THE SOVIET ICBM PROGRAM (CONCLUSIONS) (SNIE 11-10-57)

Created: 12/10/1957

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SPECIAL

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER

THE SOVIET ICBM PROGRAM

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM conclusions RELEASE IN FULL

(The full text of this estimate is being published separately.)

Submitted bp the

DIRECTOR OP CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

The following inielligence organisations participated In the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the Intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, The Joint Staff, and the Atomic Energy Commission.

Concurred tn by the

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

ononcurring were The Director ofand Research, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, VSAF; the Deputy Director for Intelligence. The Joint Staff; and the Atomic Energy Commissionto the IAC. Thc Assistant Director. Federal Bureau of investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of his

jurisdiction.

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THE SOVIET ICBM PROGRAM

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the probable development timetable and characteristics of theIntercontinental ballistic missilencluding thc probable dale of firstcapability, and to examine the factors likely to affect Soviet acquisitionubstantial nuclear delivery capability with the ICBM weapon system.'

CONCLUSIONS

development has an extremely high priority in tho USSR, if indeed it Is not presentlycrash" basis. We believe Ihat tho USSR will seek toa substantial ICBM capability aa rapidly as possible.

We believe the USSR is concentrating on the development of an ICBM which, when operaUonal, will probably beofigh-yieldaximum range ofautical miles,EP of five nautical miles or leas at maximum range,ystem reliability of aboutercent. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army, believes that the USSR will adopt Initially an opera-

For purpose* oi thisfirst operational capabllitr- is arbitrarily definedotal ofrototype ICBMs In the hands of trained units at completed Uunehlncsubstantial operaUonal rapabUltr" ll arMtrarth- definedotal ot MO ICBMs In the hand, of trained unlU at completed Uunehlnc sites.

Uonal ICBM of atmiles maximum range, and that it will further develop this weapon to thc longer-range system indicated above.

he date al which the USSR willirst operational capability with the ICBM will depend on many factors, apart from the over-all urgency of thc program. These factors Include thc extent ofsuccess in missile testing and the availability of launching facilities,equipment, and trainedto operate tho system. Wc estimate that some time during tho periodohe USSR will probablyirst operational capability with up torototype ICBMs, withapproximating those estimated in the first sentence of

the belief of the AulsUnt Chief of SUff. rnfcllleenee. Department ofear, this Inl-Ual operaUonal capability will be *lih an ICDM Of atautical miles maximum ranee.

ICBMs could probably be produced, launching facilities completed, andunits trainedate sufficient to give the USSR anCBMs about one year after

its first operational capability date andCBMs about two or at most three years after first operational capa-bility date.

Original document.

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