NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER 7
MAIN TRENDS IN SOVIET CAPABILITES AND
i iik OF
Tht /olltwmo MoUWriee oroaniialitmi participated In lha prepaiallan oftt'aaie; Thr. Central intelligent' Agency and theganiiatlans af the OepartmtnU of State, the Ar-*w.he Air Force. IKe Joint Staff, andc Knew Committer,.
m It Nrmetaberneumug *en The DtWHfrau.i
Chief ot Staff, luieil.aaue. Dema'fment if the Army; the Dvtxlor Of JVimI luUMgtace: thetaff.PUT;>ntttlioenew. The Joint Staff, and Iht AUmir Energy CommUitonf fo Irtr IAV. Thc Aaittent Direcfpr. Federal Bureau of Inoetttgutlon. abitainfi. ihr tubfee; being outtide of hU jurisdiction
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTERNAL POLITICAL
The Victory ol Khrushchev and the
Changes in Internal
Impact on Popular
Probable Developments In Domestic
II. TRENDS IN THE SOVIET
Shifts In Economic
Prospects for Economic
Trends In Defense
IN SOVIET SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
Scientific Manpower. Training, and
Scientific Capabilities in Major Scientific Fields
Biological and Agricultural
IN THE SOVIET MILITARY
Soviet Military Thinking and
Likelihood of Force
Soviet Military Policy Toward the Satellites
TABLE OF CONTENTS-Conlinuecl
Trends in Specialized Scientific and Technical Capabilities
Chemical and Biological
Trends in Soviet Military
Trends hi Soviet Strategy and
Soviet Strategy for the Initial Phase of General War .
Offensive Capabilities in Western
Offensive Capabilities in the Far
Capabilities for Naval
V. TRENDS IN SOVIET RELATIONS WITH OTHER
Soviet Policy Toward the
Soviet Policy Toward
TABLE OF CONTENTSContinued
VI. TRENDS IN SOVIET FOREIGN
Thc Soviet View of the World
General Aspects of the Co-existence
Techniques of "Peaceful
Policy Toward the Underdeveloped
Relations with Free World Communist Parties
Soviet Policy on
Soviet Policy in the
Soviet Policy in Particular
South Asia and the Far
MAIN TRENDS IN SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND
To review significant developments affecting the USSR's internal politicalrelations with Bloc states, economic situation, military programs, and foreign policy, and to estimate probable Soviet courses of action
thc Soviet internal scene andexternal policy continue to bemarked by change and innovation.of Khrushchev hasthe flexibility andof the post-Stalin leaders'their major problems. But none ofin Soviet policy suggestsin basic alms or in thean irreconcilable conflict betweenand non-Communistthe Soviet leaders display aof confidence, buttressed by theirpolitical and technologicalthe prospects for ultimate victoryside.
Trends in Soviet Foreign Policy
respect of the Soviet leadersnuclear power will continue andunlikely to initiate general war orcourses of action which, ingravely risk general war,next five years. At the samethey are probably confidentown growing nuclear capabilities,
added to their great conventional strength, are increasingly deterring the US and its allies from courses of action gravely risking general war.esult the USSR probably regards itself as progressively achieving greater freedom of maneuver in local situations.' The
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF. docs nof agree with the estimate that theare likely to feel that they are achieving greater freedom of maneuver nor that they will regard the US as increasingly Inhibited bySoviet strengths.
The US has alwayi been eauUous ot riskingwar. This Is certainly evident to theBut also evident to them are examples such as Berlin. Korea. Taiwan, and Syria which underline US firmnesslear challenge Is presented.
The Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence. USAF. has found no specific evidence or indicators fromthc Soviets could derive the opinion that US caution will increase as Soviet nucleargrow, fnonvincing case could be made for Increasing Soviet caution, based on fear that the West would feel compelled ta exercise Ils superior militory capabilities before the Soviets might reverse the relaUve military advantage.
It appears lo the Assistant Chief of Staff.USAF, that Increasing Soviet boldness
Footnote conUnucd on following page.
posture during the Suez and Syrian crises convinces us that the use of threats willasic element in Soviet policy. At times the Soviet leaders will probably bring the threat ofmilitary strength into the open by menacing words or harsh diplomaticMoreover, the USSR might go considerably further iny supporting indigenous Communist or other forces in localaction, or even sending Sovietjudging that grave risk ofwar would not result. Thus the risks of general war arising throughmay increase.
ut in general thc Soviet leaders will probably continue to prefer non-military means of achieving their objectives. They
during lhc nexl ftvo year* wilt be unlikely unless thc Soviets attain clear military superiority, or unless the Soviets have reason to expect aor ir resoluteness In US policy The first condition Is not believed attainable; the second ls not believed demonstrable. The Assistant Chief or SUff. Intelligence. USAF. believesthathould read as follows: Tne respect of the Soviet leaders for USpower wUl continue and they are unllkey to Initiate general war or to pursae courses of acUon which In their Judgment, gravely risk general war over Uie next five years. At the same time, however, they probably regard their own growing nuclear capabilities, added to their great conventional sliciiclli, aa enforcingon the Western powers. The USSR's posture during the Suet and Syrian crises convinces us that the use of threats willasic element In Soviet policy. At times the Soviet leaders will probably bring the threat ofmilitary strength Into Uie opto bywen's.harsh diplomatic exchanges, by sup-porting Indigenous Communist forces, or even tendingudging that grave risk ot general war would not result. The Soviets must recognise, however, that the possibilities of miscalculation in crisis situations are such that general war might nevertheless occur, and that preparedness for It la therefore essential. Wc remain convinced that the USSR will not desire to lei any cilils develop lo the point of seriously risking general war."
probably regard the present worldas ripe to develop further in their favor through continuation of suchWhile determined to build up their armed strength against any eventuality, the present leaders have probably decidedontinuation of "peacefulwill best assure against the risks of nuclear conflict and at the same time offer far-reaching opportunities to weaken and divide the Western powers and to promote Soviet Influence in the key underdeveloped areas of the world.
Almost certainly thc Soviet leadersfurther crises as the interests of the two great power groupings clash in the Middle East and elsewhere. They willtrong line in such crises. Yet we believe that"in general they will continue to emphasize such tactics as high-level goodwill visits, broadened contacts,of cultural and other exchanges, expanded foreign trade, long-term credits and technical assistance, and arms aid. Their aim will be to cause furtherof the lines between the Communist and non-Communist worlds and toandetraction ofespecially US, strcugth from around the periphery of the Bloc.
The Soviets will almost certainlytheir efforts to woo thecountries, particularly in Asia and Africa, in order to estrange them from thc West and to lay the groundwork for growing Soviet Influence. The USSR has thc economic resources forexpanding its "trade and aid"while its extensive stocks ofarms will permit it to capitalize further on the desires of manycountries tois their neighbors.
USSR clearly regards the chief immediate opportunities for expanding ita influence to lie in the Middle East. It Is shrewdly supporting Arab nationalism against the West and thereby attempting to avoid the appearance of seeking undue political influence of its own. It is also conscious of the extent to which vital Western interests are involved in the area, and of the risks which would ariseirect test of strength between the great powers themselves. Nevertheless, its longer run aims are to elirninatemilitary power and political influence from the area, toosition from which to control Middle East oil, and ultimately to dominate the area.
During the next few years Uie chief Soviet objective in Western Europe will be to weaken and divide the NATOand above all toithdrawal of US military strength. To this end thc USSR wiil continue to promote some form of European security treaty to replace both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. But the USSR will almost certainly remain adamant on German reunification ou any terms except its own, however much this may limit its maneuverability in Western Europe.
eans of forwarding theirco-cxiatence policy and of advancing their efforts to neutralize US nuclear striking power, the Soviets will seek on the whole to give the appearance of aand constructive attitude onThey probably desire some form of simple, "first-stage" agreement with rniniraum inspection and control but we remain convinced that they will reject comprehensive inspection and controls.
Trends in Soviet Relalions with Olher Communist Stales
The USSR's reluctant acceptanceegree of Polish autonomy and ofspecial position, as well as its recognition of Communist China's stature and role within the Bloc, indicates abelief that some greater flexibility in Soviet relations with other Communist states Is both necessary and desirable in order to preserve and strengthen the Bloc. However, mindful of last year'sin Poland and Hungary, the USSR now seems deterrnincd to go slow In any further evolution of its relationships with the European Satellites, and above all to avoid any repetition of the Hungarian or even Polish experiences. It would almost certainly revert to repressive policies in event of serious threats to its position in Eastern Europe. Barring suchwe thin* the USSR wiilautious policy of economic aid,to national peculiarities, andhere and thereomewhat greater degree of Satellite autonomy.
The strong identity of Interest among the various Bloc regimes, theirupon Soviet aid and support, and the USSR's overwhelming military power will tend to maintain the essentia!of the Bloc over at least the next five years. But the underlying forcesby developments since Stalin's death will persist, creating furtherwithin the Satellites. Additional changes in intra-Bloc relations are likely.
of the major problems poseddeath have persisted: who isand how is the ruling to beStaiin's successors agreed on fun-
damental objectivesmaintenance of Party dictatorship, continued military buildup, and rapid economic growththey differed as to the policies best suited to pursue these aims in the conditions of the USSR today. These differences in turn complicated thc problem of who was to rule, rendering the leadership unstable.
ow, after four years of uneasy collective leadership, Khrushchev has emerged as dominant. Although he still lacks the degree of power achieved by Stalin through thc use of police terror, he has disposed of his major rivals and asserted Party mastery over the economic bureaucracy and the military. These developments have probably enhanced the stability of the Soviet leadership, though this leadership will be subject to continuing strain over the next several years as difficult policy problems arise. We think that only the most severecould threaten the presentarrangements, but, considering the magnitude of the problems which the regime faces, and the risks of failure in the bold programs which Khrushchev has undertaken, issues of such gravity could arise. In such an event Khrushchev would probably move toward absolute rule, if necessary attempting to reinsti-tute terror for this purpose. Butelements among the elite groups would be alert to and wouldevelopment, particularlyecourse to terror were involved.
s to the question of how to rule, the present leadership has shown awareness of the need to overcome the alienation of the Soviet population which has been caused by fear and deprivation andin apathy. Instead of ause of terror, which in the end
might not spare the leaders themselves, another approach was felt to bein order to keep the society cohesive and responsive to central direction. Inhift in emphasis to the use of incentives and the encouragement ofseemed to give promise ofSoviet strength, particularly in the economic field.
This approach has been extensively applied to thc Sovieteries of administrative reforms has sought to make better use of specialist knowledge, local talent, and individual Initiative. The latest and largest of theseadical reorganization of industry which seeks to transfer to officials on the spot morein the detailed execution of national policy. The incentive programin agriculture, aims not only at stimulating higher labor productivity but also at increasing popular support for the Khrushchev regime. The highlyhousing and agricultural programs will probably be successful enough toa gain of perhaps as much as one-fifth in per capita consumption over the next live years.
The achievement ofain would probably produce some increase insupport,onsumption program of this size will compete more sharply than heretofore with requirements for industrial investment and defense. This competition has already been partlyfor the abandonment of thc Sixth Five-Yearn favoreven-year plan forTlie issue of competing priorities, however, has not been finally settled by this action and is certain to arise again.
of the changes which havebear the stamp of Khrushchev;
his self-confidence and flexibility, the outlook is for further experimentation so long as he remains in power. By and large, we believe that his policies will be successful in generating more positive support among the population and inurther substantial growth in over-all Soviet power.over the next five years. But his changes havo created tensions and forces in Soviet society, the ultimate impact of which is difficult to foresee. The policyautiousapplied In the intellectual field, for example, has had disagreeablefor the regime. Wider contacts with foreign countries have opened the USSR to disturbing influences. Youthful nonconformity is an increasing problem,umber of critical writers are spreadingmall but increasing circle oflimate ofand of impatience with tlie pace of official reforms. The regime has made little progress in its counterattack upon these forces.
Moreover, Khrushchev's expansion of the Party's role as the chief instrument for managing the reform processeavy load upon it. With thcof thc secret police, the Partyhas assumed new responsibilities for insuring political conformity; with the abolition of most economic ministries it nowuch larger role in carrying out centrally determined economicIf the Party proves inadequate to these tasks, the prospects for success of the regime's ambitious economic and political programs will be greatly
The role of the party becomes even more critical when viewederspective extending beyond the period of this esti-
mate. ^For the next five years at least, the regime's totalitarian controls over the Soviet people almost certainly wilt not be seriously compromised. But over the longer run it is far from certain that the Soviet citizen can be educatedigher level, urged to exercise his own initiative, given increasing opportunity forwith other countries, andtoignificant improvement in his living standard, and at the same time submit without question to awhich incessantly proclaims, and frequently exercises, the right to make all important decisions for him,of his personal desires. Eventually it may turn out that the benevolent totalitarianism which Stalin's successors seek to achieve is an impossibleand that the forces released in the search for it will require theto revert to earlier patterns ofor to permit an evolution in some new direction. Even the latter changes would not necessarily alter the basic threatynamic USSR poses to the Free World.
Trends in the Growth of Soviet Power
Notwithstanding the many problems confronting the Soviet leaders, wca further rapid growth in the chief physical elements of Soviet power over thc next five years. Particularly notable will be the continued rapid expansion of the Soviet economy, further scientific and technical advanceside variety of fields,ontinued buildup andof the USSR's already massive military strength.
Economic Growth. Soviet economic growth over the next five years willto be faster than that of the US,
somewhat slower than during the Filth Five-Year, chiefly because of some redirection of Investmenteclining rate of growth in the labor force. We estimate thc average growth in Soviet GNP as around six percent annually during the next five years. In dollar terms Soviet GNP would rise from aboutercent of US GNP6 to aboutercentowever,Soviet defense expenditures, interms, are already about equal to those of the US.
Scientific and Technical Progress. The rapid expansion of the USSR'sand scientific capabilities, critical to the growth of Soviet industrial andpower, will also continue. Although total Soviet scientific capabilities may not equal those of the US, the USSR has been able to make comparable achievements and to forge ahead in certain areas of critical military and industrialby concentrating Its efforts in these fields. The number of university level graduates employed in scientific and technical fields already exceeds that in the US, and probably will be aboutercent greater than that in Uie US
Military Strength. Of outstanding significance has been thc USSR's progress in Uie development of advanced weapons and delivery systems:
a. Thc USSR isariety of improved nuclear weapons, particularly those employing thermonuclearits present stockpile could include weapons with yields ranging fromT up into the megaton range.he most powerful Soviet bombs could probably yield up toT, but missile warheads would still have yields
considerably less than this. We alsoa substantial Soviet program for expanding fissionable materialsbut the availability of suchwill continue2 toimiting factor on the size of manyas well as nonmilitary programs.
he USSR has probably tested an ICBM vehicle and we now tentatively estimate that it couldewrototype ICBMs available foruse9 or possibly even earlier, depending upon Soviet requirements for accuracy andho USSR could now have available ballisticwith maximum ranges,8 it could probably also begin to have. IRBM.
eanwhile, the USSR will probably continue to mainalanced andstructure of strong naval, air. and ground forces, supplementing these with new weapons. Nevertheless, Uiestrength of the Soviet forcesto have been reduced considerably from Korean War peaks, and somereductions and streamlining are likely, Uiough notubstantial degree.
a. We estimate that the Soviet long-range bomber force has grown toombers at present, though ita larger number of jet medium bombers and fewer heavy bombers than we had previously estimated. While we think that this force will not changein size during the period of this estimate, wc believe that lt will be further strengthened by Uie replacement of obsolete BULL piston medium bombers
'The estimate made tn this paragraph moat be considered tenlaUve pending compeUon of The Soviet ICDM Program.
jets, by thc introduction ofheavy bombers, and by furtherof inflight refueling.any estimate of future strength must be highly tentative, especially for heavy bombers, since Soviet policy in these respects is still shrouded in doubt. Subject to such qualifications, wethat the Soviets may byaveeavy bombers and tankers of jet and turboprop types,ong-range air force totalling something00 bombers. We also estimate that thc number of heavyand tankers will probably remain fairly steadyhile the total long-range bomber strength willdecline slightly.'
b. Further strengthening of Soviet air defenses will occuresult of improved fighterigher proportion
'The Assistant Chief ofiil*lUgrr.ce. USAF, believes lhal thc USSR would regard It asloore substanUalattack capability, providing for grcaier strategic flexibilityuch larger capability farorce which would provide thereater chance of success In general warUiey arc working toan additional nuclear delivery capability with, new weapon systems. Including long-range mlwlles. He therefore believes thateavy aircraft esUmaUd above would all be bombers and that by mld-IMl there will be JOO SCO additional aircraft as tankers In operaUonal units.
The Assistant Chief of Staff. Inielligence,of the Army, and the Deputy Director lor intelligence. The Joint SUIT, believe, on the other hand, that the number of heavy bomber/ tanker aircraft and the total number of long-range aircraft are both more likely tothc lower than the higher figures given above. See their footnote on
of improved all-weather fighters, better radar and communications equipment, and widespread employment of improved surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles.
Soviet ground forces havereorganized andimprovements in firepowerarc likely duringand doctrine are beingmodern warfare, nuclear as wellWe still estimate aboutdivisions, but their actualvary from somewhat In excesspercent of war strength to as lowpercent. Increasing attention isto airborne andwhose capabilities
Soviets are engaged in annaval program, especially incategory. Therehift to new designsmay be in progress.force is estimated atncludingof modern design. We estimatesubmarine force will approximatebyhe firstpropulsion reactor could nowand byheprobably produceewsubmarines couldin operation; and byayotal ofn allof submarines equippedmissile armament.
I. INTERNAL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
Victory of Khrushchev and the Party
During the past year Klirushchev hasin re-establishing the Communist Party's dominance over other elite groups in Soviet society and, within thc leadership itself, has established his own pre-eminence. By means of tlie June and7 purges and thc industrial reorganization, the Party demonstrated its supremacy over thc economic bureaucracy and the military, whilethrough skillful politicaleliminated his chief rivals from the Party Presidium.
The June purge of Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich ended four years of joint nilemall circle of Stalin's most prominent heirs. Both policy differences and personal rivalries were involved. The losing group not only distrusted many policy innovations sponsored by Khrushchev, but probably was alarmed by the way in which his energy and political acumen were enabling him gradually toa dominant role. From thc keyor first Secretary, he hadolitical machine within the Party apparatus,Party appointments so thoroughly that, although he seems to have faced defeat in the Presidium in June, he won an apparently hard-fought and decisive victory once heto transfer the dispute to the larger Central Committee,
Then in October, the Party moved against Marshal Zhukov, who had been elevated to full membership in the Presidium at the time of the June purge. It ls likely that the Party feared an attempt by Zhukov to use his new political strength to resist certain aspects of Party control in the armed forces. He is known to have been impatient with suchin the past. However, nothing in the Zhukov affair suggests that he had beena coup by the armed forces against the Party or that he even had political ambition of this kind. But Khrushchev and other Party leaders were probably extraordinarily
sensitive to the potential dangers of aforce not thoroughly under ParlyFurthermore, Khrushchev himself may have regarded Zhukovotentially dangerous rival.
thereappresent powers and thoseby Stalin, he does not appear, forto have any close rivals.major policy can be adopted withoutA majority of the newhis proteges, and the others lackto oppose him if they woredo so. But while Khrushchev hasclear field for his policies, he has notterror against his colleagues Inof Stalin and has Indicated Inthat he docs not propose to try.though the Presidium Is still theof political power and Is likelyso, Khrushchev by his recourse toCommittee In both June androemphasized the formalthe Presidium to that body.
Futuro Leadership Problems
same factors which led tore likely to generate recurrenttn Soviet politics over the next fiveof these problems will arise fromleadership's continuing effort*,the professional skills ofllto suppress the accompanyingfor these groups to expand theirOthers will be created ifas seems likely, attempts to placechallenge his own position ashead of the Party, and thereby of
e believe that, despite the decisivescored by Khrushchev and the Party, these closely-related problems will provide continuing elements of Instability in thc Soviet leadership. As for Khrushchev's own portion, even some of his presentin tlie Presidium and Centralmay In time come to doubt the wls-
of liis bold foreign and domesticOthers may become alarmed as they see In hisendency to one-man rule andhreat to themselves. The problem of succession to Khrushchev mighturther unsettling element; the usual intrigues within the Party are likely to be in Unsifted by the roaneuverings of hisand subordinates to get into position for thc struggle which they will anticipatehis death or Incapacitation.
Furthermore, we do not regard tlie defeat of tho economic bureaucrats and the military as necessarily final. So long as theesort to widespread terror and continues toigh premium uponcompetence, these groups will try again to influence polky In directions which accord with their professional interests and assessments. The economic bureaucrats are indispensable to the industrialized Soviet slate, and this will tend to restore at least some of their political influence. Theimpatience with Parly controls which Zhuxov represented is too widespread to be eradicated by his ouster and will probably find othereakening of unity within the Party apparatus would improve the opportunities forevelopment, since these groups probably will remainenough lo be regarded as desirable allies In intra-Party intrigues.
These elements of instability will subject the leadership to strain during the nextyears as difficult policy problems arise. We think it probable, however, that only the moat severe problems could threaten the present leadership arrangements.will almost certainly attempt further to consolidate his position, perhaps following up tho Presidium purge with the elimination of opponents in the Central Committee as well In view of his present strength and demonstrated political skill, only an issue grave enough toeneral coalition againat him appoars likely to upset him or to force him into more than temporary
But considering the magnitude of the problems which the regime faces, and the
risks of failure In the bold programs which Khrushchev has undertaken, we believe that Issues of such gravity could arise. Forthe dislocations created by his Industrial reorganization program, coming on top of an overambitlous combination of programsheavy Industry, agriculture, andmight so aggravate existing problems as toevere crisis. So mightpolicy moves which appeared to raise the risk of general warevel consideredby spirits less bold and confident than Khrushchev. In such grave Instances hisand perhaps even his defeatedmightormidable challenge.
We do not regard Khrushchev'sof Stalin's use of terror against political opponentsuarantee that, under such circumstances, or perhaps even Inof them, he would not seek to reinslllul* police terror to achieve absolute rule.we think It probable that, if other means were exhausted, he would make such an attempt. But important elements among the elite groups would be alert to, and would probably oppose,ecourse to terror were Involved.
Whatever developments occur within the Soviet leadership over the next five years, they are not likely to result In widespread civil violence or to-involve broad sections of the population in active politics. Instead, wethat any changes which take place will be confinedelatively small group which will continue to monopolize political power, although ll may exercise Ihat poweromewhat greater regard for public morale.
Changes in Internal Policy
t present, despite the many problems created by thc changes in Interna) policy, thc regime's positionis the populationbasicallyumber ofof stability have long been evident: thc regime's monopoly of physical force and the means of communication, the vested Interests which tie Important groups to the existing system, tho unifying effect exerted by theide-spread apathy towards politics
a general disbelief In the possibility of radical change. In addition, Westernwith the Soviet population haveide-spread sense of national pride over the USSR's material accomplishments and its role as leaderorld bloc,
Nevertheless, Stalin's successorsthat his policies toward the Soviethad produced so much apathy,and fear thai they were depriving the regime of popular support and Inhibitinggrowth. Although diflerlng among themselves on many Issues, they generally agreed on the need, while maintaining as much control as possible, to find ways lothe rift between the regime and theIn contrast to Stalin's harshness and mistrust, they apparently started from the premise that the Soviet citizenasically loyal supporter whose energy and InlUative, if encouraged and rewarded rather thancan servo the regime's purposes. Most of thc post-Stalin internal changes stem from this premise, of which Khrushchev Is the prime exponent. He Is, however, no less an exponent of the equally Important principle that the Party retains unlimited rights tothe pace and scope of relaxation, to reverse it at will, and to intervene at alt levels of society.
in consequence, changes have beenbut cautious. In the political sphere, they include the leashing of police terror, the destruction of the Stalin cult (but also thc endorsement of much of Stalin'snd an effort to humanize the style of leadership, both central and local, so as to narrow the rift dividing those in authority from the masses. Within the Partyumber of special channels by-passing the formal organization have been eliminated, the semblance ofprocedures has been revived, and "loyal" criticism from rank-and-file members Is encouraged in an effort lo restore the Party's vigor and make it an effective political instrument In economic matters, incentives are more widely usederies ofreforms, culminatingadicalof induslrial administration, has sought to make belter use of specialist knowl-
edge, local talent, and individual initiative. In the intellectual sphere, the regime hascensorship to allow greater artisticand has permitted, even encouraged In some cases, wider contacts with the Westariety of levels.
Impact on Popular Altitudes
These Innovations have produced mixed results. The lessening of terror has won theavorable reaction from all sections of lhe population. Economic responses are less clear.art of the gain Inoutput Is attributable to Improved morale among the peasants, but thefor increases in worker productivity and for the rapid Introduction of newboih dependent upon broad initiative, have to date fallen short of the regime's expectations.
Results in the intellectual held have also been largely disagreeable to the SovietWider contacts with foreign countries have opened the USSR to disturbingnot only from the Free World but also from Eastern Europe and Communist China. Youthful nonconformity Is an Increasing problem, especially on the occasions when it extends beyond rebelliousness to disagreement with the official line on matters ofroup of writers has arisen who, with bold criticism of the harsh and unpleasant aspects of Soviet life, are spreadingmall but increasing circle oflimate ofand of impatience with the pace of official reforms.
This consequence of de-Stallnl/allon, stemming from many ot the same causes which produced direct challenges to Soviet rule In Poland and Hungary, has led the regime to define more sharply the limits of its liberalisation program. Just as the Polish and Hungarian events led to renewed stress on Soviet leadership of the Bloc, so theviews of writers and students have been counteredeasscrtion of Party Infallibility. As part of the effort to stifle negative criticism, the propaganda line on Stalin has shifted: none of the crimes charged to him by Khrushchev has been whitewashed.
emphasis is now laid upon his "positive achievements" and on those ol his Ideological formulations still regarded as valid. The publication tn7 ot Khrushchev's vigorous alUck on dissident authors, like his recent endorsements of hard-line leaders ln Czechoslovakia and East Germany, served notice that the June purge, with itsof dogmatism, was not to be takenicense for continued liberties.
Probciblo Developments In Domestic Policy
Wc do not believe that thehange in thc regime's basic Intentions. Rather they appear to be anto correct extreme Interpretations of approved policies. Over tho next several years, the regime Is likely to continue itsexperiments, especially in the economic field, constantly readjusting its policies In searchetter balance between freedom and coercion. We do not believe that the trend towards reform is as yet Irreversible, and under circumstances of political crisismay occur. Khrushchev's increasing ascendancy, by freeing him from the need to defend his past policies against thc criticism of his colleagues, might facilitate such aIn response to difficulties or changed conditions. But the longer the period of relaxation Is maintained, the higher the price thc regime must pay. ln terms ofpopular support and new disruption of the machinery of control, If It chooses toto wholesale harshness ln its dealing with the population.
Barringeturn, we estimate that, over the next several years, thc fear andwhich Stalinism produced will slowly diminish. Among the majority, this processprobably leadomewhat closerwith the regime, which is being given credit for ending fears of the police andliving standards. But the regime's own liberalising policies, as well as Khru-
-Km *promises, raise thethat popular expectations will outrun actual gains and generate morethanmall minority, made
up chiefly of students nnd intellectuals Infields, appears already to have become so Independent In its thinking that it cannot be brought, cither by persuasion or pressurehole hearted acceptance of the regime. This group probably will maintain attitudes of dissatisfaction and even some oppositional feelings unless changes proceed far faster Ihan Is likely. Since these people areosition to Influence thc public opinion now emerging In the USSR, they may be subjected to sterner measures in tho future.
The regime's chief Instrument forthe reform process Is the Party. With the downgrading of the secret police, the Party organization assumed newfor Insuring political conformity; with tho abolition of most economic ministries, it nowuch larger role In carrying outeconomic policies. Itsfor these assignments are uncertain; thus far It has demonstrated no markedin eliminating dissent and has evenew signs ot being Itself infected with the same dissatisfactions which are agitating students and intellectuals. If the Party proves Inadequate to these tasks, possibilities for success of the regime's ambitious economic and political programs will be greatly
The role of the Party becomes even more criucal when viewederspecUvebeyond the period of this estimate. It ls far from certain that the Soviet citizen can be educatedigher level, urged to exercise his own initiative, given increasingfor comparisons with other countries and encouraged toignificantin his living standard, and at the same time submit without question to awhich incessantly proclaims, andexercises, the right lo make alldecisions for him, regardless of his personal desires. The regime's best hope of managing the resulting tension lies in the activityisciplined minority, able,highly resourceful, but completelyto thc wishes of Its leaders. Despite its highly favored position, this minority itself Is subject to many of the same tensions as the
at large. Eventually it may turn out that the benevolent totalitarianism which Stalin's successors seek to achieve is ancontradiction and that the forces re-
leased In the search for it will require theto revert to earlier patterns of control or to permit an evolution In some new
II. TRENDS IN THE SOVIET ECONOMY
in Economic Policy
he Soviet leaders continue to view their economy primarily as an instrument for the creation ot national power. Thus heavyand particularly military production, retain first-priority status. But the gap in the priority structure which separates heavy industry from other sectors is being narrowedew attitude toward consumption. Along with the traditional emphasis upon heavyhigher living standards are being sought In an effort to stimulate higher labor productivity, to generate some active support among the Soviet population, and to remove the stigma of poverty from Communism In order to increase its attractiveness at home and abroad.
ccompanyuig this modification ofrigid prioritiesecognition that many of his economic methodsreliance morecoercion than on Incentives, extremeof administration, resistance toare ill-suited to thc currentof the Soviet economy. Thus his successors have exhibited more concern with material incentives and more readiness toexemplified In such ventures as thc New Lands and corn programs in agriculture and the administrative reorganization InThese sweeping moves have been accompaniedarge number of lesserall designed lo modernize anwhich, despite Its rapid growth, was still being managed by methods developed during prewnr years. Khrushchev has been the chief sponsor of these changes, and his presentsuggests that, apart from such basic matters as stale ownership and centralall of the institutional features andpractices of the Soviet economy are subject to critical review
oth these tendenciesto modify thcof priorities and to revise the economic structure itselfarc exemplified In the policy ieclsions of the lastonths. First, when
production results6 indicated that the very high growth rates of the five-year plan were threatenedailure to build enough new industrial capacity, the Soviet leaders refrained from the traditional response of cutting Into the consumer sector for extra resources to meet the targets In heavyInstead, they accepted the necessity of atemporary slowdown in Industrial growth, meanwhile increasing allocations to agriculture and housing. Second,seized upon the defects of the ministerial structure as responsible for the difficulties experienced6 and embarkedadical reorganization as the means ofthe tempo of industrial advance.
uring the next five years, il is almost certain that various ambitious programs for defense. Industrial growth, and popularwill turn out to be incompatible. In these circumstances, we believe that thedefense program would not becurtailod. But thc investment resources needed In industry to make acceptabletowards overtaking American industry might conflict with the requirements ofofficials for expanded militaryFurthermore. Khrushchev's sweeping pledges to improve consumer welfare, madeid for popular support in thc aftermath of the Satellite crisis and during Uie Presidium struggle, commit him toalpable increase In consumption. Well before they reach their targets, however, his agricultural and housing programs will probably compete with defense and industrial investment for both materials and labor.
he difficulty of pursuing all these goals simultaneously probably lay behind theto abandon the Sixth Five-Yearn favoreven-year plan. Apparently the regime wished to erase from public0 targels which it doubted its ability fully to meet. Probably it Judged that, in tho light of Industrial lags
seehe original targets for this sector, particularly those tor some key industrial materials, could not be reached without cutting too deeply into other programs. If this Interpretation is correct, abandonment ot thc original plan appears to reaffirm and to extend into the future the decision, embodied in7 plan, not to put all-out stress on heavy industryof the cost to other economic goals. The Issue of competing priorities, however, has not been finally settled by this action and ls certain to arise again.
Prospects for Economic Growih
Soviet economic growth during thcfive years will continue to be faster than that of the US, though somewhat slower than thc pace achieved during thc Fifth Five-Year. Thc principal factorsthe past rapid rate of growth haveigh level of investment concentrated In sectors providing most rapid growth. Increases In the industrial labor force, and gams Inefficiency. We believeigh level of Investment will be maintained, amounting to more than one-quarter of GNP (ln the US. investment's share Is about one fifth).In thereater share of total Investment will have to be directed toin which the returns, in terms ofproduction, arc relatively low. These programs include expansion of the fuel and raw material base,hronic lag In new construction finally produced severe supply stringenciesevelopment of theregions, where initial Investmentare high; and the large effort InTotal output will grow less rapidly undera distribution of investment than It didreater share uf funds were directed into such sectors as machine-building and chemicals.
Another major limitation upon rapid growth is the fact that the labor force will not grow as rapidly as before, especially to-*ard the end oferiod, as war->ediiced age groups move into employment "nereas during thehe labor lorce grew by an averageillion new
workers each year (appatcntly with the aid of some reduction of miliiary personnel after the Korean. population growth will provide an average of only aboutillion. The planned reduction fromoours in the industrial work week, which will probably be carried out. will reduce the net gain in labor time even further. On the other hand, if further reductions in military manpower occur, they will have some offsetting influence.
For these reasons, and because laborbe freely drawn from agriculture, the USSR must rely heavily on productivity gains to maintain the extremely high growth rates It desires. There is much room In thc Soviet economy for gains in labor productivityfrom thc use of moreider and more preciseof Incentives, and from Improved efficiencyultitude of planning andactivities.esult of the vigorous attention being given to such problems and Khrushchev's relatively undogmatic approach to them,expect continued gains Ln labor productivity over the next five years. The Impetus tobtained from this source, however, seems unlikely to be so great as to offset the limitations cited above.
Thus we estimate that the average yearly growth of Soviet GNP will drop from perhaps as much as seven percent in recent years to around six percent during the next five years. Even so. the USSR will slowly gain fuither ground upon the US economy, which Islo grow al an annual rate ofercent. In dollar terms, Soviet ONP will rise from aboutercent of US GNP6 to aboutercenlhe USSR nnd the US. however, will allocate resources in sharply different ways.NP only two-fifths that of the US, the dollar value of Sovicl defense expenditures Is estimated to be about equal to those of the US. andisercent as large as American investment; Soviet consumption outlays, on the other hand,ollar value only about one-quarter that of US
-TO P- -
in Defense Expenditures1
c estimate that7 Soviet defense expenditures are aboutercent of GNP in terms of rubles (the comparable US figure In dollars ist our estimates of military trends are correct, defensewill increase gradually, reachingevel one-quarter to one-third higher than at present- Since GNP will probablyat the same rate or faster, the relative burden on the economy will become no heavier In the aggregate, although defense needs will have to compete with other programs forand for specific industrial products, such as electronics.
Most of the increase in defensewill be caused by increasing allocations to aircraft, guided missiles, military research and development, and nuclear weapons. These programs together probably account for more thanercent of totalat present.2 they are expected to require aboutercent more resources and to account for nearlyercent of total defense programs.
Soviet defense expenditures in recent years, when converted inlo dollar values,to be of roughly thc same magnitude as US defense expenditures. Thus the Soviet defense effort, which consumes about one-seventh of the USSR's much smaller GNP, produces military goods and servicesollar value roughly the same as the US. This Is owing primarily to the facts that in the USSR military end-items are less expensive, relative to consumption items, than they are In the US, and that the average level of real pay and subsistence provided Soviet military personnel Is much lower than in the US.
Soviet leadership remainsrapid industrial growth, with theof overtaking US Industry in per The now defunct Sixth Fivc-
Estimates of Soviet defense expenditures arc subjectider margin of error than other statistical estimates In this section and should therefore be used with ercater caution.
Year Plan, however, alreadyowerpercenttheercent claimed during the Fifth. Even this target now is apparently Judged loo high. As for overtaking the US, total Soviet output ls Increasing faster than US production but is still less than half that of American industry (see
Cumulative failures in completing new Installations for several basic industriesoint6 which producedimbalances in the Soviet economy andeduction of goals in7 plan.ndicates that thesewere not overcomeoreover, the building of new capacity for coal, iron ore, rolled steel, and electric power almost certainly continued to lagplan. Accelerated production gains would have been necessary during the next three years if the0 targets for these commodities, vital to the growth of other industrial sectors, were to be met.
The Soviet leaders hope that the slower growth of the industrial labor force will be offset to some degree by Increased production per worker. One of the most importantfor raising productivity is theand re-equipment of industrial plants. This program, of which automation is theexpression, has lagged behind schedule, however, and Seems unlikely to catch up.hole probably will have to bear the brunt of increased investment in thesectors and also the reduction in total investment at which Soviet sources have hinted in discussion of plan revisions.industry, furthermore, increased demands for Investment In raw materials may require machine-building, upon which theprogram depends, to get along with less. Apart from Investment problems,difficulties in getting new machinery first into large scale production and then into use continue to plague Soviet industry. The productivity gains from modernization,while contributing substantially togrowth, are likely to fall short of the USSR's high expectations.
US AND USSR
OUTPUT OF SELECTED PRODUCTS
ANNUAL PERCENTAGE INCREASES IN OUTPUT OF SELECTED COMMODITIES
km -'n miaoin*
The Khrushchev regime has laid great stress on another means of raisingby Improvement of general economic administration and plant management. Thc major Innovation in this field Is theof most industrial ministriesegional economic councils. Basically, the new structure attempts to distinguishthose decisions which deAne national policy and those which concern Its detailed execution and, while maintaining Moscow's monopoly ln thc first sphere, to leave the second to officials on the spot. We do not believe, however, that the reorganizationwill make much contribution to Industrial growth. The inevitable period of initialwill perhaps last longer thanEven over the long run, while many sources of Inefficiency will be eliminated, the regional system promises to breed its own bureaucratic excesses and perhaps, because of its greater susceptibility to local Interests and consumer pressures, to deform central policyet gain will probably result, but this Is likely to be rather small unless the reorganization is followed by other reforms which arc at present only in the discussion stage, such as expansion of managerialore realistic pricing system, and improved criteria for economic performance.
uring the coming five years, large-scale transfers of labor from agriculture ln order to compensate for productivity shortfalls inwill be much more difficult to carry out than in thc past. Agriculturalwhich declined steadily during Stalin's later years, has risen with thc higher priority which his successors have attached to this lector. While one of the ultimate alms of the agricultural program Is to resume the flow ofInto Industry, the immediate goal Is to ^crease output. During the next five years. HS" agricultural programs seem asncroase 'abor requirements as to. Kh["shchev will be loath to rc-co the agricultural labor force untilsuccesses are achieved.
t aPP<*rs that the lag in pro-"cuon of basic materials and the relative "necnclcs in labor and especially In invest-
ment funds available to industry will resultomewhat slower growth of Industrial production than In the past.ery large Increase estimatedercentthe Fifth Five-Year Plan, we believe that the gain72 will probably beercent
The Consumption Program
A third major economic task Is fulfillment of Khrushchev's consumption goals, which are more ambitious and more specific than those embodied in Malenkov's economic policy. In place of MalenkoVs emphasis upon light Industry, priority Is now focussed upon agriculture and housing. The goals are unlikely to be attained on schedule, but even the effort required to make substantialtoward them may involve sharpwith other priorities. In the distribution of stnto investment, for example, agriculture and housing together, which rocolved less than onc-fourlh of the totalotone-third in7 plan. Again, In Its attempt to increase peasant Incentives, the state markedly increased the prices it pays for deliveries of agricultural products. GreatIs being attached to the state farms, which ate currently being rapidly expanded, partly nt the expense of the collective farm sector.
The major agricultural target is to reach American levels of per capita production of milk and meat, the formerhe latter. Fodder supplies are the primary obstacle,arge increase in the grain harvest Is hoped for. This Increase Is to be obtained from reduced losses as moremakes possible faster harvesting, from higher yields resulting from betterpractices, and from some furtherof cultivatedlan has been launched to Increase the New Lands acreage by about one third in the next two years, partly lo provide for proper crop rotation, and Khrushchev may be considering even further expansions of cultivation Into marginal areas. The New Landi and any future additions will produce lower crop yields than thosein the traditional areas of cultivation and
be subject to frequent failures, but we estimate that they will increase theost acceptable to the Soviet
While many of the major commodity goals cannot be met, agricultural productionhole will Increase faster than population growth and may2 be nearly one-fifth over the peakchievement of US levels ot per capita meat and milk output on thc stipulated schedule ls out of the question, but thc progress recently made and the great emphasis now being placed on these branches suggest that the Soviet consumer willubstantial increase in supplies of animal products.
Thc housing decree ofaised the Sixth Five-Year Plan targetillionillion square meters. While the state left its own house-building target virtually unchanged, it did increase by about one-fifth the allocation devoted to meeting that target, and it also committed itself to providematerials to private builders. If the housing goal is to be met,ubstantial above-plan increase In production of building materials or diversion of them from other uses will probably be necessary. Fulfillment would raise urban housing space per capita above the level attained hefore forcedwas launched three decades ago. but would still leave the Soviet population very poorly housed by Western standards.
if these and other programs to raiseliving standards retain their presentthey will probablyain of perhaps as much as one-fifth In per capita consumption7s has been true for the last two or three years, this increase will probably be spread over the bulk of the population rather than directed toward small favored groups.esult, the regime wnl probably enjoy some Increase in popular support. On the other hand, Soviet failure to rnaxe at least the above estimated progress toward, higher living standards wouldundermine Khrushchev's attempt to create an imageegime dedicatedelfare and determined to fulfill its promises to the people. Such a
failure would tend to weaken popular support and might even, by its effect upon workerdamage the prospects for economic growth. To some extent, therefore, thefreedom of action relative to thehas beer, diminished, and the cost of regaining it has been increased.
Foreign trade continues to be of minor Importance to the Soviet economy,for only about two percent of ONP, While earlier attitudes of rigid autarky havesomewhat, the USSR is still far from willing to abandon considerations ofand to enter world markets whenever opportuniries arise for economic gain. Trade is instead conducted for quite specificfrequently political, and Bloc members or potential allies are preferred as trading partners.
Soviet imports and exports together rose by about one-tenth6otal ol9 billion. Other Bloc states continued to account for about three-quarters of this trade; exchanges with the European Satellites grew by about five percent, and those withChina fell as Soviet aid shipmentsThe USSR and other Bloc members continued to boost their trade withcountries, andG five suchAfghanistan, Iceland, Egypt,and Burmaconducted more thanercent of their total trade with Bloc partners.
The USSR's harsh economic exploitation of the Satellites, which had gradually softened In thc years following Stalin's death, virtually ended laieonsequence ofdecisions in the wake of thc Polish and Hungarian crises, the USSH has assisted the East European regimes with new credits and the cancellation of old obligations, whichwill cost5 billion over the next decade. Soviet exports to this area have increased significantly, but the return flow of goods has grown slightly If at all. Thcpattern of exchange requires the USSR to increase its shipments of grain and scarce industrial materials such as steel, coal, Iron ore, and nonferrous metals, while slmulta-
importing less Polish coal andoil. While these shifts arc lessifficulty to the USSR than are its domestic economic problems, they do serve to aggravate thc solution of these larger difficulties.
rade outside the Bloc remainsin the developed nations of Western Europe, which continue to account for about four-fifths of Soviet trade with the Free World. But Soviet trade with the underdeveloped countries, though small, Is rising;6 it grew byercentotal of0 million. This trade Is still roughly ln balance, and drawings on nonmilitary credits extended by the USSR have amounted to slightly0 million since the Inception of thisThus the credit program, of which the USSR has provided0 million out of the Bloc total5 billion, is asegligible drain on the Soviet economy. Even when the utilization of these creditsthe net drain to the domestic economy will be small. The slowdown7 in
extension of new Soviet credits is due to the exhaustion of the most ready opportunities during the preceding two years rather than to limitations upon Soviet economicThe USSR will continue to press its foreign credits wherever It sees potentialgains, nnd considerations of economic Impact on thc USSR will remain relativelyunless thc magnitude of theincreases drastically.
71a. CmlAir. The USSR ls ln the first stagesetermined and vigorous program to enter International air routes and ts embarking on an ambitious program toodern civil air fleet. In entering international air routes thc USSR is probably motivated more by political than by commercialThe USSR apparently has now realized the significance of civil aviation capabilities as an clement of national power and prestige and isrowing capability Ln this field.
S EC H'P-
III. TRENDS IN SOVIET SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY1
closely-controlled Soviet scientific effort haa focussed preponderantly on the buildingtrong Industrial base and the development of modern weapons. The USSR has placed great emphasis on science andand has concentrated manpower and facilities In an effort to achieve the highgoals which It has established forproduction and for the Industrial base.onsequence, the USSR's achievements in areas of critical military and Industrial significance arc comparable to, and In some cases exceed, those of the United States.in arens to which the Soviets assign low priorities lends to progressuch slower rate.
Highest priority wiil continue lo belo milltary-Industrial research andbut the rapid expansion of Soviet scientific resources will now permit greater flexibility. Greater Individual Initiative win probably be encouraged within assigned tasks of research, basic research In new fieldsand somewhat more scientific andeffort allocated to the consumer sector of the economy. Better direction ofresearch Is likely. As part of thereorganization of the Soviet economy, efforts are apparently being made to improve coordination of the Soviet scientific andeffort, and industrial research andwill probably be brought into bet-Jer balance with production requirements at lhe local as well as national levels. At the same time, ideological obstacles lo scientific icsearch and development (never of much consequence in major Industrial or war-sup-
, dsl wmcontinue toin the fields previously affected. TheseS'ther with continued emphasis on increasing scientific resources, willto further substantial gains In Sovieta^ technology over the next five years.
Scientific Manpower, Training, and Facilities
The reservoir of scientifically andtrained manpower available to theUnion hu mcreased tremendously in the postwar period. Of the estimatedotaliving graduates ofscientific and technical curricula,ave graduated since the end of World War II. The total number ofactually employed In aU scientific and technical fields In the USSR now exceeds those so employed In the US (see Chart on followinge estimate that tho high graduation rates of recent years will continue during the period of this estimate.2 the USSR will probably have aboutercent moreengaged In scientific and technical work lhan the US In thc particular fields ofsciences and engineering, the number of Soviet scientists engaged in research and teaching is substantially smaller than in the US However. Soviet emphasis on research in military and basic Industrial fields probably resultsear numerical equality between the two countries In scientific manpowerto these critical activities.
In the postwar period the quality ofscientific training has approached, and in some cases surpassed. US levels.training In the USSR, while not as broad as that given an engineer in the West Is good within the particular field ofSome deficiencies continue in the practical and experimental aspects ofparticularly in some fields of biology and engineering, although efforts are being marie to overcome them. Tlie USSR is also not as well supplied with nonprofessionalmechanics, and maintenance men as are the Western Industrial countries, where broader sections of the population havemechanical skillsonger period. Considerable progress is being made Inthe supply of such personnel, but shortages of skilled technicians will persist in the USSR as In other countries.
US AND USSR
OF HIGHER EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS EMPLOYED IN SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL FIELDS
Union Uniied Staiei
Sovie* Union Un'ied Stale*
Union Uniied Slam'
SOVIET KANDIDATS AND AMERICANN SCIENTIFIC FIELDS"
Soviet Union Untied Stoim
oviet scientific facilities, in terms ofsupport, organizational direction, and number and quality of laboratories, areadequate for thc effective utilization of scientific talent.ew fields Sovietare superior to correspondingin lhe West. Notable In this regard are certain high energy particle accelerators and electronics research establishments.some shortages of complex research instruments arc believed to exist, theydo not significantly hamper researchof major importance. For Instance, though thc USonsiderably largerof high speed electronic computers than lhe USSR, the number of computer hours actually utilized for high priority research is probably nearly the same, since Sovietare not called upon to serve routine business and government functions.
uring the next five years the Sovietwill continue efforts to improve Itsin scientific instrumentation. More highly qualified engineers will probably be made available for the development andof scientific equipment, especially In priority research areas, and an increasing amount of equipment will reflect original design concepts
he Satellites continue to makecontributions to Soviet technologicalin certain fields, principally inelectrical measuring instruments,communication equipment, synthetic fibers, and pharmaceuticals. However, the Importance of Satellite contributions Isas Soviet capabilities In these fields Improve.
he USSR is also progressively lesson Western research andNevertheless, the Soviet leaders haveolicy of acknowledging foreign achievement and encouraging maximum use of foreign experience. The USSR Is clearly anxious to take advantage of the possibilities in international scientific exchange, and to make Soviet scientists fully conversant with developments in the West. The All-Union Institute of Scientific and Technicalof the Academy of Sciences publishes and
circulates extensive abstracts of foreign Jour-nals. and at least in high priority fieldsscientists have access to the full range of scientific research published throughout the world.
Scientific Capabilities in Major Scicnlific Fields
oviet scientists have made strikingover the past few years in many areas ol fundamental research. In mathematics, many fields of physics,ew fields of chemistry, fundamental research appears to be comparable In quality to that performed in the US. In at least some fields, the best Soviet scientists are as gifted and competent as the best in the West, andimilar potential for wholly new discoveries.
Atomic Energy* There is substantialthat the USSR is continuing to expand steadily not only its military atomic energy activities but its program for nonmllltary uses. We estimate that the Soviet atomic energy program will continue to enjoy the very high priority that has been accorded to It in the past The USSR is conductingresearch In all major fields related to atomic energy, including controlledreactions.
Thc USSR is engagedomprehensive reactor development program which willit to keep generally abreast of world progress in this Held. Although the USSRto have revised its ambitiousuclear power goaleg-awatts downegawatts of electric power, this reduced plan is still quiteand Is within Soviet capabilitiesigh priority effort Is devoted to it The USSR will probably make further offers of technical aid. as well as of assistance in theof nuclear power stations, within the Bloc and to non-Bloc countries.
'For further details on Soviet atomic energysnd nonmllltaryee NIB, -Tlie Soviet Atomic Energy7 (Limitedoviet atomicscUvlllM of direct military significance are discussed below In Chapter IV.
Sciences. Tlie presentot Soviet scientists in the various fields ot physics and mathematics are comparable to those of scientists ln the leading nations of the West. Greatest capabilities arc exhibited ln nuclear physics, solid state physics,physics and high-speed digitalIn the geophysical sciences, Soviet capabilities are also generally comparable to those of leading Western nations; during the next five years significant advances willbe made in geomagnetism, permafrost research, geochemlcal prospecting, and polar geophysics. Recent progress has also been acliieved in chemistry and metallurgy,in high-temperature alloys and ceramic cutting tools. Soviet capabilities In electronic component development will keep pace with those of the West and may lead thc US Ln some respects.
Medical Sciences. Soviet medical practice lags behind that of most major Westernbut appears to meet standards adequate for current civil and military requirements. Clinical practice isair standard in large urban areas but is still backward in rural areas. Medical research, on the other hand, is pursued with vigor and mayevel which approximates or even surpasses that of the US In certain fields relative to military and civilian defense, notably neurophysiology, radiobiology. aeromedlclne, and hematology.
and Agricultural Sciences.biological and agricultural researchbeen generally backward,rend
toward Improvement in the quality ofIs becoming evident as Ideologicalon research diminish. Heavywill be placed on Increasing per-acre crop yield and livestock productivity.
fndiufnof Technology. For thefuture, wc estimate that the over-all level of Soviet Industrial technology will remainthat of the US. However, tho mostSoviet plants arc alreadyar with those in the US, and wc expect the general level of heavy Industrial technology to beStriking progress has been made over the past few years In the theory and practice of automation. Additionaland possibly fully automaticlines will be established during the period of this estimate. There will probably beemphasis on engineering processand on shortening the lead timesto bring developed items IntoHowever, research and technology in consumer goods fields will continue to lag far behind that In thc US.
Miliiaryhe USSR has the capability to develop weapons and military equipment generally equal to those of any other nation. Despite the increasingof military equipment, the USSR will be capable of continuing the successfuland development of modern. Integrated weapon systems.
'Specific Soviet capabilities in miliiary fields are discussed below in Chapter IV,
IV: TRENDS IN THE SOVIET MILITARY POSTURE
MILITARY THINKING AND POLICY
n the years since World War II,ilitary thinking and the Soviet military establishment have beenrocess ofdictated by rapid advances tn military technology and by the fact that the USSR's chief potential enemy, the US, lies beyond the reach of traditional Soviet military power. This rethinking has been reflected In greater emphasis on air defense, submarines, nuclear weapons, long-range bombers, and guidedFurther evolution in Soviet militaryicy and force structure can be expected during the coming period under the Impact of further rapid advances in technology, the urowlh In mutual capabilities for nuclear devastation, and other factors affecting the balance of military power.
fl'J. The chief factor affecting Soviel militarythinking and leading to changes in the Soviet military establishment hasrowing appreciation of the devastation inherent In all-out nuclear conflict, and of the threat to Soviet security and Soviet objectives posed by Western nuclear capabUities. Thishas led to strenuous Soviet efforts toboth adequate air defenses and offensive nuclear capabilities. These efforts, as well as various declarations of Soviet political and military leaders, clearly indicate that the chief military contingency against which the USSR 'eels it must guard is that of general warall-out use of nuclear weapons. The USSR almost certainly believes that the West's current military posture and strategicam such as to compel the West, ifwar occurred, to fight it primarily bymeans.
espite their strenuous efforts to develop nuclear capabilities, the Soviets probably con-*'der that present US capabilities tolear war remain greater than their own. They show acute awareness of the advantageto the US from its deployment of nuclear striking forces on the periphery of the
Bloc as well as within the continental US. We believe that, under these circumstances, the Soviet planners have concluded tbat atthe USSR,turprise attack, would receive unacceptable damageuclear exchange with the US.probable further Improvements In the Soviet nuclear and delivery capabilities over the coming period, the USSR almostwill still not be confident that It can attack the US without receiving unacceptable damage in return. These estimates of Soviet military Judgments underlie our basic(see, chapter VI) that thc USSR will not deliberately Initiatewar or undertake courses of actionrisking general war during lhe periodreview.
n the other hand, the Soviet civilian and military leaders probably regard their own growing nuclear capabilities, added to their already great conventional strength, ascaution on the Western powers. They are probably confident that their own nuclear capabilities have already readied the point where the US and its allies will also beexcept under extreme provocation, from deliberately Initiating general war or trom reacting militarily to any local crisisanner which would gravelyonflict Into general war.
e believe that the highest priorityof Soviet military policy during the period of this estimate will be to maintain, and to develop further, such formidable nuclear capabilities as to continue to deter the US from resorting to all-out nuclear conflict nn any provocation save the most extreme threat to national survival and to supportof an aggressive foreign policy. But the Soviets must recognize that theof miscalculation In crisis situations are such that general war might nevertheless occur, and that preparedness for It Is therefore
Fot this and other obvious reasons they aim eventually tolear military superiority over the US. Accordingly, theplanners probably desire to achieve aattack capability sufficient, together with Uic USSR's air defenses, not only toevastating attack on the US, but also toS nuclear attack on the USSR. to prevent unacceptable damage to the USSR).
iven foreseeable technological devel-'opments and maintenance of US armed strength, however, the Soviets may regard the capability to neutralize US nuclear attack capabilities as unattainable during tlie period of this estimate. On the other hand, they probably consider that although they cannot prevent, even with surpriserippling retaliatory blow, they can maintain suchto damage the US as will deter the US from resorting to general war. To this end they musttrong long-range bomber striking capability, while they are working to acquire an additional nuclear deliverywith advanced weapon systems,long-range missiles. But thc Sovietmay nevertheless think the prospects for development of advanced weapons systems so promising that they canemporary risk of maintaining their manned bomber force at something less than they wouldconsider desirable.1
n ourajor corollary aim of Soviet military policy, to which the maintenancetrong deterrent posture Is an essentialIs to provide Uie Soviels withsuperiority in situations which they may estimate can be dealt with short of all-out nuclear war. To the extent that such supe-
'As csUmnted elsewhere In this NIB. the USSR must reccgntee that the possibilities ofIn crisis situations are sveh lhatwar might occur, snd that pieparcdnesi for It Is therefore essential. The Assislant Chief of Start, Intelligence. USAK. therefore beUeves that lhe Soviet leaders will not be likely to accept needlessly the mk ol maintaining their long-range bomber capability at less Ihan ihey otherwise would consider desirable, and hea conclusion should be added to theas follows: "However, we think itthe Soviet leaden will Ukeisk."
rlor capabilities can be developed andthey enhance Soviet ability to use the latent threat of military action as anof political warfare.*
An additional objective of Soviet miliiary policy, which has assumed increasedsince the Hungarian revolt and Polish crisis. Ls to ensure essential Soviet control over the European satellites. Whatever plans the USSR might have had to withdraw forces from the Satellites prior to thesewe believe that they must nowan Indefinite retention of Soviet forces In Eastern Europe.
In assessing thc size and types of forces essential to meet the above requirements the Soviets have apparently concluded that they mustarge and diversified forcedesigned loide variety ofWhile they will place further stress on maintaining strong strategicattack capabUiUes and air defenses, the evidence indicates that they also are contln-
' The Aaslstant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,of the Army, believes that. unless balanced by other considerations, represent an overemphasis on one segment of Soviet strategic thinking which is not necessarily the most significant In the Soviet view. In the Soviet view the cOjecUves of any military action would have lo include definite gains for tho Soviet stale. In view of the devastation wblch could result to both aides In an all-out nuclear exchangelmost certain thai they nee no advantage to any one In Initiating such an exchange Rather, they probably Judge that as the nuclear delivery capabilities ol both aides Increase, thc range of Issues over which either lhe Bloc or the Writ would launch all-out nuclear war decreases.
Consequently, since both sides are developing effective (oices to deter all-out nuclear war. the Soviet leaders probably believe that their strong ground, naval, and tactical air forces wouldlesort to local military acUon. withpronpeets of success, to any area where the USts allies could not rapidly reactomparable scale or whore tha issues orwere such that the US and its allies chose not to broaden the conflict. The real threal of Soviet miliiary acUon therefore lies ln the type of situation In which the Sovietsthe Weil while opposing the Bloc would noi risk lhe devastation ot all-out nuclear war.
to modernize and strengthen their forces In other fields In view of their growingof the devastation inherent In all-out nuclear conflict, they must regard the growth of nuclear capabilities on both sides as making each side increasingly reluctant to use such weapons, and logically would not wish to deprive themselves of other militaryIn our view their continued maintenance of strong ground, naval, and tactical air forces, indicates their belief that such forces, equipped with convenlional and nuclear weapons, would be of great Importance In both general war and limited conflicts.
ince an important technologicalby cither side could greatly affect the present balance of military power, the USSR will continue to devote the highest priority to weapons research and development It will produce advanced weapon systems Inquantities using such weapons toits existing military capabilities. Wc think it will not make early major alterations In Its present force stfucture. although such factors as the increasing cost and complexity of new weapons and equipment, thedemands of highly Important nonmllltary programs, and the rapid obsolescence oftypes of military equipment will probably dictate some alterations in the presentof Soviet forces over the next five years.
ikelihood of Force Reductions. The USSR has publicized two reductions inpersonnel strength: theut, was announced In5 andwas claimed by the end of that yew; theillion cut, was announced Inith completion promised byn our last estimate In this series, we concluded that total Soviet militaryhad probably increased during the Korean War period and that the first of the two Soviel claims may have relatedost-Korean reduction in force levels. Further evidence and analysis supports the belief that substantial changes in numerical strength hove in fact occurred. The pattern ofcall-ups and terms of service over the past decade suggests that military manpower may have increasedeak of around six million In thes, and has been re-
duced substantially during the past several years. Moreover, recent analysis of Soviet statistics reveals Increases in civilianwhich point to the possibility of aflow from the armed forceshus the USSR, In announcing forcemay have been taking propaganda credit for force reductions from peak Korean War levels which had been made In large part prior to the announcements.
Some reductions probably continued to take place after the6 Sovietbut evidence is lacking as to the extent of these cuts. The promised token withdrawals from East Germany were actually carried out with much publicity Innd there wereelective weeding out of officers and men elsewhere In the Soviet forces. But in the fall6 there were reports that demobilization had been halted; since then we have had no evidence of further cuts, and Soviet propaganda has failed to make the claims that we would have expected had thc announced cuts been completed. Therefore, we do not believe that cuts of the size the* USSR announced In6 for completion by7 were carried out during that period. The disturbances in East Europe innd further uncertaintiesby the Middle East situation, may have led to Soviet suspension of suchplans.
In any event, with respect to currentmilitary personnel strength, there Lsagreement between our estimates made on the basis of unit order of battle and those made by analyzing conscription trends and population and labor statistics. On the basis of estimated order of battle, lots] Soviet active miliiary personnel as ofould be. includingn the groundn the air forcesaval Aviationn the navy, and0 whose subordination Is unknown
"In addition, there ire anin Soviet security forces, ror detailed personnel ilrrneth esUmates of Soviet and olher Bloc military forces Inee Annex Table l.
of thc shortage of manpower In thc Soviet economy and for various othernoted elsewhere In this estimateVI.he Soviet leaders probably believe that some further reductions In the numerical strength of their armed forces would be desirable. The relatively great size of Soviet forces-In-being maythe Soviet leaders that some reductions can be made without undue prejudice to the security or other interests of the USSR Whether Soviet forces arc In fact reduced, however, will dependreat extent on the degree of danger and tension that the Soviet leaders feel in the international situation. It Is possible that they will conduct their policy Inay as significantly lo increasetensions, and thus to require armed forces as large, or even larger, than they have at the present day. We think it more likely that there will be some further reduction In Soviet force strength! during the period of this estimate, but we do not believe that the reduction will be substantia).
Soviet Military Policy Toward theThe Soviet leaders regard Die Satellite area In general as vital to the military posture of the USSR, both as an extension of the de-fenso perimeter of the homeland andase for Bloc offensive power. Even prior to the Polish and Hungarian uprisings the USSR probably had some reservations concerning thc reliability of Satellite military forces, but we believe the events of last fall have rein-forced Soviet determination to maintainSoviet forces in and near thefor an indefinite period. However, addi-tlonal token withdrawals from East Germany may occur, and there may be some reduction In present Soviet strength in Hungary as the local situation stabilizes.
The events of last autumn probably re-emphasized to Soviet leaders the desirability of using the Warsaw Pact, an ostensiblymutual defense arrangement, as the basis for Soviet-Satellite military relations. Under this pact the USSR will continue its efforts to develop and maintain reliable and effective Satellite forces, but it will probably not permit any significant expansion of these forces.
TRENDS IN SPECIALIZED SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES
USSR Isoncerted efforta variety of improved nuclearparticularly those employingprinciples. Of theovietdetected between9otal ofaveC
We estimate that ile7 couldariety of nuclear weapons, with yields ranging fromilotons (KT) up into the megaton range.
general, we anticipate that thebe capable of producing improvedof the yields andto support Itshe most powerful Sovietprobably yield up toT, butyields of missile warheads willto be considerably less than this.lo thermonuclear weapons, aof fission weapons, Includinglow-yield weapons, will becomeWc believe that development ofwill require additional testing.of such tests, however, would notSoviet stockpiling of very high8 MT) weapons on an emergencybasis,
weubstantiallor the expansion of fissionableproduction, the availability of suchwin continue throughout tlie periodestimate toimiting factor Inthe size of many military andprograms. Our estimate ofquantities of nuclearfor weapon uses Is given below.have been calculated by deducting
detailed esllmales of Soviet capabilities in nuclear weapons design and dates of availability, sec2 il. The Soviet Atomic Energy7 May IBM (Limited Distribution).
till ma led producllon those quantities of nuclear materials estimated to meetuclear test expenditures, and to meet the Inventory and fuel requirements of research and power reactors. No deductions have been made for production reactor expenditures,nuclear tests, propulsion applications, or materials tied up In weapons manufacturing pipelines.ajor nuclear propulsionwere undertaken, this would require substantial allocations of nuclear material."
The uncertainty in our estimatevailability throughs large but probably docs not exceed cnc-hall to twice thc value shown. The uncertainty in our estimate of cumulative availability of Plutonium equivalent throughoes not exceed plus or minusercent of the value shown. These uncertaintiesrapidly as the estimate Is extended into tbe future, and no meaningful numerical range of uncertainty can be given beyond
hile there Is considerable evidence to indicate the types of weapons the USSR is probably stockpiling and the delivery systems it contemplates, there Is no direct evidence touantitative estimate ot the Soviet weapons stockpile by type.
'Trie Director of Naval Intelligence docs notIn thc quantities of fissionable materials listed herein as available for weapons uses, nor tn the estimated production or fissionableupon which these figures are based. He believes that the quanUUes of material which will De available for weapons use will notthe lower limit of uncertainty Indicated for the estimate.
'The term -Plutonium equivalent" Is usedour method of estimation does not permit us to distinguish between Plutonium.ritium, or any other reactor-produced
hc USSR Is capable of developing and producing during the period of this estimate advanced types of guided missile systems inategories, and its research andprogram in the guJded missile field will continue toery high priority. The USSR Is also capable of developing various sizes of nuclear, high explosivend chemical (CW) warheads for its guidedalthough the availability of fissionable materials will limit the extent of nuclearproduction during the period of this
urjcce-to-Air Missiles: An extensiveof surface-to-air guided missileIs now operational in the Moscow area, and similar installations appear to be under construction at Leningrad. The Moscowwhich couldimited number of nuclear warheads, can probablyery high rate of fire against multiple targets at altitudes up to0 feet, although it is probably vulnerable to very low altitude attack.urface-to-airwith increased range and altitudefor static defense of target complexes, and with low and high altitude capabilities (or defense of static targets, field forces, and naval vessels, could probably becomeThc maximum altitude capabilities of Soviet surface-to-air missile systems willkeep pace with those of operationalbombers and cruise-type missiles. On the other hand, we believe the USSR will not be able to place ineapon system capable of successfully intercepting ballistic missiles by
urface-tc-Surtace Missiles: The probable Soviet firing of two TCBM test vehicles In the summer7 and the successful Soviet launching of earth satellites attest both to the high capabilities of the USSR in long-range ballistic missile development and
ore extended discussion of Soviet guided missiles, see NTEoviet Capabilities and Probable Programs In the Oulded Missile Field.ea also appropriate sections. Slno-Sovlet Bloc Air Defense Capabll-lUcs through6
the extremely high priority this program enjoys. In the light or this and other newwe have re-examined our previousof Soviet ICBM development, and have tentatively advanced9 the probable dateew (say, ten)missilesautical milesange could first be available for operational use. This estimate Is predicated upon;op priority flight test programeriod of about two years from the first firingest missile this summer;aximum range.EP ofnd (c) the equipping of thc firstunit with prototype rather than series produced ICBMs. Early success of any phase of the test program, or relaxed accuracy and reliability requirements, could advance the date of availability."
We have likewise re-evaluated the Soviet program for development ofUMevidence indicates that the USSR has probably elected toissile which ls. missileighter warhead. Withrogram, the USSR could takeof existing development, production, and operational capabilities and could probablyral operational capabilityn. missileost of thetargets on the Eurasian periphery which wc believe the USSR would wish to attack would be within range of this missile fired from within the Bloc. While firm evidence Indicated an early Soviet interest In IRBMs with ranges uphere are no current Indications of development of ballistic missiles of ranges beyondave for the ICBM.
As previously estimated on the basis of considerable evidence, the USSR has developed and could now have available for operational employment at least four shorter-rangemissiles, with maximum ranges of about. We believe tlic Soviet surface-to-surface pro-
-The estimate made In this paragraph must bellative, pending compleUon of SNIB It -lo-ji The Soviet ICBM Program, now In process.
gram also includes submarine-launchedWe estimate that for this purpose the USSR could now have supersonic cruise-type missiles capable of maximum ranges of. and thatupersonic cruise-type missile of up. range could probably become available. To an extent varying with thc missile guidance systemtheir accuracy would depend on the ability of the launching or guidanceto fix its own position.
Other Missile Categories: For Improving thc effectiveness of its Interceptors, the USSR could now have available short-range air-to-air missiles equipped with HE warheads,Including one suitable for all-weatherat ranges up. Soviet air-to-air capabilities will probably improve, and some large-caliber air-to-air rockets or guided missiles could be equipped with. In the air-to-surface category, subsonic missiles capable ofnuclear warheads up to aboutm. could probably now be available, primarily for use as anti-ship weapons, but also suitable tor use against isolated and well-defined radar targets on land.ir-to-surface missile could probably be available for employment by heavy bombers. It will probably also be within Sovietto develop specialized decoys and anti-radar missiles to aid in penetrating enemy
Earth Satellite. In addition to theirpsychological purpose, the artificial earth satellites launched by the USSR arelo acquire data of scientific andvalue While il is too soon to say how much data is being acquired, the satellites launched to date are known to be providing new information on ionospheric effects and refractions at certain radio frequencies, and probably also on the effects of weightless flight and outer space radiation on equipment and living organisms. They are also providing data on pressure, temperature, and meteoric densities at extreme altitudes. Future Soviet earth satellites, which may be launched at any time, will provide additional scientific data contributing to both military and non-military Soviet projects. econnaissance
previously estimated. may be available considerably earlier, Space vehicles and space platforms are almostincluded In Soviet planning.
Chemical and Biological Watfajf.Soviet military doctrine recognizes the potentialities of CW and BW as adjuncts to nuclear and other weapons, and Soviet forces are thoroughly trained in the offensive use oftockpile of CW agents is believed to have been maintained at least at World War II levels, and may have been Increased. It probably consists primarily of such nerve gases as GA (Tabun) and GBs well as some standard agents such as mustard. One of thc "V" scries of nerve agents, far more persistent and toxic than the "G" scries, may have been in production in the USSRffective use would depend on Soviet solution of the problem ofroper aerosol for its dispersal.
Accumulated evidence also indicates an active Soviet BW research and development program encompassing anti-personnel, anti-livestock, and possibly anti-crop agents.relatively little is known about tlie scope of the program, particularly lis offensive aspects, the USSR has probably had afor small-scale, clandestine BWtor at least several years. We have no evidence of large-scale productiongents and munitions, but the USSR has thc facilities, personnel, and materials needed for such production.
In the field of defense against BW and CW. Soviet capabilities are at least comparable to those of the major Western nations, and in the case of CW may be superior. Soviet troops are well-equipped with CW defense Items, and the current Issue gas mask appears to afford adequate protection against inhalation of known agents. Extensive programs are under way to indoctrinate both military personnel and civilians in defensive techniques,
Electromagnetic Warfare, Sovietand defensive programs In this field are likely to be pressed forward. We believe that at present the USSR is capable of Jamming and seriously disrupting Western long-range radio communications, and that
It also has an appreciable capability forWestern bombing and navigational radars. Its jamming capabilities now extend up to frequencies of at0 mc/s;0 some Soviet Jamming equipment could operate at frequencies0r higher. The USSR could also develop devices to enable missiles to home on electronicSoviet forces arc now training In the use of CHAFF, research Is underway on anti-radar coating materials, and we believe the USSR ls developing active airborne jamming equipment. Conversely, known types ofradio and radar equipment are vulnerable to electronic countcrmeasures, particularly Soviet bllnd-bomblng and air defense radars, all of which operateew narrow frequency bands. The USSR Is capable of Increasing Its spread of frequencies and of developing anti-Jamming devices, but2 Sovietelectronic systems will probably still be subject to disruption by properly employed techniques.
TRENDS IN SOVIET MILITARY STRENGTHS Soviet Ground Forces
There has been an extensive program over the past several years to reorganize and modernize the Soviet ground forces to meet the requirements of modern warfare, bothand non-nuclear. More advancedof practically all types of equipment in Soviet line divisions have appeared. The fire power of individual units has been Increased markedly, additional vehicles (Includingvehicles) have been provided, and communications equipment has beenOur evidence on these developments relates primarily to the Group of Soviet Forces. Germany, but we believe they are proceeding throughout the Soviet field forces.
All these changes are in line with revised Soviet tactical doctrine, which emphasizes the need to supplement standard ground force tactics and training with those designed to meet the conditions of nuclear warfare. This doctrine stresses firepower, mobility and maneuverability, greater initiative, deeperIntensified reconnaissance, and the protection of Individuals and units against
effects of atomic and chemical weapons. It also envisages the use of tactical nuclear weapons and guided missiles In support of Soviet field force operations. Thus far,both the revised tactical doctrine and the reorganization of ground force elements reflect evolutionary changes without basic alteration in thc field force structure.
order of battle of Soviet Armyis still estimated atineplus supportingresentsuggests that the actual strengthsunits vary widely accordinglocations. First category units,best equipment and highestare believed to be those near theof the USSR, with second categoryoccupied areas abroad and lowestin the interior of the USSR. Theis probably aboutercent ofstrength; hi border areasprobably exceedsercent, Inand other occupied areas It Isor slightly less, and in remoteit may be as low asercentprobablyigh proportionofficer strength, however, andis believed to be kept locallyThese peacetime manningwith standard conscriptionprograms, would probablySoviet line divisions to be broughtG and permitdditional line divisions30.
urther improvementsfirepower and mobility of Sovietare likely, and there may bealterations In organisation todispersion and flexibility ofweapons and guidednuclear and non-nuclearbecome available In significantduring the period. The USSH willemploy those weapons for relativelysupport of tactical operations,conventional field artilleiy and ungulded
Tor detailed esUmates of the strength ofand other Bloc (round force* In lineas ofsee Annex. Table 7.
rockets will continue lo provide the major direct fire support for units In close combat. Anti-aircraft artillery, on the other hand, will tend to be replaced by guided missiles, first In static defenses within the USSR and later In mobile field force units.
Airborne Forces, increasing attention is now being paid to the development of Soviet airborne and air transportable forces, asby: the rapid augmentation ofcapabilities, especially in assault-type helicopters and converted BULL medium bombers; Uie appearance6 of thowin-turboprop assault transport;ew light-weight self-propelled anti-lank gun for airborne use; and further improvements in personnel and cargoThe USSR has sizable airborne forces In being, estimated ativisionsotal strength ofen. Soviet Aviation of Airborne Troops now compriseswin-engineULLarge helicopters,arge gliders. This strength could besubstantially by other military and civil transports.
Soviet airlift capabilities will increase considerably, primarily ashelicopters and transports areThe largest operational Sovietcan now0en with combatnd1 the USSR could probably have In operationwith payloads up0 lbs. Tht BULL will probably be employed as anmedium transport until late in the period, when it will probably have beenreplaced by the CAMP and possibly other advunccd types. Better auxiliarywill also become available as improved aircraft are introduced into the civil air fleet. New turboprop medium and heavy transports will probably become operationalew four-turbojet transport"
Soviet Air Forces
e estimate the over-all actual strength of Soviet military air units Inat
* Tor estimated performance characterUtles oftransport aircraft, see Annex. Table
ircraft.'* Furtherof all components of thc Soviet air forces vrill occur, and will Include Increases in the proportion of Jet all-weather fighters, in thc numbers of Jet medium and heavy bombers, and the emergence of ainflight refueling capability. The present combat effectiveness of Sovietaviation Ls, on the whole, below that of the US. However, the introduction of new aircraft types and the relatively low turnover of personnel will almost certainly raiseproficiencyigh leveln the long run, guided missiles will replace manned aircraft within many of the missionsby tlie latter, but we doubt that this process will go so far during the period of this estimate as to leadajor reduction In the numbers of Soviet military aircraft.
oviet air capabilities will be augmented by Improvementside variety of ground and airborne supporting equipment,in the electronics field. There will almost certainly be advances in the performance characteristics of early warning, ground-controlled intercept and airborne intercept radars. The accuracy of navigational and bombing radars will probably be improved. There will probably be significant increases in the quantity and quality of ECM equipment and of ground and airborne communications equipment, including modern high-speed data-handling equipment for air defense. Continued expansion of the network ofwell-equipped air facilities Ls also likely."
e estimate thectual strength of Soviet fighter unitset fighters, of whichre In Soviet Fighter Aviation of Air Defense with air defense as their sole mission, while thc remainder are In tactical and naval unils with air defense as one of their missions. At
"For detailed estimates or the strength of Soviet and olher Bloc air forces during the period of this estimate, see Annex,.
"For further Information, see appropriate sections of SNIEoviet Gross CapablUUe* for Attack on the Continental US In mld-IMO. IS January(Limitednd, Slno-Sovlet Bloc Air Defense Capabilities through mid-MM,
presentf these aircraft have at least limited all-weather capabilities;2 all-weather fighters may comprise aboutercent ot total Soviet fighter strength.numerical strength will probably not be Increased and, primarily because of theof guided missileutback In the number of Soviet manned Interceptors will probably begin late in the period. Other factors which might contributeoviet decision to decrease its numerical strength in manned Interceptors Include probableIn the destructive power of Individual Interceptors, and Increased demands oncapacity resulting from the advent of more coinplox fighters.
the subsonic FRESCOis now thc principal equipmentfighter forces, the supersonicfighter and the all-weatherrapidly being phased intoWe estimate thatill probably Introduce new dayfighter types withaltitude and speedat the expense of combat radius;Soviet all-weather fighter willcapable of operating at altitudes upfeet, and of climbing0 feetthan two minutes.**
Aviation includesjet fighter aircraftetThe latter are primarily UseBKAOLE, with combat radiusm.mprovedbombers will probably be introducedIncluding the USSR's firstsupersonic "dash" capabilities."regiments, formerly equipped withaircraft, have been re-equipped with ]et
estimated perforrnance characteristic* and dales ot operaUonal availability of Sovietsee. Slno-Sovlet Bloc Air Defense Capabilities through6B.ndowever, wc nowIt unlikely that the" whlch is Included In these tables, will be placed In operational service.
"For estimated performance and dales ofavailability of Soviet light bombers, see Annex, Table 7.
and Ihere Is conlinulng evidence of the employment of Jet fighter regiments of Tactical Aviation for both ground support and air defense missions.
ong Range Aviation. The capabilities of Soviet Long Range Aviation haveto Increase during the past year. Itsstrength In bomber aircraft has grown fromo. Theof bomber regiments has also Increased, althoughomewhat slower rate thanthc preceding year. Tho trend Inactivities during the year Is believed to have been toward larger-scale operations and longer-range nights out of home base arras, including flights to potential forward staging bases. Inflight refueling has been underfor both the BISON Jet heavy bomber and the BADGER. Jet medium bomber, apparently using convertible tanker-bomber versions of these aircraft, and ls at least in limited use by BISONs assigned tounits, Finally, there is evidence that the USSR has established nuclear weapons storage facilities in the vicinity of Long Range Aviation bases.
ecent evidence indicates that Soviet production of BADGERs. and the number In operational units, are considerably In excess of our previous expectations. We nowthai there wereADGERs in Long Range Aviation units as ofnd on the basis of current evidence weBADGER strength will continue toduring the next year or two. At the same time, the USSR apparently continues to employ the BULL piston medium bomber for training, reconnaissance, bombing, and other purposes, and it is being phased out of Long Range Aviationlower rate than formerly estimated We do not now expect BULLs to be entirely phased out until abouthereafter, there will probably bo someIn Jet medium bomber strength In Long Range Aviationesult of the Increased availability of heavy bombers, the assignment of more medium bombers to naval andto tactical aviation, and the advent of significantly advanced delivery systems,longer range alr-to-surface andguided missiles. The BADGER
will remain the primary medium bomberlthough byew medium bomber with supersonic "dash"may be Introduced."
nhc USSR apparentlyon an improved production model of the BISON Jet heavy bomber,ew bombing-navigation system as well as provision for inflight refueling. Considering thebetter performance characteristics of the BISON, its greater development potential, and the development of an Inflight refuelingthc USSR may have decided to place greater emphasis on the BISON* than on the BEAR. We therefore believe that the BISON will probably comprise the greater proportion of Soviet strength In heavy bombers in the later years of thisISON withimprovement In performance could probably be operational
positive evidence of Sovietdirected toward nuclearhas been obtained. However, wethat:
Soviet aircraft nuclearis probably now engaged Inand testing of reactor components and
reactor system suitable for nuclearof subsonic aircraft could probablyto thc Sovietst Isthe USSR could for propagandaan experimental aircraft powered innuclear power at an earlier date.
employ Its long-range bomberadvantageously, especially foroperations, the USSR wouldsubstantial inflight refuelingis particularly desirable forbombers, for example, one refuelingcompatible tanker couldthc area of the continental USbe reached by the BISON on afrom bases In the Chukotskicoverage of US targets on one-way
" Fur estimated performnncc characteristics oflone-ranee bombers, together with estimated dates of OperaUonal availability, tee Annex. Table 8,
could also be Increased by refueling. Refueling for the BEAR, while less essential than for the jet bombers, could Increase Ils coverage of US targets from interior bases ln the USSR. The USSR could employheavy bombers in thc tanker role.configured specifically as tankers might also appear as thc period advances. But on the basis of present evidence, we believe most of the tankers Ln Soviet Long Range Aviation during the period are likely to be convertible jet tanker-bombers, and that the bulk of these will probably be in the heavy category. Thc use of convertible tanker-bombers wouldgreater flexibility In the employment of Long Range Aviation.
While evidence Is Inadequate to establish precisely the total size of the Soviet heavy bomber force, we have unusually good evidence on the one plant known to be producing BISON jet heavy bombers, whichumulative BISON production ofyvidence on BEAR turboprop heavy bomber production is less extensive butaboutroduced. On this basis, aboutISONs andEARs would have been available for operational units asuly. If this Is In fact thc case, both BISON and BEAR production have fallen short of our estimate of last year.
Beyond this point of good evidence,there is an area of considerableparticularly with regard to the BISON program. There Ls some evidence suggesting that as many asISONs may have been In operational units as ofhis would mean that the rate of BISONhas Increased considerably sincend that an additional unknownplant has entered the BISON program, although we have almost no evidence tothis. II is similarly possible that BEAR production could have increased to an extent sufficient to provide aboutn operational units, though we also lack good evidence.there is evidence that additional plants estimated to be capable of producing heavy bombers are cither continuing in the BADGER program or are preparing to produceor tanker aircraft.
If recent heavy bomber production has In fact been as low as the preponderance of evidenceartial explanation may lie Ln the field of technical problems. For example. It Ls possible that larger-scalehas been delayed pending theof higher-thrust engines or otherexpected to Improve performance characteristics. But we would believe it more likely that Soviet planners have deliberately decidedelatively modest heavy bomber program. In our view,oviet decision would probably have been based on suchas the unlikelihood of general warthe next few years, the great expensearge-scale heavy bomber program,eliable jet medium bomber force with one-way intercontinental capabilities for Interim use in emergency, and thc expectation that new and improved intercontinentalsystems will become availableew years. On the other hand, if heavy bomber production has reached the higher levelsin. it would indicate greater Soviet emphasis on the heavy bomber weapon system for Intercontinental attack.
We have noted statements ofstressing his view of thcImportance of manned fighter and bcrabcr aircraft as contrasted wiih guided missiles. If these views had beensolely in statements beamed lo the outside world they could be cUsmissed as mere propaganda. It Is hard, however, to interpret their inclusion in the Soviet press, with the resulting advertisement to the Russianunless they were intended to prepare the Russian people for some de-emphasis on the heavy bomber, or to cover up delays inwhich might have been occasioned byexperienced with the heavy bomber production. We cannot disregard, however, the possible conclusion that such statementseliberate effort to discredit and degrade the effectiveness of US retaliatory forces in the eyes of the Soviet people as wcU as the Western powers, and to exploit to the fullest extent the psychological advantage gained by recent Soviet mlssllc/satelllte advances.
In any event, we believe that the USSR willtrong long-range bomber force, including both medium and heavy bombers, at least until it hasubstantial nuclear delivery capability with moreweapon systems. However, it is dim-cult to predict with assurance how large the USSR will desire this force to be, particularly
in heavy bombers. The estimate of heavy bomber and tanker production, particularly for the, presents unusual difficulties. Future Soviet policy In theseIs still shrouded in doubt. In view of this uncertainly we have expressed below our estimates of Soviet long-range bomber/tanker strength in terms of ranges.
SOVIET LONO KANGB AVIATION (Estimated Strength In Operational Unit*)'
HEAVY nOMhKRS AND TANKERS
MEDIUM HOMRERS AND TANKERS Jet Piston
See qualifications In paragraph*
chance ol success In generaf war-while" they aft working to'acQulrVan" addiUcuufn^ciear descry capabll ty with new weapon systems, Including lone-iangc missiles. He therefore believes'that the
nlU aT taSk^rfas'hat* In ope?.!
Dtputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint 3tafT. and the Assistant Chief of Staff, IntelUrcnce Department of the Army, believe lhat the above projected future strength of thc heavy bombers itto the available evidence and foreseeableast estimate! predicted anexEiijve predul-tlon prociim of heavy bombers This program ha* failed to develop as had been antlelpaticTtills the present estimate Mill Implies an extensive- proeiain even though reduced
forrnar.ee bombers and possibly tanker aircraft. However.they believe that the total aumttljl
uring the postwar years Soviet naval forces have been greatly strengthened by an intensive building program, concentrated on light cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. The Soviet submarine force ls by far the
largest In the world; over half Its present strength consists of long-range craft, ofignificant and Increasing proportion arc of postwar design and construction. Wemain Soviet naval strength Intestroyers.scort vessels.
ubmarines. These totalsvessels of postwar design numberingight cruisers,leet destroyers,scort vessels,ong-range" and "W" classes) and aboutedium-range" class)."
Several important developments arcin Soviet naval forcesesult of changing weapon systems and new concepts of naval warfare. These willinclude tlic application of nuclearto naval vessels and use of both surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles.we have no firm evidence that the USSRuclear-powered submarine, we believerogram for its development has reached an advanced stage and we estimateeactor could be availableevelopment of nuclear power plants for cruisers may follow thc operational testinguclear-powered icebreaker, which will probably occur In8 ore believe thc USSR is presently capable of adapting nuclear warheads to torpedoes and depth charges.
Although the evidence pointing to the existence of Soviet guided missile submarines Is not conclusive, we believe that the USSR will construct or convert submarines for surface-to surface guided missile launching. Converted boats with topside missile stowage could already be In operation. Twentywith topside missile stowage could be converted by the endnd byhe USSR mayotal of aboutuided missile submarines built on basically newincluding boats with nuclear or other improved propulsion systems. Air defense missile systems for surface vessels, alsoof modification for shore bombardment purposes, could probably begin to be availablehe unfinished hulls of six cruisers, which have been In Soviet shipyards since the cessation of the cruiser construction program several years ago, may be completed with guided missile armament.
"Detailed estimates of Soviet naval strength by major type and fleet area are given In Annex, Table 9.
The operating efficiency of Soviet naval forces, while still below that of the US Navy In some fields, ls quite high and will continue to improve. The submarine force Isintensified training, particularly In long-range operations. The principal weaknesses ol the USSRaval power will continue to derive from the wide separation of its sea frontiers and Its Inability to control thc sea routes between these areas, althoughIn Inland waterways will Increase its ability to Interchange smaller vesselssubmarines. The lack of adequate supply lines to its Northern and Far Eastern fleet areas and the land-locked position of Its fleets in the Baltic and Black Seas are additional handicaps.
Submarine Construction. The Soviets will probably continue to place primaryon submarines in their navalprogram.0 the Soviets have builtubmarines of postwar design. It is estimated that aboutoats. "W" and "Q" class, will be builtethat thc total number of Sovietof all types at the end7 will be. Throughout thc period of thewe believe that the production ofsubmarines will continue at about thc present rate ofer year. The mostevidence indicates that the program for production of "W" class conventionallong-range submarines has been curtailed and may possibly be terminated this year. The Soviets will retain their capability forproduction however, and we believe that after an Interim period for changeover and development of prototypes, seriesof new long-range types will beThis procedure would be parallel to thathen the changeover to thend "Q" classes.
. Wc estimate that the USSR could nowrototype nuclear-powered submarine, and that they may develop otherin propulsion design during the period. Thc Soviets also couldew type of submarine specifically designed for guided missile ruing. Although they have adequate fissionable material and the over-allpotential to produce larger numbers
the new types, we believe that theirwill be of thc magnitude Indicatedthey adopt less sophisticated designs for reasons of urgency. Subject to successfulof prototypes, we believe the Soviets could build, within the period,ith advanced weapon systems and improved propulsion, aboutf whichwould be nuclear powered. Considering such factors as the decommissioning ofboats and the development of newand weapon systems, we estimate that the total force willby
aval Aviation, Soviet Naval Aviation, comprising nearlyercent of total Soviet air strength, Is now the second largest naval air force in the world. It is engaged In atraining program which stressesaction between its land-basedand naval vessels (both surface andoffensive action against enemy naval forces, and air defense. During this period. Its strength will probably be Increased and Its modernization will continue. There Is no evidence of Intention to build aircraft carriers. Improved Ught bombers and all-weather fighters will probably be introduced. Long-range maritime reconnaissance andcapabilities should be Improvedby increases in the number of jet andmedium bombers allocated to Navaland by the probable availability of air-to-surf acc guided missiles for attack against ships.
TRENDS IN SOVIET STRATEGY AND CAPABILITIES
For reasons which have been set forth elsewhere in this estimate we believe that the Soviet leaders wish to avoid an all-out nuclear exchange with thc US. We have also pointed out that they almost certainly consider that any general war with the US would Involve such an exchange. Consequently, we thinkey clement of Soviet strategy In any war, whether with the US or with another nation, would be to attempt to keep thelimited in geographic scope. The Soviets would probably also prefer that nuclearnot be used, at leastar commencing during the next year or two, since theythink that their relative capabilities would be greater if the local war were fought with conventional weapons only. However, they probably consider thatimitation would be Impossible In many circumstances.
Tlie number and variety of conceivable local wars Is so great as to preclude anyto consider In this estimate the manner in which the Soviets might conduct them. We therefore confine ourselves to one aspect only ot Soviet military strategythat for thephase of general war. Even though the Soviets almost certainly desire to avoidar, and probably believe that theirnuclear capabilities powerfully deter the US from Initiating It. they cannot ignore the possibility that general war may occur, and their planners must prepare for ft.
Slrolcgy for the Initial Phase of General War
eneral war might grow out of local war, or directly outituation of Intense Inter* national crisis, or It might (though we think thls highly unlikely) be Initiatederiod of comparative International calm. Wethat the Soviets recognize the advantages that would accrue to thc side that struck the first blow In any all-out nuclear exchange. Therefore wo believe that, whenever theleaders decided that the likelihood ofwar hadertain point, they would themselves Initiate it byhe primary objective of such attacks would be to destroy or neutralize Western nuclear retaliatory capabilities, both In the continental US and overseas.with this assignment of first priority, the USSR would probably also seek to destroy other key US war-making capabilities- At
-The Autitant Chief of Staff. Intelligence,of the Army, believes that the USSR would avoid initiation of nuclear attacka and would teak to achieve its objectives by limited or local war If military action became necessary. The Soviet leaders would attempt loimitation on the use of nuclear weapons prior to hostilities or lo conduct hostilities underwhleh would limit or preclude the use of nuclear weapons.
It has been estimated in paras.ndhat lhe SovieU would not be confident that they would not receive unacceptable damage In an all-out nuclear exchange and that they would not drll-berauiy initiate general wax or undertake courses of action gravely risking general war.they are probably confident thatUS would be similarly deterred except underprovocation.
Consilient with these Judgments, tha Soviet leaders, beforeecision lo Initiate nuclear attacks, would have to Judge that their own deterrent capabillUes were no longerand that their gains from an aU-outattack would outwelght their losses.In such calculations would be survival of the stale without whleh any gain would be meaningless,
It followi that the Soviet leaders woulduclear attack againat the US only If Itthe only hope of survival. Such awould occur only If the Soviet leaden came to bellevr that the US was Irrevocablyto launching an all-out nuclear attack against the USSR,
the same time, the USSR would make aair defense effort against those Western nuclear striking forces which had escaped the Initial Soviet attacks.
uring any local war or Intensecrisis it is virtually certain that the USSR (as well as the US) would prepare against the possibilityreatly broadened conflict. These preparations would almost certainly luclude some redeployment of forces, mobilization of additional strength, civilprecautions, and the like. However, the USSR would not want to push preparations so far at to convince the US that general war was Imminent, lest this lead tlie US to strike the first all-out nuclear blow. This factor wouldimitation on the degree of Soviet preparation.
Another major limitation on Sovietratlons for general war would He In theof achieving surprise. Theof attempting to neutralize Westernretaliatory capabilities would makein the Initial nucleareyof Soviet strategy. While the USSR could not count upon achieving surprise against all Western nuclear capabilities, both within the US and elsewhere, It would almost certainly attempt to do so to the fullest extent possible. Thus, if the Soviets decided lo begin the genera] war themselves, they would Iry to avoid compromising the element of surprise in their initial nuclear attack by observable
The foregoing considerations lead us to believe that the outbreak of general war would Ond the Sovietstage of military readiness beyond that of ordinary peace-time, but short of what their planners might believe best for the most rapid exertion of thc total military effort. The actual state of readiness would depend on the development of the particular situation and on the Soviet calculation of the risks involved, and Is impossible to predict In advance.
The Soviet leaders would probably launch an attack by ground and tactical air forces against Western Europe In order to prevent NATO mobilization, deployment, and counter-
Wc believe that thc USSR would plan to commit its teady forces to an offensive, especially In Western Germany, as soon as possible consistent with maintaining surprise for the Initial assault against the US, US and allied nuclear bases overseas, and carrier task forces. Under favorable circumstances from the Soviet point of view, advances against NATO could be initiatedt the moment the West obtained warning of the Soviet strategic attack. The Soviets would probably also regard an attack to seize the Turkish Straits as of early high priority, but we believe that they would probably delay Initiation of other major campaigns in the Middle and Far East until they could assess the results of the Initial nuclear exchange."
n the naval field, Soviet objectives would be: to prevent NATO carrier strikes andlaunched missile attacks on Bloc targets as part of the highest priority effort to neutralize US nuclear capabilities;to Interdict US reinforcement ofareas and to isolate thc European theater.
"The Assistant Chief ol Start. Intelligence.of Uie Army, believes that any Soviet delay In Initiating operations In the Middle andat would be minimal, and. If It occuTed, would ne occasioned primarilyesire to place maximum logistic, combat, and manpower support behind operations In the NATO area. The SovieU possess adequate ground, naval, and tactlal air forces to tupport simultaneouson several fronts. The difficulty In shlftlnit forces over lung lines of communication (which presumably would be disrupted) to or from the Middle and Far East obviates the value of watting to assess the resultsuclearUnder the assumed eondlUons of an all-out nuclear war, lhe Soviets would hare to commit forces to an attack on Westernbitaeii In the Middle and Par Bast Hence, surpilse would already have been minimised by preparations for and eaecuUon of auch attacks. Immediate launching of combined arms opera-ticTis into Western tcriltory In these two areas would best exploit any lurprlse attained In Initial long-iancc attacks. Moreover, such operations would make It difficult for the West to attack Bloc forces without also damaging Weslern civil populations ard military forces. Conversely, any delay would provide the West with oppoitunvUei to bulld-up and re-attack the Bloc from these areas and would expose Bloc forces to Western retaliation In their homeland.
Strolcgic Attack Capabilities
capabilities for strategic air attack
will Improve during tho period of thcas the Soviet stockpile of nuclear bombs and the number of high-performance long-range bombers grow. Present Sovietfor attack on the continental US areby tho relatively small numbers of operational heavy bombers, the status offacilities at Arctic bases, and the lack as yetubstantial inflight refuelingWe estimate, however, that during the period of this estimate, the capacity of Soviet forward base areas could be Increasedto permit the staging of the entire estimated long-range bomber and tanker force. Moreover, the USSR will be capablelaunching Increasing numbers of heavy bombers from interior bases on two-wayagainst the US.
Soviet planners would attempt totheir initial attacks Inay as to achieve the optimum combination ofand weight of attack against all areas where US and Allied nuclear retaliatorywere deployed. Nearly all available Soviet heavy bombers and many medium bombers would almost certainly be used against thc continental US in an attempt to destroy or neutralize US retaliatoryand other key elements of US war-making capabilities Ught bombers could bein initial attacks against overseas targets within their range.
The scale and timing of attack with bomber aircraft would also depend upon the
availability and effectiveness of other delivery systems which will probably become available as the period progresses. At present thc USSR is probably capable of employing smallof both bomber-launched alr-to-surface missiles and submarine-launched surface-to-surface missiles against targets in theUS. These weapons, together with ground-launched surface-to-surface missiles wiih ranges up toould also be employed In Initial attacks on Western nuclear striking forces deployed on theof the Bloc. As the period advances, the numbers and types of offensive missiles
to Soviet forces will Increase, and byoviet guided missile capabilities for strategic attack could probably Include more effective air-to-surface and submarine-launched missiles as well as IRBMs nnd ICBMs. Soviet planners would probablylhat long-range ballistic missiles could impose maximum surprise and difficulty of interception, but also that during this period the accuracy and payload capacity of such missiles will be Inferior to those of manned aircraft of comparable ranges, 'flic large-scale use of missile-launching' submarines ln an Initial attack would probably be precluded by the risk of premature disclosure ot Soviet intent.
Air Defenselthough the effectiveness of Soviet defenses againstattack would depend in large measure upon the success of an initial assault onnuclear delivery capabilities, the USSR's large air defense forces would be used tothe effectiveness of counterattack by Western forces. All Bloc forces withfor air defense are Integrated Inlo an over-nil active air defense system, which places primary emphasis on providing defense in depth for key administrative, industrial, and military centers within the USSR. Largedefense organizations contribute to the Bloc's readiness for air defense, but we believe the general population is Inadequatelyagainst large-scale nuclear attack.
Principal current weaknesses of Bloc air defenses Include tlie limited all weather fighter capability, the low traffic handling capabilities of communications and control components, thc probable Inadequacy of radar height-finding capabilities at high altitudes in certain areas. Inadequate low altitude radar coverage, and the limited early warning time available In Bloc border areas. Bloc airare most highly concentrated In the European USSR (eastine roughly from the Kola Peninsula to the Caspianast Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and lhe Maritime and Sakhalin areas ot the
etailed estimate on this subject, see NIB ll-OT, Slno-Sovlet Bloc Air Defense Capabilities throughs.
Soviet Ear East, with some concentrations at specific locations elsewhere. Tlic approaches to Moscow are by far the most heavily-defended area In the Bloc. Moscow'sare estimated toigh capability to engage large-scale attack al altitudes up0 feet under all weather conditions, but they probably leinaln vulnerable to lowattack.
general Bloc air defensebo as follows;
a. Against penetrations conducted during daylight and in clear weather, at0 feet, theof thc system would be greatest.0 feet they would begin to diminish and0 feet would fall off markedly. At altitudeseet they would also be progressively reduced.
gainst penetrations conducted at night and under poor visibility conditions, theof the system would be considerably reduced.
c. Against varied penetration tacticsaltitude stacking, diversionary maneuver, decoys and electronic counter measures, the capabilities of the system would be diminished through disruption and saturation.
the next five years there will beimprovements in theof most Soviet airIncluding fighters, radars,and control equipments.guided missile and unguldcdwill increase. Thesewill considerably Improve Blocfor all-weather defense againstand cruise-type missiles.at the end of the period, warningto Bloc targets Ln border areasbe deficient for fightermarginal for surface-to-air missileagainst the highest performanceaircraft and cruise-type missiles.will also continue to have difficultyvery low altitude attack, airsystems will still be subject toand the USSR will probablyeapon system capable ofIntercepting ballistic mlssllesC
Capabilities in Western Europe. Theoviet line divisions In East Germany, together with forces available In adjacent areas, could Initiate an attack withoutby major units. To augment thc strength of the ground attack and to seize bridgeheads and other key objectives In NATO territory, thc USSR could mount Initialoperations from within Soviet territory. We estimate that in the European area, the Soviet airlift capacity ls sufficient for troops and light equipment equivalenten each)ne-dayanddivisionsive-day operation, using half the civil and military transportnormally In that area. Airlifton this scale would be limited to the radius of the smaller aircraft employed..
Air support of tactical operations in Western Europe could be provided byet light bombers stationed in Eastern Europe and Western USSR, as well as moreactical jet fighters stationed in these areas. However, the dual missions of tactical fighter units and thconsiderable number to air defense would limit the availability of fighter aircraft for tactical support In the Initial phase of the land campaign. Ballistic missiles andnuclear weapons could now be available for the support ot offensive operations, and their availability will almost certainly Increase as the period advances.
Offensive Capabilities In the Ear East. The USSR has aboutine divisions in the Far East, together withircraftizable naval force. Stockpiles ofare probably sufficient, not only for the initiation of operations, but also for aperiod of combat. Soviet forces in the Par East could, alone or in conjunction with Chinese Communist and North Korean forces, renew hostilities in Korea. They couldlaunch an operation against Japan with an airborne force equivalentivisionsne-day operation, and upivisions
ive-day operation. An Initial seaborne attack for the purpose of seizing poitcould be undertaken by lightly-equipped troops landedeterogeneous group of ships and craft. Balanced forces equivalentivisions could be embarkedollow-up operation and landed through the port facilities seized. The same technique could be employed In other areas of the Far East within range of land-based aircraft Airborne and amphibious attacksmall scale could also be launched against Alaska.
apabilities /Or Naval Warfare. At the present lime the capabilities of Soviet naval forces include: extensive submarinealong most of the world's strategic sea
lanes, employing conventional and possibly nuclear torpedoes and mines; attacks against US and Allied carrier task forces byand shore-based naval aircraft, some of which could probably be equipped with air-to-surface missiles; operations In Bloc coastal areas by surface units and supporting shore-based aircraft, primarily to deny Western access and to protect the seaward flanks of ground campaigns; attacks against portwhich would be used by US overseasemploying shore-based aircraft, surface forces and submarines, some of which could probably employ surface-to-surface In short, we estimate that the USSR has an extensive capability to interferewith US and Allied sea communications in the event of war.
oviet capabilities for naval warfare will continue to increase, especially with theadvent of nuclear-powered submarines, Increases In over-all submarine strength,capabilities to employ guided missiles and nuclear weapons for both offensive and defensive purposes, and increasing naval air reconnaissance and attack capabilities.naval forces will remain capable of lifting balanced forces of considerable strength, but the landing of heavy supporting elements of such forces will be contingent upon the seizure of adequate port facilities.
V. TRENDS IN SOVIET RELATIONS WITH OTHER COMMUNIST STATES
trend toward redefinition ot intra-Bloc relationships consequent upon the death of Stalin has continued; lt eventuated in thc Polish crisis and the Hungarian revolt ofhe special position of Yugoslavia, the emergenceemi-independent Communist regime In Poland, and Communist China's growing power and doctrinal Influence have. In effect, broken Moscow's onetime monopoly of Communist thought and power. The USSR's reluctant acceptance of thesemayelief that greaterof local variations Is the best way to preserve and strengthen the Bloc. However, alarmed by developments In Poland andthe USSR has moved to preserve the status quo in thc orthodox Satellites and, in Its repression of the Hungarian uprising, has demonstrated that it Is determined to retain its hegemony in Eastern Europe.
The strong Identity of interest among various Bloc regimes, their dependence upon Soviet aid and support, and the USSR'smilitary power will tend to main-lain the essential solidarity of thc Bloc over at least the next five years. But theforces of change released bysince Stalin's death will continue to operate, creating further instability in the states of Eastern Europe and In their relations with the USSR. The growth of Chinesepower and influence will also create problems as well as benefits for Moscow. Thus, additional changes in the pattern of intra-Bloc relationships arc likely in the period ahead.
Soviet Policy Toward the Satellites
Soviet leaders are still confrontedEuroperoblem partly ofcreation. Moscow appears to havethat the best way to encourage thedevelopmentounderwas to move away from thcof Stalinist policy and, In its stead, toplay to national sentiments and local
peculiarities within the various Satellites. But this policy set in motion forces which tended to defeat the basic objective, thc strengthening of the Bloc. The over-allof policy, together with thewith Tito and the Soviet XXth Party Congress, led to rising Satellite unrest, which threatened Soviet control.
rior to the Hungarian revolution and the Polish coup, the Soviet leaders clearlythe strength of forces within the Satellites seeking reform and change.apparently did not recognize or seriously attempt to cope with Satellite ferment evoked by the denunciation of Stalinism at the XXth Party Congress, until June, when the riots in Poznan (and the Polish regime's disagreement with Moscow over the causes of the riots) demonstrated thc dangers of loosening the reins. But the damage had already been done in the two Satellites where nationalism was strongest and where party factionalism was most disruptive. Faced in the fallew and defiant regime in Poland and arevolt in Hungary, the USSR was forced into unwelcome decisions,olicy of accommodation In the former and ofin the latter.
The reason for the differing Sovietof Poland and Hungary lay in the USSR's determination to preserve Communist regimes in Eastern Europe and to keep the states of that area In the Soviet Bloc. When Hungary suddenly declared its neutrality and its intention to leave the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet leaders felt compelled to intervene in the only way they could, through military action. In Poland the USSR was reassured by Gorrmlka's promises that Poland wouldIn the Bloc. Thus, though disliking the Gomulka regime, the USSR concluded that it was more tolerable than the political risks involvedilitary attempt to unseat it.
In the light of thc Hungarian and Polish crises, the USSR now seems determined to go
In any further evolution of itswith the Satellites and. above all, to avoid If possible any repetition of theor Polish experiences- It has shifted its emphasis toward attempts to combat the Influence of those forcesprincipallyantl-Sovletlsm. and economicwhich have been responsible for most of the Satellite ferment. Major reliance will still be placed on Satellite parties that will subjectifto Soviet Ideology, Soviet directivesforeign and defense policies andleadership in general. In exchange for their fealty, thc orthodox Satellite leaders can anticipate some Soviet economic aid,easure of Internal autonomy, occasional grants of recognition and prestige, andfor their own power positions and party policies.
Although the security of the SatelliteIs thus uppermost In their mindswith measures to insure this security given first prioritythe Soviet leaders do not seem toeturn to Stalinist severity andas either necessary or desirable; they may even regard lt as infeaslble. There isto be any Soviet attempt to resume thc previous degree of economic exploitation of the area. Tlie Soviets appear willing tocertain differences among the Satellites and to tailor their policy to meet varying Satellite requirements. They apparently still believe that if some concessions to autonomy are gradually nnd judiciously meted out. the Satellite peoples will eventuallylose relationship with the USSR.
Czechoslovakia, economically the most successful and politically the most stable of the Satellites, appears to be Moscow's favorite, and may be Intended to serveodel for the others. Czech party leaders have been relatively successful in utilizing the threat of Soviet interventioneans of suppressing popular ferment, while at the same time pointing to economic and politicalsince the death of Stalin. Theappear lo have persuaded thenot to Jeopardize IU relatively favorable status by precipitate action.
ungary presents the Soviet Union with numerous practical problems. To accomplish its primary goal of restoring Hungary as quickly as possible to orthodox Satellite status. Moscow has encouraged the Soviet-installed regime to combine severe political repression with limited economic bribery There appear to be no suitable alternatives to this tactic Both repression and bribery, however, are probably scheduled to dimmish with time and accomplishment.
Soviet policy toward East Germany seems motivated primarily by the same considera-tions which underlie tho USSR's rigidto German reunification (see, Chapterware of the unpopularity of the Communist regime In the GDR. the USSR is fearful that any relaxation of tightwould stimulate the growth of pressures for reunification and promote Increasingoropular revolt in this highly sensitive area. Therefore, little liberalization has been attempted and Moscow hasUibricht's repressive policies. The USSR probably feels that It has no alternative but to suppori the doctrinaire. Stalinist East German regime.
The reluctant Soviet acceptance of the "new" Poland now appears loong-range adjustment ratheremporaryTenseness in Soviet-Polishhas abatedn large partthe Gomulka regime has restrained anti-Soviet and null-Communist popularand has removed the immediate threat to the party's position. Concurrently, direct Soviet press attacks on Polish liberals have ceased and the strength of the pro-Soviet (Nalolin) faction In the Polish party hasThc Soviet leadersarge arsenal or political, economic, and military weapons with which to exert pressure on the Gomulka regime or ultimately to destroy it. although they cannot be certain thatwill always prove effective or that their use would not. in fact, boomerang.
Soviet military leaders almost certainly feci that the lines of communication through Poland to theirivisions in East Germany are Insecure. Pouttcally, Moscow must also
concerned over the dangerous influence of the PolUh experiment on the remainder of the Bloc. It haa attempted to offset this by Insisting on doctrinal conformity in the other Satellites. It has also sought to minimize Poland's unique status by granting paperto the orthodox Satellitessuch as status of forces agreementswhich parallel some of the actual privileges obtained byNevertheless, the continuation of the Gomulka regime willinimum prove embarrassing to Moscow and will probably aggravate the USSR's problems in the other Satellites.
Current Soviet policy toward Poland thusalculated risk. .The Soviet leaders still do not view the risk as sufficiently dangerous to Justify military action.Moscow probably hopes that thc risk will diminish with time and that Poland will gradually prove more susceptible to Soviet pressures.
The ability of the Soviet Unionto handle tho Increasingly complex Issues associated with its presence Inime when its own Internal policies and Its relations with Communist China are also changingIs by no means certain. Popular dissatisfaction, party factionalism, intellectual ferment, and chronic economic difficulties in the Satellites all appear to be long-range problems and probably are now causing great concern in Moscow. Varying Chinese. Polish, and Yugoslav "roads toSoviet vacillations and purges, growing contacts with the Westall combined with the very real popular pressures from withinwill probably continue to stimulate at least the desire for reform and change.
The current Soviet effort to minimisewhile simultaneously attempting to control the general movement for change through limited concessions, will probablyfurther explosions and national"coups" but it does not appear toasting solution. Should essential Sovietover thc Satellites not be seriouslyand should Poland remaintate of senu-orthodoxy and dependence on the USSR, Moscow might In time be willing to
reater development toward autonomy in other Satellites. It might consider that evolutionrouping of seml-lndepcnd-ent Eastern European states (still closelyto Moscow) would quiet Satellite unrest and thus serve long-term Soviet alms.
n thc other hand, should essentialcontrol over the area appear to bethreatened, and should Poland movefarther away from orthodoxy, pressures In Moscoweversionarsher policy would probably grow. In the evont of another Satellite revolt or the attempt of any Satellite regime to secede from the socialist camp, the Soviet leaders would almost certainly decide to Intervene- militarily. This, in turn, would probably lead to the conclusion that the post-Stalin Satellite policies in general were aandeturn to more repressiveoffered the best means of coping with the problems in Eastern Europe.
Soviel Policy Toward. Moscow's more flexible post-Stalintoward the Satellites may have beenby its apparently strong desireapprochement with Yugoslavia. Efforts to accomplish thismost notable since thc springave not been uniformlyIn fact, Soviet-Yugoslavame-calling stage during the winter. But the present Soviet leaders apparently believe that the split with Yugoslavia was one of Stalin's major policy failures and that, on balance, the prospective gainsapprochement outweigh thc possible dangers. Moscow's immediateis probably to re-establish close party, state and ideological relations with Belgrade and. concomitantly, to encourage aof Yugoslavia's ties with the West; the ultimate objective is to bring Yugoslavia back into thc Bloc. For Its part. Yugoslavia almost certainly desires to avoid compromising Itsbut wishes to maintain closewith the Bloc. As long as BelgradeSoviet policies favorably, we believe that Yugoslavia will maintain Its rapprochement with the USSR and may gradually movea somewhat closer alignment within lira-its which would safeguard Its Independence.
Communist China's stature In the Bloc has continued to grow. Pclplng Inst fall backed thc Soviet Intervention ln Hungary and generally supported the Soviet attempt to preserve Uloc solidarity. Earlier, however. It probablyoderating Influence in the dispute between Moscow and theregime. Communist China's use of Its influence In this manner was presumablyIn large part by Pciping's desire to maintain the strength of the Bloc and toits rightajor voice In Bloc affairs. Further, Peiping has clearly Indicated that its ideological pronouncements are Intended to represent "original" and significanttoontention which Is probably of concern to Moscow. Tlic ideological and political leadership of the Bloc can no longer be said to rest solely with the Soviet Union.
Moscow's willingness to allowhare In the ideological leadership of the Bloc and to acquiesce in Pciping's increased role in Bloc affairs is probably basedarge extent on the absence of any practical alternative. In Soviet eyes, any heavy pressure on Peiping,
such as threats to reduce economic or military aid. would almost certainly put an undesirable strain on Slno-Sovlet ties. Therefore, despite anxiety, and probable subtle attempts toPciping's basic conformity and toits growing Influence and asserUvencss, the Soviet leaders will probably acceptIncreased stature with outward grace. Khrushchev has already admitted thattoo canount of Communist wisdom. For Its part, Peiping will probably continue to acknowledge publicly the USSR'sof the camp and its dependence onassisunce and advice.
hough new points of friction willarise ln the course of the next several years, differences will almost certainly bewhen compared to the basic pointsreement In addition to Ideological bonds, thc USSR and Communist China shareto tho US and are linked by the belief that concerted political and economic activities are mutually advantageous. Further.China's manpower and strategic location and the USSR's military. Industrial, andcapabilities have served to create an interdependence fully appreciated In both capitals.
VI. TRENDS IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY
Soviet View of tho World Situation
In none ot lhc many changes that have taken place since the death of Stalin has there been any suggestion that the USSR lsIts basic attitudes and aims. Tbeot the present Soviet leaders remainsconditioned by their concept ot irreconcilable conflict between theand non-Communist worlds. They have shown no diminution of vigor in their search for ultimate victory, though their views as to the best policies and tactics for winning lt have undergone Important change.
In looking at the world situation from this viewpoint of conlllct, the Soviet leaders display much confidence In thc prospects of the Communist side. They show pride in the USSR's achievements over the last fourand appear convinced of the over-all strength of their present position In the world. Despite their setbacks In Eastern Europe, and the manifold internal problems which beset them, the new leaders seem confident of their ability to cope with these problems and tothe growth of Soviet strength and the expansion of Soviet influence.
At the same lime thc USSR's post-Stalin leaders, especially Khrushchev, appear flexible and pragmatic in their appraisal of theat play In the world situation and of their impact on Soviet prospecisw In particular, they seem toealth^ respect for the strength of the US aa the principal source of opposition to their ambitionseen awareness of those gaps which still separate Soviet from US power Khrushchev himself cliarly regards it as one of the primaryobjectives to outstrip the US. Indeed the Soviet leaders may tend to assess the strength of the Western powers as greater tlian it often appears to us in thc West. They almoststill regard the US as having superior capabilities to wage nuclear war. and they may overestimate the unity of the Western
Given this respect for Western power, the Soviet leadership is highly unlikely to believe that thc present situation would be altered to Soviet advantage by resort to general war. In fact Its own growing appreciation of thepotentialities of nuclear weapons and advanced delivery systems, as tbc USSR Itself develops such capabilities, has almost certainlyajor impact on Sovietas to thc risks of nuclear war. Doctrinal acknowledgmentodified outlook toward war occurred at the XXth Party Congress, which abandoned the thesis of theof war between the Communist and capitalist worlds.
In our view the Soviet Union, except in the case of an unforeseen technologicalwhich gives high promise of victory without unacceptable losses, will notinitiate general war during the next five years. At the same time the Sovietdespite their suspicions of US intentions, arc probably confident that their ownnuclear capabilities will deter the US from embarking on this course.they must regard miscalculation as thc most likely way in which general war would occur.
For the same reasons which inhibit it from deliberately initiating general war the USSR will almost certainly seek to avoid courses of action which in its judgment would involve serious risk of general war. During any international crisis the Soviet calculation of this risk will be of paramount Importance. We think that the Soviet leaders estimate that because of Soviet nuclear capabilities the US is becoming increasingly disinclined toIn an all-out nuclear exchange.the Soviet leaders may believe that they can pursue certain aggressive courses of action, extending even to local war, with less risk of general war than the same courses would previously have involved. In general, therefore, we believe that insofar as Soviet courses of action are restrained by fear of the
resorting to general war. these restraints will tend to diminish during the period ot this estimate."
We cannot confidently estimate how thc Soviets will calculate the risk in variousduring the period ol this estimate. Wc believe they would consider that openby Soviet lorces across the frontiers of non-ConununisL stales would in most areas Involve risk of general war. The Soviet assessment of the dcgTee of risk would depend on the particular frontier crossed, theof the Issues at stake, and the whole complex of attendant circumstances.
Whether or not the Soviets actually use armed force during the period of thisit is clear that thc latent threat ofmilitary strength willasic element in thc conduct of Soviet foreign policy. At times the Soviet leaders willbring this threat into the open, bywords or harsh diplomatic exchanges. They may go considerably further insituationsby supportingCommunist forces In local militaryor even sending Sovielfshould occur which did not seem to involve serious risk of large-scale conflict, or if they judged that confusion arid division rathertrong Western reaction would result. But we remain convinced that the USSR will not desire to let any crisis develop to the point of seriously risking general war,
Since thc Soviets believe in irreconcilable conflict between themselves and the West, their major policy decisions will always be affectedreat degree by their calculation of the risks of war. In the present phase this calculation almost certainly causes them to prefer non-military means of achieving their objectives. But wc believe that they also see many intrinsic advantagesomparatively peaceful course, Viewed in retrospect, it
"The Assistant Chief of Staff. Ir.WHIeence.USAK. does not agree wllh the estimate Uiat tbeon Soviet courses ot acUon Imposed by fear ot the US resorting lo general war will tend to dimmish during the period ofsUmateof an increasing disinclination by the US to engage In an alt-out nuclear exchange. Seelo paragraphummary Estimate, page 1.
would seem that when the post-Stalin leaders reassessed the situation bequeathed to them by Stalin Lhey came to two basic conclusions: (a) lhat, on lhe whole, Soviet foreign policies hadoint of diminishing returns; and (b) that these policies Involved needless risks for the returns realized. To limit these risks and open new opportunities forthe Soviet position, theyumber of major policy shifts.
As reflected in the main characteristics of post-Stalin foreign policy, these opportunities must have appeared to the present leadership to lie broadly In two fields. First, concerned over the impetus to Western strength and unity provided by Stalin's postwar policies, they have hopedess rigid andposlure to dispel the image of aggressive Soviet intentions and thus complicateefforts to maintain andosition of anti-Communist strength. In thisthe Soviet leaders must consider theto which new aggressive moves might compromise this hope.
Second, theyupport of themovements in Asia and Africa, with their largely anti-Western bias, majorto weaken and divide the Western powers, and to substitute Communistfor lhat of the West. They look upon the upsurge of nationalism in Asia and Africaulfillment of Lenin's prophecy that these areas would prove to be the Achilles heel of the imperialist Western powers. Moreover, they probably expect that the revolution of rising popular expectations In allareas will far outrun the possibilities of fulfillment, thus enhancing theof Communist methods and creating local instability which the Communists can exploit
However, the purge of7 revealed that there had by no means been unanimous Presidium agreement over many aspects of post-Stalin foreign as well as domestic policy. Molotov in particular has been blamed for opposing certain doctrinal innovations, the Austrian peace treaty, the rapprochement with Belgrade, high level goodwill visits abroad, and normalization of relations with
Japan. Some latent opposition to present policies undoubtedly remains in the Soviet hierarchy, and may again come to the fore In eventrisis, but the June purge seems to confirm the ascendancy of Khrushchev'sline.
hrushchev and his colleagues probably regard thc present world situation as highly fluid and credit this fluidity largely to thclr own actions. They are probably pleased with thc situation ln Asia and the Middle Bast In particular, and look upon It as ripe to develop further In their favor. Though concerned over the risks Inherentonfrontation of Western and Soviet Interests ln such areas, they probably see possibilities of major gains through continuation of their present policies, at minimum cost to themselves. Moreover. Soviet behavior In international affairs, now that the Stalinist Isolation of the USSR hu ended, has become subjectomentum of Its ownbroadened diplomatic relations, technical and cultural exchanges, andtrade and aid programswhich are not onlyifferent image of the USSR to the outside world but are giving the Soviet peopleess distorted Image of the world at large. These factors will tend to prevent any sudden reversal of Sovietpolicy. Under these circumstances wo sec the Soviet leadership as likely to continue Itl present policies for some time,
Gonerol Alports of the Co-cxisionce Policy
iewed In the above context, we see the present phase of Soviet external policy as one designed to achieve certain Important though limited objectives, while avoiding anyrisks of nuclear war and providing time for the further forced draft growth of soviet power. These objectives arc: (a) tothe world with Soviet military strength nnd national power, while at the same timeeneral sense of Soviet peacefulness and respectability which will further blur thc Image of an aggressive USSR; (b) toetraction and decline of Western power, especially withdrawal of the US from Its bases around the Bloc; and (c) to hasten theof Western Influence from Asia and Af-
rica, while expanding Soviet influence In these areas.
A hallmark of present Soviet policy ls Its tactical flexibility In execution, in contrast to the heavy-handedness of Stalin's lime. The pragmatic approach of Khrushchev and his fondness for experimentation suggest that tills will continue at least so long as heIn power. The present leadership, for example, shows fewer doctrinalas to tactics, and greater willingness to modify doctrine to meet the exigencies of the time. In this category fall the ostensibleof other roads to socialism and the concept, endorsed by the XXth Parlythat neutralist though non-Communist governments can also serve Soviet purposes. This concept has found particularin Soviet efforts to encourage neutralism In the Afro-Asian area.
The significance of these doctrinal and tactical developments Is very great Theof Communism is designed to occur by gradual stages Instead of by convulsiveThus thc USSR has not recently pursued with its old vigor the forcibleand Communication of olher states; It even manages to pose, convincingly to some, ai the champion of national Independence. The lines which divide the Communlsl Irom the non-Communist world have becomeblurred. The result Is that when crises occur. in Egypt. Jordan,heissues between the Bloc and the West do not stand out with the clarity that wu evident, for example, in the Korean situation.
We believe that the Soviet leaders foresee thc likelihood of further crises as the Interests of the two great power groupings clash ln such areas as the Middle East. With respect to Soviet behavior In such crisis situations, Khrushchev's boldness and apparentgive cause for concern. But theof Khrushchev, his absorption with the USSR's manifold internal problems, and the Soviet desire to avoid undue risks of nuclear war will probably militate against hastyIn foreign aflairs.
their flexibility, moreover,Soviet leaders apparently sec no need
make concessions on the most important issues dividing East and West. Theym.fee example, not tony territory now under Communist control. Similarly, on such issues as Germanand disarmament, we think that there will be little give in Soviet policy during the period cf this estimate.
Techniques of "Peaceful Co-existence" In line with its new tactical flexibility, the USSH will continue to place heavy reliance on such conventional methods of International intercourse as high level goodwill visits, broadened diplomatic contacts, promotion of cultural and other exchanges, expandedtrade, long-term credits and technical assistance, and arms aid. Non-Communist governments will continue to be cultivated in an attempt to create an identity of Interests between them and the USSR and to inculcate the image of the USSRespectable, peace-loving state. Following traditional Soviet practice, the USSR's extensive propaganda apparatus as well as thc network of frontand Free World Communistwill also be used to thisarticular technique of increasing significance, is the Soviet capability and intention to enterair routes. With few reciprocalthe Soviets can thus demonstrate their technological prowess to Free World countries, particularly in underdeveloped areas.
By such means thc USSR will continue toumber of already well-established diplomatic and propaganda themes. Playing upon growing concern over avoiding nuclear war. it will contrast the USSR's role as the foremost protagonist of peace andwith the aggressive intentions of the US- Another major theme ls to portray the USSR as thc chief supporter of the emerging former colonial countries, willing to help them "without stringss opposed to US efforts to force these countries intoalliances and continued USwith the colonial powers. The USSR, through stressing peaceful Soviet Intentions, Is also seeking to convey the thesis thatWorld collaboration Iside variety of fields.
espiie the USSR's emphasists continued hostilitythc West implies the continuation in varying intensity, of more aggressive cold war tactics wherever the prospective gains appear to outweigh any damage to the over-allline. Savage propaganda attacks on capitalism, Imperialism, and the West,thc US, are likely to recur. The USSR will almost certainly also use subversion and infiltration to achieve local Communist goals In situations susceptible to advantageous Handling along these lines. These techniques reflect thc continuity of Soviet attitudes from the Stalin through the post-Stalin era, and there is little reason to expect theirFinally, the Soviets have recentlyood deal of public stress on theirnuclear capabilities, and we think they will increasingly use the latent threat of their military strength as an Instrument of policy.
Policy Toward tke Underdeveloped AreasTrade and ytid. As previously suggested, one of the principal characteristics of current Soviet policy is its stress on underdeveloped countries, in an effort to estrange them from thc West and to lay the groundwork forSoviet influence. In the needs of the new and underdeveloped countries of Asia and Africa for help and guidance inthe USSR sees opportunities forthese states by providing assistance and encouraging them to employ CommunistTherefore one of its principalhas been the so-called "trade and aid" campaign, of offering both arms and technical and economic aid on liberal credit terms. Not only do such efforts serve specificis the underdeveloped countries, but they contribute to thc desired image of the USSRespectable and economically advanced member of the international
Byhe USSR and its satellites had agreed to extendillion in cconomlfi.credits for this purpose, the bulk of which wvfl be drawn uponeriod of several years. In addition arms of anvalue of0 million had been delivered, probably on credit, to Egypt, Syria, Yemen, and Afghanistan. In return the Bloc
t>ccn willing to accept otherwise largely unsaleable raw material surpluses, anfeature to underdeveloped countries. Bloc trade agreements with Free World nations rosen effeet at the end3yhe largest part of this rise representing trade agreements withcountries.46 Bloc trade with underdeveloped countries roseercent. Technical assistance, though still small In comparison with that of the West, continues to rise; during the first halfloc technicians are estimated to have been Innderdeveloped countriesonth or more, compared to an
The volume of Bloc trade with theareashole Is still Insignificant compared with that of the West, and theand economic assistance which the Bloc has thus far supplied is also relatively very small. Both trade and aid haveighly significant impact, however, partly because theyew departure in Bloc policy, vigorously followed up, and partly because they have tended to be concentrated inareas (Egypt, Syria, Afghanistan,where they loom large in the economies concerned.
The Soviet leaders are probably pleased with what they regard as their success to date with this policy and will almost certainlytheir efforts in this field. The USSR has the economic resourcesonsiderable expansion In its trade and aid campaign, while its extensive stocks of obsolescent arms will permit it to capitalize further on the desires of many underdeveloped countries to strengthen themselvesis theirIn areas where they expect localto be receptive, as in the Middle East and South Asia, the Soviets will probably continue to supply armseans oflocal tensions and creatingfor the expansion of Soviet influence.
Relations with Free World Communist Parties. Soviet policy toward the Communist parties in Free World countries has been ad-Justed to thc requirements of the "peacefulline. Moscow continues to allow
them somewhat greater auionomy and local tactical flexibility lhan was permitted under Stalin, though it has sought to retain Its essential control. The over-all tactic set down for the Free World parties, as reiterated at the XXth Party Congress, remains that of advancing Communist interests primarily by parliamentary means, if possible inwith non-Communist parties, rather than through violent struggle.
Such developments as the denigration of Stalin, thc Hungarian revolt, and ostensible Soviet acceptance of "many paths to(as in Poland and Yugoslavia) have caused confusion and division In many foreign Communist parties and led to some defections. To date, however, these parties apparently continue to accept Moscow's leadership and will probably continue to do so for some time to come. Some foreign Communist parties may adopt moreational Communist character than Is considered desirable bybut the essential solidarity of theCommunist movement appearsto bo seriously shaken, at least in the short run.
Soviet Policy on Disarmament. Active exploitation of the disarmament issue is one ot the key aspects of present Soviet externalThc USSR clearly regards this issue not only as an essential part ot its pose ofco-existence" but, even more Important,ossible means of neutralizing Western nuclear striking power and inducing Itsfrom around the periphery of the Bloc-It is probably also concerned over thethreat to its position in the Satellites from US and NATO power in Europe. For these reasons the USSR has tended toon such disarmament proposals astestan on use of nuclear weapons, liquidation of foreign bases, and troop withdrawals from Europe. By Itson such Issues the USSR clearly hopes to encourage the relaxation of Westernefforts, help undermine NATO and create divisions among its partners, and above alllimate inhibiting Western use of nuclear weapons. In addition the USSR Is probably concerned about the enormous cost of Its military establishment and would
a measure of disarmament which would permit some diversion of resources to meet other pressing needs. It may also have some concern over the possible development of nuclear capabilities by "fourtharticularly in Europe. However, we do not believe that either of these concerns would be compelling in Soviet thinking.
he Soviet leaders, no doubt pleased with the Impact to date of their disarmamentwill continue to give the appearancelexible and constructive attitude in an efiort to mobilize world opinion In their favor. They will lay further stress on simplecalculated largely for their propaganda appeal, such as ending tests or banning the use of nuclear weapons. They clearly hope lo broaden thc UN discussions to include other powers, as also serving their ends. Further vague proposals designed to appear asto meet the Western position are likely. The USSR may even make some furlhergestures at disarmament, perhaps the sloughing off of certain marginal forces,this seems desirable for other reasons.
hile the USSR will thus rely largely on diplomatic and propaganda exploitation of the disarmament Issue, It probably feels that some form of limited International agreement would reinforce Its pose as the strongestof disarmament, stimulate furtherof Western defense efforts, andthe use of nuclear weapons. In Soviet eyes lhe preferred form of agreement wouldoosely drawn mutual pledge without significant inspection features. But theleaders undoubtedly recognize that they must pay sonio price for such an agreement in terms of inspection and controls. Tn our view they would be willing to accept limited inspection arrangements lo delect violationuclear test ban,inimal number of fixed observation posts in connection with any agreed arms reductions. Their interest inS tioop withdrawal fromwould prohabiy lead ihem to go evenin allowing mutual Inspection in Europe.
ut the USSR clearly regards the present Western disarmament proposals as heavily loaded in favor of the West. In particular i*
will almost certainly continue to rejectinspection and controls. AsIndicated by their repealedof such proposals as elaborateschemes, the Soviet leadersand defensively to theseas Western efforts to pry Intoand to interfere withontrolled society. In ourdeepseated distrust of the West andpreoccupation with security will longa bar to any but the roost limitedand controls. With equalalmost certainly will reject anynuclear weapons production as ato.condcrnn them to aof Inferiority. Finally, thenot as yet seem to regard Itself ascompulsion lo reach an earlyit sees lhat other factors areto some degree of WesternIt is also probably confidentSoviel capabilities and theworld public opinion will eventuallyWestern powers to settle for less inof controls and Inspection than
ovietie UN. The Sovietregard the UN and Its various organs and specialized agencies as Important forums for their "coexistence" policy In all its aspects. They have evinced growing awareness that when acting jointly wiih the Asian-African bloc, the Soviet bloc can frustrate Western policies or proposals, and they may even hope for UN endorsement of Soviet policies onIssues. We believe that In the period of this estimate the USSR will seek to exploit the possibilities inherent in this situation and to this end will maintain nnd probablyits activities In the UN and theagencies.
Soviet Policy in Particular Areas
he Middle Eait. The USSR clearlythe chief Immediate prospects forits influence as lying In the Middle East, The events of the past two yearsthe growing estrangement from the West of Egypt. Syria, and Yemen, and the Anglo-
Invasion at Suezhave almostappeared to the USSR as offeringopportunities for substantial gain.
e consider that the USSR's alms in the Middle East are to eliminate Western bases and influence, toosition from which It could deny oil to the West, and ultimately to establish dominance In the area. Tho USSR Is shrewdly supporting Arabagainst the West and Is carefullyan appearance of seeking undue political Influence of Its own; It is careful of Arab sensibilities and Is soft-pedaling subversive activities aimed at promoting Communist regimes. Thus the short run Soviet emphasis will be on promoting neutralism andthe position ot the West. The USSR will probably attempt lo bring the Arab states gradually within the Soviet sphere ofbut It Ls unlikely, over the next few years at least, to Install Communist regimes.
The USSR appears to be carryinglexible and opportunistic policy of limited risk in the Middle East It can be relied on to continue its attempts to capitalize on such disruptive forces In the area as Nasser'sfor Arab hegemony, Yemeni designs on the Aden Protectorate, the leftist coup in Syria, and the Arab-Israeli conflict, on which it Is taking an Increasingly pro-Arab position. It will provide further aid and support to Egypt and Syria in their attempts toother Arab regimes. Above all, the USSR will seek to exploit the Arab-Israelias the one Issue on which Arabs are united and which can serveounter to Weslern efforts to unite the area against the Communist threat
The USSR can be expected to continue toightirect voice In the affairs of the area and to propose four-power or other negotiations to that end. It will also use the regimes in Egypt. Syria, and Yemen asInstruments of its policy in the area. The USSR might seek bases in one or more of these countries If opportunities offer; In any event the construction of Installations,port facilities, in the area for theand maintenance of Soviet-madecreates facilities which could be used
on short notice by the USSR in addition It will continue Its attempts to promote good relations with other states of the area.trade and aid, technical assistance and in some cases arms offers are likely. When local issues such as the revolt In Oman can be exploited, the USSR will do so.
But in pursuing the above policies, the USSR will be conscious of the extent to which vital Western Interests are Involved In the area, and In particular of expressed USto protect these Interests. It will be concerned lest the further crises which will almost certainly develop in the area lead lo local conflict between Weslern and Soviet-backed power or even between the greatthemselves, with resultant risks of general war. We believe that the conduct of theleaders In any such crises will depend directly upon the Western reaction theyThey have already shown that they will not hesitate to provide arms and advisors or tohreatening pose. In certain situations they might employ Umitcdofut the USSR must recognize thc geographic factors which make It difficult to intervene militarily In theEast without violating the boundaries of US and UK allies. We believe that they will not desire to let any crisis or local outbreak reach such proportions as to Involve serious risks of general war.
Souin Asia and the Far East. In these areas Soviet policy will probably remain focussed on promoting neutralism andWestern Influence through trade and aid, goodwill visits, cultural and other exchanges. poliUcal support for popular nationalist causes,ariety of olher means. The USSR can be expected to concentrate further on India and Japan as the pivotalnations in this area It will almost certainly capitalize on India's growingdifficulties and on the deepbetween India and Pakistan through additional offers of assistance to India,Soviet arms offers are also likely to take advantage of India's concern over US military aid to Pakistan.
respect to Japan, theof relations" will continue, with theof encouraging Japan toore Independent attitude at the expense of its ties with the US. Moscow and Peiping may make further limited concessions lo Japan for this purpose. They are probably confident that Japan's critical foreign trade needs will impel it to seek Increased Slno-Sovlet Bloc trade and that the domesticforces at work In Japan arc alreadyleading itore Independent foreign policy.
Tlic USSR probably regards Southeast Asia ashinese Communist area of Influence. However, the Soviets willto stress their willingness to assist the countries of this area with long-term credits, technical aid, and purchases of their rawwhile touting the value of Communist methods as the best way to achieve thedevelopment which these statesseek. The USSR will utilize still strong anti-colonial sentiments in these areas to stimulate and exploit differences with the Western powers.
4 thc USSR has devoted special efforts to strengthening its influence Inperhaps Initially because of fear that the Afghans would Join the Baghdad Pact. We do not believe that the USSRto go so far as to convert Afghanistanatellite, primarily becauseove would alarm the non-Communist world and probably could be accomplished only through thc use of Soviet military force. It is seeking Instead to establish Afghan economic and military dependence on the USSR.
Africa. As part of its effort in theareas, the USSR will almostIncrease its activities in Africa during the next Ave years. It is already trying to develop diplomatic and economic relations with thc newly independent states of Morocco, Tunisia and Ghana, and Is devotinggrcuter efforts to Libya and the Sudan, It has offered trade, aid, technical assistance and, ln some cases, arms. We do not believe that the USSR will during the period of this estimate undertake serious commitments or
become deeply involved In areas of Africa far removed from the center of Sovietill probably confine Itself to the establishment of Its diplomatic and economic presence on the continent, to some limited encouragement of nationalist andmovements, and to an attempt to end the exclusiveness of Western Influence In most of the area.
Up to the present the USSR has beenln its support of Arab nationalism In North Africa against the French. If aof the Algerian conflict does not occur fairly soon, however, we believe that thcwill probably become more active and outspoken In this respect, though it is likely that material support will be rendered through Egypt rather than directly.
Western Europe. Post-Stalin Soviettoward Western Europe appears to bedefensive in character, aimed more at protecting the USSR's position In Eastern Europe than at expanding Soviet Influence beyond its present frontiers. Though the USSR obviously does not Intend to neglect Western Europe, it probably considers that its opportunities for maneuver are limited at present, and Ls concentrating Its efforts on more vulnerable areas.
Tlic chief Soviet objective In Westernis Io weaken and divide the NATO pow-crs, and above all toithdrawal of US military strength. Soviet disarmament policy and its attendant propaganda islargely at this target The USSR will also continue to promote the conceptetente In Western Europe, via some form of European security treaty which would replace both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Indeed the USSR probably expects simply through its policy of "peaceful co-existence" and relaxed tensions toeduction ln NATO unity and arms outlays. Special attention will also be paid to exploiting differences among the NATO powers as well as weaknesses Incountries.
We believe that the USSR will remain adamant on German reunification despite Its recognition that Its Immovable stand on this
1 O HS'P-
limits its maneuverability in Western Europe. In our view the Soviet leaders are still acutely concerned over the potential threatevived and nationalistic Germany, backed by the US in seeking the recovery of its eastern territories. In Soviet eyes thedivision of Germany, with the USSR0 East Germans as hostages. Is the best means of limiting this threat. The Soviets are highly unlikely to believe that any formula for reunification will offer adequate guaranteeseunified Germany's tacit or open alliance with the West, Inbesides East Germany's military value
to them, they are probably fearful of thcthat loss of their East German satellite would have on their position elsewhere In Eastern Europe.
atin America. This area has also been the target of Bloc diplomatic, economic, and cultural activity In an attempt to promote trade and other contacts and encouragewith the US. Further efforts in thisare likely, as well as continued local Communist Party and front group activity to promote anttUS sentiments and toLatin American cooperation with the US.
ESTIMATED ACTUAL STRENOTH OF BLOC ACTIVE MILITARY PERSONNEL,
TOTALS (Excluding Security!
' Figures In this Uble are based on estimated order of battle. Estimates of this type yield appr rather than prcUe measures of actual itrtngUi at any given line, and can lag considerably
chances in actual strength. 'For purposes o( this table, anaval Aviation personnel are Included In total Soviet
air forces personnel strength.
not include MVD naval forces, which for purposes of this table arc carried In Soviet security forces total.
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence.
0 are In the sir forces. The Assistant Chief of
and the remainder In aviation units.
ESTIMATED STRENGTH Of BLOC OROUND FORCES IN LINE DIVISIONS.7
Actual strengths ot dlvUloni vary. The figures showr. represent estimated averages.
dispositions of Soviet Uce dlvltons: Occupiedorthwesternesternouthweitern USSR II: Southernentraloviet Far
' la ^addition. Soviet ground forces are estimated to Includertillery dlvUloni.ntiaircraft artUery divisions,eparate brt-*No effective combat units.
"Ei Uma led breakdown by major groupings: . Communist; Europeanonh Koreai Mlnh, J2
Pro? MEDIUM BOMBER"
Prop HEAVY BOMBER1
Jtt fLl Bmrs.)
UTEJTY/LIAISON Jetet (U.rop TOTALS
ESTIMATED ACTUAL STRENGTH OF BLOC AIR UNITS,
MM MO-MO (Included In estimated numbers of Soviet heavy bombers and Jet medium bombers; seend
FLASHLIOHT andircraft in Soviet units, but onlyn European Satellite and Asiatic Communistedium bombers assigned to Naval Aviation and (later In the peilod) lo Tactical Aviation included In these totals.
See the footnote of the Assistant Chief or Staff, Intelligence. Department of the Army, the Director of Naval Inielligence, and the Deputy Director
Intelligence, The Joint Staff, to the Table onssistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence. USAF. believes that the strengths esllmatedhe medium and heavy bomber columns would all
homber aircraft, and that additional tanker* will be ln operational unit' as follows:
See his footnote to the Table on
ESTIMATED GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF SOVIET AIRCRAFT STRENGTH BY ROLE.
East UtSR '
Jet (Day) Jet (AAV)
BOMBER' Jet Prop
far the largest proportion ot heavy bombers are Centralmaller number are in the Far East.)
Jetet (Lt.rop (Seaplane)
b. Germany. Poland. Hungary, and Rumania 'Northern, and Leningrad.
'Baltic, Belorusslan, Carpathian, Kiev, and Odessa. 'Moscow, South Uial. Volga. Votoneih, and Uralorth Causasus and Transeausasus MD's.and Siberian MD's. 'Far East and Transbaikal MD's.
'Includes medium bombers assigned to Naval Aviation.
ESTIMATED SOVIET AIRCRAFT STRENGTH BV ROLE WITHIN MAJOR COMPONENTS.
Propmall) Prop (Mcd.j
FIGHTER AVIATION OF
AVIATION OK AIRBORNE TROOPS
See the footnotes lo the Table,y lhe AjistaUnt Chief of SUIT. Intelligence, Department or the Army, thc Director ot Naval taicHtger.ee. thc Assistant Chief or Stair. Intelligence. USAF. and theDirector for Intelligence, The Joint SUIT.
ESTIMATED PERFORMANCE OF SOVIET LONG RANGE AIRCRAFT (Calculated In accordance withpec)
. bombload one refuel'
Combat Celling (ft.)
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
estimates based upon use of compatible tankers which provide approximatelyercent Increase In radius/range.Jet medium bomber with supersonic "dash" capability. 'Capable of0..0 lb. bombload.
0 lb. bombload unless otherwise Indicated.
8 BADOBBnd mo3 basedestimate of normally expected Improve-
ESTIMATED PERFORMANCE OFOHT BOMBER AIRCRAFT (OPTIMUM MISSION PROFILE)
Combat Radius/Range (run.)
Maximum speed at optimum alt. tktsJti.)
Target speed/target alt. <ltU./tU
Combat Celling 4ft.)
May also be used In antisubmarine warfare. 'Includes. "dash". "dash."
ESTIMATED PERFORMANCE OF SOVIET TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT (Calculated In accordance wiihpec)
Power Planli Number Type
r Troops or Cargo (lbs.)
Transport Version of Badier
Transport Assault Transport Version of Transport Version of
Normal rated power.altitude mission.
'Believed to be competitive designs; only one may be produced.
ESTIMATED BLOC NAVAL VESSELS.
7 7AL ALL FL.EET9
kites USSR China
USSR USSR USSR China
Heavy Cruisers Old Heavy Cruisers
Light Cruisers Guided Missile Cruisers
Postwar Long-RangeO'.her Lonr-Raiige' OM Long-Range Oulded Missile
(Converted, topsideNrw TypesPostwar Medium-Range Other Medium-Range' Old Medium-Range Short Range Old Short-Range TOTAL
Lo addltJoa to tht ma]cr surCacc veiseJ shown, we estimate that Inhereinor surface vessels in Soviet serv.ee.au.tes and Communist China. Minor mrfae* vessels Induce amphibious, mtnewarlare. and patrol veaaels. "Old" surface ships are those more thanears old
'iscussion of the factors which may aStct future Soviel submarine construction and strength, see DISCUSSION,a. -Old"
submarines areearsonventional submarines of post-Worldesign and construction,lass long-rant*lassubmarines older than post-World War II but less thanears old.
theseew type submarines, th* following tentative estimate Is made of thc possible types:uclear-powered.uclear-powered raided missile.onventional-powered guided mlsalie. andubmarlnes of improved design.
ESTIMATED COMPOSITION OF BI<OC MERCHANT FI.EETSndOccati-golngRT ond up)