Saddam Husayn's
Prospects for Survival Over the Next Year!
The niicclor of Cental Intelligence
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: : Iraq: Saddam Husavn'a Prospects For Survival Over The Hoxt Year
I vould like to call readers' attention to the Estimate's discussion of Saddam's vulnerabilities. In ay view, the key-value of this paper is its appraisal of the intense internal and external pressures on the regime in Iraq. Many in the Intelligence community felt strongly aboutudgment on Saddam's survivability, and such views are presented in the Koy Judgments. This, along with the brevity of the Key Judgments, may obscure for the reader the paper's contribution to our understanding of his considerable vulnerabilities, which is found In the main text andommend to your attention.
Diroctor of
Control
Intolligonce
Iraq: Saddam Husayn's Prospects for Survival Over the Next Year
Information available as of1 was used
in iho preparation of this Special National Intamgonco Estimate.
Tha toMowing intelligence organzations pantopatad
the preparation of tfxs Estimate:
Tha Coir* Inteligence Agency
The Defense inre*>gerice Agency
The National Security Agency
Tho Assistant Secretary lor IntefWpeneo and Research,
n o' S'.a'.e
Oftee ot Intetiigence Support.
Deoatrnent ot the Treasury
Tlie Director for Intelligence.
Department of Energy
Tho Intelligence Dwision. Federal Bureau of Investigation also panictpaung:
Tho Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence.
Department of the Aimy
The Director ot Naval Intelligence.
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence.
Department o* the Air Force
The Director of Intel igence.
Headquarters. Marine Corps
This Estimate was approved for pubkeation by the NationalFor&gn fntearge/xx Board
Nj>ac.ret
Iraq: Saddam Husayn's Prospects for Survival Over the Next YearT
Saddam Husayn lias hccn weakened by Desert Storm, tlie Shia and Kurdish rebellions, and economic and social damage, but his key support groups stilltake in the system or arc cowed by his skill at intimidation and reward. Unless their support erodes significantly, we conclude that the odds favor that Saddam will still be ruling Iraq one year from now.1
* Senior military officers have ample reasons to be disenchanted with Saddam, but his pervasive security networks, the threat of purges and retribution, and his roleymbol of national unity arc likely to serve as restraints on military opposition.
Saddam will try to maintain the relatively privileged livingof his key supporters and appease the rest of the population with promisesetter future, but continued economic sanctions will deepen the fissures in Iraqi society. Lifting of sanctions, on the other hand, would provide significant relief to the regime and would strengthen Saddam's prospects for survival. I-
Iraq will have only limited capabilities to endanger US interests during the next year. Nonetheless, the United States will be challenged to monitor and, if necessary, contain Ihe actions of Saddam's regime, particularly with respect to weapons of mass destruction and treatment of opponents at borne and abroad. We consider it unlikely (hat he will authorize terrorist acts against US targets in tbe coming year, although he probably will lake such measures against dissidents and defectors and could also try to undermine regional coalition partners.}-
1 SiaiiflSR and Treasury Wnr lhal.Saddam may bela leather ihr many challenges Mini him. there isignificant postlbilUy lhal his hold ontaild crumble rapidly and with filile notice. Siaie/liVR and Treasury do not believe there It sugkltns Information on the liuUiailoniflnd^-iduals Saddam relies on/or maliuainint power loirm lodgment on his ium'ral.1
1
Key Judgments
Saddam's Saniiabiliry
Saddam Husayn's once absolute power over Iraq has eroded. Desert Storm. Shia and Kurdish rebellions, associated economic and social damage, and the continuing effects of international inspections and sanctions have weakened him. We believe that he, like most of his predecessors, will eventually be ousted from power in an cxlraconstituiional and violent change of regime. Nonetheless, his key supportservices. Republican Guard, andtake in the system or may be influenced by his skill at intimidation and reward. We conclude that the odds are that Saddam will still be ruling Iraq one year fromnly significant erosion of support from key groups would alter this judgment.[
After Saddam?
Any successor to Saddam will most likely share his perspectives on the threats to Iraqi interests and will come from the same political culture.uccessor, al least initially, would enjoy some international support and recognition, and would need toroader base of domestic support than Saddam Thus, although faced with many of tbc same problems as Saddam, wcuccessor would pursue different, and probably less brutal, solutions to Iraq's challenges.'!
The Military'* Position
Senior military officers have many reasons to be disenchanted with Saddam, including his0 rapprochement with Iran, his loss of Soviei backing during the Kuwait crisis, and his current inability to rebuild the military and restore complete sovereignty. But Saddamumber of levers to keep military opposition in check. Many military leaders continue to see himymbol of national unity; this perception,
'nd Treasury believe thai, white Saddam may be able tn weather thefacing him, iht'e isignificant possibility thai hti hold an powerrapidh andwith linle notice. Slaie/INR and Treasury do not believe thereInformation on ike inttisulions/lndhlduab Saddam rttiet on forloitm judgment on his
' The Deputy Director forIA. the Military litleHigrnce Board IUIB)IA and ihe military unices' Intelligence chiefs, and Director. SSA. believe this sentence oiemaies ihe likelihood cf significant policy changes on ihe panuccessoraddam. CIA. the MI ft. and SSA further belief that any likely successor would share Saddam's regional ambitions and would pursue similar methoih ai home to suppress Shia and Kurdish
combined with his pervasive security networks and the fear of purjes and retribution, serve as restraints. Military support for Saddam could erode if senior officers perceivedinterests were being threatened by Saddam's inability to get sanctions removed, end intrusive inspections, or by involvement in police actions against their own people. A
successful move against Saddam would emerge from carefully guarded
planning, minimizing the chance lhat wc would detect it in advance.
Economic Vulnerability
The economyey vulnerability. We cannot isolate the impact of sanctionsingle determinant of developments in Iraq, but we see the cost of sanctions as deepening fissures in Iraqiaddam will try to maintain the relatively privileged firing standards of his key supporters and appease tbe rest of the population with promisesetter future, but he will find it impossible to insulate most of the population from economicElite groups are also feeling the pinch of sanctions, asby the exodus of tens of thousands of skilled middle-class Iraqis, and the regime's inability to resupply and rebuild the militarySignificant lifting of sanctions, on the other hand, would provide relief to the regime and would strengthen Saddam's prospects for survival.
(racks ia Saddam's Hold on the Sunoi Heartland?
Some fissures have appeared in what hadtrictly regimented society. Evidence exists of increased lawlessness including crime, bribery, begging, kidnapping for ransom, and prostitution, open criticism of Saddam, and flight of Iraqis (including Sunni Arab middle-classfrom the country. Together, these developments could undermine Saddam's reputation as the only leader capable of preserving Iraq.
Saddam's Short-Term Goals
Saddam will concentrate on giving Iraq the appearance of political stability while he tries to rebuild the country's civilian economy and military capabilities:
Ie will try to reassert control over all of Iraq but will probably calibrate his actions against Kurds and Shia to forestall an international reaction, unless he fears civil war or loss of keywhich case he would not hesitate to launch large-scale counterinsurgency campaigns.
CIA's Deputy Director for Intelligence: ihc members of the Military Intelligence Hoard, ami ihr Director. National Security Agency, believe lhal economic sanctions,combinedpolitical Isolation and other pressures, will not be sufficient tohange of regime in Baghdad met ihr nextonths]
Vill
SeWt
He will concentrate on getting sanctions cased or removed and oil sales approved. He will give top priority to rebuilding the military to ensure its loyally and to protect its capabilities, regardless of the status of sanctions.
He will try to normalize diplomatic and trade ties and woo foreign governments and companies back lo Baghdad by offering reconstruction contracts and preferential treatment in oil sales and debt repayment.
Saddam's Continuing Challenge to US Interests
If Saddam remains in power, the United States will face challenges to:
Monitor, and, if necessary, contain the actionsefiant Saddam Husayn, especially with respect to UN resolutions on weapons of mass destruction and to treatment of the regime's opponents at home and abroad.
Support Saddam's neighbors who participated in Desert Storm who may be targets of Iraqi subversion and harassment: ai the same time, manage what are likely to be divergent policies as some regional states fear chronic turmoil in Iraq and may take measures to resume contact with
Iraq.
Maintain guard against potential Iraqi terrorism; we judge the most likely targets to be Iraqi dissidents and defectors, as well as regional neighbors who were part of the coalition. We think that Iraqi terrorism against US targets is not likely over the coming ycar.l
Si
Scope Note
This Special National Intelligence Estimate is based on two keySaddam will not fully comply wilh UN resolutions, and most sanctions will remain in effect, although increasing amounts of food and humanitarian assistance may be provided. We also considered significant changes in Western or coalition policies toward Iraq, including the resumption of military hostilities, as beyond the scope of the Estimate.
Contents
rHrlrYiijnfc
JuuyiTienis Scope Note
Prospects: Can He Survive?
World View
Vulnerabilities
Can He Keep Control?
Can He Keep the Machine Loyal?
Can He Cope Wiih the Bite of Sanctions?
Looks Outside
And the Neighbors Look Back
Saddam Lasts Another Year: Implications for the United States
X.il
Discussion
Saddam's Prospects: Can He?
Saddam Husayn's once absolute power over Iraq has eroded: he no longer enjoys authority over all the country, has fewer resources to keep his followers satisfied, and has to be more wary than ever of Ibe loyally of ha security forces and inner circle. Bui Saddam is skilled in using instruments of intimidation and reward, and we see his many detractors as lacking access, power, or motivation to bring Ihe system down. We conclude thai the odds are thai Saddam will still be ruling Iraq one year fromignificant erosion of support from key groups would alter this
Long years of reward and repression haveeneration of Iraqis who only know Saddam's rule and fear his power. They appear to have littlein iheir ability to remove Saddam. He has projected himself as the unifying symbol of Iraq whose elimination would mean instability,and eventually partition. Dissidents arcincapable of cooperating or building andthe kind of coherent, coordinated effort needed lo overthio* Saddam wiihin one ycar.f
brutal and preemptive political style thai created "the republic of fear" will continue io define and shield Saddam He will continue lo relyew cohorts lo advise and protect him. Members of his extended family, the Cabinet, the government, and ihe Ba'th Party may dislike his policies and threats and may believe lie should be removed, bul they are all unlikely to risk taking the first step against him. They will be constrained principally by fear bui also by the belief thattrong leader perhaps only
' Siuit/IXK and Trrmnty AraWvr rial, wktltuxhU lo mflfi ihr man* ikaHtmtcs tmVt himimijawjtraw agimMlr ikm tilmrr eomU trmmUt mfdfy ond Mia hiilf notice. 5tat/ISKond Trtmmni kthntaVMMoaM1 Saddam
nht<
fur mat (
Saddamwield Ihe kind of authority that will keep Iraq whole and protect Iheir sclf-intercsi.
Wc sec some fissures in what hadlrict law-and-order regime. These developments may notomplete breakdown of civil authority, bul reflect Ihe desperate economic situation and may indicate an intentional relaxation of some internal controls.visitors to Baghdad describe aa increase in public lawlessness including crime, bribery, begging,for ransom, and protfitulion. allin Saddam Husayn's prewar Iraq. Perhaps more Idling signs uf social stress arc reports of increasing numbers ofof them professionally skilled Sunnithe country, some seeking
lo emigrate. Iraq's continued international isolation lias also become an increasing frustration for the Iraqi people. P
The majority of Sunni Arabs rallied around Saddam during March and April out of fear of Ihe Shia and Kurdish uprisings, but some are now vocalizing their discontent. Though mindful of the repercussions of criticizing Saddam and of the regime's continuing capacity for repression, many Iraqis are altoof Saddam's apparent willingness lo bringdestruction upon them. Among the cause* of their concerns are rumors thai Saddam has hidden nuclear materials in residential areas. Saddam should be able lo contain the hatred and feat being more openly expressed by civilians, bul his ability lo cope wilh these problems will be further complicated if sanctions remain in place. Ultimately iIicm1 stresses could undermine Saddam's reputation as the only leader capable ofafe and secure Iraq.
Saddam will probably be able to manage threats from the military over ihe next year. Most senior military leaders, especially Republican Guard commanders, will remain loyal because of their similar background and outlook, the perquisites they enjoy, and their perception of the internal and external thrcata to Saddam andoreover, by directly involving them in ihe bloody suppression of the rebellions. Saddam has linked iheir fate lo his. '1 hey will also fear the extensive networks of spies within their ranks and the punishments meted out to suspected traitors and Iheir families.I
To contain the ambitions of his generals and ensure their loyally and his security. Saddam will continue to do what he has always done:
Concentrate on ihe Republican Guard, trying to ensure it is ihe best equipped and supplied arm of Iraq's military, even if this requires strippingArmy units of armor, artillery, other equipment, or personnel
' Staie/ISft Ulinti Saddam's ability in manage ihrraitfram the mililary remaini tn Question. While we can preiumr that Saddam has choten military commanders he believe* tu he loyal,currentlymallon on ihe idenlilies u/ many Republican Guard commandei. ikut making il impasiible to aisesi iheir
loyalty!
commanders and reassign loyalGuard officers to command posilions at all levels of the Army.
Try to protect special weapons programs, reinvest in indigenous conventional arms programs, andforeign arms suppliers Io evade sanctions.
the military's sense of mission high by cmpba-Iranitin meddling and Israeli or US threats.
But even Saddam's bcsl efforts lo keep up hismorale may noi suffice. The military has been involved in virtually every governmeni changend it seems that Saddam too will eventually share tbe violent fate of his predecessors. Some ofltccrs might move againsi Saddam if tbey believed his reckless and clumsy efforts lo avoid compliance with UN resolutions invited military retaliation. They might also move if his actions appeared likely to lead to the disintegration of the country or prevent its recoveryuccessful move againstwould emerge from carefully guarded planning that minimt/es thethat we would detect it in advance. If Iraqi history serveshange in regime may not be precipitated directly by social and economic discontent or ethnic unrest, which have never been far from the surface in lmo_.|
Other circumstances, especially in combination, might undermine military support for Saddam:
If the military perceived that sanctions weredegrading Iraq's defensive capability andwas Ihe obstacleelling them removed.
If they believed Saddam'sinability to remove foreign forces from, in, or near Iraq or to end intrusiveattack ornew rebellion from the Shias and the Kurds.
If theihe Republican Guard-were involved in susiaincd police actionaintain order in Sunni areas, including Baghdad.
Arab Sunni support during ihe rebellions,to him are beginning to dominate
Icsopoianiian mystique, Be) ' onscious*
t^mmn..
u lo the Mediterranean Sea Sod-dam'ss superimpoied on posters and stamps over xhoie af Hammurabi. Sebuchadnei-zar. ihe ancient Akkadian. and Caliph Harunrulereater Iraq coincidedolden age
Wfacn all else fails. seek islam. Balblsmtrongly secular system of'belief'.butSaddam before ihe war made extensive effortsajority Shia population, includingreligious shrines andogus famlly.tru thai shows himirectif the Prophet Muhammad, according loccounts In highly publt-rtTm meetingi wiih Shia tribal and religious leaders since the end of the rebellions, he hat offered lo refurbish iheshrlneS that had been
amaged during the
If military morale were seriously undermined by purges, executions, (be bite of sanctions, or by favoritism to Saddam's family, or, in the case of the regular military, favoritism shown the Republican Guard.l 1
We cannot isolate economic sanctionsingle determinant of developments in Iraq, but wc judge that sanctions and other pressures arc deepening fissures in Iraqiifting sanctions would
' Theeputy Otrecioe/oi Intelligence, ihe members af the Military Intelligence Board; and the Director. S'attonal Security Agenty. belinr that economic santtiom. etn combined with potto-eal Ixotallon and other prttsuret. will noti'athange af regime in BathJodo>rr the nextonths]
strengthen the regime significantly. As lung asare in place, Saddam will probably be able lo shield key supporters from tbe worst of the economic downturn by offering them economic und financial perks, suchgenerous pensions, gifts, and whatever consumer goods and public services are available. He will try to aprose other Iraqis by promising higher wages and subsidies and lower prices for food rations and other consumer goods but will find it impossible to insulate most of the populace from declining living standards He will blame economic failure* on lite West and onljci.ils whom he Im publicly chaigcd to oversee reconstruction.!
lit Vicit
Saddam appears unrepcnlani. He and the govern-ment-controlled media explain the defeat in the Gulforalattle that Iraq really won because it survived the conspiratorial effort ofations intent on destroying tbc country, its people, and its resources. One Iraqi editorial shortly after the war compared ligypt's defeat7 to Iraq's defeat and inferred that the Arab -masses" could turn Saddamictor just as they had transformed Nasir Saddum remains committed lo his vision of Iraq's role in Ihe region and will take calculated risks lo achieve his goals.|
Events since January have probably reinforcedbasic sense of isolation, mistrust, and betrayal. He remains parochial and xenophobic. He seesand Iraq as victims of an international conspiracy, tits speeches lince Ihe war refer lo -Great Iraq" and tbe importance of nationalism. Arab solidarity, and aali-impcrialism. He is angry at those Arab* who failed to support him and hasense of betrayal by the Soviet Union and Iran. He also has contempt for those Iraqis, including government and parly leaders and military officers, who wavered in following orders)
Saddam, however, has retained his ability to appear flexible when confronted with imminent danger. He encouraged talk of democratic pluralism when the rebellions threatened the partition of the country, and he admitteduclear weapons program when he feared military retaliation for his deceptions.!-
Saddam's Vulnerabilities
Political: Can He Keep Control?
Saddam's strategy for survival includes gestures at political reform:
Heew. expanded Cabinet power to initiate legislative reforms.
He has hmled at electionsew National Assemblyresidential referendum this year.
lie abolished Ihe People's Army the Ba'th Parly militia -and promised to curb corruption In the party.
" He offered amncsiy lo all Iraqis except military officers involved in the rebellions and offered to negotiate with Kurdish and Shia factions.
He relaxed restrictions on travel abroad.!-
Saddam's political initiatives probably are intended more for external consumption lhan domesticWe believe few Iraqis, especially Shia and Kurds, expect broader political participation. Saddam also may be trying to appeal to the loyalties of civilian party burcaucrals who advocate limited liberalizationetain power.
Saddam's actions overall suggest he remainslo the same narrowly based political style as before the war. Even proposed constitutional reforms reaffirm the dominance of Ihe president. Hiswith Ihe Kurdsew law allowing political parties stipulate that all parties will be subordinate to tbc state and banned from foreign contacts.ihe preeminence of the Ba'th Pany is reaffirmed and only it can recruit in the military services. Real power will remain concentrated in tbe hands of
The Inner Cirele. Saddam's key supporters remain his extended family, long-time Ba'th Party associates,oyal military and civilian intelligence and security apparatus. He has rewarded relatives and crejaica who have proved their loyalty with new and expanded powers. Since the end of the war, Saddam:
his son-in-law. Husayn Kamil al-Majid, Defense Minister. He retains significant control over the oil and defense industry ministries as well. He has been an important figure in talks wilh the Kurds and in meetings with UN officials and other prominent foreigners who have visited Baghdad wilh UN teams since the war.
his cousin. Alt Hassan al-Majid, Interior Minister. Known as the Butcher of Kurdistan, he was responsible for tbc brutal suppression of the Kurds8 and served as Military Governor of Kuwait during the occupation. He also participated in the negotiations with the Kurds and in security talks involving the UN.
S
Appointed his half-brother Sabawi io be chief of bis internal security organization. Sabawi ranoperations in Kuwait during the occupation. Another half-brother, Barzan, remains in Geneva as Ambassador to thehird half-brother was named governor of Satnh ol-Diney Sunni Arab stronghold in central Iraq.1
Saddam retain* the loyalty of these advisers and. in fact, bat drawn them ikact to him. Some, like Deputy Commander of tbe Armed Forces Izzat Ibrahim, Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz, Vice President Tahu Ramadan, and Prime Ministerm-mudi, were reshuffled to Iheir current posts lust February. They seem to beuffer between Saddam and the world in talki relating to the UN sanctions, inspection teams, negotiations with ther planning reconstruction.
Although we lack evidence of opposition towithin the Ba'th Party. Saddam isihc party of suspect elements andleaders with individuals baying militaryvisited Iraq
in early summer said party mem Dent were fearful of losing their privileged status and confused about (he impact of proposed political reforms. Saddam will face link challenge from within the party over Ihe next year. Party mem ben' fear of their fate should Saddam fall probably far outweighs their concerns for ihcii future under hi* rulc.|
Saddam's intelligence services (Mukhabarat) have been among the regime's principal instruments of control. Mukhabarat offices were largcttcd during the March uprisings and may have sustained somein northern and southern cities. Wc believe thai Saddam still relics on the Mukhabarat and may have taken measures to restore their strength, bul wc do not know how successful he has bccn.l
Military: Can He Keep the Machine
Iraq's military retains the potential toajor force for change. Alongside the security andservices, which family members usually run, it has been the key to Saddam's staying in power. Its
leaders, most of whom are Sunni Arabs, are hand-picked and presumably share Saddam's regionaland internal security concerns. The Republican Guard is deliberately composed mainly of Sunni Arabs from central and northern Iraq to counter the Shia majority in the Regular Army. Saddam has rewarded their loyalty by giving them the bestand the most perquisites. I-
Saddam in rebuilding and reconstituting the armed forces in ways thai maximize their effectiveness and loyalty under the new conditions:
educing the size of the Army, largely by demobilising Shia personnel. For the time being, he probablymaller Armyigher percentage of Sunnis can be more easily monitored by his internal security apparatus.
He is consolidating understrength Guard units into fewer but stronger units. He is reconstituting Guard heavy units at ihe expense of Regular Army units.esult, ihe Guard eventually willigher percentage of Iraq's overall combat power.
He is moving the Guard headquarter* and divisions inlo garrisons in the Baghdad area bul is keeping Regular Army units far from the capital. Thus, ihc Guard will be deployed between the capital and potentially mutinous Regular Army units.
Saddam is placing large numbers of senior Guard officers into the upper hierarchy of ihe military.
is ensuring lhal Guard member* and their families receive preferential treatment for basic goods and service*.)
Potential for Military Opposition, Senior military officers have ample reasons to be disenchanted with Saddam. Even before the war. many in the military were unhappy about Saddam's sudden rapprochement with Iran, his loss of Soviet backing during the Kuwait crisis, and his willingness to risk destruction
rather thanolitical resolution to thewith Ihe coalition. They almost certainly resent the appointment of Husayn Kamil as Defenseand his concurrent promotion to lieutenantThey may be uneasy with Saddam's inability to protect miliury programs, including "capons of mass destruction. They may resent his inabilityel UN observer* removed from Iraq, foreign troops removed from its borders, or to eliminate the threat of renewed attack,
Nonetheless. Saddamumber of levers to keep military opposition in
they are conservative and intenselyin outlook. The brutality with which theythe rebellions suggests they will remain loyal, al least while Ihe prospect of internal rebellion exists. Saddams pervasive security networks combined with the fear of purges, executions, and retribution against family members will also restrain senior military officials.I
Fxoaomlc: Can lie Cope Wllb Ihe Bite of Sanctions? The economy is another major factor determiningbility lo survive. In the short lerm, we expect Iraq to make limited progress in meeting basic civilian needs. Some additional electric power,telecommunications, and oil facilities will be repaired. These efforts willlateau and many sectors will deteriorate as stocks of spare parts and the capabilities of the labor force arc exhausted. Increased deliveries of food, medical supplies, waler treatment chemiculs. and even distribution of these supplies will be necessary over tbe nextonths to avert famine and epidemics. Without the import of at least SI billion in foodstuffs, Iraq will not be able to meet its minimum aggregate food requirements by years end [
Sekrel
Table I
What's Left in Ihe Iraqi Military: Estimated Iraqi Wartimeand Current Ntatm of the Armed Forces"
1'hit table lists all neapora in the Iraqioctadrni many thai are de reikinclude*ombat aircraft ihat flew lo Irnii.
acn iochide lit aircraft aueued alle* the war io be intact but derelict, in Horace and nortoperalional, or held by toreisn maintenance Idealities.
* Includes al lea*ilitary transports in Iran.
table is
las! vcar
Saddam probably believes he can survive the impact of sanctions by ensuring an adequate supply of goods and services for keythose who are close associates; members of his intelligence, security, and personal guard; and those who serve in the Republican Guard, ft is the same strategy he employed last year when sanctions were first imposed on Iraq.n
Saddam assumes that sanctions will eventually be eased if not removed, even if he fails to comply fully
with UN resolutions. Judging by his tactics, Saddam believes that publicizing economic hardships suffered by ordinary Iraqis offers the besi chance for eroding international support for sanctions in the short term. In tbc longer term, he probably assumes thai foreign government and corporate greed will override support for sanctions. I-
Taking Care of Key Supporters. Saddam is trying to assure his primary supporters that he does notin fact protects -Iheir economic well-being.
St-Vet
figureaddam In norther* Iraq. rpeinglVH fvl
is allocating mosi available resources, lo restoring Baghdad and central Iraq, which arc home lo his key supporters. Saddam has diverted international food relief earmarked for other cities to TTkril, hisHe hai ordered hefty nay raises for theespecially the Republicancontinues to pay civil servants who arc not required to report lo work because of damage or other disruptions caused by the war. The regime hasew bank under Saddam's uontrol thai trill ofTer interest-free loans to slate employees, veterans of the "Mother of Allnd those deemed "friends of Saddam.'1
Appealingke International Community. Saddam is trying to erode international support forsanctions. His official spokesmen appeal through the UN and other diplomatic channels for their removal or casing on humanitarian grounds. Trying to exploit human suffering, they have granted foreign observers und journalists unprecedented access to local facilities and even staged demonstrationsisiting UN mission. They also appeal directly to commercial interests, especially in countries whose compliance wiih the sanctions significantly damages
Iraq: Minimum Cost and lime Required for Chilianeliberately to punish the Iraqi people, and some Iraqis apparently accept this explanation. Saddam has publicly tasked other officials with overseeing and administering reconstruction and setting up numerous potential scapegoats for economic failures.]
Saddam Looks Outside
Saddam will apply the same aggressive tactics to ending Iraq's diplomatic isolation and getting foreign support to removee will use the specter of famine and disease, Pan-Arab and anti-imperialist propaganda, and ihe lure of contracts and debtlo restore Iraq's trade and diplomatic tics. Saddam will also try to bully Iraq's former diplomatic allies and trading partners to resume ties. Iraq's near inability and unwillingness to repay debts and the UN sanctions will probably discourage most governments and companies from doing significant business wiih Baghdad until Iraqi oil begins to flow.
their own economics^
Tapping Private-Sector Resources. With hi* regime's resources dwindling or inaccessible, Saddam hasmany trade and financial restrictions toprivate enterprise. Merchants can obtain foreign exchange outside of the government-controlledsystem and restrictions on licensing requirements have been cased to facilitate imports by the private sector. The regime islind eye to what had been considered black-markcl trading, allowingto openly sell goods well above government-set prices
ropaganda War, Iraq's propagandaregularly lauds Saddam for postwar economic improvements and blames the coalition- especially the Unitedcontinued hardships. It also accuses the West of maintaining strict sanctions
Saddam has had some limited success. As proofonce again is part of the internationalthat Saddam isiability, Baghdad hasto iu participation in the May meetingArab League, visits by Iraqi officials tosome Arab states this spring, and visits toby foreign dignitaries, even those underMoreover, press
report that atfagainstres ta fling their embassiesandozen more are preparing
nd the Ndgbbors Look Back
Iraq's neighbors have little sympathy for Saddam. Except for Jordan, all hoped he would be defeated in the war or ousted in its aftermath. For the most part, they give some measure of support to his opponents or back internationa) efforts to monitor his behavior. But they also worry lhat his successor will not be able to hold Iraq together or that the delicate balance of
Without.Sadtfa^rn: Differently? '
': Saddamsayttotan.ahfrrfti.
cswell,eek .ypfiOriuniticj.roto inspire the hint* leHfauesilpnzd.mtfjoriiy
iii"
fuuttuts one' "
to-he.
TV toiewjead'erj wotfd probablyV>loserio
seefcjffljwjeftow and as they define their on They .would share Sadda
either
in ihe Gulf will be disrupted. In particular, some fear their neighbors will rush to take territorial advantage of the vacuum of power in Iraq orethnic ifredeniism by advocating Kurdish or Shia autonomy]
Guard. Tehran also appears to be broadening its support of opposition groups to include those based tr Saudi Arabia and
Iranian leaders are intent on Saddam's ouster, and they hope UN economic and diplomatic sanctions will eventually topple him. We expect Tehran to continue to provide moderate levels of support to Iraqi Shia opposition groups andesser extent to the Kurds. They will offer safehaven. training, weapons, money, and advisers or small units from the Revolutionary
Searet
on its decadelong relationship with Iran and newly strengthened ties to Saudi Arabia and Egypt to keep regional pressure on Saddam, and it willmaintain its unilateral trade embargo against Iraq, in placeven if internationaland regional cooperation against Iraq erode.
Syrian President Haflz al-Asad remains disappointed that his arch rival Saddam Husayn retains his hold on power. He probably believes that, if Saddam can rebuild his military and political power, he willto punish Damascus for supporting the anti-Iraq coalition. Consequently, we believe Asad will noteconciliation with Saddam. Q
Instead, Damascus will continue efforts to unseat Saddam. It will continue to piovide limited military training and logistic assistance to various Iraqigroups, including the anti-Saddam front Syria supported during the war to liberate Kuwait and pro-
exiled Iraqi military figures. Syria also will
s
* Monitor and. if necessary, contain the actionsefiant Saddam, especially with respect to weapons of mass destruction and treatment of regime opponents
> Maintain coalition resolve during the debate over economic conditions in Iraq und whether to modify or lift sanctions.
Work with some important US partners in tbe region, who will feel the political repercussions of Saddam's remaining in power; differing strategies may create strains in their relations with the United Statcs.r
Wc think thai, over the next year, Iraq *iih or without Saddamhave limitedto endanger important US interests and relationships
may use nonmilitary means to harass and intimidate the rulers in Riyadh and Kuwait City in particular, although it will not be able to threaten militarily these neighbors.
will not be able to seriously undermine the US peace initiative between Israel and various Arab states, in large measure because its ability tothe Palestinian movement has been seriously setback.
If Saddam Lasts Another Year Implications for tbe United States
If Saddam Husayn remains in power over the next year, Iraq willumber of challenges, and the United States will need lo commit diplomatic,and military resources to:
Insure Baghdad complies with UN resolutions and pressure the UN and member stales to stick with the inspection regime; such efforts could complicate olher US arms restraint initiaiives in the region.
Saddam may eventually seek revenge against Ihe United Stales, bul his use of terrorism against US targets will be hampered by the fear of USand the degradation of his terroristNevertheless, limited action against Arabpartners or Israel remains possible. He is likely to sanction operations as well against Iraqi dcfoclors and dissidents.)
Over Ihe long term, if Saddam remains in power, bis ability to reassert Iraqi power and ambition will grow. Wc anticipate that Iraq will continue to seek ways to weaken American influence in the region and will find iu nationalist ambitions at odds wiih US policies and goals.
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: