MONTHLY REPORT, OCTOBER 1991

Created: 11/15/1991

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

approved for release date:*

NORTH KOREA

THE NORTH KOREANS' INITIAL RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT BUSH'S PROPOSALS TO REMOVE TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM OVERSEAS DEPLOYMENT WAS FAVORABLE BUT NON-COMMITTAL. IN THE LONGER TERM, HOWEVER, MOST ANALYSTS EXPECT NORTH KOREA TO SIGN AN IAEA AGREEMENT, BUT COOPERATE ONLY MINIMALLY WITH INSPECTORS. WINNING PYONGYANG'S ASSENT TO HALT THE DEVELOPMENTUCLEAR WEAFON WILL BF EXTRAORDINARILY SrrriCULT, BUT ITS POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ISOLATION PROVIDE SOME PRESSURE POINTS.

UCLEAR CAPABILITY HASIGH-PRIORITY AND COSTLY EFFORT FOR THE NORTH, AND ANALYSTS ARE VERY SKEPTICAL THAT P'YONGYANG WILLAN ON REPROCESSING OR ABANDON ITS NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM.

THE NORTH KOREANS ARE WELL-SCHOOLED IN DENIAL AND DECEPTION AND IN PUTTING SENSITIVE INSTALLATIONS UNDERGROUND; ANALYSTS BELIEVE THE NORTH KOREANS MAY HAVE UNDISCOVERED SITES FOR HIGH EXPLOSIVES TESTING, WEAPONS DESIGN, AND RELATED NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE TASKS.

P'YONGYANG COULD ULTIMATELY ACCEDE TO SAFEGUARDS CONFTCENT THAT, AS IN IRAQ, SUBMISSION TO IAEA INSPECTIONS WOULD NOT SERIOUSLY IMPEDE ITS NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM MID KAY EVEN BRING GREATER ACCESS TO FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY.

JAPAN'S TENTATIVE OFFER OF SEVERAL BILLION DOLLARS IN ASSISTANCE CONTINGENT UPON NORTH KOREAN ASSENT TO THE IAEA REGIMES REMAINS THE MOST SIGNIFICANT LEVERAGE.

NORTH KOREA'S RECENT DECISION TO JOIN THE UNITED NATIONS OPENS THF. DOOR TO BROADER INFLUENCES. NEVERTHELESS, P'YONGYANG KAY SIMPLY IGNORE FOREIGN PRESSURE, AS IT HAS IN THE PAST, AND CONTINUE WORK ON ITS HUCI.EAR PROGRAM UNTIL COMPLETION.

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