikes which, incidentally, were organized and led by the poliUcal prisoners. It is also possible Uiat large numbers of the many millions of labor camp inmates who have been dischargedtrong hatredovernment Uiatthem and might swell the ranks of potential resistors.

Peasants. Dissidence among peasants has traditionally been strong and has focussed upon collectivization and the low livingIdentifled with it. These livinghave risen substantiallyf successive increases in the prices paid for compulsory state deliveries, but theyremain below what thc peasant thinks he could obtainree market Inbureaucratic rigidities ancf frequentto eliminate their private plots and personal livestock offend the peasants* sense of individuality and tend to alienate them

Irom tlic regime. Nevertheless, they have been relatively free from police terror inyears, and wlille many peasants resent the anti-rellgious policy of the government, they probably care little about Ideological preachings and thought control.

Intellectuals. The intelligentsia, instands high in Soviet society hi terms of Income and prestige, and many of them,among the bureaucratsested Interest in the regime. Most scientists, moreover, seem to enjoy both official support and relative freedom ofIn their fields. The limited relaxation of controls following Stalin's denigrationintellectuals in many less favored fields to protest against party controls, though usually by implication only. These protests revealed that virtually all prominent writers, artists, composers, and scholars wouldmore freedom of expression. Although the post-Stalin regime has somewhat relaxed the extremely stringent Stalinist conformlsm, it has basically maintained its doctrines, and merely enforces them with greater flexibility and leniency. Strictures on creativeremain tight enough to cause widespread dissidence among the more sensitiveHowever, the dissidence of Soviclb not necessarily one of hostility against lhe Soviet system but is often directed against the methods and interpretations of thc Communist gospel by the Soviet leaders.

Students. Youth There has been evidence ofsirioncc, and therey young people againsi thc discipline and the drabness oflife. These demonstrations were all the more striking ns youth has for years beenamong lhc firmest supporters of the regime.t appeared lhalesult ofigher Intellectual level achieved by improved Soviet education, of tlieof relaxation following the deathh CPSU Congress, and therevolution youth hasritical eye on the disparity between Communist theory and practice. But in spite of the fact that students at least are now bettor equipped to think ro: themselves and that the regime t l( nit ncy in deal

ing with young deviationlsts. it would beto consider Soviet youth agroup. Youths remain Sovieteven though their understandingmay be superficial and theirto it perfunctory. The fact remainsas yet know little outside tlie USSRtheir thinking Is done through astate-defined Ideological premises. Ittherefore, that their dissidencea serious threat to the regime'sit is much more likely to be directedgradual reform of the regime than

minorities,f thc Soviet population offor many years provided centers ofto Soviet Communism. Thoughof dissidence has varied sharplygroups, no other groups insidehave fought so grimly againstodds. In the firstartisans ini Lithuania battledtroops The process of russlflcationwas carried out withby Moscow; entire minorities werefrom home areas and, in thcor less destroyed as groups.of the resistance was broken, andthe death ofolicy ofwas instituted As wil+be seen inthc minorities which hadof thc Tsarist empire and thusof thc USSR have calmedarc not. at this time, believed tothreat to the Moscow regime.Western territories which wereor after World War II. whilestill rank high in potential

tuorkers' grievances stemfrom low pay, strict discipline, andarbitrariness. Among the workers,and unskilled ones, receiving

ion estimate as ol January I,. fromB Annua! Climates. Political and Demographic Com posiUon of thc Sino-Soviotrepared by the Air Research Division. Library of Congress.


lower pay and fewer privileges than the highly skulled, are probably the moreelement. However, their livinghas recently Improved and there Is now less emphasis on the harsh labor discipline that washief factor of dissidence among workers during Stalin's rule.thc resistance potential of this social group cannot be presumed to be high and. with further economic Improvements as well as over-all successes of the regime, maydecrease.

rmed Forces. There Is no evidence of serious dissidence in the Soviet armed forces. The permanent cadre of officers and non com missioned officers (constitutingf total strength) Is composed ofreliable men who have beenindoctrinated; most of the officers are Communist Party members. There ia some dissatisfaction among the conscripts, much of which stems from the normal soldier'scauses of discontentlow pay, strict discipline, limited opportunities for socialetc. Further, the attitude of thereflects the various causes ofamong the populace at large, but no anti-regime activiUes have developed. Theof party control following the removal of Marshal Zhukov has undoubtedly Irritated some elements of the military but not enough to produce serious dissidence. Whether harsh military discipline and Uie wide cleavagethe status of the officers and enlisted men. and again between the Junior and senior officers, actually contributes to dissidenceagainst the regime is may be true Uiat soldiers do not like compulsory indoctrination, it Is also true Uiat at least some of it will sink Into theirand that they regard suchns an inevitable duty to their nation, of whose achievements they arc proud, on the whole, it can be assumed that there Is little if any resistance potential to be found in the Soviet armed forces.


issidence exists on nearly every level of Soviet society, extending from simple grumbl-

ing to Uie rejection of Uie regime and ItsIt Is believed, however, Uiat the latter extreme occurs most often among-people who have suffered at the hands of the regime byimprisonment, or persecuUon, or those whose close relatives and friends have suffered. The overwhelming majority of Uie people,ln the Russian component of Ihe USSR, arc complaining mainly about personal discomforts, which some, however, may well attribute to the faults of Uie system. Even before thc Malenkov-Khrushchev InnovaUons and reforms contributedeneral decline of dissidence. Uie regime had alreadysuch pervasive authority that Uiewere forced to devote their energies towith existing conditions rather thansteps to achieve an alternate solution. Although active resistance ceasedts still widespread. On Uie other hand, much of what appears to be passive resistance may be in large part nothing moreemonstration of time-honoredindifference or apathy.

issidence in many areas of Uie USSR isactor of real significance, and the gulf between dissidence and resistance Is far wider than elsewhere in the Sino-Soviet Bloc In the first place, the Soviet population hasCommunist rule for four decades and has, by and large, become accustomed to it. In thc second place, this rule ls exercised byot by forclgncii, and the grievances of Soviet peoples, particularly the Russians, are not reinforced by Uie emotional power of Injured nationalism.risis would change this attitude and create oresistance potential, wouldon the type and duration of the crisisar, the vast majority of thc Sovielcould be expected to set aside theirand defend their homeland. If,esultrisis, improvement of thc living standard should decline, it is possible that, at least among some groups, minor types of dissidence could grow into more serious ones In any event. opposiUon to the presentor Its methods docs notesiie on lhe part of Uie people to reject allconcepts on which thc Soviet state is built



Since thc death of Stalin and lhc demise ofore relaxed political climateumber of measures taken to alleviate the most serious causes of dissidenceecrease In dissidence,In the prewar territories of the USSR but perhaps even, to some degree, ln theannexed territories. Among thesewere efforts to raise the living standards, the easllng of arbitrary police stateradual decrease of the labor campsomewhat more freedom of expression combinedess fear-laden atmosphere, and, thoughery limited way, Increased contact with countries outside the Bloc.h CPSU Congress constituted the climax of these developments and made all previous relaxation moves by the Kremlin leaders

However, some of the new methods proved to be counter-productive Inasmuch as tliey stimulated questioning by Soviet citizens, who began to express their doubts about theof the Soviet system and its tactics. The events In Poland and Hungary causedinterest and questioning,among the Intelligentsia. These events among othersertainby the regime, of which the theoretical bases were announced in the middleao's "hundred flowers" doctrine, too, led to retrenchment In China, which must have been added evidence that, whatever the nature of their questioning and doubts, expression of dissent und dissidence would meet withcounteraction.

Whether dissidence in the USSR willor decrease In the future Is hard to predict. Continued improvements In living standards and further gains in Soviet prestige through technological or diplomatic successes will tend to diminish It, particularly among the majority which Is largely unconcerned wllh Ideological issues or abstractof freedom. Students and intellectuals, whose ranks arc growing,reatersince many of their questionings arc more fundamental. Tlie regime, while ready tofrom its more liberal policies when dis-

sidence finds mounting expression,desires to refrain from tolal repressionarea lest it stifle the "positive"it is seeking to encourage. Thus anhas appeared for dissidence tolong as it remains quiescent and doeslikely, in the regime's view, to assumeforms. If the current stabilizationshould succeed, dissidence may peterIn the new Western territories. Ifsecurity apparatus of the Sovieteasily keep such dissidence fromInto


Active and organized resistance was aproblem during and Just after World War IL Thereafter, severe Stalinist repression prevented any active resistance of significance-Stalin's death gave new impetus to resistance as demonstrated by large-scale unrest in some Siberian prison camps. Again, some activeerupted inuch as riots in Tbilisi, strike and work stoppages in Moscow's Kaganovlch Ball-Bearing Plant, anddemonstrations in Vilnyus and Kaunas in Lithuania. These outbreaks wereand not necessarily organized resistance groups arcto exist in the USSR, with the possible exception of such religious sects as theWitnesses, the Monashi, and others. The Witnesses have been most active in the western Ukraine and In Moldavia. The sect was accused of taking orders from its parent organization in Brooklyn, of preaching that the United Statesemocratic country, of encouraging pacifism among draft-age youth, and having advised its members during thc Hungarlon revolution to light against thegovernment. Thc group apparently was able to surviveight-knit organization for several years because of the tolalof its members bul lis continuedas an organization ls questionable.

Whatever resistance still exists in thc USSR is almost certainly unorganized and passive. Much evidence of unorganizedto specific policies or ideological tenets has come to light during the past two years. It often has taken the form of public


criticism of policies or concepts, mostly as criticism of less basic matters; attempts by writers, artists, and scholars to break through official controls; insubordination towarddiscipline, from refusal to attendlectures to hooliganism and crime; and nationalistic grumbling by minorities.resistance is most likely to occur in intellectual and student circles and has as Its object the greater liberalization of theregime toward Individual freedom

resistance is hard tobecause it depends on the motivationperson whoarticularof what might be consideredconsists of individual criminalas looting, robbing, and murder.or beating up of policecollectors, and administrative officialsbe unorganized resistance but Itbe an act of vengeance of anreponsearticular situation andpertinent to the question ofReports of acts of violence inUnion should be regardedbeing considered Indicative ofresistance. Since the death ofthe population of thc labor campstremendously reduced and variousbeginning with that of Aprila large number of habitualindividuals of this sort turn toreleased can be explained In tooways for their actions lo beof resistance potential.


emigres seem to havenegligible role ln directing or evenrecent resistance activity within theUnion. The regime seems to havein Isolating potential leaders offrom foreign contacts. Most Sovietseem to have little knowledge ofEven If the Soviet public wereinformed concerning omlgrfs. it islhat the latter could gain substantialinside the Sovicl Union. The feelingthat emigres hove lost touchreality and no longer understand the

real problems facing the Soviet citizenry. Many, in addition, would resent what they consider the emigres Qlght to luxurious living while their compatriots at homo languished in poverty. Some minorities, particularly the Baltic peoples, may have more sympathy for their emigres than the Russians do.


regime seeks to inhibit dissidencevast propaganda campaign designed tothe Communist Party and theand to discredit all Westernthe eyes of the populace. The-regimean ubiquitous secret policeunder the control of the CommitteeSecurity (KGB) of the Council ofof the USSR, for the purpose ofcomplete surveillance over theand ferreting out any individualsexhibiting actual ortendencies. An estimatedmilitarized security forces (most ofand Interior Troops) are kept lnreadiness to quell summarily anyuprisings. Punitive measures,mass deportation and forced labor inareas of the USSR, serve both toresistance elements and toresistance activity. Suchbeen applied wltli special force inStates, the western Ukraine, andThc effectiveness of" theactions Is reflected In thecf thc regime. While lhein the Soviet Union appears to bea less stringent application ofthan during the Stalin era. thereindication that the securityhas lost none of Its effectiveness


regime has shown Its ability tolocal and sporadic disturbances,evoltational minoritymilitary units In the nrcaj whichconsist of cross sections of manywould hardly be vulnerable,the Hungarian and Polish forces, to any


appeal. In caseimultaneous or rapidly spreading revolt tn several heavily populated areas, the Soviet regime, due to its formidable security apparatus, would appear to beetter position to defend itself than any other government In the world,lt were dangerously weakened. While even then it cannot be predicted that theSoviet control system would collapse, it Is possible that the effectiveness of theapparatus would be greatly weakened.


The Soviet security apparatus hassome modification since the death of Stalinhat year the Ministry of State Security (MGB) was absorbed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and4 the Committee of State Security (KGB) of the Council of Ministers was formed,without some functions formerly held by the MGB. Thc MVD which Inherited some of the regulatory apparatus from the MGB, including the militia (civil police) and the security troops, lost some of its functions, and control over local operations of some of its remaining functions was decentralized. While the ostensible purpose of thesewas to restore "socialist legality" to the police system and to Increase theof local governments for law and order, Moscow isosition to assert its direct control over all security and law enforcement agencies.

Modifications in thc apparatus have been primarily undertaken with two aims In view: First, to deny In any given individual in thc Soviet hierarchy total control over the organs of the secret police and to circumscribe to some degree their power in society. Theconcern has been primarily one ofSoviet citizens to relaxhole and to eliminate those secret police functions that seemedheir coercive aspects for the efficient operation of Soviet society. There has been no indicationreater hesitation in undertaking investigation of significant causes of subversion and treason. The sizehe security police apparatus was reduced agniflcantly after Stalin's death, but in the

summer7 these forces were increased. Available Information docs not Indicate whether tho reductionseriod exceeded the Increase of Uie summer


Present capabilities for organizedare virtually nonexistent. Evenliberalized security controls are probably more than adequate to stamp out anyorganized attempt to resistresistance, chicfly_passive. Is likely to diminish as the USSK becomes militarily and economically stronger. With Uie exception of some naUonal minorities, thc maximum Uiat can be expected from thc overwhelmingof the Soviet people, and particularly Uie Russians, is dissidenceype Uiat is not necessarily directed against Uie system as such. On the other hand,onolithic state, opposiUonmrt of the system can be regarded as tantamount to opposition to Uie systemhole; thc Soviet leaders almost certainly so consider It..'A steady improvement in Uie living standard would almost certainly reduce an Important source of dissidence, but nil that of Intellectuals and students, foreterioration in living conditions would add to other sources of dissidence and raise resistance potential in time of crisis.

The relationlevelhange in the degree of East-West tensions is difficult to predict Ma)orin InternaUonal relations willaffect Uie level of dissidence. but whether it will increase or decrease depends on lhc specifics of any given case. Tensions attributable to Soviet foreign policy may well raise thc level of dissidence while tensionsfrom moves generally considered lo be Western provocation may lower the level ofeduction in tension maylhe amount of dissidence or at leas', deepen the apuUiy of national minority groups, but on the oUier hand it ls likely to stimulate further dissidence fromand artists nnd In other of the elite levels of Soviet society by turning their attention from external dangers lo internal problems.

doubts In the regime andmight have been aroused by thecampaign and the ensuingcontroversy, the loyalty of thethe Soviet state was not shaken.some of the doubts now existing mayas the regime continues Itsdrive. In any case,ore objective approach tocould not be expected resistance potential to thelt would endanger the Soviet state.whileapproach to these problems,to keep thc arguments within aframework and to restrictand nature of the changes sought.however, will not hesitate to revertoppressive measures to keep thcin linet appears necessary.

kinds of external support,stimulating active, violent, andto the Communist regime,certainly be counter-productive into nearly all dissident elements InUnion. However, support designedmore modest alms, such as continuedwould be welcomed byand groups. The acceptabilityof external support depend onsuch as the kind of support,source of support, the safety of thethe nature of "resistance" askedkind of reward involved, etc.of encouragement designedpeaceful evolution of the system asfor radio broadcasts, may also beto some elements of the population,taken by olher, more militant dissidentsby the West


nil-Communist or anti-regime resistance in the USSR in wartime would depend largely on the length, severity, and location of the war and on the course of Its military operations Thc mere initiation of lios Unties would not ipso facto increase the resistance potential, lt is almost certain that the regime's appeal lo Soviet patriotism would not fall on deaf

ears and that most of Uie Soviet peoples, with the exception of some national .minorities, would work and fight for Uie defense of thelr homeland. Moreover, security control would undoubtedly be stepped up and dissidents would find it more difficult to organize and more dangerous to state their views than in peacetime.

Uie war were prolonged and thcmajor reverses, resistanceprobably Increase. In view of Sovietduring World War II andfact Uiat since then Uie USSR hasstronger and has acquired muchIt cannot be assumed thaifrom great hardships, tensions,controls would In Itself catalyzeInto resistance. Only if warsufficient toreakdown ofwould organized resistanceof this contingency, even if Uieweakened, anil-regime resistancebe regarded as treason and enoughcontrols would remain to renderor resistance very difficult

resistance would becomelikely il the tide of Uie war turnedagainst the USSR and foreignthc USSR Until that point,elements would be afraid tothc severe penalties imposedwith Uie Germans afterII. Particularly In minority Ureasborder, extensive anti-Soviet activityexpected as anti-Sovlcl forcesnatives inspired with thc vision ofwould take to Uie woods and formbands, as they did during and afterII, rinding supply lines, performingsabotage, providing Intelligence andIn escape and evasion operations. in olher parts of the USSR wouldlo offer assistance ifbe established with them. Forlabor camps and colonies,they do concentrations of anti-Sovietmight be able to create disturbanceshinterland Many exiled Germans,Crimean Tatars, and BaitsAsia, the Altai territory, andwould he willing inlelligence collec-


However, it would be difficult toactive resistance in areas still under Soviet control. Even if hard pressed on military fronts, the Soviet leaders would make aand probably successful, effort to rnalntain control in the luhicrland to prevent resistance elements from becoming activetheir lines.

n the event of an Impending collapse of the Soviet government. anti-Soviet elements of the population, together with forced labor camp inmates and forced exiles, could attain significant resistance capabilities, particularly with external support. But apart from these elements, resistance among the broad masses of the Great Russian people would be difficult to organize. Patriotism, Indoctrinatedfor Soviet authority, and apathywould render them passive andto active opposiUon. Therefore, even if the security apparatus were seriouslylittle resistance activity could befrom the mass of the Great Russian population beyond local harassing operations and defections. Similarly, the most common reactionoreign occupation of Sovietprobably would be passivity and Memories of thc last war arc sUll fresh and the people have not forgotten thcof the German occupation, as well as the subsequent Soviet revenge for Since Soviet propaganda would try to equate Uie activities of the invaders with those of Uie Oermans In Uie last war. occupation policies would be crucial in determining Uie attitude of the masses.

imited amount ot Information onweapons effects has been released to the Soviet publicul the campaign appears to have minimized the effects of atomic warfare. This effort has beenby propaganda, probably lo arouse patriotism,uclear war purelyeasure in defense of the homeland and reassuring the people of Soviet victory lnonflict Although popular reaction lo atomic attack is extremely difficultamiliarization program may

have Uie eflect of leaving the populace sofor Uie actual destruction andUiat survivors would beUiat patriotic fervor might be

A nuclear attack on any scale is unlikely immediately to either Increase or decreaseactivities among Uie survivors to any appreciable extent. However,hort period of Ume the extreme hardships brought about bymall nuclear attack would tend to create actions of desperate elements which, whether intended or noi, would base Uie effect of resistance. At the same Ume inevitable disruption of the control structure resulting from such an attack would reduce thc regime's capability to deal withimited nuclear attack were planned and executed so as to reduce Soviet administrative, political and military control but to mmimize general population casualties in national minority areas, such as theEstonian and Lithuanian SSR's. the Georgian SSR, andesser extent the Ukraine. It Is probable that resistancein these areas would become greatlyparticularly If they received external support.

Such resistance potential as does exist would probably not be aflected by Uie question of which side started the war. It can be taken for granted that the Soviet government would do all It could to shift tho blame to the free world in general and Uie United Slates InIt may be assumed Uiat potential registers as well as many dissidents would anticipate such propaganda and not pay too much attention to It. Tlic populationhole, even if impressed with Sovietal the beginning of tlic war, would In the long run be influenced by Uie trend of Uie war ralher than by thc question as to who attacked whom first. Also, the nationality of thc attacking lorces would probably haveeffccl on long-range popular altitudes,lhat popular opposition to lhe invaders would almost certainly be much stronger againsi Germans than otheries





All thc factors which engender dissidence In the USSR are present in the Balticcollectivized agriculture, low standards of living, pronounced Income Inequalities, slate control of thought and expression, and fresh memories and continuing fear of police terror. These alienating factors aremany fold, however, by the nationaland historic experience ofesistance potential is probably nowhere higher in thc Soviet Union than In Estonia. Latvia, and Lithuania.

The most important single factor in Baltic opposition to Soviet rule is the experience of national Independence between the world wars. The bitter memory of forced Soviet annexation is intensified by thc brutality of Soviet rule, which brought the exile orof hundreds of thousands of natives, by the radical depression of living standards, and by thc imposition of the rule andof the traditionally hated and feared Russians. Thus, anti-Soviet and anti-Russian sentiments pervade all Baltic social strata and groups. Outright Communistcompriseinute fraction of the native population. Many native Communist Party leaders lived in the USSR when thestates were independent and returned only upon Soviet annexation of their nativeBaits in general look on them as

The near unanimity of anti-Soviet feelings among native Baits isertain degree offset

'Althoughtrict ethnic sense the terras "BalUc" and "Bait" should be applied only to Latvians and Lithuanians, Estonians being of Finnish slock, the term Is used In this paper to apply to all Ihree. for convenience and on geographic grounds.

by the greater political reliability of ethnic Russians brought into the area since World War LT. The estimated proportion of the non-indigenous population of Russians in thsrepublics rangesigh ofercent ln Latviaow ofercent in Lithuania. Since the position of Russians in theseis dependent entirely on Soviet rule, theytrong vested Interest inthe present regime.

Despite thc Intensity of anti-Soviet feeling among most Baits, Soviet security measures at present prevent any resistance greater than individual or small-group passive resistance and an occasional mass demonstration.adical alteration of the present situation, such asharp relaxation of security controls,reakdown of thc SovietItself would seem to make possibleresistancearge scale.

The de-Slaiinization campaign and the partial liberalization of lhe Soviet system since Stalin's death (both of which were more limited in the Baltic republics than in most other areas of the USSR) brought some hope to Baits, expressed mainly in the form of rumors during thc spring6 that the Soviet leadership might restore the Balticto autonomous, although satellite, status. The events In Poland and Hungary in the autumnCew nationalist demonstrations In Lithuania and open anti-Soviet talk elsewhere. The regime easily curtailed such public manifestations of nationalism, however.


23 indicated theof small groups of organizedin Lithuania. However, as InLatvia, the few remaining groups were be-


successfully penetrated by MVDIt is doubtful If any impenetrated group existed.esult, there are no known organized resistance groups in the Baltic area at this time. While there is reason to believe Uiat some former resistance group members may still live in Uie forests of southeastern Lithuania, there ls no recent evidence to indicate Uiat an organization as such exists. Acts of sabotage Uiat occasional -ly occurred up3 appear to have been the work of isolated persons.

T:ir Immediate objecUves of anygroups ln thc Baltic states probably would be personal and organizationalecondary objective would be harassment of Soviet lorces and collaborators. Theirobjective presumably would beational state ln which they couldormal life. There ls no knownanti-Communist infiltration of Uie armed forces, bureaucracy, or war Industry. Nonviolent resistance in the Bailie republics, such as occurred during Uie Hungarian revolt, when there was what appeared to be aexpression of nationalism, wasnot the work of organized resistance groups-

Thc extent and nature of unorganizedIs unknown but believed to bein over-all slgnflcance. Studentstootential for unorganized resistance. In all three republics studentIn the universities has been expressed67 In demonstrations and In the distribution of leaflets. Party leaders have been criticized lor neglecting student ideological education,

Dissidence and passive resistance alsoto exist, but there Is not sufficientto evaluate their extent andNewspapers in Uie Baltic statesnon production in factories andand there is thc usual amount of self-criticism in the papers. While these Items indicate that the Soviet regime is not satisfied with conditions in tlie Baltic republics,art of the acts can be attributed toresistance. Passive resistance in Uie formlow-down ol production cannot be in-

creased perceptibly without wcurrlng danger of deportation or other acts of reprisal and control.

is widespread, but difficultand to evaluate except when thcof external events changesaction. During the Hungarian revoltwidespread unorganized resistancein the overturningtalindemonstrations demanding withdrawalArmy troops, ln staging of parades, andUie national anthems, mostLithuania, but reportedly in Estoniaalso. Prom theseto be widespread. Theis still alive In thc Baltic states,Is litUe opportunity to express itExpression of dissident feelingsmore successful in Lithuania than inand Latvia. Moreover, Soviettransfers have reduced Uie numberEstonians to aboutercent ofand ethnic Latvians to aboutand Lithuanians toopulation transfereesto participate In resistance activities.


seem lo know comparativelythe activities of emigres, andresist Soviet domination do not seem toinspired by emigre acUvily.however, derive satisfaction sndIrom thc knowledge Uiatexist abroad, that many nationstlie United States) do notSoviet annexation of their countries,the Baltic stales still have formalrepresentation In exile.


regime brought Uie organizedof the Baltic states underthe use of militarized securityArmy Iroops. Suspect elements ofwere deported during Uieperiod and later replaced by othermainly Russian. Subsequentof resistance groups by securitywith lhe individual deportations,the Baltic slates of resistance leader-


organization, and activity.ol government organizations has proved effective In keeping potential resistance in check. Unorganized resistance hasimilar manner. Passivebas been Inhibited through threatened deportations, pardons to some deportees, and Improvement ln the standard ot living. Feelings of dissidence are widespread but cannot be evaluated accurately because the populations have little opportunity todissidence Into action Untileven mildly anti-Soviet statements were punished by arrest and long imprisonment. Even now, persons who show evidence ofnationalistic activity arc arrestedas were the leaders of thcn Lithuania. Both because of the strategic position of thc area and the known disaffection of thc native population, security measures in the Baltic have been even more stringent than elsewhere In the USSR.

methods are also employed byto reduce dissidence andconformity. Partyand Indoctrination arevirtually omnipresent. The regimerewards In terms of power andto Baits who collaborate withthe threat or exercise of repressionthe most Important means ofactive resistance in the Baltic republics.


individual Baltic republiccan suppress any localized revolttime. Soviet troops andforces stationed in the Balticare of ethnic origins other than thein which Uiey are stationed, andexpected to cooperate ln thc suppressionlocal revolt. II is therefore unlikelyHungarian-type uprising could take placeof Uie Baltic slatex. Thc majoritylive in rural areas while most ofand otlier non Halts live inin Estonia one cun find inkolkhoz some person* who arcRussians und non-Baits form atthe population of thc Baltic capitals.

both Estonia and Latvia revoltsdifficult because there ls nooreign country that mighthelp. Of all Uie Baltic countries,has Uie best conditions for stagingmass uprising of someaddition to bordering on Poland,olatile and CatholicUie Lithuaniansong historyand of fighting for theirthey see them. Besides, the geographyLithuania, particularly Uieand hills,efuge fromcan operate.


There are no known organized resistance groups In the Baltic states. local capabilities for resistance activities do not go beyondmainly passive, resistance orUie most favorable conditionsdemonstrations with nationalistMore violent types of demonstrations, such as holding up Soviet supply vehicles, were reported4 but not since. Such acts probably were Uie work of outlaw elements, most of whom could not beon at the present for specific action or for organized action Ln Uie future.

A marked Increase in East-West tensions furnishing hope of liberation would probably encourage more determined attempts atresistance.evelopment, however, would probably be accompanied by anof security measures and terror which might neutralize most practical effects of thc increased determination toecrease of East-West tensions would be likely toany sort of active resistance and tofatalistic acquiescence to Soviet rule. If accompaniediberalization of security precautions and thought control, it might, however, facilitate the spread andof nationalist sentiment.

While it is believed that there is noorganized resistance, either active or passive, it is conceivable that some very small isolated groups do exist, particularly inLithuania. But it would be extremely

difficult for them to expand. They have no contact with the West and have lost contact with friendly local populations through the deportation of Identifiable sympathizers. Their survival efforts constantly require theft and other unlawful acts which increase the partisans' vulnerability and constantlytheir isolation from any possible sources of help, supply, or recruits. At the present time, resistance in new forms IsImpossible because resistance groups or potential members must be supplied with funds and equipment and, most Important, an effective communications system with each other and the West. The lack: ofprevents the identification and location of real or potential resistance effective means of communication is established, resistance ln the Baltic states will probably further decrease.


hc outbreak of war between the Soviet Bloc and the West would undoubtedly Increase resistance potential in the Baltic states. Contrary to the passionate desire for peace in almost every other portion of the Soviet Union, many Baits hope for an East-West war since they see in it their only hope for liberation. It cannot be assumed, however, that in any future war Baltic resistance could be as widespread and effective as it was when Germany attacked the USSRt which time the Baltic states had been under Soviet rule lessear and tlie Soviet armies had toasty retreat.

The possibilities for active Balticln any future war would depend largely onighting front were located in or near the area. If the front were remote, anti-Soviet Baits might be able to form small partisan bands ln the forests to harass supply lines and perform acts of sabotage. Many Baits would be willing to assist evasion and escape operations, although the presence of non-Baits on collectivized farms wouldthe difficulties of such assistance. Given an opportunity, many Baits would probably be willing to perform measures, however, Wouldbe able to prevent large-scale xirganizatlon or military and political warfare of more than nuisance value.

If an active front approached the area, on the other hand, more widespread resistance could be expected, though not approaching the Baltic performancender anti-Soviet occupation, native Baits would beto participate in pro-Soviet partisan activity and most would lend their heartyto the liquidation of Russian partisans or pro-Soviet native elements in the area.

Baltic resistance potential ln wartime would be little affected by such matters as the nationality of the attacking forces or which side initiated hostilities. Even German rule would be considered preferable to Soviet (the Nazi occupation of the area havinglthough Baits might resist Soviet rule with somewhat greaterif the attacking forces were non-German.





Any evaluation of cUsafTection ln themust take Into account the differing peoples of this area. While there are elements of discontent common to all the indigenous peoples of the area which unite them against the regime, there are also factors which set the Georgians, Armenians, and Azcrbaidzhani peoples apart from each other. The Georgians and Armenians, for reasons of longernationhoodommon religioneel superior to theoslem people. At the same time, the Georgians, becauseonger and more unbroken period of independence than the Armenians, feel superior to the latter, whoatent distrust of their mountain neighbors.

The underlying basis for dissatisfaction and discontent in Georgia, Armenia, and Azer-batdzhan is to be found In an anti-Russian attitude on the part of the native populations. Such factors as non-Slavic lineage, distinct languages, acceptance of Christianity in the case of Georgia and Armenia antedatingacceptance by several centuries, andcultural and historical heritages have imparted to the Georgians and Armenians, particularly theense of national distinctiveness which makes them look upon the Russians as interlopers and late-comers. The assistance rendered to the Georgian and Armenian nations during critical periods in their histories by the Tsarist regime has not eliminated this feeling. In the case of the Azcrbaidzhani people, who prior to theRevolution had no real sense ofthe anti-Russian bias stems fromcolonization. This began in thecentury, and reached Its peak Ln thes with Russian exploitation of the oil

resources around Baku. The ensuingof the areaislocation ofa disruption of their traditionallife, and an incipient second-class

While difficult to document as to scope and Intensity, anU-Russlanism Is demonstrated by the limited amount of social contact between minorities and Russians. Certain areas of large Caucasian cities appear to be separated into Slavic and non-Slavic sections.does not appear to be too common and is frequently frownedoresource for disaffection is Sovietin practicematerial hardships, low living standards, the collective farm system, the antirellgious nature of the regime, thought control, and the stifling of nationalismail of which also engender discontent in other parts of the Soviet Union.

Apart from the Party and government elite, discontent would appear to extend to all strata of the population in varying degrees. The politically more mature Georgians have been most vocal in expressing dissidence in the post-Stalin period, followed by the Armenians and the Azcrbaidzhani in that order. Among the Georgians, students and intellectuals are the most noteworthy dissident elements. In Armenia, the most disaffected group appears to be the Armenians who returned to Soviet Armenia in the early post-World War nEstimates of tlie numbers who returned range0. Theirresults, mainly from very poor economic conditions and the fact that they are notaccepted by the local .population.

iscontent, though widespread, does not appear to be intense enough to translateinto resistance activity, particularly on


organized basis. Furthermore. Lhehistory ol dissidence In the Caucasusthat while there has been somett has been on an unorganized basis and without particular goals Inewof dissidenceesult of Uiepolicies of Uie regime Is not disccrnlble. The relaxation of stringent police controls has been welcomed. People express their doubts and criticisms of the regime more openly now. Such events as Uie dc-SUUlnlza-lion campaign, Uie Polish-Hungarian events, and Uie Soviet leadership ousters of7 have caused confusion and doubt about Uie present policies of Uie regime. There are. however, no signs of Increased dissidence or resistance. The population Is aware Uiat Uie regime is willing and able to eradicate any evidence of resistance.


A few small organized resistance groups are believed to exist in Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbatdzhan. There Is no availableon their strength, discipline, training, facilities, or equipment Furthermore, there is no means of communication with these alleged resistance groups. Such groups would almost certainly be nationalistic InThey would operate within Uieof their own national republics In most cases.

Unorganized active resistance to someby the people of thc Georgian and Azer-baidzhan SSR's has been reported. The most serious known disturbance occurred in Tbilisi in6 when student meetings to mark the anniversary of Stalin's death grew into nationalistic demonstrationsesult of the regime's refusal to permit honors to Stalin. The demonstrations were eventually put down by force. wiUi casualties estimated by various sources at from dozens. Apart from uus Incident, it Is often difficult to differentiate other reports of unorganized active resistance from criminal, speculative and blackmarket activities.real deal of dissatisfaction with Uie Moscow regime. Intellectualalso has been shown in many Caucasian literary publications which have been severely

criUclzed during lhc last year for nationalistic deviations. Certain examples ofone of criticism even stronger Uian Uiat which has been directed against the regime by Russian writers.


emigri groups have claimedwith resistance organizationsArmenia, and Azerbaidzhan,have not been substantiated inera. Thereontactinternal Georgian opposiUon elementOcorglan government-In-exile, butnot been maintained In recent years.external sources appear to haveany of the Internal resistanceWorld War II.


Uie past Uie Soviet government hasfrom the Caucasus entire ethnicwhich it believed to be disloyal.have been executed or givenlabor camps in Siberia or CcnUalthe Soviet UnioneryInternal security organization, within all walks of life and allThese measures have been veryin controlling active resistance. It lsthat any national minoritygroup of significant size could existcoming lo Uie attention of Ihc Sovietservice. It follows that any majoror riot must be essentially spontaneousbecause any organization largegood communications, to foment suchwould have been penetrated andbefore the event could takeUie death of SUdin, the techniqueof people has not beenit is possible thai the informantbeen relaxed somewhat, but either ofcould be revitalized at any moment


ven under present conditions ofrelaxed police controls, the Sovietsyatom is more than adequate to prevent


stamp out any organized resistance activity in the Caucasus. While Individual,resistance might be encouraged by the regime's relaxation oi the rigid police terror of the Stalin era. any Indication that such acts were becoming common or organized would be enough to bring about increased securityto prevent the formation of organized resistance. The factor most likely to affect resistance potential would appear toreakdown of the police and security control system. Short of this, orundamental change in the leadership of the Soviet Union, such events as an increase or decrease in East-West tensions or Ideological disputes within the "socialist camp" would have little effect on resistance activity. Any deterioration In the economic condition of the population would lead to increased discontent, but the regime could easily prevent any organizedto regime policies. Signs of external support in any form to resistance groups in the Caucasus would bring Uie sharpestand puniUve measures against such groups.


he opportunity for anU-regimeunder conditions of actual warfare would depend considerably on the type and location of war being fought. The outbreak ofwould bring extraordinary securityinto play on Uie part of Uie state. As long as Uie theater of operaUons remained outside thc Caucasus. Uie likelihood ofresistance operaUons would remain small because of Uie Increased securityWhile some resistance groups might become active, most likely ln Georgia, as soon as hostilities broke out. the vast majority of the Caucasian population would probably'.Vint.uul-ntttti;ejf If*

of battle turned conclusively against theregime, the potential for organizedon an expanded basis would increase accordingly. Otherwise, thc memory ofpunishment of World War II collaborators would militate against large-scale organized resistance movements.

The optimum conditions for organizedwould, of course, occur ifheater of war or if thcot central authority were imminent, If either should occur, resistance acUvittes would probably range from disobedience of Soviet laws to assistance to enemy forces inIntelligence information, harassment of Soviet security and armed forces, and help in escape and evasion operations. Independent military activity against Soviet forceswould be beyond Uie capacity of resistance groups, unless large-scale units defected along with equipment and material. Such miliiary action would depend on direct outsideMoreover, the troops of this area are ethnic non-Caucasians.

With the exception of Uie Germans who might encounter hostility because of their World War II policies, only Uie Turks might arouse Armenian antagonism; Uie Armenian massacres In thes and during Worldrc not yet forgotten. Tlic question of thc responsibility for Uie instigation ofwould have little effect on resistance activities. However, the occupation policies of the Invading forces wouldtrongon the local populaUons as far as their willingness to engage in resistance activities would be concerned. The Soviet postwar propaganda campaign depicting the horrors of German occupation in other parts of the country was designed in part lo overcome any latent sympathy in such areas as thefor future "liberating" forces.





Ukrainian nallonallsm continues to be an Important political problem with which the Soviet regime must reckon. The Ukrainians are the largest minority group in thc USSR The political, economic and strategicof the Ukraine Is second only to the RSFSR. Thc best evidence of Soviet concern over Ukrainian nationalism and Itsanti-Russian sentiment. Is found lnappeals to root out "bourgeois

The economic and political grievancesthroughout the Soviet Union are at the core of opposition In the Ukraine to Soviet rule. Soviet sponsorship of the liquidation of the rich peasant and of thc collective farm is probably resented more there than in some other parts of the Soviet Union since the Ukraineairly large proportion ofpeasants. Those various grievances, shared with other Soviet peoples, count far morc in explaining existing dissidence In the Ukraine than Soviet suppression of Ukrainian nationalist aspirations. Opposition to thethere is first anU-Communlst, and only second antl-Russtan.

Ukrainian reaction lo the mssification efforts of the Soviet regime remains, however, considerable. Ukrainians, whether Party members or not, remember with bitterness Stalin's purge of leading Ukrainianwho stood up for Ukrainian cultural autonomy ins and resent theof the calculated policy ofood portion of leading Parly andpositions In the Ukraine with Russians. Stalin's glorification of Russian heroes and the continued identification of Russianwith thc Soviet state hurt Ukrainian

pride. While religious attitudes may be of diminishing importance in the Ukraine as elsewhere In the USSR, thc liquidation of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church0 and of thc Unlate Church in IheTnewIy acquired western Ukraine after the warurther cause for resentment.


Ukrainian nationalist tensions,ontinuing nuisance for the Sovietdo not now represent any serious threat to the regime. The nationalistorganizations active in the yearsfollowing World War II are nowif not completely, quiescent Only In the eventisintegration of Soviet central controls might Ukrainian nationalism rise to the surface and serveocus for an anti-Soviet resistance movement.

Thc intensity of Ukrainian nationalistis difficult toreat many Ukrainians, probably the majority, are loyal members of Soviet society, particularly now that living standards are gradually rising and police controls have been slightly relaxed. Russification has probably gone further in the eastern Ukraine than In any other of the non-Russian lands and has been much morein industrial cities, which now contain large numbers of Great Russians, than in towns and villages. Russians and Ukrainians have mingled together there for hundreds of years and the educated members of society know both languages equally well.sentiments increase as one movesin the Ukraine away from the Russian lands. Opposition to Soviet rule is believed to be most intense in the territories absorbed during World War II along the Soviet Union's

western borders, where memories of Sovletiza-tion arc freshest Resentment of the Russians is not confined here to Ukrainians alone, but is shared by such other minority groups in the area as Poles, Czechs, Hungarians, and Rumanians.


rmed resistance to the Soviet regime after World Waras most intense in theseterritories, particularly ln the Carpathian mountains. Ukrainian nationalistactive in German-occupied Europethe war mounted guerrilla operations there against Soviet units, communications lines, and collective farms6he Soviet authorities had crushed these organizations by thes, but reports received from Soviet defectors as late6 indicating that the Banderovtsy (followers of the Ukrainian nationalist Stefanre still active, remain unconfirmed. Most likely there is no nationalist resistanceof any significance in thc Ukraine at this time, but the reports suggest thatpopular belief ln the existence of these organizations may be widespread. Although there has been no evidence of an upsurge of resistance activities since the death of Stalin, such activities seem to have been implied in radio and press appeals, as latehat partisans ln thc Volynskaya Oblast surrender voluntarily and receive pardons for their past actions.

norganized resistance In thc Ukraine exists primarily in the western oblasts and Is conducted mainly by Intellectuals. It isin nature and is manifested In resistingy advocating the use of Ukrainian national feeling in literature.attacks on Ukrainian writers as being national deflationists tend to confirm these trends.

S. Since the suppression of nationalistand resistance movements during thc Stalin regime, there Is now no evidence to Indicate any nationalist movement Since the death of Stalin, the Soviets have treated the Issue of nationalism cautiously in the Ukraine. Some attempts to conciliate nation-

al feeling can be found in their liberation of former partisans from labor camps, theof former Ukrainian Communist writers suspected of nationalistic tendencies, and thc disappearance of some Party and KGB officials who had been engaged in theof resistance. The celebration ofth anniversary of the Union of the Ukraine with Russia was officially observed withdeference paid to the loyalty and heroism of the Ukrainian peoples.


groups have been ofto resistance groups In thelittle contact that did exist withthe Ukraine has been broken byliquidation of the UkrainianInvolved. The contact betweenthe Ukraine and emigre groups tendsunilateral; escapees augment thecolony and Intensify anti-Sovietthe non-Bloc countries, but there hassignificant reverse flow or Intensificationfeeling ln the Ukraine. mere existence of an active emigre1lend to buoy the hopes of thosethe Ukraine who arc bitterlythc Soviet regime. Concern expressedSoviets in this matter Is reflected Inintelligence activities againstgroups and the propaganda-thc Soviet press and radio attemptingand thereby diminish anyof these groups.


revolt in the Ukraine could beby thc Soviet regime at theThc existence of satellite regimeswestern borders of the Ukraine hastended to isolate this earlierof resistance, both materially andruthless suppression of thehas served as an illuminatingwhat would happenovolt that isaided by the West. Thelarge numbers of border troops alongwestern border ol the USSR provides

immediate forces to counter any revolt. In addition, Soviet army divisions stationed throughout the Ukraine can aid lnof revolts. Zakarpatskaya Oblastto offer the best terrain for possiblebut its isolation from the remainder of Uie Ukraine would probably localize any revolt.


long as Soviet police and securityremain relaUvely Intact, therebe no prospectesumpUon ofIn the Ukraine. Barring anupheaval, these controls are likely toin force for the foreseeable future.suppression of Uie Hungarian revolt,reportedly litUe sympathy for aof resistance. Instead,nationalists engageubtleresistance by staying within Uie boundslaw and officially approvedtype of resistance ls directed againstrusslflcation and has as its objectiveand fosteringkrainianfeeling. Apparently It is hopednationalism can be kept alive andwill serve as an Ideological basis for aln the future. Meanwhile,gained by legal methods, lifethe Ukraine, although under aIs becoming more tolerable, thusdecreasing resistance potential.


the event of war, Ukrainiansnot try to engage in large-scaleactivities while Soviet militaryremained in farce. They rememberresults of their resistance to the So-

viet regime during World War II. They would be unlikely to commit themselves to resistance against Uie Soviet regime unless they were convinced Uie USSR would lose Uie war. In other words, Ukrainian dissidence could not be expected tootential enemy of Uie USSR until the outcomear were largely determined. In fact, most Ukrainian soldiers would probably fight fiercely on Uie Russian side.

As long as security controls remained firm, an enemy could expect litUe or no help from Uie Inside, if, however, the political structure should begin to crumble under rhe impactar, resistance could and might very well become active again. Pent-up opposition to Uie Soviet regime could quite naturally be channeled Into demands for Uieof Uie USSR. The Carpathianon Uie border of Hungary,and Poland, where Soviet controls are less firmly established than elsewhere in Uie Ukraine, wouldonvenient base lor launching resistance activities in Uie area.ove would almost certainly require foreign assistance.

The question as to who Initiated Uie war probably would matter little, nor would the nationality of invading forces, with theof Germans, who almost certainly would be fiercely resented evenart of an international force. Their presence onsoil would seriously Impair thcof anti Communist resistance

While certain resistance activities such as intelligence collection or escape and evasion operaUons might be possiblemall scale, no large-scale underground movement In Uie Ukraine Is likely to gain momentum untilpower had been shaken at its foundations,

Original document.

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