The Implicationsreakup of the USSR: Defense Assets at Risk
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The Implicationsreakup of the USSR: Defense Assets at Risk
An Intelligence Assessment
of Soviei Amlyju- CoramenU and queries are welcome and may be dirtcted lo Ihe Chief. .SOVA. on
Tbe Implicationsreakup of (be USSR: Defense Assets at Risk(
ScopeIntelligence Assess mem ii parteries of studies on alternative fu-
ture Soviei security policies and military capabilities. In this paper, we explore the military implicationsartial or full dissolution of tbe USSReneral Staff perspective- We do not attempt to project tbe ultimate ramifications of Ibe failed August coup, bul instead consider the slakes for tbe General Staff of losing assets in peripheral republics. Previous papers in this series include: t
Development: (Jeneral SiaJJ Planning in, andhe Republic Challenge toSoviet
Defense Policy and Planning
We begin our analysis by considering only the geographic distribution of ntilitary assets in the. USSR as it stands today. We explore the options the General Staff might consider for relocating forces and replacing fixed facilities, but we do so wilhout tying the breakup of tbe union andew state to any other specific scenario. We consider tbe scope of traiuitional problems, but not the defense burdenew government may be willing lo shoulder. We do not attempt to size the potential destruction of military forces or facilities that could occur if the umon's dissolution is accompanied by large-scale violence, the internal security imrJitationsreakup, or iu effects on Soviet or republic threat perceptions. .
Th* Implication ofBreakup of Ibef erase AssetsRisk
In theli of ihe failed August coop, republic independence declarations are forcing tbe center to evaluate tbe defense implication*reakup of Ihe union. Miliury planners roast likely have already raoraid-ered tbe effects of seccsiion on those defense forces and fatalities currently located in sdcclcd rtrubtxv To emulateeneral SutT analyst..have rxsntidercd three notKmsl successor states to thebased oo the irino-plfts-cese rurrr^menl signed r^ all oart six repubbes. one drawn along Slavic lines, trad case leaving ibe Russianvirtually on us own. Our analysis fecssscs on tbe mililary pcrn-er that might rtanain. and docs not cordidcr the current turmoil or any future chaos that may accompany the breakup itself.
A new ccoperativo defense union among the participants of the nine-olua-one agree men! would contain almost all of the USSR's current mililary fotxes and facilities (seehe most significant losses would be strategic defensive faciliiics, especially those in tbe Baltic resjiori. The seceding republics contain relatively small amounts of Soviet ground, air. and naval forces, which would almost certainly be relocated; almost no final-assembly plants for weapons; and no strategic nuclear offensive forces..
A Slavic Union of the RSFSR. Ukraine, Belorassia. and oorthernwould remain fairly -ell off militarily and would have shorter land borders than the USSR. Strategic defenses-including tbe ballistic missile
by the loss of facilities in Central Asia. Many ground aod air force
arc aarrec ly based outside this isotkmal
Union woo Id have enough empty garrison* to accwrunodau all of tbe displaced ground forces it chose to relocate. Tbe loss of pctsdoaion trad research and development facilities could disrupt plans to modernize strategicnd defensive forces.
In Oeneral Staffn IsoUtcd RSFSR (New Russia) would and itselfualitatively weaker militarybecavse it wouVd losesew Russian stale would be much smaller in industry and populaiiOn, iu western land border would be Ynspx, aod Mestcow would be much closer to tbe country's border. Marry of the moat rncsdern ground and air oniu are now based outside of Russia, and facilities would
Soviet Mil In ir1 j; VVlihia Three Notional Socerssor
h>ve to be built to acccoimcdate the men and equipment in ralocntedonsiderable strategic defenses, and even some strategic offensivere now deployed outside the Russian Republic and would have lo be mewed. Several important facilities related lo strategic offensive and defensive force moderniralioo, and scene for crsriveational force reaearch and devcleenseat, would be lost.
Tbe General Stall would probably combine relocating equipment,fixed facilities, aad Degouaiing basing rights in ibc former republics to preserve Soviet miliury power as much as pcnsible- At ibe same lime, il could recast defense rccmircmenu lo bring them more into line with unavoidable reductions in capability. Tbe Nino-PI us-One Union could probably muster much Use same military capabilities as tbe current USSR, even if it cbose to shoo tbe other former republics Tbe Slavic Union might be able to do almost as well as tbe Nine Plus-One Union, but cooperative agreement* would have to play an toportanl role in iu security policy. New Russia would almost certainly find cooperative arrangements integral to reliabie aod affordable security.
ew Russia, however, would have devasuting nuclear capabilities aod Ihe potential to marshal significant offensive conventional capabilities relative to iu rsdghbccs. HowNew Russia wexUd choose to ckvelop thai potential wocJd be determined by its view of ibe evolving Ettropean political crsvironmenl.
Gnond, Air. and Naval Force*
Purpose Ground. Air. snd Navel Forces
Purpose Grwsnd, Air. and Naval Forces
Sufi1 Options for Copingreakup
The Implicationsreakup of tbe USSR: Defense Assets at Rbk'
Sonet military planner*ace greaterknge* lhan *ilime in ibeperiod. Even before ibe failed August coup, the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, lhe reunification of Germany, and force reduction! in all services fundamentallyibr Sovieu' leoctratrf lc position and redefined their national tccurity peobiemi Meanwhile, perva-me domestic disarray called the very idea of long-term plnnnim into question, and rescesreea were be-comini increasingly unreliable. Economic chaos was furihtr undermining military budgeta. Turmoil in the industrial lectoridening technology gap between Ibe USSR aad the West. Draft resistance and Undent cicmptkont resulted in fewer, poorer quality recruits. Widespread criticism of the military was tapping morale.'
The failed August eonat lean redefinition, but more likely fracturing, of theto hasten tbe decline in central military power. Il presents the General Staff with imrrrcdiate prospect* of gaps developing in Ihe center's defense potlure. More funds mentally. It changes lhe political and ccortorruc foundation upon which defense postureuilt and control)id
The Start problems stem from lhe fact that its baseline force-building and operational plant areon the defense ofrcpublic union.'of such planning haveefease posture in whichorces aad industry arc deployed to ensure utttoat security. Cosrvcsstiotral forces anddefense forces are located around the union's periphery and concentrated most heavily la the west-en USSR. Strategic offensive forces and defense industry, by contrast, are located primarily within tbe Russian Regwibbc, with special ccocentr* tinea In the west. Adhrtiing thai posture fat response to Ihedemandseat of new problem* fee military planners. To assess tbe magnitude of possible
diiruinioni, we have investigated bow ihe disposition of defease assets tttsgbt be aflccttdmoeby rathree wtcoenes
A successor Mate to the USSR whose member republics correspond to the signatories of tbe nlne-plus-one agreement Sis. republics secede:Latvia. Estonia. Georgia. Moldova, and Armenia.
A stale In which theon-Slavk republic* leave the USSR. Thiscreator state, the Slavic Union, correspentds to the prtateot areas of the RSFSR. Ukraine, rjeieeustia. and lhe northern half of Kt taksUR, ill of which have primarily Slavic populations.
USSR pared back to the Russian Rcptsblsc. In this luccessor state. New Rusiia. the only other territory we have notionally assigned to lhehe Ukrainian Crimean Oblasi.
Even before the failed coup, use General Staffwas considering scene of the military impii-cationsreakup For example.
^rVe do not xaow. however, bow extensively iha General Staff hat planned Ibr largo-teak breakup* such as we crsasider here.
Wc evaluate how the military cuu Id relocateeplace key facilities, and revise operational plans so be cons in em with the changes in resources,nd deployment* The impact of nccctnson oa fcera rnodernjrstkai It latetacd bywhich tveap-otta final-assembly plants wotsM be outotential tucceascv state. Tbe Iota of component pUnts could be hut at disruptive.
do not consider tbem here- Of our three txxaarioa, atone is likely to cone to pats* precisely as described. Cot-tctrvelj. however, ihey illustrate the proton We rang* of variation at posaibla ooteotne*
MIMl.iWn U'lUor,General Stagrt.-rti
the Nine-Plus-One Unto.
Tbe Gorbachev administration bad been tryingefine Ibc relationship among tbe republics in iu attempt lo reform lhelep in Ibis program was tbe signing onpril of an agreement between Gorbachev and leaders of nine republics: ihe RSFSR. Ukraine,ibesosun. Kazakhstan.Tajikistan. Turkmcniya. and Kirgbiriya. That agreement was to form tbe basisew draft union treaty, which would have bound all of these republicsingle entity.
The General Suff may look to Ihe signatories of ibe nino-ptos-one drafl treatyUusiWc set of pa rlicipantsoint defense union. We assume in this scenario thai tbe republics that signed lhepril agreement remain willing to work togetherornrooo defense. Republics noi signatory to lhepril agreement do not contribute to lhe new union's defense.
bomber bases, and SSBN bases- would be within the Nine-PIus-One Union* borders. These borders also would enclose all of the final-assembly plants for strategic offensive systems that we judge may be in production over tbe nexl decade.
An important ballisiic missile earlyEW) radar site located at Skrunda (Latvia) would fall ouuide the Nine-Plus-One Union. The Skruodscover ICBM andSLBM reentry vehicle (RV) approaches out over the Norwegian Sea. Aradar would be espeosive and would take nearly eight years to build. The Union would retain,satellite-based early warning capabilily againsi US ICBMs. and naghboriug radar* in the Union would cover some of the potential ballistic rnitsile flight-pttbs from ibe north and west- We judge that, by Ibe, saieUiie-based warning could providecoverage.
boundariesine-Plus-One Union would enclose almost all of the USSR'* physical andresources (see figure 2t. By Sovietn lhe0 ibis area willopulation cental io that of the current USSR, assuming no net migration. The removal of the Baltic republics, Moldova,and Georgia would leave the Nine-Plus-One Unk* with land borders significantly longer than those of the USSR. The borderbo would isolate rUh'nihgrad and part of Azerbaijan from Ibc central mass of the union. The defense of these -islands" could be difficult or impossible in wartime.
Almost all of the USSR's military asset* at they are now deployed would resideine-Plus-One Union. Strategic defensive capabilities would be roost affected by the loss of facilities and bases. Of Ihe general purpose forces that would fall outside of the Nine-PI us-One Union, ibe rnajority arc deployed in Eastern Europe and are currently slated to be reserved back into the USSR over tbe next few years (see figure
All of Ibe USSR's current strategic offensivesite, mobile ICBM bases, heavy
Aboul one-teatb of Soviet air detente interceptor regiments, SAMnd aircraft warning radar units would lie outside the borders of the Ninc-Plus-One Union. Territorial lenses could produce gap* In the Soviei air defense network thai would reduce the space and time available for defender* to detect, tract and engage attacking aircraft. The lots of bases iu the Baltic republic* would probably be the moat problematic, because the Soviei Generalat US strike aircraft, cruise rnistilcs. and SLBM* and NATO Uctical aircraft wouldthb region in anefensive force* based in
and Moldova cover approaches fromwcsl and from countries like Romania.. and Iran. Tke tScdi ofuble u> fcjrcca in those places could be reduced, however. ai Ibe com of providing new totes La ihc RSFSR for SAMs aad fighters. Strategic air deleoaes also could be supplemented by relocated grossed force aarsystems.
Cecal Pari mi Crearad, Air, aad Naval Forces
The rcnuiniug Soviet Ground and Air Forcea In Eastern Europe, already slated for withdrawal,most of those forces tbat would fall outside the Nine-PI us One Union. Including the forcea in Eastern Europe, about one-fifth of can cast Ground Forces end overird of tbe current sir force cosnbal strength (light aad medium bomber, fighter, fighter-bomber, and ground attachould ba baaed outside Union border* The anils that arc bated wiUsta tha current USSR but would be outside the Nine-Plat-One Union arc roughlyaneuver drs-bion* and eight assorted air regiments spread evenly throughout the Dallic republics, Georgia, Armenia, and Moldova.
Tbe imagelavic Union appeals to manyA Slavic Union would retain approajtnaldyercent of Ihe USSR's current territory and industrial capability (seeighty percent or more of ihe USSR'* energy lesources also would fall Inside the Union'* borders. By tbehis area willopulation equal to aboutercent of the current USSR.
The majority of the USSR's current military assets now re**d* inude tbe besrders of our notional Slavic Union. Nonetheless, important (pace aad strategic defensive facilities would fall outside Ihe Union, and significant rxetioe* of theater Ground and Ah* Forces are now based in Eastern Europe, the Baltic republics, the Transcaucasia, and Central Asia (see figure 5k
naval forces would be leas affected by rcrnabor-dinailonine-Plus-One Unices. The two Urgent fleets ibe Northern and Pacific- are based laport* The Black Seaated as last RSFSR andrge number of Baltic Fleet surfaceberutrirsea, aaaiharlea, aadand storage facilities are, however, located ia the Ba It ic republics,ajor sabarsariae crewfacility at PuVdiaki, Estonia. The ships and lubraa-lines could be split between ports bt Leningrad and Kaliningrad, altlsougb additional support fadlllics would have to be built for this- Operationally, the Scanjet Navy would worry tbat forces ia tbe Leningrad area could be bottled up in the Gulf of FiaUnd. that naval forces baaed iu Kaliningrad would be raaced in aa capessed and vssatserrjstc position, and that lha ksas ofhc Baltic region would nearspcr aaral air easaatsesst* there.
Almost all Soviet defenseocatedpotauUted Nine-Ptes-One Uaioo
final *ssemMy plantssld ben
nil pUat in Iculisi (Georgia)
All of the USSR's current strategic offensive forces would lie within the confines of the Slavic Union. But some facilities import*at to the modernization of tbeae force* would lie outside of its borders:
Ai compared wiih lha Nus*PW*-Ossetwo *ddil>onal baiiiMie muaile early warraing ula would be outside UM Slavic Umoo TWae via. loo led al Lyaki (Arriba uan) andover ICBM aad SLBM RV sr^sreaebe* over the Indian Oceaa and western China. Thu widespreadr wanting capability against SLBMi could lead to changes in strategiceratlont.
Aboutof Soviei air defense interceptors, SAMs, and aiierafl wainini radars are now based ouuide ibe border* of Ibe notional Slavic Union. The loss of these bases would Increase Ibe vulnerability of attack from the south. Coverage against iborter range aircraft, such as fiom Western Europe and China, would be less affected, but the General StatT would expect any attackers to eapsoit tbeae gaps.
A major strategic defease training aad RDTJtE facilily. at Sambagsn. abo would fall outside the Sbek
jce-ereaiing the in-frastruetnre built up during decides of testing al Saryslsagaa wenOu at bast ba ditSewb aad eatremely eapemive and would ukc many years- (
The world's largest spaceports well as several space tracking fnautiea and cspeeations areas, abo lie in southernincludeareas, for cosmonauts and rrconnsissance satdlite filmywraum wppesna:
All geosynchronou*this capabilityearly warning, navigation, and miliury and civil corrununscationi latcflitea.
All sembyrKhronoua geopcaitionirsg uUllitea,
Tbe Encrgtya beavy-lifl launch vehicle, thecrglys M. and Ibe Sbultlc orbster.
The rnamsed space program.
Planetary captation and deep-space launches.
Military tccoonalssnace. turvtallance, and anibatel-lite (ASAT) program*.
Many of theuch as those for ibe roanised ipace rsroeiam and Shuttle orrsiier J"
J Uuaehes arc unirrac to Tyura-tara. These CoaJd, ia theory, be relocated at ersorrnocj
however, reksauoa co-Idhebility lo boaeb saullstea ibio sons* ortstu.
Cresrral PssrposeAk. and Naval Fareas Significant numbers of ground and air uniu arc cnrrcatly based in Eastern Enrope or wiihia ibe USSR but outside ibe borders of our actional Slavic Uoioo- Thb pool of forces represent, aboulpercent of crrrrentof them of the roosi modern types. These divbtont, one-third of which arc units io be withdrawn from Eastern Europe, could be based at currently cabling ground force garrisons in theSlavic Union.
Approiimatelyombat air regiments currently are based ouuide tbe notional Slavic Union New and ctpensive nutways. hangars, and towers would have to be built or cabling ones upgraded io ensure the uniu'capabilities ai their new location. The (round-based maiolenaoce and weapon* handlingof these uniu would also have to be
A Slavic navy would face the less* of faciliiic*with the Caspiaa Sea Flotilla Tha* sma llhas no Urge surface ocenbauaua number of large ansphibious vessels.*ignincaa( aambers of
naval torpedoes. alTrsoagh thb production could rarob-.iy be uken up at fsctono within the RSFSR.
The Soviet military probabl, recoeairca ihatforces could entirely lha iter tha aauoa and leave Russia on ha own (sec ngureWith its smaller resourceussia ihat chose to maintain force* roughly as capable aa those of the csrrrent USSR woulduggcriag militaryruaia has
esTx-nt of major Soviet defense production facilities, bwl accounts for much Icaa of Ibeverallutput It is. however, setf-suflkkni in all major energyuuiarojected lo have aboul half the prople Ibe USSR hai now.*
New Russia's geography would coniribwle to iu vul-ncrabirity to air and gtomsd alUckt. aprciaUy in ibc weal. IkciDic of ihe ihape of Ibe European landman. New Russia's European bnd border would be longerthai oteilher ibc prnlublrd Slavic Union or of Ibc USSR today li -ould aboas of territori-al depth ia the western regoos thai would eetriplieaie both air defense and fround force defensive opera' lions. In particular, Moscow wouldilometers drjscr to tbe country's western border.'
Al the tamerae percentage of Soviet air andround forces currently are based ouitide of the boundaries of our notional New Russia. AJmost all ma teak offensive and naval forces arc currently bated inside (assuming lhe Ukrainian Crimeanart of New Rtuntat, but half of tba Ground Forces, three-fourths of ibe theater Air Forces,hird of strategic air defenses are located In Eastern Europe, Ukraine, Belorussla, and other republics outside of New Russia (sec
:i It* .'i
A small but srgWtkanl rsntlsoa of the strategic effeo-tiveurrently based outside the confines of theled New Russia:
> Three dxnsirans ofCBMs arc ta BcVoeassu. One division could beledormeracility at Drtwyaaaya. Othercould be accommodated at tome capense by ciponding ciistingases, or by building new fnabties.
Four divisions of tllo-based ICBMs fall ouls.de-iwo diviiiems equipped withndCBMs are in Ukraine and two SS-II ICBM
' ThW ini iwt laaanta anaa* laa nw OMuath*aa laciMim
h aii ia.Ion Nn Im
Ml aaasssSBtshaVnod Smra./
divisions are in Karakhsun. The Sovieu probably pUn to deactivate iccne of thesendCBMs wader START. Tbe rest of Ibe mooiles could be moved into csounghin Rut**.
Four heavy bomber reap menu are based in Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Maltsulriing the bombers'bility watte requiring tbctn lo operate from new bases would call for significant modi&catjotn to the heavy bomber iafrastrstctuix. activity thai could includeew coeutroctkn and upgrading of runways and nuclear weapons storage facilities
These lystems arc ia many rases the nsnct aacdern bt the Soviet arsenal, because recent Soviet strategic offensive modemiration has focused heavily oaIn Ukraine, Bcioruisia. and Kazakhstan.
Continued tiralegk offcrnrve force* rnoderruutlon would be severely disrupted by the lest* of Ukrainian factories in Dnepropclrovsk and rSrlogrsd thaiIhe SS-II andCBMs. If Ihese faculties were loai today, tbe losses could deUy (for al least five yean) rnoctcrnlatlon of the SS-II.
Jar disrupt these profiten;ba Russiant cotald compensate ttstssfaarariry bytome older interna, inch at ther SS-II Modn Ibeir inventory to keep force levcb from declining. Tbe SensirsalatlnskWeapons Test Center (Kazakhstan) woaid lie out tide New Russia, bast tha Soviets say ihey are pes stung to transfer rtuckar testing away from ScnusaUtirtsk entirely to Novaya Zemlya in the RSFSR.
The majority of baDistk rnbsilc early warningmany satellite ccwtrctilies lieotsM retain BMEW ccwersgcEastern Chits* from the Mithesevtaover lhe pole from ridan al Pechora aadNew Rasti* alio would be faced withhird of it* sateiliu cotttrc* acrwortepaicsly havo to make tigaaAcut change*effective uldliec cotvtrot
ovti ilitd ofcfcme isncrccptorAMad radarart based coju-ck New Russia. Fcrttxirwe. lira logic ddtMitfi ionouldTeccc. because'i ia Kiev thai produceAMs and air-to-air missiles (AAM) would fall outside New Rus*ii_
Military shipyards al Nikola rev and Kiev in Ukraine would bm be tnn ol* New Russia. Tbeae yard* canroduce frigates, raajor surface coaabaunta, and naval aaailiana and abo provide valuable repairfor Urgef New Russia intended lo punuG naval mission* requiring Urgebe tea* of comiruction and repair capacity could be ilgs-uncaat. Tbe SovkU already have indicated, however, dial Niaobyevad ihe kiev yardeted lo eacJaar-ely riviliia prod acaton, and tbat carrier productioa will ccaie after tbe current carrier* are finbbed.
the Kussrans chose lo repUce these facilities, it would prove very expensive
Cetseral Pssrpoae Cftaraas, .sir. aad Nam! Force* Roughlyercent of Soviet Ground Forces are currently deployed outside the boundaries of the notional New Russia. Without access to tbe 0round Forces infr*itruerurr built up within Ukraine and Dejorutsin, New Russia would have lo build new facilities or expand existing ones to house relocated men and equipment.
About three-fourth* of the current Soviet Air Force* combat itrcngtb lies outside New Riuaia. Large amounts of airfield constrsciion or modification would be necessary to accra-mricdaic thesei mi In addition, about one-fourth of tbe current pilot training infrastructure lie* outside
A* ia the Slavic Uaioo scenario, naval force*ew Russia thai lasdaded the Ukrainian Crimeanould be largely eaa fleeted. However. irCrifnea. borne to the Black Sea Fleet, were not toeoepceaied in New RataU, about anotherercent of the current force of major surface combatants snd submarines would have to relocate. Any relocation to Russian territory oo the (slack Sea would be difisc-olt. If aot laipoisiMc becauseckof suitable port* Rcloca-lica to caber beettald rrrjesre constrict ice ofn fioLiie* at already crowded ttavalbe loss of the Crimean naval base* aad ibipysrds probably won Id mean that the Bbscfc Sea Fleet wossld be greatly reduced In sire, and il would shift its focusreater extent onto coastal defense operations.
Near-term ground and air force tnodrrniration efforts would not aeceaaarily be threatened by thb breakup, because Ibe final-assembly plants rapponnsg the ground aad air force irscde-rnrxatioa 1stussia Scene disraptsona of prcdacnoa will almost certainty accompany the breakup of tbe union, but these might ba limited by consolidating alreadyequipment (much of it moved in from outside Ncw Russia)malter force. The mostleas would be factories in Khar'kov (Ukraine) and Minsk (BdorussU) that produceVs. and artillery. Given tbe recent downturn in prodacrjon of these lyalexisa. however. New Russia could make op
for these leaaea by expanding cuipui at caisting plant*
located within the RSFSR. t>
Longer-term mode miration would be hampered by the lotsumber of major RDTJtl! faciUtks. Emba MIC. la noctberaa bnportaal de-rcloptneni center for rnocnie uexieal SAMs. Thea Weapons Teat Range (part of which Be* inht primary Soviet center for ioiegratiem testing of aircraft-carriedajor supplier of military orxical devices.ocated In BclnrustU.onst lo the Ve. Faton Weldingechnological leader not ocJr in Ihe USSR, but abo in the world
The table oa page IJ ommarirc* the aaaets at risk for our three notional
Ti*Utt0 .Lf ICiMl
Htlocaiion and CFE Umln
ceilings on Ground. Ale. und Air Defense Fortes equipmem would allow ike USSR lo wUkdrownto lis Interior im amlttpaltonreakup How CFE limits would applyuccessor stole would depend on negotiations among tkt seceding republics, or the successor and current CFE signatories.destruction rtqulnmtnts would also hart to bt satisfied. (
CFE ceilings art sirueturtd lo limit the amounts of ready fonts around tke USSR 'e periphery, hut would not significantly hamper the relocation of forces Into Its Interior. The CFE ceilings apply only to lhe defined ATTU tone,uccessor state willing to bear tke costs could relocate forces lo areas east of the Urals. Within the ATTU some, special restrictions limit active and stored equipment around Leningrad. In the non-Russian republics, and In the Russian Caucasus. Because CFE tonal and subionaloverlap current republic borders, newlyrepublics would turns to strike deals to divide up fonts without violating CFE limits.
If secession from lhe union mas orderly and newly Independent republics wanttd to become partstiponts In tht CFE Treaty, iht republics, tht center, and other CFE nations probably could find ways 10
unsdlfyiug ihe agreement la expumd participation The Baltic republics, for example, have agreed that they would sign the CFE Treaty once their independeni status was assured. Because CFE was negotiated between lhe NATO and Warsaw Fact alliances, lhe forcesewly independeni Ukraine. Beiorussia. Tramscaucasion. or Baltic state would count against ihe Warsaw Pact's holdings Within alliance ceilings national forces wtrt established by negotiation, with-in the alliances. It Is unlikely lhat tke countries af the former Warsaw Fact would reduce their forces In cm-der lo nccommnodaie thoseew state. Since the Warsaw Fact mo longer eslsti
If critical differences erupt between the republics and Iht center over equipment allotment or over destrue-llom and Inspection responsibilities, however, or If the union dissolves Into stparatt republics with Utllt interest In fulfilling previously signed agreements, tht CFE Treaty could bt rendered Irrelevant or Invalid. For example, at anost-Soviet stale might argue lhat the forces In Independent republics would disrupt tkt forte batance In Europe ta math then new limits would have to be negotiated toem Into account, or list abandon the Treaty.
Su.fi OmtSean fa* CtnAsngrnatv
TV SovietSufi* rrobm Ny wotdd astern lhe feasibility of retauuoj aa ranch of 'an carnal core bai ttrrnrb aahere are three iwi*Vi to prtaarriag the military force* and facilities ttrt*teoed by leeeasMrt:
Relocate force* to noriac or (new) operaiiortal bases.
Build new faculties and weapon* to replace any kit behind.
Negotiate to maintain forces and installailoni in newly backpc*>deoi republics
The General Staffendd protabfy aho reeaamtae defenseand tailor tbem to reelect the chanced miliury sitution tad reduced resource*
The General Staff could relocatefromrr^btic* or part theirnto raoraje libirsormg ojuifmau to meet aattiripaiedeeither approach woaid irceire chffer cat levers and type* of resources. To relocate>wortssist be Im'lL For caatn-ple. the Air Force* wcadd need rmrrways, hanaari or bunkers, weapon storagend air trafficetor. the Ground Fcceea would need marrntauaot facilities, unrmmj tko Moraac, and tin iniej areas.personnel would rerjuiro rjuarUrt aad astdacal and recnaiional ftcsbl.es. butrc already
inadequate to meet ihe needs of troop* beingftom Eastern Europe,
New Russia coo Id by far face the largest task in relocating gitssind and air units Much of the forces tha Nine-Plus-One Union might rated to more arc in Eastern Europe, already slated to be meed. For the Slavic Union, Use compset ion ot* the East European withdrawal* willignificant amount of force* still to be relocated from forever Soviet republics For New Russia, the forces slated for withdrawal from Eastern Europe are ensly about one-sUth of all the ground and air forces Ihal would have to be moved New Russia abo ss-outd face the largest requirement* to build new eccr-mtrscda lions for relocated air aad ground forcea. Depersding on the course of theNew Russia might even end up moving some unit*Ukrainian President, for tiamplc, said before the 'ailed coup Ihat Ukrtme woold receive half ihe troops removed from Fasten- Europe.
All three notional tucccasor (tales would haveove sum Scant amounts of strategic defensive forces. New Rttatia would ooce again face the largest burden. To rc-crcatc along iu new border Ihe same kind of dense, ovcrUppsng air defeatse barrier tbe USSR now de-ptoya fan thesMfiggggg sUte would require substantial new me coau-trucsJoa for forcea that are moved.hift would require year* to complete and could not eompeeaau for the loss of defensive depth. Altervely, asscU from tha republics could be redeployed cesry at raining defensive sites Thb cheaper but leas effective option would limit ckfenaes to key mililary, indusLrUl, and political urgeU and abandon barrier defcratea. .
Newhease in which tccrssioa poact question* aboutoffensive force control. Tbe current paitrrn of Mrategk depicymr nt* still involve* mcderEsiatka at macry aaat* outside the RSFSR. Somervertbelni have dbr-assserl over law past year the deairability ofall itrategieforcea into the RSFSR, b> part to
Rrloctiiag Deft are I, 4a, r. ,
Foe most cf iht large, fixed mtieti at risk, such at C' titer, BUEWS radon, space launch tiles, and some industrial/RAD facilities, relocating thofacUliy is essemlally the same as building It ctsevehxre. Other defense facilities. Isamreer. may hen* aedj small amounts of unique instrumentation or tooling. In those cases, the research, design, or productionof the stag may be ihe moat Important asset so be rriocesed
When major defense-Industrial plants are considered, there appears to be sufficient redundant capacity to make up for ihe few general purposessembfy plana that would be lost to the center, even In lha New Russia case. The Industrial basestrategic modernisation is smaller and would be seriously ccmpromised tn ihe Sew Russia scenario The final-assembly plants for ICS Mi tn Ukraine are unlaue asseti. and^Z
^Relocating their personnel and eirutpmeni to newly constructed quaruri woulddisrupt production capability.
forces out of areas of ethnic unreal or rrsaens wiiere conventional defensive .operations could Uke place,
A peoi-Soviet su te might decide to rely oa new production aad conat-wctiou rather than rrlocaiiag some critical defense facilities and weapons. Military facilities such as large radars aad teat ranges arc not easily moved and might havu to be retail within new border* beeeccraaor statu might notall weaponry from Kcedingmight leave, trade, or lose control over some weapon* to acwty Itsdes^rsdcast govrj-cenrata. The Oraseral Staff might wkh to produce aew equiprarrst to rcpfacu what It could not retrieve. .
Reproducing For en
Tht table below comparer the total number of various weapons that would be left outttdt our notional post-USSR states with the0 weapons production Air defense Interceptors are included in combat"Ullltaryncludes training support, transport, and reconnaissance aircraft.fj
"'V-fl loll tyres!
only the location of final-assembly plants, the0 productioneasonable surrogate for amounts the Nine-Pius-One Union and the Slavic Union could produce. New Russia, on the other hand, would probably be hard pressed to match these rates.
SUse-Plos-Ooe Union would have to rebuildew large, imporUat faciuiie* one BMEW raeUrand care,C* 'ao'ui.es. The former la probably tbe mealAh hough tbe Sovieu undoubtedwould approach lha pro* poetemporary gap io ballistic trait* lie early warning with treateplacement radar Located farther inland than Sarunda would improve tbe ejuality ofoacow ABM battle rrasajcrr.cnt performance, and atucfc aiacaamcot capabilities. The Slavic Union would loae two additional BMEW radar sites and facilities such as Saryshagan and Tysraum. Tha grraiyrschrcstsous Uurtch capability from Tyura-urn could not be rebuilt within tha Slavic Union'sa nenaltv in mailovum oavload
New Russia, with ila smaller reaouico base, would have to replace Ihree additional BMEW radar tile* as wellromber of weapon* teal ranges. Emirvaleot BMEWS ccn-erage might*ith fewer radars. Tbe selection of aew sties for tbeae facilities would be complicated by the RSFSR'i weather and geography. Many test and RAD facilities were built la the tcnthern USSR to take advantage of Ha generally clear weather aa well aa Ha bxaadc-a. There ara fever snttbte sites within lha RSFSR. Aad given the generallyf not toxic, nature of tha activUIc* at suchheir relocation could ran afoot afowing earrlroeune-Ual activism in the USSR.
Tbe numbers and type* of equipment based outside tbe notional successor nates suggen that reorce* i*easonable solution lo Ihe overall problaru csuscdreakup (see inset onbe amounts of snntcrtel lhat could poteoiially be losi generally rereesent many yean' production0 rates. The Nino-Pha* Owe Union and lhe Slavie Un*on mlf bl (inula higher produeiionut New-'H its smaller conventional and strategic pro-dociion capabilities, probably could not make wide use of this ecejot* The cocusoinj downward cextnotnK presaurra on weapon* pcociircsneni, however, make it onllkely that any tuccexsor stale would rely more beavily oa reproducing forces than on relocatlni them
A succesvx stale's polilical leaders could alleviate some of tbe pressures on the defense establishment by nejeeiatini access to criticaluch ancould obnatc Ibc need to rebuild expensive facilities and move somef. however, tbe processes of separation are violent or largely out of the center'successor state might be reluctant to leave equipment behind and mot likely wotdd rely on unilateral strength for iu security. Inuccessor state simply might not be willingay theof retaining access to lost facilities.
Strategic facilities cm tide of successor sis lea are peoUbly the snost critical. Access to lhe BMEW radar tiles alone would be tlgnincant. Maintaining accent to air warning data from Ihe excludedwouldig boost to air defense performs net for the Slavic Union or New Rtosia. Access to trace launch and RAD facilities in the soulh would be critical to malnlaining superpower attributes suchanned space program and nigh-technologyresearch. For Newhe fate of the Mrsoffensive and defentire tyitcrni and their rwedue-lion facilities would be of key lalercst. Negotiatingorce* agneioeott, especially for ground UOOpa and air force regiments now in place, could
reduce the relocation effort and, especiallyew Russia, potentially increase lhe defensive depthi)
Many republics trould tssost likely view large miliiary presence* as politically or ecologically unpataiable. Although tome fixed facilities like factories, Cand radars might be lest threatening than forces, even radar nations and airfields haveocus for popular opposition in the USSR. Antinuclearand natiottalism will certainlyactor ia negotiations ot Hal us-of forces iprnneau But re pubJ.cs may bodful even to achieve scene temporary agreementay to extract otherfrom the center. The Kaxakb Republk gov-crrtmeni. for example, negotiated with tbe USSR centralthe failedthe use cf Tyuraum.
Tbe center's reassessment of iu lecariiy polky could suggest ways lo snake better use* of the residual equipment leftuccessorowering of mist ion require menu lhat would decrease the amounu of general purpose equipment needed would be consulett with the recent tread* in Soviet thinkingefensive poattsre and Moscow's corvcurrcace with weapons ccilingt esublisbed in the CFE Treaty. Some possibilities mlf hi bee
The tignirkaai hate* of itrateapcven in thenion, and tbe coal of rebuilding sir defense capabilities could place ibe traditional mission of the Air Defense Forces order greater tent liny. Tha* could leadhange in mission away from rxatxtrarcheetsiv* strate-gk defense against nuclear attack and toward early warmingore limited defense against crxaven-bottal threats.
Strategic orTcnsive forces la all of tbe successor suica coo tintoromineal role In defense planning Budget ate bales on the relative roles of atntcgk and getters! purpcae forces couU lead to greater relit see on itratcgk force* and further reduction* in itnitdiiig conventional capabilities.
Evenent-USSR Mate ifctal toouuide lis borders, tbe distribution ol the defense infrastructure shields sonic miliuryfrom the effectsreakup. Suaiesrie offensive forces sund out in this regird because they arc already cement rated lar|eJy in the RSFSR. Even New Russia miihi muster force levels at or near tbeae wc currently project for the USSRhole -the dculkd force mi> could be different, especially in regard lo bombers, but New Russia would wield dcv*siaiia| rrociear capabilities.reakup of the RSFSR iuetf would threaten these capabilities
Unaoa both -ould incorporate much of ihe USSR's present miliury capability. The Naie-FTua-Onc Union could probably continue much like the USSR, even If it severed lira to iu former rrasublita. It wrnald face anbattle to shoulder uouaicralry the burden of replacing the lent hied facilities while relocating currently deployed ground, aar. and strategicforces within iu herders. The Slavic Union would have larger rwobfeans than the Nine-Plus One Uraion, bul these, too. appear amenablereative mis of relocating forces, rebuilding facilities, and negotiating access to key facilities. Theto support high force levels will be determined by the political perceptions of tbe foreign threat and the ecesnomie and serial pains that large forces entail, la addition lo ibe costs connected with the breakup of the union
or without breakup, the changes that have already uken puce ia Eastern Europe and cornpii-anee with CFEe the USSRaccessor slate with lignincantly smaller conventional forces than the USSR had in thehese smaller force* would require substantia! moekUtaation before ihey could eiecute large-scale offensive or counter of-tensive operitions The losses the Nine-Plus-One Union suffers from secession would further erode it* immediately available capabilities for offensive and counteroTentivehe Slavic Union does not appear to face any Insurmounuble structural deficiencies lo maintaining strong comni tonalcapabilities. Force relocation could be very costly for New Russia,-ould alio lose facilitiesodcnunlioa and RDTdtE. These lease* would most likely weaken Newrge-scak conventional defensive capabilities.
Strategic defensive capabilities, in contrail, would be sjgiw Oca ally cjomprornbed even in the Ni*sc-Pl*uvOne Union. The dclrisrscnul efTceu of losing bases in the Baltic region and the southwest could be fully negaied only if Soviet force* acquired basing rigbu on the same scale they enjoy today. Strategic defensive modernisation capabilities would be progressively weakened byand New Russia ultimately could lose access to vital factories Thb suggest* that the rose of strategic defenses could be called into questionost USSR Hate ,
From the Soviei General SulT* perspective, retaining Ukrainebe key toilitary potential. The Nine-Plus-One Union and Slavic
Russia alone, if it remained com nutted to mainta Ining forces to nscet ihe threatassed convceiional atuck from the West or to multiple theater defensive operations, would beosition tha General Staff would view with some alarm New Russia would inherit ihe strategicapabilitiesupe--power, but strategic force modemUatkei plan* could be sharply affected by the loss of Ukraine,ad Karakkstaa. Conventional force axiderniraiida does not appear to beecalmed, but standing conventional force* and capabilities could be severely compromised. Tbe Russian miliury'* concern would be hcightctscd by New Russia's leutgur Earopean bed border and decreased depth. Tha relocation ofdefcitsive, ground, and air forcea while rebuilding scat facilities wouldtaggering burdenhrunken and do toned economy wracked by Ibe social turmoil of secession.
Negotbiiag long-term aoccss to critical militaryoutside of the RSFSR would ba valuable ban poaiibry dsrhcah for New Russia. It would have tut deal with new actor* on itsor Bclceuuian uates, for example. Accra* to facilities la lha foresee republics would ba least beefy
if New Rtxuaa emergediolent devoration of
power to tbe republics.
Aa would probably bed thai tbe best path of Ha tecurity would be ia coopeialivo arrssvgrrrseot* along lines that turd born already ikxtcbed out by tbe
Gorbachevt New Russia.oaSdnJ.ur, (era. Iuould Mill wreak doasu uoo taat as* atrj. Il would nUl be coarotoaarjy tuperiorry ol" ra
bul ioU pointmiliury power beyond iubordan.'
In turn.Russia without UkrW aod ibe oilier republics would retain tbe pceerrtUJ ot*major rxvili-ury power. Tbe way La wUcfa Riiseina rtviliury potential would be den^oped and used lo lhe world would depend mainly on the political system etUb-litbcd in lhe country and tbe newly esisteai interna-tional cexvtieluiioo thai the Srwiet republics' traiisi-tton wUl have btlped to ibape.Original document.