SOUTH AFRICAN NEGOTIATIONS: MORE PROGRESS AND PROBLEMS AHEAD (DE

Created: 12/1/1991

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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South African Negotiations: More Progress and ProblemsJ

National Intollioancs Eit.mata

wilh tha advica and aaalnanca ol tha

US Intalllganca Community.

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433

Diractof of Control

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South African Negotiation* More Progress andProblems Ahead

enselnwII^AaeSy

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Tho Director otInline* pepanmemol^eNavy

Depertme.ir ofForce ecioroM.ni9iii0er>Ce Haaaqoere's. Marine Corps

Key Judgments

South African Negotiations: More Progress ano" Problems Aheadf

Fitful Progress2

We believe the talksew constitution for South Africa will continue to make uneven progresshen formal negotiations begin later this month, both the ruling National Party and the African National Congress (ANC) will Open vvith hardline positions. We expect that eventually they will abandon their more extreme demands because' both believe the benefitsettlement greatly outweigh the costs Jof returningiolentodest economic upswing will also improve the climate for compromise. Issues likely to be resolved earliest include interim governing arrangements, the mechanism for drafting the constitution, and most of the principles underlying ttT

Bui More Time Is Required

Nonetheless. Pretoria and the ANC are unlikely lo agree on the detailsew political systemosiapartheid economy for several years.ebate on redistributing wealth and power will generate considerable heat. Moreover, both black and white constituencies will need time to adapt to the changc^icadv made and to accept the compromises necessaryeitlemeni^^

Conflicting Coals

The goals and strategies of the two central actors arc still evolving,2 the Nationalist* will seek multiple constitutional checkslack-led government because they believe that thewould probablyonracia!govern effectively yet. They will also attempt toultiracial coalyjpfi against the .ANC. but we doubt its ability to win an eventual electk

The ANC leadership will increasingly act as an impatient but confident government-in-waiting, demanding the right to have input into Pretoria's decisions during the transition to majority rule. The ANC also wants to weaken support for the Zulu-based organization, lnkatha, by highlighting its close ties to (he government!

Inkaiha will support most of ihe Naiionalists' negotiating positions but will remain sensitive to any moves to diminish its influence or undermine itspower base. Despite the recent peace accord, Inkatha's fear lhatT. means to marginalize il contributes to endemic factional violencc-

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Violence Will Won*o

s hasf the turmoiir

Although violence bas reached new beishtt since F- W. de Klerk;became President int will probably net even worse. The closer constitutional talks Approach agreement, the more active white extremists and other opponents of talks will become. Sustained violence at extremely high levels could derail theoutcome wc judgecould assassinations of key leaders or revelations of government complicity in fomenting fclack-on-black fighting. We do not believe de Klerk is wing violence to weaken the ANC. Nevertheless, the involvement of renegade police hasembers that the government is behind much

Outcome: Negotiation Break Oown

if violence or deadlock caused talks to collapse, we judge that any bait would be temporary:

Pretoria would try toew constitution with any group that re* mained willing, while urging those who had left the talks to return.

The ANC alliance, rather thiniliury campaign, would conduct mass protests while lobbying the international community to pressure Pretoria into concessions.

Ob the other hand, if talks did not resume fairly quickly, the level of noience would rise precipitously and the economy would enter^shar recession in tbe ensuing climate of pessimism and uacertaint

The United States Counts

ietionsfl

5

The United Srates enjoys influence with both the governmeni aid the ANC. Independently or in center: with other Western states, particularly the Unitedt can facilitate talks through informal mediation, advice, material assistance to antiapai thcid groups, and Ihe encouragement of investment. Bul intervention thai appeared to dictate terrm or fiior one side over the other would risk selling bock the negoiiai

Contents

'. 1

:

Judgments

Progress in'Constitutional Talks

Support...

But Worsening Violence

Trust i

Opposition

Goiii and Sliategies of Key Actors

Pany Hedging

OoTcnarnent-in-Waiting

Bid To Stay in the Game

of Soulh African Trade Unions Emboldened

African Communist Party Marginalized 6

More Progress.

;

But Quick Settlement Improbable

i

Scenario: Talks Collapse

and Opportunities for the United States

i

Discussion

ruling National Parly and ihc African National Corrs.'ess (ANC) have made treat strides toward res-living their differences and advancing lo tbe next phase in iheira new constitution. Although they still disagree on some core issues. Pretoria, the ANC. and the oilier My jctcrs all appear to auumcettlement will occur some-tine2 and ihai the ANC and iu allies currently^flvg enough support IOonracial election. |

RlfuJ Progress in Contlilotional Tallcj

Pretoria aad ihe ANC remain committed ioa new constitution and will meel scon with other groups io launch forma, talks. Each believes thai ihe ber.eSisetilement greatly outweigh the costs of returningiolent stalemate. Notwtihsiandins the freque-itiy harsh rheloHe from both sides, their view? on many key issues will probably continue ioAircady. ihey agree on who should participate in ihe talks, on the necessity ot' interim arrangements, and on ihc needixed economy Nsnelfce.est, ihe talks will remain vulnerable to disruption.has reached unprecedented heights since de Kick came lo power in'f and will ifciy gci even *ctic.

Nelson Mandela vlwsJteANCasjk+undrr-ac-zln talks with rrrtoria.even tkouti^is roupwowdprobablycetracdalefeisloei. he talks export> and Isfnatraitdut3iWpW=

f**suiens&Klerk antry. thai Pretoria has note

' between the.AXC otdlnkoi believes'the Wesil^'tfV. credit for his reforms inharsh ietaey'foeblaeki

ut Worsening Violence

During the pas;onths morslacks died in fighiinmost between ANC and Inkaiha supporters. Random attacks by whiles against blacks have also increased since de Klerk began VsThe September pestisigned oy ihe governmeni. ANC, and Inkalha has noiajorerhaps became some of the grassroots str-.ic' luresalls for have >ei io te formed. Sustainedisiier levels wishargc.ed ur re? tU .ions of governpl^ oautd disrupt or even derail ihe 'al

Southolitical| remainighly cnarged2ingle, explosivecouldhe talks. Fur. the ANC

Till tsLBdiiravialci!n AttiHiM Steitliry nf Situ

laArTiirs In Halii ot ih' "Ji it formal nisei

t|l" ee1t Inshif yen.

Soutb Alnca: Quantrtj lornt-Rrialtd Deaths. MM

Kuion-iiMjuitf ol cme rgtnci j 1

i

hc

1

b* Kfcrael tied PtnidciH

AM

Nthonal jxai*ugnrd

ion

of

might lulldialoguelent temporarilycurilT forces killa Urge nambcjcf bjacta while trying toan

constituent audience* and ihe international eorr.mu.hey -ill reflect the fundamental misgiving! each group mil has about whether its longtimewill make the ne<esiary .concessions.

Trust

The goodwill apparent al government-ANC0 hasbt noknc*raipect* for aof2 we Weak Both ibe ANC and :mt it facio gwerameni-ltuuiha allianceclaim ibai it*ot Mgotiaiiag in good faiih Although Nth irgei -Ul be aimed mainly at

The continued influence of Communists in theta of rcccm ANC military tern-ity. and erratic ANC mcenwpu about the South African economyduamaaonftdence ia ib* grcea A

of Vioodoto or do KUih

Tht luddtn remiiai of ttthtr hlondelaKlerk from ike polilieml trine mould jar.not derail, ikroitrielike-minded cabinet ministersdt Klerk,eaderihip changehave little impact on partythe leading contenders lo succeedFinance Minltltr Bar end duiaf Public b'nit'prlits Dawiefirmly eommltied to reform.probably would disrupt ikeremier siaius in the blackand could cattle delays in ikeWalttt Slsulu would providtleaderihip continuity oyer ikebul rising nar Cynl Ramapkoia isio ereniualiy ukejkektlm. Both10

bombing (raced to ihe ANC would undermineaith in Mandela's abilityconirol ihe ANC's miliiaiy wing. Meanwhile, statements by Mandela and oihcr ANC officials on plans loSouth Africa's mines and renegotiate or ignote iis foreign debts have aUrmid^-er^ie staunches! while supporters of the talks.^E

The ANC interprets Prtioria's aid to Inkaiha as evidence the government ii intent on mortally:t. Mandela's anger at dc Klerk forking more drastic measures to control Ihe police will noi dissipate. Most ANC supporters, for iheirill emphasiie vigilance raiher than trust in iheTheir concernsas Pretoria and in-fcathj derounce likely ANC mass actions nt'i year, especially if ihey perceive de Klerk and Both* working closely togclhc: on negotiation

be hard for de Klerk lo accommodate the demands or either Mandela or Buiheleii wiihoui the sianily assuming sinister

Organized Opposition

Some right wing white groups, even including the Conservative Parly,he means to disrupt the talks. Conservative Party members, however, arc divided over woe; her they should boycott ihe talks or try to use them toeparate white homeland. The Conservatives will continue lo play upecterlack authoritarian government to gain new supporters, although :har. tactic wjll noi bring them any immediate tcuctiti because under current law the Nationalists are not requiredeneral elec-lion unlit

its part. Inkaiha believes the ANC still means to marginalize it, despite the receni peace accord.refusal after his release from prison to meetBuin and his harsh criticism of Inkaiha set the stageontinuing antagonistic ANC-tnkaiha relationship. During the negotiationsear, il will

The ciossr constitutional la Iks approach agreement, the more active while eitrcmisls will become. White eilremisl groups have proliferated since de Klerk became President. More thanhite paramilitary groups may now be operating in Soulh Africa*,of their total membership rangeo

10mm vim

-we responsible farampa.m.itlhite support for de Klerk's effort

member, oi ihe ANC. Militaryproblcmi. tf. for example, ihey were Moody bombingone ernmcnt believed had Mandela's ap-otia wwtd SBtpcod ike ulks. Em if nvinced the government that renegade

Nejintkiii.il Gnats and StrMnrira of Key Acton

None of ihe key players In the ncgociailons Is under an immediate lime eoraifaint Theeneral elecuon is artificial a. de Klerk bas

ike pejbacacaury strength to changeIu

and taypcir.ejc-

importance alacucal ruber "ha- strategic To Ma oeawiaiagts&xai. players are likely lo cita lb*

onservative Parly

deadline election ri

NaiiocorJ Parry Hedging In Beta

Tbe Nationalists will seek multiple fcmi or insurance against potential abuseslack-ledThey believe that Ibe ANC ll not yet capable of governing effectively and thai the white minority would suffer without extensive checks ami bilancei. Pretoria is counting on the process of drafting,andew constitution taking it lean several years. During that period it will contm-ually reassess therganizational development and policies. Measures thai Pretoria Is seeking to guard white interests include:

. devolution of power to regions and local

wnpreher-sive bill of rights, protecting etiv-jtc Jy-aersoip and cultural rights in particular.

U btcaoeral legislature wita an upper chainbcr ibai ia practice would allow whiles to veto decisions of Ihe black (najcesty.

W msliipany eiecutive braocbotating pre^ceacyabinetmembers of many

-hicb will remainwhite for someatification process requiring while voters and the curreni_Parliament toew contiitulion.

t

Pretoria appea

iter attica

VI

appears close ic compromising on the ANC's demand for an interim government. Blacksoice in policymaking while ibe talks grind on.is not prepared to suspend the currentbut il has pledged la seek transitionalthat would satisfy the ANC The Nationalist! may hopeersuade the blsck occoiition to setileigh-loel advisory rol* on security and political matters In addition. Pretoria may offer Macks limit-economic decisionmaking po*eri to secure the lopport of flgr perineal and labor groups forrowt*

The NaiiOBalats willloultiracial alliance that can oSei still compeuiioo to ao ANC coaliiioaooraoal electionew government Tbey win implemeot additional reform to try lo efface scene of the effects ef apartheid, court moder. ales of all races, and recruil more nonwbiic mcroberi into National Pany ranks. We believe thai Coloredi. Indians, and many conservativeseveral million belonging lo evangelical'be receptive to this effa

ANC's Co-ernnKsst-in-Walting

elves as tbejeaderiaf i

EE?

usonths

ANC leaders will increasingly acl as an impatient bul confident government-In-waiting. Indignant ANChave already criticized tbe government for not consulting with ihem before making recent unilateral moves. In Ihe coining talks, ANC officials wilf Mil additional dcmesik and foreign leverage againstby portraying themselves as theinevitable black successor

nsjbiliii fur

J

The ANC -til preaantents structura that would undercut tbe Nationalpaiy oa SUte power. Nevertaelew. secure ie thrthat iu eventual accession to po-er is assured, ihe ANC leadership -ill probably coeocvo-mssc oa this issue because ities thai the National Party will not agree lo any interim arrange-meivi in which Pretoria and the ANC are equal partners Moreover, tbe ANC sees certain advantages in being ablevade immediate retpensit decisions unpopular with its constituency

ANC leadersood chance of securingagreement to their demandational consiit jonl assembly be elected toew conntl-luiion. The government realizes the ANC would walk out of the talks if it refuses to budge on Ihis issue. Some signs suggest that the two may agree toout broad principles first,eferendum on tbem. and thenonstituent assembly to work out the detailsew consiitution De Klerk, however, almost certainty would insist on polling white votes separately in the referendum, in keeping

seek white zppteval for the

Jf

pressure from Pretoria and the international community, ihe ANCaitempiing io strengthen ill military *iBjf. The intelligence chief of ihc militaryrecently said thai it0 memters outside South Africa, ihougn he judges only one-third to behe group believe* Pretoria should allow the military wingoexist now wltn the garcra-ment'sj iccurlty forces inside South Africa and protect ANC followersc townships. Pretoria ir. unlikelyee inver the longer term. ANC leaden itiicipate ih.it tome elements of the military *ieg nil be'imegraicd into the South African armedhe govern meet "tl^esist incorporation of untrained ANC cicfe*^ "aft

Inkaiha's Sid lo Staythe Game Ir-kathb will support most of Pretoria's negotiating positions but will remain set'silive to anyNC moves In diminish its influencendermine iis regional power case. Lite Pretoria, Inkathi opposesNC* noilon of it interim jcsrnriveri!.the multiparty conference to draft aconsliiKCc-n, favors devolving pOiiliCJiaway from the central government, and stronglyarket economy Inkattta.as noi supportediopji party'i p'an foja multipartyotating presieendR^ ^jjv

likaOu bases it! long-term strategy on theew ANC-Ied governmentbe short liv Ackrvewledging Mandela's popularity. Inkathaconcedes lhal theII win the Sri nerncial election Accordingly. Inkatha's irrrr jim la to supcor: the creationacy thai allows Ciiicf Buiheleuence, Inkatha believes that an ANC regime wit ;fie electorates etpeciaiions. openingo win the presidency Inunlikely outcome, in our

o' South African Trade Unions

H-jiricrtcd by its recent successful general strike, (he Congress of South African Trade Unions tCOSATUJ is unlikely henceforth to confine itself to labor issues. Already, it isarer.;mcm-3'ing It probably will work mainly with Us allies, the ANC and the South African Communm Pjrivo intluciu; boiitnd economic issuesver them.

famprOih

however. COSillore independentpreparation few noi tabic oonflicts between it

Outlook:

believe the talks will make fitful progressiclt side's hardline opening petitions will test the resolve of the other parikipalinn iroups Wetftat Pretoria and the ANCacH abandon

i. j

V3

some of its most controversial demands. The poniesreater-1han-even chance of reachingneat year on interim governing arrangements, on the mechanism forew eflasruuiafl, and on most of the principles underlying i

A return to slow ecsnccnicGDP ruing at aa annul raleo Jlotof

'.fitmprove the climate for taiks Increased capons and an improving capital account, facilitated

by South Africa's reintegration into the worldwill reinforce the mcdesi cyclical economic upswing already under way. Pretoriawcit could boon annual growth to atereem ifegains access lo IMF facilities. Whiles, ia particular, ara likely to feel leas nervous about pending 'kpV'jyr 'heir economic fortunes are improving!

ut Quick SeitlenwM Improbable

The purtica ate unlikely lo reach final decisions on (he detailsew political systemosts par? held economy for several years. In addition. Nationalists will nottrci ;ne government1 ta the AN<

ti> be lajgaBjgajj |bj

other reasons,cttlencat Utat occurs too soon may not prove viable. De Klerk and Mandela an both itruggling to bring their constituents along on the politically mine strewn course ahead. Both whites and blacks'need lime, not only to adjust to the changes already made under de Klerk, but io accept the

that will be necessaryulemcm.

cenario: Talks Cullapta

We jodge thai any halt lo tke talks from deadlock orwould be temporary. Although wkites control :te government, tke iccaniy forces, and the ccceotny. lacy cannot prevent Urge-scale outbreaks of black violence that would mm parts of the rauntryaad eccnoinic recovery unachicablc- At (he same time, the black opposition would not yet be

Economic Issues: Sent Came Jot Hope

Nosctnt Eeoaemtt Constmus. Most partiesrecognizeelatively unfettered private sector Is essential for robust economic growth and lob creation. The parties also accept that redressing the stark legacy of apartheid will require government Intervention tothe slower redistribute effects ofgrowth. Accordingly, key players expect that an economic settlement willixed economic system that entrusts government with greater responsibility for effectingbut leavesasic fret

leaves theupnorqetwi

Nonetheless, strong economic rhetoric will surely continue at the partitl shore uppositions and reassure constituencies. Tke parlies still differ on tht practical details of economic policy and mutt hammer out compro-mtsts on matters tuck as tax and spending levels, land transfer mwckomimi. andaction programs. Beyond tht timeframe of ikit Estimoit. economic policies by any new government will bt unoopular because of rising block tiptctatlons foe redistribution. Meeting thtstrconcmic growth It hi

Medium-Term Pretpecti Still Tentative. South Africa will experience slow economiclittle help In lowering iht 4lt-pc':entseveral years evenolitical settlement il reached toon. Uncertaintieshe stability and policieiayority gov-crrmtm will cloud the business climate and discourage muck foreign investment. Sontk Africa's chronic shortage of skilledthe result af deficient blackill per Hit for several generations.

of businettti to expand.

est

nd Social DaU

|

l

*l| 1 - -

Possible CataJyrts

landslide ANC eieaiomlacks highly critical of National Pony's bargaining laata and security actions duringnos in ague. Mandela changes stripes} or dies and Is succeeded by firebrandttacks by whitecauses greater militancy among blacks.

Impact

hreat of widespread white backlash at black regime becomes Increasingly autkotiiar-lam oeuravertial gcvervneni economicresult In wkue flight. Utile new foreign investment.

Rale by Naliaaal Party-Led, Multiracial Coalition

PeatlUe Caialyu

Conservatism among blacks much deeper than previouslyany mainstream blacks critical of ANC performance inarner votes of vast majority of whites, large portions af the black community

Impact

Highly. black extremists. Including possible breakaway ANC faction, well poisedxploit black anger over perceived continuance of whilelack support for tht new syiltm erodes.

'O

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