THE POLITICS OF RUSSIAN NATIONALISMS (SOV 91-10044)

Created: 10/1/1991

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The Politics of Russian Nationalisms

An Intelligence Assessment

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASEAS9

The Politics of Russian Nationalisms

An InlrtligenuAsiaimtnl

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS9

Office o( Soviet Aiulytis.cceiuibuiioni SOVA.

Tbe Politics of Russian Nationalism?,

Jiidgrneots

Informalii-

MifJlOoMkerim

lord Im Ihli upon.

arious forms of Russian nationalism have rremerged to become major political forces. The most important nationalist group todayoalition of nation-building, oeroocratic>niinded nationalists associated with Russian President Boris Ycl'tsin. Their goal is to establish an independent, economically prosperous Russian nation. To achieve this, they are deterrnincd to destroy the remnants of the Communist system and to replace il with political and economic models borrowed from tbe West. They are willing to jettison the remnants of the Soviet empire and accept the full independence of the non-Russian republics, but they want to maintain strong economic and political ties to some republics, especially Ukraine. Byelorussia, and Kazakhstan, which have the largest Russian populations. ,

A group of Christian nationalists is currently allied with Yd'tsin's coalition. The Christian rationalists generallyreater degree of political pluralism and democracy and some limited formarket economy and usually appear willing to accept the secession of the non-Slavic republics from the union. The Christian nationalists havemoral suture in Russia but have been submerged in the broader coalition of Russian nation-building, democratic-minded reformers and have not been able to esublish themselves as an independent political JJ force.

A coalition of conservativeby Western sundards arc reactionaries seeking lo ramposc an authoritarianopposed to Yd'tsin's goals. These conservative naiionalisu, in alliance with neo-Sulinists in the Communist Party, were the driving force behind the failed August coup. They believe the policies supported by Yeltsin and President Gorbachev led directly lo the loss of Eastern Europe and in the future will lead to the breakup of the union and tbe disintegration of Russia itself. The conservative nationalisu and nco-Stalinists remain deeply hostile toward the West and the ideaarket economy. Frequently this enmity toward the West Is linked to anti-Semitism andelief that the Weslem world is controlled by anti-Russian Jews and captialisu.

The failure of the August coup thoroughly discrcdiled the Communist Party and iu nec-Sulinist supporters, accelerated the breakup of the union, and greatly enhanced public support for Yd'tsia. Yd'Uin and his supporters arc seeking to use lhe window of opportunity created by the

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coop lo push through as much of ihcir program as ibey can. In (he future, however, the conservative nationalists may be able to disrupt Ycl'tsin'* program by exploiting public fears on keyide variety of evidence indicates lhat, although most Russians favor in general terms lhe establishmentarket economy, they remain strongly opposed to it in specific detail and fear Ibe transitionew system. Similarly, while most Russians appear willing lo allow tome republics to secede from thesmallerthose io Central Asia and ihethey are much less witling to concede the secession of the republics having tbe largest Russian population* Finally, conservative Russian nationalists stand ready lo exploit the issueotential breakup of Ibe Russian Republic as some auionomous regions within Russia press for their own greater autonomy or independence.

The Russian Orthodox Church may play an important role in any future politicalnnce of Russian nationalists. Since his election as Patriarch last year, AJekscy II has enteredenuous de facto alliance with Yd'tshVt coalition tad with lhe Christian nslkaaliits. Ii Ihe future, however, it seems likely that church leaders will push for measures that place ihcm at odds with the rtation-buildiog, democratic-minded reformers. Some church leaders, including Alcksey. apparently hopeave the OrfJtodox church restored to Its prerevolutionary statusrivileged institution Aleksey. moreover, has made it dear that be shares many of ibc doubts that tbe Christian nationalists have about the Christian rnorality of some Western institutions, sucharket economy

Yci'tsin's coalition is nowost coup euphoria and may be at tbe peak of iu popularity. Aa it begins to grapple tviih Russia's fcrtrudable political and economic problems, there will be considerable potential for some segments of society to tarn to chauvinistic forms of na liooaltsmsocieties have often turned to chauvinist or extremist leaders when economic and political conditions combined to produce widespread feelings of national degradation, helplessness, and fear of lhe future. Within lhe next year or (wo, YeTUin's popularity will almost certainly decline somewhat because be is unlikely to achieve significant improven (be living standards of most Russians in the near term. As bis popularity declines, tbe likelihood will increase that more chauvinist nationalists may challenge bis position. This will especially be the case if near-fa mine cjondittons develop in large areas of Russia or If large numbers of Russians in the non-Russian republics are subject to violence or arc forced to migrate to Russia.

Coot wits

Trie Reform Nsitoealtas: Tbt Dcasocrstic lUfarmen u

Tbe CorixtUo NiticffialrstS: Subtract gca* In the Dccnocritk

The Cotwemtivn NnuensalJsta: SiiU Allied WHb ibc

The Fjiicrnau Frcun Rsmm Wkb

Tbe Dttmpucs of Nitionaltmi in lhe New

Tbe EiacTicncaarket

The

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Russian NatJeautto and the Cgitodo*

Reeoaenicoce of Rntbi Nationalisms

Various form of Russian nattonalbm have ree merged to become major politicalussians *ee wane form of Russiaahe only political force capable of perrviding an ideology thai wouldenewed and reformed Russian government that might, in turn, form the coreew union. At tbe same time, tbe specter of resurgent Russian national-ism has raised concern* in the various rcpoNic* and in the West because, in tbe past. Russian national am has often been associated with xeisorsbobia, virulent anti-Semitism, chauvinism, and autbotitarianitm

The growth in Russian nationalisms appears, in part, toesponse lo the rutiooslbt aad separatist movements that have come to docrunate tbe politics of most of tbe republics As nationalists in otherhave pushed for greater autonomy or outright secession from the union, ethnic Russians have often interpreted these political movements as beingajjabtft themselves, lacked, aatiortatist* in the republics wiib the strongest secessionist rnovementi have frequently demm need Russians as "occupiers" and have invigorated their own political movements by calling for an end to Russian domination These republic rnovementi have, in tarn, heightened the Russians' awareness of their own ethnic and national identity.

Gorbachev's poiscy o' rfo&nosttrong Impetus to the growth of Russian nationalism! (ilai-moii waa originally Intended to encourage the Soviet people lo improve the existing Marxist-Leninblbut it quicklyowerful weapon against tbe system itself. Although Gorbachev himselfbelieved thai, under the tension and cynicism of tbe Brerhnev system he inherited ihereasic unity of values among the Soviet people, it quickly became apparent tbal they had little in common and little desire to remain within ihe aame framework Russians, in particuUr. found they had little inwith other ethnic groups and have frequently

seen themselves as having suffered the most under Communism In response, they have turnedto nationalismeans of establishing some common ideniity in ibe ideological and spiritualof modem Soviet society

The events surrounding the collapse of the August coup have greatly accelerated the growth of some forms of Russiaa nationalism. Much of Russianapparently saw the coup as an attempt by the Communbt Tarty to halt developmentree, democratic state. Russian President Borb Yd'tsin, la particular, has been able to translate thb perception into support for hb own political aad economic reform geared towardussian nation I

Tbe Reform NstioratlbU:nocr*lk RefocBter* as Natiooalbtt

Historically, Russian nationalism has assumed aof forma These forms or strains share some common characteristic* but have often led indrvitfinjat to support widely varying positions onn the last few years, various groups of Russian nationalists have generally clustered into two disparate and feudingach in illume with other political groups. The moat important of these nationalist groupsoalition of desmocratic reformers including the Democratic Russiaassociated with Yel'tsin.

Trie goal of the democratic reformers is to establish aa iodependeot. economically prosperous RussianTo achieve this, they are determined to destroy the remnants of the Communbt system. TThey are willing, and sometimes eager, to borrow Western political and economic modeb. although frequently tbey add that those mcdeb must be significantly modified to fit Ihe realities of Russianbey appear willing, if necessary, lo jettison the remnants of the Soviet empire and accept the full independence

:

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Nationalismsht Cast af

"If you wantnow ihr basic difference, between Western observers of Rusilan nationalism, ask ihrmefine iheir subject. If you want to tee them quarrel in public, aik one of them to comment on ihe definition of ihe other.

Aleksonder Yanov US political irierutll

Tht words nationalist and riatidnalum often have negative overtones, ia both Russian and English. In pan because notionalists, eipecially Russianare often identified with policies of national chauvinism,lltarlsm. or anti-Semi-lism. Al the same time, the word nationalist is sometimes appliedositive senseroader spectrum of political actors who take pride in iheir homeland and want to Irnprove tt but who would oppose any movement toward national chauvinism. Russian President Yeltsin, for example, hasbeennationalist' because ke seeks, first and foremost, to promote the Interests of Ruttla. Yel'tsin sometimes refers to Russia's long history and frequently appeals to Russian national pride to gain support for his policies. This has been particularly evident since the failure of the coup tn August. Since the coup, Yeltsin has repeatedly referred to the critical role Russians played in defeating the coup and in securing freedom "for the entire arumry. The it rang popular rttponst Yel'tsin has generated since

tkt coup and some of his symbolic acts, such at replacing ihe USSR Hag with ihe peer evolutionary Russian flag, have been seen by many observers In both the USSR and the West ot evidence ofYel'tsin and most of the political actors allied with him. Including Moscow Mayor Popov and Si. Ptttriburg Mayor Sobchak. are thus seen as nationalists primarily In the sense ihat ihey ere seeking toodern, democratic Russia. Yel'tsin claims no special place for Russiais other nations, ht asstrts no special superiority of Russians or Russian Iradttlons or culture, and his principal appeal Is not based on Russia's traditional claim to Its own unique path of development,aiher ihal It consciously needs to adaptthai is.andecottomic systems. Yel'istn and his allies thus have little In common wiih other notionalists suck as Vladimir Zhlrinov-skly or Valenitn Rasputin who consciously andbase iheir appeal on motionspecial place for Russia, tht superiority of Russianor culture, or similar sentiments that appear intended lo elevate the Russians' national Image of themselves above others. Accordingly. In this paper we refer to the plural nationalisms to emphasise that nationalist sentiments and nationalistroad spectrum and that. In practice, the various forms of Russian nationalism may have Itllle tn common

ilic non-Russian republics. At the same time, however, tbey recognize t* advantages of political and economic union with some republics. In the case of Ukraine. Byelorussia, and Kazakhstan, the Russian reformerstrong attachment lo maintaining close political, cultural, and cconcsnsic links to these republics because of their large Russiaa populations and broader Slavic ties. After the coup, svben the movement for secession from the union teemedstrengthened in most republics. Yel'tsin and his aides raised the issue of border settle meets for thosethe Balticopt for com-plele secession When republic leaders Inrahhstan. and other republics that have targe Russian minorities protested. YeTtsia seat repcesents-tivea to those republics lo confirm Russian recognition

of the existing borders and. at the same time, ensure that those republics continued their dialogue on le-newing some form of political and economic union with Russia Yel'uin aad hit allies abotrong interest in the welfare of ethnic Russia as in the non Russian republics. Yel'tsin has been active in seeking agrecancnis from these republics, for example, to respect tbe rights ofsaians lib mostfocus is, nevertheless, on Russia. Yel'tsin has made il clear that, while he will urge the non-Russian republics to respect the rights of ethnic Russians, he will not use force to protect their status or privileges

Yd'tsin and the reform nationalistsumber of nonnaiionalist allies. Oneoalition of dcovocratic-rrurided reformojt associated wiih ihe -Movement for Democraticed by former Fordgu Minister Eduard Shevardnadre, Aleksandr Yakovlcw. .nd Arkadiy Vol aky. These democratic redeemers sap-ported Yd'tsin strongly during the coup. They are diaiinguisbed from Yel'ttin'j rationalist, in that they are more indined to itrcas the need to eetabiish democratic institutions throughout the country and less inclined to focus srxcial attention on Russia.

Before the coup, leadersrnocratic Russia ceili-cued Yd'ttin for agreeing to sign the unionversion that they believed would perpetuate adominatedtrong central government- Since the coup, Demccratic Russia's leaders haw goneadvocating sovereignly aad have been more inclined to accept the tndeperdence nwements of (he various republics. When Yd'tsbi raised the issue of borders with any republic opting for full secession, for example, they joined with political leaders from Ukraine and Kazakhstan in criticizing YcTtsin for attempting to bully the other republics.

A second group of Yd'tsin's currentbe duster of former Communist Party reformerswith President Gorbachev. These men,Gorbachev, appear to regret tbe breakup of the Soviet stale and want to preserve as much of It as possible. They almost certainly recognize, however, lhat any union that emerges from the current lurmoil wilt be vastly different from tbe previous system and must be based largdy on voluntary participation by the republic*.

Neither the reform democrats of Democratic Russia nor the former Communist Party reformers associated with Gorbachev can currently challenge Yd'tsin's dominance of Russian politics nor alter significantly the policies he intends to implement Their difference: with Yel'tsin's policies are marginal rather than fun-damental. and they probably recognttc thai, if they were to break wiih Yd'tsin and his reform national, isis, ihey would be able to generate little public support on their own,

Tbe Christian Nationalists: Submerged In the Democraticoose coalition of Christian lutionalrit* is alsoied with Yd'tsin. They arc sometimes referred to byWestern observers as "liberalalthough that term is somewhat misleading outside the contest of the Russian political spectrum. These Oiristian nationalists generallyreater degree of political pluralism and derraocracy and some limited formarket economy. They usually are willing to accept the secession of the non-Russian republics from ihe union, although they often add that secession would do more harm than good to those republics. They are distinguished from other democratic-minded reformers by their fervent attach-fneot to Russian Orthodoxy and Russian traditions and by thdr especially strong abhorrenco of Marxist-Leninist ideology and tbe heritage of the Bolshevik Revolution. They have been etpeciglly prorrdnent in the fight for rehabilitation of Aleksandr Sc4thcaitsyn and his writings and frequently identify closely with his ideas, induding his suspicion of Western notions of freedom ofarket economy, arid (he role of political parties.

The Christian rationalist* have considerable moral stature in Russia but have not formed an effective independent political organisation. In9 the Christian Democratic Union of Russia (CDU) was formed under ihe leadership of former politicalAleksandr Ogorodnikov. The platform calledultiparty democracy, the separation of powers, free elections,muttitiered" market economy. The CDU soon split, however,action brokeeodnikov over the issue of whether to cooper-ale with newly elected Russian Orthodox Patriarchhom Ogorodnikov believe* is toocorrupted by his past connections to the KGB. Inorripeting group, the RussianDemocratic Movement fRCDMj, was founded by Orthodox priest and former political prisoner. Gkb Yakunin, Orthodox priest Vyacheslav Pdosin, and nationalist writer Viktorhe threehad jusi been elected to tbe Russian Congress of

f.ntirnfrrt-

Deputies, ind the croup received sympathetic coverage in the Sonet punCDM ere- raptd-ly. and in February IWI Ibe Soviei prest reported lhai lhe RCDM waa only one of foui political otgani-taliorrs thai had attracted tbe minimum number of adherent) to be officially rtgtsierrd Isier. however, ibc RCDM alio iplii into rival -eg* ni ratpinion polh conducted in Rttuia before lhe August coup indicated thai onlyercent ot leas of the Ruitian voting-age population idee lined ibe Christian naiioanlist parties as most closely rcprescntini its

Since at least the9 elcciions. the Christian rationalists have gecserally allied thesnselvea with other democraticminded refcernersroad conthat has been seeking to desiroy ibe power of the Communist Party and open up the Soviet Government and society to Western-style political and economic systems The Christian national >iu have occanonally been ptornincat in supportinges idem Yd'tsin and his policies, and they have rsartkipaled actively In Democratic Russia, whose leaders have sought toroad spectrum of democratk groups in support of far-reaching reforms. Father Pofotin. for example, serves as chairman of theSupreme Soviet Committee on Freedom ofand Social Work and works informally as Yd'tsin's adviser on religious affairs. Christianleaders were active in condemning ihtcoup and were among Yd'tsin's strongest supporters.

In working with other reform groups, the Christian nationalists have contributed to the strength of the democratic pdilical movement and have helped fig-urea such as Yd'tsin, but at the same lime Ihey have been overshadowed by and subrnerged in the larger democratic reform movement.esult, although the Christian nationalists have had some success ia gaming attention and disseminating their views, they have not established themselves as aa Irsdependenl political force. Today, the Christian nationalists are still subordinate to Yd'tsin's coalition, and theChristian nationalist group* have nottbe kind of support thai would enable tbem to function as irsdependenl political actors

ctserrati'f NaltoaalUlt: StiB Allied With (he Devil!

Another group of Russian nttionaluLs has Formed part of the traditionalist opposition to democratic and market-oriented reforms. These natksnaliiti oppose the foesncr Communist Party 'doeovert cluttered around Gorbachev and the prordorrn, naticei-beiilding groups associated with Yd'iaiO. They generallyte-cont rolled economic system and anpolitical lyitcm. although their spedlk proposal! have ranged fromiliiary junta to restoring the crarist monarchy. They ate frequently strong supporters of the Russian Orlhodoa Church and sec the church as the re petitory of many speciii-calty Russian values. They are highly tuspioous of tbe West and often warn against reform lhat Ihey fear might desiroy Russian values and transform Russiaestern colony. Fiequenlly ihey are strongly anti-Semitic In the Russianoet rum. they are freqoenlly referred lo asonservative ration*y Western standards, they arc reactiemanei who seek lo turn back lhe clock to an authoritarian regime.

Tbe conservative nationalists have joined partadii ksnalist political coalition opposed to most democratic and market-oriented reform- This alliance between conservative aalionalisu and othersotnetimes been stxamcd. In sharp contrast with the coeiservatire nationatisis. the neo-Stalinisis want to restore the legacies of Lenin, tbe Bolshevik Revolution, and Marxism, and they usually reject both tbe peerevoU-tionary Russian monarchy and the Rtrssian Onhcdox Church.

At tbe same lime, the conservative nationalists share some common values with their political adversaries, the Christian nationalists. Both groups usually appear to be either Russian Orthodox believers orto Orthodoxy as an embodiment of the Russian spirit They are strong supporters of environmental reforms and of measures to preserve historicalThey hate the legacy of the Bolshevik

Wv*YeV!

Who Are Iht Conservative NasiaaallutT

Unlike moil other political groups, iht conservative nmiemalists have modi Unit tffort loform am orgo-nlied political pany or movement of ihrir own Instead, ihey hartoose ami Irformal networkisseminate their Ideas. Many of tht members of this network are prominent Rusilan writers, IncluCing Valentin Rasputin, Vasllly Belov. and Vladimir Soioukhln Before the coup, these and like-minded literary figures largely captured -onj'cJ af the important weekly newspaper Li teratoma y* Rossiya and the monthlies Nash Sovretnennik.Sluvo. ana* Kuban. In addition, ihe conservative natlonallsti were eflen able lo express their views In publications largely controlled by their neo-Siallnist allies, IndvdlngScrrcxskn yi Rossiya. Molodaya Cvar-drjx and Vcrzu>>islxyrXk*MXu Zhuraal Within the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, members of the conservative Soyuz (Union) group of deputies, such as Yuriy Btokkln, often expressed the views of the conservative naiionalisit

enin, and Marxism-Lenin tiro and often are Ulractod to tbe prcren^utionary rrsonarehy and to many Ideas of Akksandr ScJzhenrtsyn i

Despite tbeir dissrete tbe ten tage of Lenin-bm. tbe alliiocc bet worn tbe conservative nationalists and (he rvco-Stalirrists bai ritoal likely held log ether because of their agreement oo teveral other issue* ihey ennsidec more critical Probably moat Important, they believe tbat Western-orientedudud-iog Yen no.eesaadr Yakoviev. aad Eduard Shevardnadze, have been implementingthat will desiroy the Russian empire. They believe the policies initiated by these men have led directly to the kas of Eastern Europe, the secessionist movements in tbe non-Russian republics, and even to Ihe potential breakup of Russia itself through theof self-rule to miaoritic* within the repobbc. The conservative nation*litis and ncc-Stalinists have also been allied in their hostility toward (be Wesl and the ideaarket economy. This enmity toward thereotienlly linked toand

" iielief that (he Western world Isolled by anti-Russian and anti-Soviet Jews and capitalists. They see captieliimarsh ccooorruc tin era indifferent to the well-being of the Individual and responsiblean culture that swamp* the populace with Satanic rock music and pornographic Alma.

Tbe August coup plot teas probably were pinning their hopes for success at least partly on tbe ability of the emierva live rational bis and their rsec-Staliiist allies to mocalizc broadf society in favor of the coup. Cane month before the coup, for example, tbe conic rvalue newspaper Scrvetikaya Russia published an appeal to save the country that stressed several themes dear to the hearts of conservative nationalists The appeal referred to tbe eflcats of "crafty and pompous masters, deer aad cunning apostates, and greedy and rich mooey-grubbers, sneering at aa, mocking our beliefs, and taking advantage of ourhe appeal appeared to call on ihe mililary to overthrow tbe Russian government, but stepped short of making an explicit calloup. Without naming Yel'tsin or Gorbachev directly, the appeal castigated political leaden "who do not love this country, wbo fawn oa foreign patrons, arid wbo seek advice and bkaimgt across theoe signatories of the appeal included several coup leaders, including Deputy Defense Minuter General Valentin Varennt-kov, and two men who Inere members of the Emergency Commlltee that led the coup, Vasiliy Starodubtsc* and Aleksandr T'lryakov. Tbey abo included several wdl-knownbt and aee-Sulintst aciMsts, Jssctssdiag Yuriy rscasdarev. Yuriy Blokhin, Eduard Volodin. Aleksandr Prokbanov and Valentin Rasputin.

Before Ibe coup, the conservative nationalist* and rsco-Stalinbts hadoalition and receivedsupport from govern men IcoopDefease Mirusier Yam. KOB Chsef Krysscaskov. Interior Minuter Pago, and Prime Minister Pavlov. Last year tbe traditionalist coalition won Gorbachev's agreement to Ihe formation of a

^HlHlk'NIIIII

tan Communist Patty (RCP) under lhe leaderihip ol nexvStalinitl Ivan Polozkov. Since then, the RCP hu Krrcd astool of the men! traditional itt-mindod members of the t'emmuruai Party. In Ihe (allhe traditional mi perauaded Gorbache* to back off from implementing economic reforrm that would help make the iranillioaarket economy. In the following moot hi. they forced several of his most important reform-minded advisers to resign or tale to the sidelines Id1 ihey persuaded Gorbachev to at least sequence in aa attempt to use force igaiast the Lithuanian gewerriment

On balance, however. Ihe coalition of conservative nationalists and neo-Stalinlsts has proved ineffective in blocking movementore open,and mitket-orieated sysicm. Tbe Quick collapse of ibe coup showed dearlyt tie rupcoel the tradi-tiooalist coalition bad ia Soviet society. Even before tbe coup, it was dear thai traditionalists were out of touch wilh most of Russian society. In June, when then Prime Minister Pavlov asked tbe Supreme Soviet for extraordinary powers and hb request seemed lo be supported in speeches from Yazov, Kryucbkov. and Pago, tbe Supreme Soviet voted ejverwbetmingly against Pavlov in support of Gorbachev. Within lhe Russian Republic the election in0 for the Russlao Congress.of People's Deputies indicated that popular support for traditionalist Candida tea was far weaker than for those supporting demccralic and market -oriented reforms The strong electoral victory of Yd'tsin for Russian Presidesvt ia1 against an array of traditionalist and Communist Partyindicated that support for the traditionalist coalition had continued to decline Opinion polls, likewise, have Indicated thai public support forpolitical figures and policies continues lo decline steadily. Yd'tsin's plan before tbe coup lo call for new declines of local sovieu was based on bispublic support for traditionalist officials wat so low thai newwould elfectivdy drive most of tbem fmni thdr posilloni of power in local governments

Since Ibe coup, public support for raeo-Stalimitfigures has goneree-fall. The coup servedoiy discredit most traditionalist politicalthose not directly implicated in it. Yel'uln has acted quickly tocapitalire on this and has

sought in icmove from office any Russian officials who sup;.nied the coup Ihe Communist Parly has been rrTee trvelv destroyed us assets and archives have been seized, its headoaarteis sealed, and its activities banned from most workplaces.

This destruction of the party and discrediting of its neo Sulimit members may also suggest that lhe alliance between the tscoSulinttts aad exstttervative nationalists itn end. Since the coup, mostussian nationalists haveow profile. Valentin Rasputin, for example, was prolific in the months preceding the coup in publishingpolitical snide* He has published nothing since Writer Yariy Bleajaia, who isSSR people's deputy aad leader of the Soyuz deputies group, has sought to distance himself from tbe coup participants and has si leased his support foronstitutional change. Blokhin's signature on the July appeal suggeals that bit current support for peaceful, constitutional change it not one of his cereis dearly self-serving and intended to salvageeft of his political standing. Blokhin, Rasputin, and other conservative naiionaliit spokesmen clearlynevertheless, that any future response ihey ate able to generate in society must be distinguished from tbe discredited pcsiclca of ihe nce-Stahints. It seems pcassibte. there/ore. thai in tbe future the conservative nationalists may he less inclined totheir alliance with the neo Stalinists snd more Indincd to seek other allies or articulate their envn naiionaliit position

The Eab rtsttstc Fro- Rous* With Hale Tht "KoU of ihtit pal to* processangerour conspiracy by freemasons and ZlonttlS.

Pamyat leader Drrulriy Vasityev

At the far end of tbe nationalbt spectrumew groups lhat Oppose most democratic and market reforms bul are so extreme in their views and pro-nounccmeriU that they have been kept at arm's length by other conservative nationalists and have notjoined the iraditionalbl political coalition.

Patnyat (Metnorjl is Ibe meat well known of llvese extremistut other group* ere abo active. When Pamyat emerged frocn political obstutit) in ibe, it received considerable publicity in the Soviet and Western press and was Initially iccorded Move support from iiadiiionaliii Communist Party cdicials, particularly in St. Peter tburg (then leoin gradl it has since split into several rival orgamaa-lions, each espousing tome combination of rabid anli-Semitlsm and obsession with what ils members believeJewishconspiracy" to desiroy Russia. As it became Increasingly apparent thai Pamyai members hale Coenmanrsts as much at they bate Jews and Western capita lb Is, however, party oflkiaU quietly dropped their support for (heand some Pamyat leaders have beenfor ibeir public statements calling for eapttbicai of Jews from positions in government and educational inttitu lions C

J police officials luipeci Pamyai members hare been involved this year bt lhe murders of four Russian Orthodox priests who were either active ia tbe democratic reform movement or were Jewish converts. Pamyat and similar organizations remain on tbe fringe of Ibe Soviet political spectrum. In elections for tbe USSR Congress of People's Deputies.in9 and for lhe Russian Coo-gress of People's Deputies inoopenly associated with Pamyat was elected.

Tbe Dyanrnics of Nationalism lu tbe New Russia There is no belter breeding ground for parochial nationaliim than economic stagnation. Ike feeling of htlplrnness. and the /ear ef tontorro-n.

Jeray Jedlieki. Polish historlar

The August coup bad at least three immediate efleets on the dynamics of Soviet politic* it thoroughly discredited tbe Communist Party and its rseo-Sialinist supporters, it accelerated the breakup of the union, and il greatly enhanced public support for Yeltsin In turn. Ycl'tsin now faces formidablehe economy is in shambles, aod there is little be can do that would tignificanlly improve il in the neat year or so The breakup of thecerbates

the eeoooenic problems because it Ihtcatcns to disrupt the economic links lhat remain among the republic*.

Tbe combination of eeoooenic deterioration anddisiategralion has left many ethnic Russians in the non-Russian republics feeling vulnerable loor communal violence and has caused many Russian* within Ratii* to weesder if chaos can be avoided Devcscecrtcot* since tbe coup have reinforced thesewere alreadyluggesl lhat there is cceosiderable potential for large segments of Russian society lo lurn to chauvinistic forms of Russian rationalism. For etampJc, although Yeftsintrong mandate for his Western-oriented democratic and economic reforms when be won the June election for Russian President, tbe third-highest vote went lo Vladimirabid conservative nationalist whose campaign was charactcrited by confusing and conuidietoryagainst Jews, the market economy, and Western enemies of Russia. Zhirinovskiyercent of the totalbehind Yd'tsin* S7 percent and significantly behind former Premier Ryihkov'sercent. Nonetheless, although Zhiiioovskiy may have received some help from the KGB. bewithout the benefitidespread party organization or grassroots following and drewmore votes than other, better knownincluding former Interior Minister Vadim Bakatia

Inure, if Yeltsin's popubrity dedines and other political leaden who support hb form of nation-buildingsm based on Western-orientedare not able to capture part of that loss, larger set menu of society could turn tol toot lists such as Zhirtnovtkiy, who would institute more authoritarian or chauvinistic policies. Although theoohesive national force, remnant* of ilin puce and could align with anii-Yertsin' nationalists Thb could partscnlarly be the ease as Russia eonfronis three of its most difficult problems the transitionarket economy, Ibc dissolution of the union, and the potential breakup of Russia.

wonrhV-iitfrii

Tht Emergencearket Keoisomy The Bolshevik legacy oflo 'e farming and ilaic ownership of nearly all properlyong Russian tradition of villagegricultural work and ctdse state supervision of moil businesses. Many Russian nationaliststhose who offer-ne bale the legacy of Communismprofoundly duirustfulull mar let economy and private ownership of property, especially privateof land. Some, such as conservative nationalist writer Rasputin, believearket economy would destroy incut traditional Russian value* tbat derive their strength from Russian village life. Others, such at Christian Democratic Movement cochninnanAksyuchits, recognize that some formarket economy is needed, but prefer to emphasizearket economy in Russia must include provisions for fulltrong social safely net, and the values of "Christian just

Over the past year, both tbe USSR aad ibe Russian Republic Supreme Soviets haveumber of laws allowing some limited degree of privateand bisdownenhip but bare kept heavyThe hesitancy ofntities to adopt more far-reaching reforms embracing private businessand private osvnership of land reflects Ihe recognition, sbarcd-by virtually all Soviet political leaders, that Russian society remainsarket economy and private property. Thisdl-foonded.ide variety of evidence from public opinion polb and other data indicates that tbe Russian public is thoroughly disenchanted with Communism aad the role of the Soviet central government in the economy andthe general concept ofarket economy. Russians clearly arc suspicious about many of Ibe1arket economy and are fearful aboul tbe economic insecurity inherent in making the transitionifferentoll taken In Russia early thb year indicated ihat almost half tbeercent) believeermbii-ble for some people to be very wealthy if their activity contributes to society's well-being,ercent) believe ihat, under no car cum -staisceserson be allowed to get much richer thaa Others, because suchmmoral Another poll, conducted in MayS publishing company, found that even many Russians wbo lavoi a

Cinfirlrr"-'

Europe, and ibe reaoifccalKin of tier many, all of whkb were accompanied bystrong andcoaee*kd anti-Russiaa sentiment among ibe peoples ofj(ie. Russian rationalists retrain derided aboai Ibe consequences ol ibe kai of thaernalat almoM all of ihemimilar process taking pbec ia (be movememi of some republics for (resleior outright secession from ibt USSR.

The lost of ihe -'internals even more dirncult for many Russiansccept became almos( all of (he non-Russian republics have significant ethnic Russian minorities, and because mosl of ibemin czaristan of the Russian empire. Indeed, conservative nationalist writers such as Vaal-liy Dclov. Valemin Rasputin, and Vladimir Kiopin have joined with neo-Sullnist wrilers such asProkhanov and Eduard VotedJn in criliciiini any Russian soppon of republic independence move-menis. In January, for example, shortly after Yel'tsin condemned (he central eovernmenfs use of force la Lithuania, these nationalist and rseo-Sulimst writers signed an open letter accusing Yel'uin of suppMlag those wbo would -drsrneasber tbe state of Russia snd the single Russian nationalhe letter accused Yel'tsia of -trampling the national aad historical interests of Russia gad the Russians" and of seeling tbe destruction of Russia itself For Russiansuch as Rasputin and neo-StalimsU sach as Prokhanov. Rusts and the USSR are the same thing, and Russian interests in the non-Russian republics should take priority over any native sentiment lor autonomy or secession.

So fat. Isowever. ibe conservative nationalist responsequate Russia with the USSR has not generated enough political pressure toignificant segment of tbe Russian population against any of the republic independence movements. On (he contrary, public opinion palls indicate thai Russians understand and even accept the loss of at least some of the "internalor example, iu January, three days after the central government', use of force inoviet polling organisationersons iaities of the Russiaa Republic-nether (bey approved or coadesnacd the actions of the troops They replied:

ercent.

percent

Difficult iopereenl.

Similar polls taken onanuary showed thai, in Moscow and St. Petersburg.ercent of those Hisestsoned esandentned the troops' actions,4 percent supported them Two Other peaks,ebruary and March, inches led that, although ethnic Russian* were about evenly split over whether the Baltk rrpubhex should be arkr-ed lo secede,argin they opensed tbe use of force by Moscow in dealing with tbe Baltic republics. Clearly, although marry Russians might prefer io keep ihe union intact, few ore willing to sanction the use of force to maintain it. Conservative nationalist appealsirm policy in dealing wiih secessionist republic* have received Utile support in the USSR Congress of People's DcfHilies, in the Supreme Soviet, or insociety.'

Even ethnic Russians living ia the non-Russianseem to be accepting tbe breakup of the union. Public opinion polls up to the end0 indicated that from cue-third to one-half of the Slavicin the Baltic states supported independence, and Ihat support increased substantially and steadily after the attempts to destabilizea January and cwrtinoed m

-as leengnieed ia September.ardcore of Russians unalterably eppesedontinue trying to subvert the Baltic, their ability to inobilize tbe Russian aad other Slavic populations in (hose republics will probably be marginal

In other non-Slavk republics, there has been aharclcore Russian minority unalterably opposed to icpublic movements for political autonomy or outrightublk appeal from Russians in Dushanbe last year, for example, captured the sense of panic and indignation apparently fdl by many Russians in the periphery. The ktlee appealed for help against the "fanaiical crowds, the bloodletting, tbe blind hatred, and thet crilidzed the compromises of ihc central gesverruneat and warned darkly thaifa,could bring Ta-nkistar. to anarchy. Similarly, ia Azerbaijan.have appealed to tbe Soviet military lot protection, complaining that they have bceotneia their own country.'

Ml* i

lr> mosl of these republics, however, ethnic Russians

maller minority lhan ihey do in the Kmssiimalbt BtpMia

Baltic States, and.opinion polls suggestignifi-

cam number are willing io move back to Russia in Ihe

future (seendn Georgia. Kyrgyistan,

and Utbckitlnn,hird or more of -the ethnic Russians would like to return to Russia. In

western Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, the per- ,

of Russians who would like lo return lo ,

Is aboutercent. Sonet ethnographers have ,

that an outmlgration of Rowans from the ,

Asian and Caucasus republics began in the ,

nd has increased since then. They have |

noied thai, not surprisingly, those Russians who ,

mosl assimHaied into tbe local culture through a ,

of the local language are lhe least likely lo

and the most likely to support local indepeo- ,

movements. In Tashkenl. for example, public .,

polb indicate that, whereasercent of all

haveesire to return to Russia, ,

4

ercent of those who know the Uzbek lan-

would like to leave.'

6

these figures and those in the mosl recent Soviet census suggest lhat the dc-Russiflcaiion of the periphery wilt continue in the coming years, perhapsapid pace. The process could snowball and result in Russian flight from areas of Central Asia or lhe Caucasus. The net result of this in the long run would be lo dissolve ihe few remaining ethnic and cultural bonds between Russia and Ihe peripheral republics, and with them lhe basis of conservative Russian oalionalisU to assert some authority over the non-Russian republics. Within the neat few years,ass flight of Russians from therepublics would exacerbate problems of Russian unemployment, place severe strains on local social services, and couldevere backlash from Russian nationalists.

Conservative Russian nalionalbls might be able to increase their support In some cbewmsunces shortats flight of Russians from toe periphery.nationalists, for example, often claim they do not oppose the secession of the non-Russian republics, but in practice they appear willing to accept lhe secession of only some republics. Aleksandr Solzbcnitsyn, who often appears lo reflect the views of many Russian nationalists, apparently described ibc sentiments of

many Russians in his widely disseminated pamphlet How Shall Wtomiderablc response among Russiansas published last year. SoltlKoilsyn proposed that all non-Slavic republics be allowed to secede if ihey chose lo do so, and in the case of the Central Asian republics he indicated thai Russia should urge them to go. But SoUheniuyn argued thai Ukraine and Byelorussia were still essentially Russian in their history and culture and that the Ukrainian and Byelorussian languages were merely derivatives of Russun. These republics, he said, should be partlavic union with Russia, aitucsgh he stated lhat ihey should not be forced tourthermore, he argued

rtimiktce-wJtraBU Iwmwoeoe,pubtbhcd

kue<fcnisiinli.ii: in -hid, he .denied

lhat if Uirtieonito lecedeOatd be atlowedihe same lime, Setrht-iiiya espreued concern fee aitai tuckCtrnx* -heee ethnic troops lie tailed, andniuOnilisU fatorden

of Uvea* w. .hincd by Lenla.

jylflrnlir*

Attitudes on EmlgTutiem of Russians In Non-Hussian Arras

November ana"he Soviei Center for Public Opinion and Market Researchussian residents of IS cities outside the Russian Republic on their attitudes toward their status In lhe republic of their residence. This pollseful snapshot of ethnic Russian sentiment In Ihe Soviet periphery (Answers are given In percentages J:

you live in this

Question

On the whole, are you satisfied the republic?

.

Utralv

Would you like to emigrate lo Russia rather the remain In this republic permanemlyl

kutste

"iw

Ukraltu

Wr9

g*es

Axertedtm

S7

J

6S

37

A massive Russian exodus from your republicsoon Is:

tiket.

like/.

Herd!,

kketr

kiune

Utrett

.

northern Kazakhstan,nhabited primar-ity by Rtsssiaos, be rplil from Ibe rest of (he republic and incorporated into ibc Slavic union. These views have received conside'sbte supportroad spectrum of Russian particularly as reflected in public opinion polls.o polls taken in February and March, for example, Russians appeared about

evenly divided over whether to permit the possible future secession of Georgia aod Armenia, butfirm

erceni) opposed Ukrainian lodepen-dence.

rMrtirr=T

and his coalition ofIhave shown acme sensitivity over ihe breakup or ihc union, especially the potential uceu-cci ol Ukraine.and Kaukhstsa Sooo after the coopwhen il became evident thai the Ukrainian iradependence movement was movingrapidly. Yel'Uini* lenient io which he laid Russia reserved ihc righl to raise the issueevision of borders wiib anythe Balticchose to leave Ihe anion. Russian Vice Presadent Ruukoy reileratcd this assertion, laying that Russia's bilateral treaties wiib cither republics recognized ex-rsiiog borders only at long as tbe republics remained wiihin Ibe union. C

* ater told C

"JJthai YeJ'uln't warning on border Issues should be taken seriously and Ihat Russian deputies were greatly concerned about areas that werepan of Russian territory or had Urge Russian pcjpelaiiona.

Yel'isin hopes to halt the breakup of the union byew. voluntary confederation. Theuaioo structure that was approved oo 5by tbe USSR Congress of People's Deputiesoluntary, looseargely independent states bound primarily by economic lies and interrvptiMe agreements to share some common costs, such as defense The central government that remains would be severely limited in iu powers and strictly subordinated to ihc republics.

This union agreement remains vague on key points, and there is significant potential for it lo break down. Ukrainian leaders, for example, continue to insist thai Ukraine will introduce its own currency, which would severely complicate any economic agreements.Asian republics, traditionally dependent onfrom other republics, may balk ai paying laics toommon defense if they do not continue lo receive subsidies The remaining republics,Russia, may refuse to continue the subsidies. The Central Asian republics, morcovci. are Still largely in the hands of authoritarian leaders, and thereigh potential for ethnic conflict if Russians in those republics begin to demand Ihe same political rights at their ethnic brethren in Russia ot if the Central Asians begin tn discriminate against Russians enough

so that ihe Russian goveinmcnl feels compelled to intervene ia some way. tn these circodistances,lies or pofilacal agreementshare costs could become hostage to other issues, especially treatment of ethnic minorities la the republics, and could push some republics to secede entirely. If the current temporary arrangements leadore permanent structure, however, then it seems likely that, as long as Ruxaiaa minorities ia the non-Russian republics arc not subject io widespread or systematic violence and there it no sadden mats flight of ethnic Russians back to Russia, nationalist calls lo maintain the Integrity of the union are noi likely Io rrnrrnte much response.

Tbe Dissolution of Russia

Conservative nationalist! may attempt to tap popular support by trying to portray Yel'tsin and tbeal iniufF-dently firm in defending tbe tenitcesal integrity oftsdf. The issue ot* the breakupRassia emerged taraftParly platform on luiionalitica proposed ihat the Russian Republic bo divided Into large autcinomous regions and tbat autonomous formations alreadywithin tbe USSR be given more autlsority. Meat of the USSR's aweassorneart forrrulidns are located within ihe Russian Republic When9 party program was published. Russia badutonomous republics (ASSRsL five autonomous oblasts,ri.ni; okrugs.euce in1 upgraded Ihe autonomous oWasu lo full autonomous republics; secndoth proposals were widdy seen at the lime as sn attempt by Gorbachev and bis snraaortcrs to fragment Russiaeans ofYdisia'i growing power. Both proposals drew immediate fire not only from Yd'uin's supporters bul also from Christian and conservative Russian rutibnaliiu, who feared that the proposals would weaken the cobcsrvcncss or the republic After Yd'tsia was elected chairman of the RussianSennet ta0 and the Russian legislatureeclaration of sovereignly Ibe following rtionth. Gorbachev continued pursuing this divide-and-rule strategy and, behind the scenes, apparently encouraged Russia's autonomous formations io

*?ortri7Wllhr(

declaic Ihcir sovereignly from (beepublic. He was misted io this strategy bynumber of indiirotiihit CoT.muni'iSeliU in the ASSRs -ho oreosed YeTum's reforms

Initially, YeJ'Uin countered Gorbachev'i moves by publicly encouraging the autonomous republics to take all tbe authority they wanted. In the tpring0 be traveled around Russia attempting to defuse tbe growing sentiment in the ASSRs for greater

T during his travels. Ycl'tsin privately warned locaTlcadcis noto too far in their assertions of local autonomy. Later. Yd"tsin altered his public pessitiou so that, although be acknowledged the rights of the ASSRs to exercise their sovereignty, be also minted they remain part of tbe Russian Republic ind subject lo republic law. At the same time. Yd'tsin appealed to the large ethnic Russian population in the ASSRs to support him in the creationenewed federal system for tbe Russian Repebhe.

Ydtxin's itrategy had some temporary success. With the except loo of the Tatar ASSR, all of the ASSRs participated in tbe1 elections for thepresident, and all -except the Tatar and Bashkirtheir demands for tutus equal to other USSR republics aod agreed that tbdrwouldew anion treaty as part of tbe Russian Republic ddegalion. With the conclusion of the Apnl nine-plus-oneGorbachev withdrew bis earlier luppcev for the ASSRs against Yd'tsin, and Yd'tsin won the grudging support even of many conservative nationalists who were alarmed atearlier efforts to split the Russian Republic.

Public opinion polls indicate there is considerable support for Yd'tsin's position of allowing the ASSRs nsore autonomy within the republic. Russians may be even more willing than is Yd'tsin to allow some ASSRs. especially those oo the periphery, to secede from Russia, although they agree with Yd'tsin that, for ASSRs remaining in Russia, republic laws must

take peiocity over ASSR laws. One poll taken In0esidents inussian Cities noted that;

Over half of tbeerceni) were willing lo accord Ihe ASSRs equal rights with lhe republic

An equilercent) were willing lo allow the ASSRs to secedenajarity of the papulation voted for secession

5 percent thought that ASSR laws thould lake precedence over republic laws, whereas

erceni thought republic laws thould take precedence.

Gorbachev's earlier efforts IO weaken Yd'tsin by poshing measures that would fragment Ibe Russian Republic did much to discredit Gorbachev In the eyes of most Russian nationalists. Yel'uio, by contrast, has managed to use the issue i- present himself as tbe defender of Russian interests and territorial integrity. The issue, however, is by no means resolved While Ycl'tsin bis been some"hat successful In persuading the political leaderships of mosl of Russia'sregions lo remain within Russia, none have dropped Ibeir demands for far-reaching regionalThe dissolution of ihe union and key irsdi-tioaalis! taauralarsns after the failed coup cmbcJdcned regional ethnic movements to press separatist aims.

Yd'tsin's ability to deal effectively with tbo separatist challenges in Russia will determine his success in removing the problem from the package of issues thai some Russian eutiorialisis have sought to use against him.ecent major policy speech. YcTtsin strongly affirmed that he would not allow the dttintcgration of Russia. In the future, at Yd"tsio guides the drafting and ratificationepublic constitution through the republk legislature, be willignificantia balancing the conflicting interests of various groups. The status of tbe Tatar ASSR aad other areas with large Muslim populations will be particularly difficult to negotiate In ibe near or midterm,Russian nationalists will attempt to use the

CBtdMtailal

xssk

A^AranOus Rrputlie

Arlomnou. OblW

AulOrwrsCS Oruj

.

ol* the potilscal fraa^neotttion erf Rumi to broaden theirof support and challenge YcJ'tsin'i ptogramew Russian confederation

Russianms and tbe Orthodox Church

Wuh the ciccptiofl of write extremists who have aaid (hit l'- i ihould reject Chrutliolly entirely and reiuin to their pagan traditions, most Russian nation-aliils today embrace some form of RussianThey are deeply divided, however, in their

attitudes toward tbe Rassian Onacetdx Church. Most Russian nationalists believe the church fhould play an irrrpcetaat rote ia any moral and spirit aai regcrscration of society but disagree about whether the present church hierarchy has been loo thoroughly tainted by its past cooperatioa with tbe KOB and whether tt rtow has sutrieient moral courage toegeneration of society. They also disagree on what hind of moral reaetieralioo the church should strive for. Nation-building nationalists generally lookbe church for

C "minted lla

2

lot Ethnic Makeup of Russia's AuJooomow Regions

ia adojcing Western political models loa mote open, democratic society. Christianlook to the Orthodox Church topiritual renewal of society to ameliorate what they see as the most troublesome aspects of Western institutions such asa market eexmomy. freedom of speech, and freedom of religion. Conservative nations litis, who are even more suspiciousarket economy and other aspects of Western society, look to the churchoral and spiritual ideology justifying anpoUtical and econornk system that will protect Russia from the corrupting influence of tbe West.

Under Patriarch Aleksey II. the church has been moving lo distance itself from the central government and to support the general goals of the Christianhen Aleksey was elected last year, many church reformers believed he was thoroughly compromised by hb past connections to tbe KGB, which were well documented in the Soviet press at the dine of bis election. Some reformers, such as Gtcb Yakunln. even threatened tochism within the church to protest Alcksey's dection. Since then, however, Aleksey hasumber of steps to demonstrate bis independence from the government and his exwmitroeot to Orthodox moral and spiritual values:

At his first press conference after being elected, he harshly criticized the government for its pastof the churcb.

He reportedly criticized Gorbachev strongly

4 ecause of Gorbachevs failure to protect Orthodox Christians in Ukraine.

In January heough public condemnation of the government's actions in the Baltic republicsross tydtiicat error and tin.

In February be publicly rebuked Orthodoxlans for their treatment of South Ossctians.

He publicly endorsed tbe religious servicesthroughout the USSR in June commemorating all Orthodox believers repressed during theera.

r^wiftfetTrhrt-

Ir an Interview in June, he mid ihe church had distanced iuelf from "lheurdensome tutelage" and dsimed lhe right lo "bear witness lo breaches of God's truth" when the government was wrong. Then, in responseuestion calling attention to bis own post cooperation with Ihe KGB. Aleksey acknowledged "tbe tuhmissijns to presto re. lhe titeoces. the forced passivity or expressions ofnd apologlred for bli aciiona.

These rnoves hare encouraged refoemen within tbe church and bare helped ihemc facto informal political alliance with Christian nationalists. Yd'ulos reform nationalists, and other politicalwho are pushing for reforms generally bated on Western political and eeoooenic models In the near term, this alliance is likely to continue because ibe groups involvedommon goal of Anallythe system of authoritarian control from tbe central government sad maintaining scene form of union with all republics thaiignilVcanipopulation.

In the longer terns, however, church leaders may push for measures that place them at oddt with ibe nattcn-buildirtg democratic reformers. Some members of tbe church hierarchy apparently hope to have the Ortho-dot Church restored lo lis prerevolutiooary ttaiusrivileged tmtitstson In an interview ba July. Alekscy warned lhatmam ration" aadattanmi ion" have little to do with the process of Westernizing tbe Soviet way of life. He said that Catholic missionary activities plinned among the Russian peculation would seriously impair relation! between tbe Moscow Patriarchate and the Vatican and saidarish would suffice for ihe Catholics living In Novgorod, whereas the Pope had assigned an archbishop.and other church hicraich* arc pressing for the government to restore seized church property, but ai tbe same time are lobbying forcefully that other churches such as the Ukrainian Greek CatholicChurch and Ukrainian Aaioccphalous Onbodcu Church should not be permitted to ledum lostor claim special status from the state. Christian nationalists who identify closely with Orthodot values sttch as Russian Christian Democratic leader Gteb Anubchenko. moreover, stress the role of Christianin the economy and believe thai an economic

system thould be structured lhat will "interweave economics andnystem, according to Aaeshdacrtko, Russ.an boiiueasmea could furartJco the way he believe* Ihey did inimes, "without 'paper* contracts, just on lhe honest wordor nationalists inch as Anishchenko, Ortbrtdoa values vrould be interwoven with lawsvirtually all aspects of ecetnettrue aad political life, and government regulators would be given broad discretion to Interpret ihose Orthodot values iaayaper contracts" would not be anto "Christianf the Russian Orthodoi Church adopts tach attitudes and begins to posh for reforms based ott this kind of pdicy, Christian and conservative nationalists almost certainly wouldthe church against the nation-buildingand demcxraik rdorrsers

Prcrtawrt*

Yel'ulns coalition of nation-btdldJng democratic re-formen is the mosl powerful pdlucal force in Russia today. This eodiiion, and Ydtsin La ratsticular. may also be at tbe peak of their popularity. As they emerge from the atrnospberc of postcoup euphoria to grapple with Russia's formidable economic ind politicalthere will be growiag potential for someof society io turn to more chauvinistic forms ot" rationalism

The nationalists that would probably oppose Yd'tsin's coalition in these circumstances would come primarily from the coalition ofationalists who have Song opposed Weitera-ooemed economic and political rdorms. In addition. Christian nationalists who are currently allied with Yd'tsin bul who retain strong suspicions about foreign political and economic systems might break with YeTtsttt and jean theopposition They might be assisted by lhe Russian Orthodot Church, whose current hierarchy under Patriarch Alekscy II seems only marginally committed to democratic and marketnd fully committed torivileged place for itself in Ruaii* and inet dOrthodot values for the society.

Historically, socio lie* have often turned to chauvinist ot extremist leaden luch as Miller ot Vladimiravslriy when economic and political conditionsto produce widespread fcclinga of national degradation, helplessness, aad fear of tbe future. These feelings are certainly present in Russian society today, but not pervasive. In tbe past, conservative rationalist* have been largely meflective in tapping these sentiments to draw more support in society. Although large numbers of Russians apparentlywith the conservairvr nationalists, the group has been handicapped bylia nee with the rnost traditionalist elements of tbe Communist Party aad by tbeir own inability to offer any specific and positive remedies to Russia's problems. Indeed, tbeir vague appeals to tbe glorious and often mythical past of the Russian people have found In tic resonance in Russian society when compared with the proposals of tbe nation-buiiding democratic reformers, who point to tbe political and economic institutions of the West at ipcmfic modelsenewed Russia.

Yei'tun. more thaa any Other political figure, has been able toense of hope tbat hases pensive chord with bmbc of Russian society Within the nest year or two, however, Yel'uia'i popularity wul almostecline, because he bto achieve tagsutscaat improverttent in tbe bring standard of moat Russia us in tbe near term. This will espeoaOy be the case if ccxsccenic ccasdilions delerioratc enough so that near-famine condition* devriop ia large areas of Russia or if large numbers of Russians in the other republics arc forced to migrate to Russia la these ciren mi tar-res. we believeruttidtsaltrts would be more likely to challenge Yetisib'i program.'

Original document.

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