RATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER 7
TBE SOVIET ICBM PROGRAM
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS SANITIZED
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DXRECTCB CP CENTRAL IHTBLLIGEICE
Tbe following intelligence organizations participated In tbo preparation of thlo estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and tho Intelligence orgaclcattona of tba Dapartmonta of Stnto, the Army, tho Navy, tho Air Force, The Joint Staff, and tba Atonic Energy Cotnaloolcm. Tha CoDclnalono of this estimate vere1 approved by tbo Intelligence Advisory Comolttco onecember! tbo DiBcusaloo was approved on
Concurred In by tbe
CNIBLLIGENCE if CCMMHtTEB
Concurring wore The Dlractor of Intelligence and Roocorcb, Deport-mcnt of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,of the Army; tho Director of Havta. intelligence; the Asaiatant Cxxlit of Staff, Intelligence,ha Deputy Director forThe Joint Staff; and the Atomic Energy- CoamlaBloa BepreseirU-tlvo to tba .IAC. Tbo Aeoletant Director, Federal Bureau ofobetalned, tba subject being ootaldo of hia Jurisdiction.
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TBE SOVTET ICBM IBOffiAH
TABLE OF CONTENTS
THE PRCBLEM. CONCLUSIOSS.
(The TROBLEM and CCBCLDSIOKS of thlo eatimate, when detached from the DISCUSSION, are claaaified gQP flSOMff. They havo also been oaEeeminated, separately under tbe COT ODCattff^classlfleotlon.)
Soviet Experience in"Ballistic Rteailes
Evidence on tbe Soviet ICBM Plight Test
Probable Soviet ICBM Character 1st tea
Probable Development Timetable
First Operational Capability Date
Factora Affecting Operational Capabilitieo
Soviet ICBM Warhead Capabilities
(The ANNEX is classified TOP SECRET,
and bos been disseminated separately.)
THE SOVIET ICBM HiCOUH
To oat Iraa to the probable development tinwtoblo and cJiaracteristicB of the Soviet Intercontinentaltic trloallenolndlng the probable- date of first operational capability, and to examine tbe factors likely to affect Soviet acquisitionubstantial nuclear delivery capability with the ICBM weapon system.*
1. ICBM development bas an extremely high priority in the USSR, If Indeed it is not presentlycrash" basis* We beliove that tho USSR will seek toubstantial ICBM capability as rapidly as possible."
*" For purposes of thisfirst operational capability" is arbitrarily definedotal ofrototype ICBMs in tbe. hands of trained, units at completed launchingsubstantial operational capability" is arbitrarily definedotalCBMs in tho bands of trained units at cccploted launching sites*
2. Wo believe tho USSR is concentrating on the dovelojcwnt of' an ICBM which, when operational, vill probably ba capable ofigh-yield nuclear warheadaximum range ofQO nautical miles,EPautical miles or leas at maximal range,yetem reliability of aboutercent. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army, bolievos that the USSR will adopt initially an operational ICBM of atautical miles maximum range, and that it will furthor develop this weapon to tho longer-range system indicated above.
3> The date at which the USSR willirst operational capability with tbe ICBM will depend on cany factors, apart from the ovor-all urgency of the program. These factors include tbe extent of technical success ln Bias lie testing and the availability of launching facilities, supporting equipment, and trained personnel to operate tbe system, vq estimate that some time during the periodohe USSR will probablyirst operational capability with up torototype ICBMs; with characteristics approximating those estimated in tbe first sentence of
* In tbe belief of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Deporttncirt of tbe Army, this initial operational capability will bo with an ICBM of atautical miles maximum range.
U. ICBMs could probably bo produced, launching facilitiesand operational units trained,ote sufficiest to give tho USSR on operational capabilityCBMn about one year after its first operational capability date, andCBMn about two or at nost tbrco years after first operational capability data.
' 5. We estimate that ICBM development baa an extremely high priority in the USSR, if indeed it lo not prenoutlycrash" basis, and that tho USSR will seek toubstantial ICDM capability as rapidly as possible. Oa tbe basis of all the available evidence, we believe the USSR is capable of accomplishing very ambitious goals In this field.
Soviet planners have probably long estimated that important military, political, and psychological advantages would accrue to tha first nation to achieve an ICBM capability. They probably believe that certain di nod vantages they now face px the application of Intercontinental striking power can be overcome If, ot aa early date, they canubstantial capability to deliver nuclear attacks on continental US targetseapon system imposing cmxlnrua surprise
and difficulty of Interception. They hove recently demonstrated their acute awareness of the benefits of rapid Soviet progressCBM and earth satellite programs, as enhancing their deterrent posture against the US, support ing an aggressive foreign policy, and building confidence within the Bloc.
SOVIET EXPERIENCE IN BALLISTIC MISSILES
7- The thorough and systematic exploitation of German guided missile personnel ond experience initiated by the USSR at the end of Worldirm foundation for Soviet ballistic missile work, including guidance, aerodynamics, propulsion, ond structural design. Operational ond prototype German missiles were tested and improved upon; for example, some reports indicate that as manyotors ofetric toas^'thrust were completed during the. German missile specialists were, however, kept relativoly isolated from the native Soviet missile program, and8 tbe native program had apparently reached the point where it could largely dispense with German assistance.^
l/ Metric tons are used throughout this estimate.
or further details, see, "Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs in tbe Guided Missile2hapters II ond HI ondTOP SECRET).
1 TOP QECnHf
Liquid Rocket Motors. umber of year* tba USSR baa had available tbe type of motors necessary for propulsion of long rsngo missiles. e roan-developed,nginehrust ofons vas placed in production in;ad reportedly been produced More Important,on thruot motor, ropreserrtlng oa outstandingin ad^enced technology, had probably been developed to tbe point of static test. US studies have indicated that, with minorthose motors could probably achieve thrusts up to rbout Uoons, respectively, at sea level. We believe that rocket motors ofons thrust have been thoroughly tested end probably improved in the course of extensive flight testingautical mileissiles at Kapustin lor.
Ballistic Missile Firings at Kapustin Yar. Priorhe only definitely identified Soviet ballistic missile test range was that located east of Kapustin Tar,email town nearhis range has existed since early In tbe postwar period; it is still undergoing expansion and improvement. Good evidence on range activities
etailed discussion of this range ond Its activities tomoy ba found In,TOP
dates from Since tne middle of that year, atallistic missiles of short and mod lun ranges have been fired, ofwhichave. missiles. SIdcchore have been seven test firings. missile. The Kapuotin Yar program has been characterized by minimum delays nod rapid rates of test firing. Tha range has launchedissilesingleissilesh hour period, andissiles to various rangesingle month. Such high activity Indicates that handling and check-out procedures are good and test crews are well-trained.
10. Under test range conditions, good accuracies ore evidently being achieved up to ranges of. High reliability Is ovident from the very few apparent in-flight failures, f
"Probable Error" is defined as that error which io as likely to bo exceeded as not.
EVIDENCE ON THE SOVIET ICBM FLIGHT TEST PROGRAM
Taa-KIyuchl Test Range. In abouthe construction of now Instrumentation facilities began in tbe vicinity of Tyura Taa, near the extreme down-range end of the Kapustln Yar teat range. Accumulating evidence has made It clear that the activity which began5 was in fact the startew Soviet missile test range, extending. from Tyuraown range Instrumentation area near Klyuchi, on tlie Kamchatka Peninsula.
range facilities do not yet appear to be fully completed,
12. Firings free Tyura Taa, Wo believe that by7 the new test range was capable of supporting limited ballistic missile flight testing.
Although the evidence
was fragmentary, it supported Soviet statements that ICBM flight tests
had been mode. (While the TASS announcement moy hove been timed for maximum pxopngnoda effect, pest Soviet statements of this typo have generally been based on actual perf cc-nainco or assurede concluded that tbe USSR had probably flight-tested tvo ICBM vehicles, nlthough tho only Information oo to the range, accuracy, or choroctur of tbe vehicles fired was that contained In the Soviet statements nnd that which could be Inferred from the'length of the test range.
13. ctober and againovember, the USSR successfully orbited earth satellites; wo have determined
J that they vere
launched from tbe Tyura Torn range-head.
Information regarding the tvo satellite launchings andugusteptember from Tyura Tom does Indicate come These differences moy be
attributedas veil as to differences ln launching
purposes. It ls not logical, nor Is It compatible vith our knowledge of previous Soviet testing practices, to( assume that the first satellite
See, "Evaluation of Evidence Concerning87 (TOP
woo launched on J* October without preliminary flight toots. Thus Q
J on the first two firings from Tyura Tam, thereuestion whether they were actually test vehicles for an ICBM or for an earth satellite, or were portombined program.
J It does not oppearaunching has been attempted at Tyura Tam since the orbiting ofovember satellite, but we cannot entirely exclude this possibility. In any case,
I] tho next launching could occur at any
15- Probable Relationship between ICjMarth Satellite
Programs. On the basis of nil tho evidence, we estimate that tbe
Soviet earth satellite program was developed concurrently with and superimposed upon tho ICBM program, as Soviet statements have implied. Because so few vehicles of this magnitude have beca noted, we believe
that all four vehicles launched frca Tyura Ton probably utilized the sane first and second stage propulsion systems. The reported weight of tho first satelliteouldropulsion system comparable to that of an ICBM. Tbe Minimum propulsion required foratellite wouldwb-stage systemon first stageton secondystem in sn ICBM would probably be capable ofb. warhead. Oo tbe other hand, the second and reportedly much heavier0ould have required either tola minimum propulsion system plus an added third stage,arge two-stage system utilizingon thrust motors or on equivalent single motor in the first stage. In an ICBM, cither of the largestage systems referred to would probably be capable ofb.. Although unofficial Soviethave Indicated that tbe second satellitehroe-stage vehicle, wo are at present unable toositive determination. However, we believe that for efficiency of design and reliability, tbe Soviets would not utilize three propulsion stages in their ICBM.
lo. With regard to guidance, we do not know how close tbe actual orbits of tho satellites were to those intended,
J Guidance errore permissible In the orbiting of on earth satellite would not be acceptable for an ICBMEP. or less. Consequently, tbe capability toatellite into on ellptlcal orbit does not of itself indicate that ICBM guidance problems have been solved forEP. Wo believe, however, that tho guidance system used lnautical mile ballistic missiles already achieves accuracies better than those required to orbit earth satellites.
17. In spite of those unresolved questions, the four Tyura Tom
firings attest to the high capabilities of tbe USSR ln long range ballistic missile development, especially In the field of rffopuloion. Wo believe It likely that the first few firings In an ICBM program would oerve primarily to test propulsion, stage cc pa ration, and rough guidance; for Buch purposes, it would matter little whether tho first testo were of earth satellite vehicles or of true ICBM test vehicles. Therefore, we believe that, for practical purposes, the Soviet ICBM flight test program began on
l/ The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army, agrees with theugust date only if it applies to an ICBM system as described in hla footnote at the end of
g/ See footnote of the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Sterf on next page.
Zj The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, bollcvca that the first two probable firings on the Tyura Tod range,ugust.ere primarily for the purpose of testing' earth sate Ul to vehicles of the type or types launchedctober Be agrees that Information useful to the ICBM program was obtained from these tests, particularly if the last stages on tbe missiles fired were allowed to impact. However, the subsequent firings of two satellites and tbe opparent lock of any otber firings on the Tyura Tam test range to date Indicate that the first two firings cannot be considered as portlight test programpecific ICBM any more than numerous previous firings on the Kapustin Yar rango or the satellite firings tbemselvos. The Deputy Director for Intelligence, therefore, believes that tbe specific flightrogram discussed In paragraphf this Discussion has not yet begun.
PR (SABLE SOVIET ICBM CHARACTERISTICS* .
estimate that the USSR probably-ilitary requirean ICBMange of. Wo further estimaterequirement would Iriclnde, for initial operational capability,
a missile CEP. or less at maximumigh-yield nuclear warhead,ystem ire liability approximntingercent. Continued Improvement of ICBM system efficiency and reliability wouldoviet objective. However, the USSR will also desire to achieve an effective ICBM capability at tho earliest practicable date. Pending the developmentissile meeting the foregoing criteria. It may seek to establish an initial operational capabilityissileange of at. issile. range could reach the most distant target of importance in the US only from thc Chukotsk Peninsula and could reach less distant targets from somewhat less exposed positions.ange of. would be necessary to reach ell important US targets from launching sites located with greater regard for their security and logistic support.
the basis of the evidence, we believe that thounder development ln the USSRwo-ntoge vehicle designed
* The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of tbe Army, calls attention to his general footnote ot the end of
toarhead ofb. With tho evidence at band,
wo cannot determine whether it willon not or in -
lte firstair of auch motora,arge olnglo motor roughly
equivalent to tho paired mat or b. in tbe firet case, it could achieve '
a maximum rangen the second and third-
Whichever line of development the USSR lo now pursuing, oft ex the Initial two-etoge flight tent the achievement of an initial operational capability would require about the same amount of time, roughlyix month span. In tbe case of theon first stage engine, however, tbo missile's range would foil abort of the optimum. Tho USSR, if it iu developing this system, may expect that ito range can later be extended.econd generation weapon with soma combination of developments such as higher thrust, more efficienteduction in noee-coM weight or tbe use of high-energy fuels. However, tbe transition by this means.. ICBM, including an additional number of missiles to be
test fired, would probably Impose an unacceptable delay.
n balance we consider it likely that tbe USSR lsdirectly to tbe development. ICBM powered byon motorsoughly equivalent single motor ln the
first stage, and that, at the earliest practicable date, it will
irst operational capabilityew prototype missiles.
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Deport roe at of the Army, does not concur in the probablo characteristics of the Soviet ICBM presented in paragraphnd in certain specific points in He believos that:
Soviet objectives for an ICBM system cannot be firmly established. issile systemange. would enable tbe Soviets to attack the US within the limitations expressed in
The Soviets could employ any of the systems described in paragrapho attain the ranges given, and could extend the range cf the systemon thrust engine (paragraphy some combination of increasing engine efficiency, use of fuel additives, or reducing nose cone weights.
To arrive at an ICBM capability with any system inoequires the assumption that one of these propulsion systems was used in tbe satellite launchlngs. Moreover, calculation of these systems was based on Soviet announcements of tbe weight of their satellites. Since these weights are accepted, lt is also valid to accept the statements that the second satellite utilized three stages and both used tested missile components. Since there is no evidence of tha dcvolo;ptTt of paired engineson thrwt engine, he believes that this last reference was to theonton engines believed developed for shorter range missiles. This factor, evident Soviet practice of improving or scaling-up. tested components to develop progressively longer range missiles, and probable Soviet dealre to. keep their ICBM system as small and movable as possible, all support
a system based on Improvements to theon thrust first stage system.
h. Improvements to this smaller system would not necessarily Involve changes of such nature aa to makesecond generation* system. Attaining. range by this means, rather than causing "unacceptableould provide the Soviets their earliest ICBM capabilityubstantial margin if they have not already developed the larger paired euginoson thrust engine.
Thc Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Departrosnt of the Army, therefore believes this estimate should state that tbe USSH will adopt initially an operational ICBM system of at. range and that it will further develop this system to. range.
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENT TIMET ABIE
major development offort would of couroe precedeteat program. While evidence ls limited. It ioestablish or infer certain key elements in the probableprogram. As Indicated above, we believe the basicrocket motors were probably ready for static test2 andtested extensively in sbortor range missiles since that time. USSR haa elected toon thrust engines for firstcoupling designs could probably have been made ingle engine of greater thrust were chosen, there
has been sufficient time for its design, development, and static test-
ing prior to the fall There is no evidence of either the coupling
of two onginoo or of tho equivalent single engine..
least byhen construction of the Tyurarange was begun, the USSR was preparing for missiletbe capabilities of tho existing Kapustin Yar range. new range was under construction, Kapustin Yar wasprovide much basic experience in ballistic missile work. could have provided experience and design data on manyincluding cock warheads, fuzing devices, and possiblybodies and stage separation techniques.
Guidance. Wc believe tbe USSR ls capable of solving tbe critical guidance prcblca. Tbe USSR nowuidance system which-, -If improved scix'-bnt nod placed in on ICBM, could achieve CRP'o. or less at ranges. This oystem probablyadar track-radio conznand/inertial guidance nyatem of the type previously estimated for the. missiles. The USSR need not rely on this type of system, however, inasmuchoppler/lnertiol guidance system, employing principles almontknown to thc USSR, could probably achieve. or loss bynd possibly down to.
Warhead. Ke estimate that high-yield nuclear warbeada, suitable for employment in an ICBM, could probably be available*
On the basis of the above, we believe that major design characteristics of tbe Soviet ICBM had probably been formulated by5 ornd that at tho 'present timo, most major component problems have boon largely solved. While there la noto indicate whether tbc USSH Is developing heat sink or sublimation type nose cones, OS experience indicates that thoproblem is not likely to delay the program.
Geo AMffiX, Soviet ICBM Warhead Capabilities
27* Plight Test Schedule* On the basis of our estimate that the USSB Io proceeding directly toward tbo developacut of an ICBMangeEP. or lesa at maximum range,b. warhead, and considering Soviet operatlona ot Kapustln Yar and the progress which the USSR has already mode In ICBM development, ve estimaterogram oflight teots would be required to achieve the specified accuracyystem reliability ofercent. _ Ho believe that the USSR will compress its ICBM flight test schedule as much oo possible, anl It is probablyuildup totest firings per month could be achieved in this program, barring some major accident. The span of time required for completing the test firing program and the number of missiles needed for testing are factors of uncertainty in our estimate. Early and continued success couldchedule with as few aslight teots. Oa thc other hand, if success in flight tests io not continuous, as many asests might bo necessary. We do not believe that the Soviets will encounter difficulties leading to very extended delays, and wo therefore estimate that this test program, leading to tbe attainment of
* We estimate that tho USSR wouldtnlmnra system reliability of aboutercent under operational conditions. "Systemin this context means the percentage of missiles which function according to specifications from missile takeoff to detonation in the target area. Malfunctions prior to launch are not considered.
a first operational capability with up torototype missiles, could pr bably be completed some time during the periodohc. research and devclopmeut test and improvement program will continue thereafter.
FIRST OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY DATE
28. We have previously estimated that the Soviets will probably
equip their first operational ICBM unit with prototype missiles, and
will not wait for series produced missiles.-' Tho date at which the first unit would be equipped in this way will depend an many factors, apart from the over-all priority of the program. These factorsthe extent of technical success In missile testing, the degree of international tension, and toe availabilityaunching site, supporting equipment and trained personnel to operate tho system. An additional factor to which the Soviets have undoubtedly given considerable weight in the psychological and political, as well as the possible blackmail, advantages ofominal ICBM capability before the US. Provided tho Sovietsecision sometime ago toite and train the necessary personnel, we believe that some
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the
Army, refers to his general footnote at the end of
2/ Seo, paragraph &t.
time In tbe periodohey WIU probablyirst operational "capability with up torototype ICBMs with characteristics.. CEP, andercent reliability.-'
FFECTIN0 OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES
do not know vtat production facilities are nowtlie Soviet ICBM program, nor bare wo any direct evidencepreparations to produce ICBMs and systems equipment in quantity.
Wo do know, however, that the USSRighly developed industrial base which incl-.es all tho skills axd facilities necessary for quantity production of successfully developed missile systems. Based on our oatlmote that the development of on ICBM capabilityajor Soviet objective, we believe that the USSR will allocate tbc necessary resources.
Production. The centralized planning of thewill permit the USSR very rapidly to marshal economic resourcea
1/ The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army, refers to his general footnote at the end of
2/ The Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, believes
that the Soviets could. If they so desired, establish on extremely limited operational capability in the latter half8 with up to IOange ofautical milesEP ofautical miles, but whose reliability would be uncertain and probably Jobs thanercent. Be thereforethat the USSR willimited operationalwith up toCBMs with characteristicsautical milesautical miles CEP, andercont reliability in about
for the quantity production of ICBM systems end equipment. Soviet Industrial resources can be focused on the production of tbe major omponents of thengine, guidance system, control systems, warhead, and airframe. Each of these components can be produced In oeparate, specialized facilitiesoordinated basis. During the course of the ICBM flight test program the designs of various components or subsystems will prove their adequacy to meet required specifications. As each component is proven, its doslgn will be "frozen" end production drawing and specification, as well oa detailed production plans, will be prepared. Many of these stops will have been taken prior to completion of the full flight test program. When the final element of the ICBM system design has demonstrated its acceptability, tha design of tbe systemhole will be "frozen" Immediate steps will be taken to initiate series production,uild upre-selected peak rate ofwill begin. Tbe more rapidly the production program is pushed, the more likely difficulties are to develop which require costly changes. Tho USSR must weigh tho cost of delays duo to modifications against the advantages of getting operable Brian ilea early. In light of extensive Soviet experience with shorter range bajllistic missiles, we believe that tho likelihood of prohibitive costs In resources duerash production ls not very great.
3^* CEM Program. Cur estimate of the scheduling and.allocations required for on assumed high priority ICBM producllon, construction, and training programCBMs deployed onaunching facilities follows. Tho do figures were selected arbitrarily and we have not attempted to define then as optimum or minimal quantities. Although we have no evidence that the USSR is actually planning to carry out this specific program, this examination permits the assessment of the oconomic feasibility and implications ofrogram.
32. Tho USSR will determine tbo peak production rate for ICBMs on tlie basis of Soviet planners' Judgments, primarily with respect to their requirements for various numbers of missiles at selected points In time, together with their capabilities to achieve these requirements. These capabilities will includo not only those for the production of ICBMs but also these for tbe coastructlon of sites, production endof equipment, training of troops, and establishing logistic Unas. We believeeak production rate ofCBMs per month ls compatible withCBM program examined here. eriod
* months from tbe beginning of aeries production would be roqulrcd
to build up fromroduction rataonthonthly rate of U0 series-produced ICBMs. The length of time required to build
upeak production rate governs the number of ICBMs which could be available in tho early period after series production is initiated, regardless of the peak production rate. In addition to the ICBMs delivered to site, many missiles will have to be produced for training, testing, and logistic backup; the total number of ICBMs produced mighty theere delivered to sites.
33- Warhead. Wc estimateufficiently high priority will be assigned to nuclear warheads so that they will be produced for stockpiling on otne-to-one basis for ICBMs intended for operational use. Prior to9 those warheads would beby essentially hand-produced methods. In tho period9 to0 serial production could begin, the rote thereafter being dependent upon the scale of the production effort.
Launching Facilities. We believe that detailed planning
of ICBM operational bases was being carried out concurrently with
tbe preliminary and detailed design of tbe ICBM system, and further, that by6 hardware design could have been sufficiently firm to permit tbe USSB to make basic declalons regarding projected ICBM* deployment. Such decisions include tbe location of operational sltea,
general operational concepts, and logletica. At that time tha de-tolled layout of many elements of tho operational basos could hove been determined,rogram of site construction and equipment for either mobile or fixed launching facilities could have been initiated. Although we have no direct evidence of Soviet ICBM launching facilities, wo conclude that the USSR has had ample tine to complete tbo preparation of some launching facilities already, and could now -bo engagedarge ocale effort to provide tbe additional launching facilities needed to deploy the ICBMs it plans to produce
35. Considerations affecting Soviet planning for ICBM launching facilities might have included the following:
very high initial salvo capability;
practicable detectabllity of launching facilities;
sites capable of surviving nuclear attack;
transport as the basic means of logisticon these considerations, we have postulated several Sovietmobile and fixed site construction ond ICBM deployment which are
consistent with our estimate of the times at which various quantities-
of ICBMs could be available.
Postulated Operational Systems. Tlie magnitude of thethc USSR would have to invest io providing an operational systemCBMs can be appreciated by examining several possible operational site systems, both mobile and fixed. Vo have postulated thataunching facilities, consistingaunchers each, would be providedCBMs.
The firstAM systemobile rail concept. This system consists ofrains, each carryingissiles with associated guidance, handling and support equipment, and complete supplies for independent operationpecified2ach train consistsailroad cars, probably divided into sections, and includes facilities for bousing and maintaining five launch crews and associated support personnel. The entire systemconstruction ofiles of sidings and the preparationr more launch pads. Prom an operational standpointystem could be established under conditions which would allow forercent of tbe units in tho system to bepecified readiness otate on launching sites at any given time.
38. We estimate the equivalent cost to the USSR of manufacturing and fully equipping each missile train, and providing the associated
fixed installations, to he roughly illion dollars. The total Initial coats for the cntlte deployment system, Including rail and pad construction, would be on the orderillion dollars. The economic resources requiredail system of this type would come principally from the heavy Industrial sector of the Soviet economy. Ve believe that this sector of tbe economy is capable ofrogram of this magnitude and character with only minor delays In tbe over-all investment program.
39* The second postulated ICBM system consists ofixed launch sites hardened to withstand overpressuressi. Each launching sitei months to construct and consists of five underground launching positions and adjacent storage, maintenance and checkout areas, and an underground guidance station. Each of the launch positionsone missile erected and anothertorage area prepared for flrlng. Separate underground launch control centers, crew quarters and fuel storage tanks are located near each launch position. An unhardened
]7 This figuroillion dollars forCBMs, excluding tbe cost of warheads.
2/ The dollar figures are used to Indicate only the general magnitude of tho resources required.
support area contains those functions related to housekeeping,and administration. Tbe entire system Is serviced by roll*.
40. We estimate that tbe cost to the USSR for constructing and
fully equipping each launch site would be the equivalent of aboutl
million dollars, otal cost ofillion dollars for theitcs in the system. If the USSR were to implement this program, it would have to devote large quantities of construction resources sorely needed in other branches of tbe Soviet economy.
hi. ess refined, fixed, above ground system with the ability to withstand overprassuros ofsi were chosen, the construction time would be reduced5 months and the total initial coot would beillion dollars,illion dollars less than tho ICO psi system. The savings would be almost entirely ln tho cost of construction. The Initial costs of sites harder thansi system but softer thansi would rangeillion
117 This figureillion dollars forCBMs, excluding the cost of warheads.
Zj Tho dollar figures are used to Indicate only the general magnitude of the resources required.
dollars; forite eyttem, hardened tosi, would costillion dollars.
The following table comporec some economic aspects of each of the four systems considered above:
Rail Mobilesi Fixedsioi
Eeavy Equipment Industries
Manpower and Training. We estimate thatotal systemlaunch facilities, tbe manning rcquirerent wouldaunchtotalling0 men,uidance and controltotallingen, plus generalized support andpersonnel. Crews already trained in shorter rangebe ra-traincd In the ICBMeriod of about two months. Suchcould sharply reduce the training time required toleast initial operational capability. hort timea launching facility, newly trained units would be able to
launch missiles operationally, with varying degrees of proficiency. We estimate that six monthsear of further training on sites would be required toigh degree of operational proficiency. The amount of trainingaunching facility will affect, to andegree, the reliability of the missile system and tbe ability of the USSR to launch, missiles simultaneously from each launching position.
IiU. General Economic Assessment. oviet ICBM production and deployment program of the scope postulated herein wouldigh order of planning and accomplishment. Our assessment of Soviet capabilities leads us to conclude that from the economic point of view, the production of ICBMs and systems equipment in quantity, and the acquiring and training of troops, would be less burdensome to the USSR than thc construction of hardened launching sites with maximum operational effectiveness, low vulnerability,igh degree of concealment. The USSR may decideaunch system involving asmaller commitment of resources. However, any of the postulated operational systems would be well within Soviet economic capabilities.
Considering tbe various factors discussed above, we estimate that ICBMs could probably be produced, launching facilities completed,
end operational units trained at a. rate sufficient to give tbe USSR an operational capabilityCBMs about one year after its first operational capability date, andCBMs about two or at coot three years after first operational capability date.