Created: 11/20/1999

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

Panel III "Espionage and Counterintelligence

I .loyd Salvetti:

[Our next panel] is tbeused on intelligence operationsarticular focus on espionage and counterintelligence operations in the final stages of the Cold War. The panel chair is Jimareer CIA operations officer and presently CIA Officer in Residence at the George Bush School. Among the senior assignments he held inptus-year career. Jim was Chief of CIA's Counterintelligence Center and was involved in counterintelligence operations for his entire career. So wereat panel. It's going toreat discussion. Jim.

James Olson:

Thank you, Lloyd. It is my pleasure to chair the panel on espionage and counterintelligence, andarticular pleasure also to see again so many of my friends and colleagues from the CIA and from elsewhere in the Intelligencehould addm so happy to sec here today also so many of my new friends, colleagues and students from the Bush School, and fromniversity. One of the most intriguing aspects and one of the most vital aspects of the Cold War was the confrontation which took place between the two largest and most powerful intelligence services in the world, the CIA and the KGB, This confrontation occurred not only in Washington and Moscow, but also in most of die capitals of the world, where CIA and KGB officers competed daily to penetrate the other side's secrets. On our panel today.

we have two of Ihe Ibremos! practitioners of ihe art of espionage and counterintelligence, one from each side,istinguished historian who has written extensively on the subject. Major General Oleg Danelovich Kalugin, to my immediate right, was born in Leningrad. His father was an officer in Stalin's NKVD, as you know, the predecessor service ofthe KGB.

General Kalugin began his overseas intelligence career under cover firsttudent, then asajoumalist, in New York.5e served as deputy chief of the KGB Residency at the Soviet Embassy ine became the youngest general in Ihe history of the KGB, and eventually rose to the position of head of foreign counterintelligence. In his illustrious career, General Kaluginey role in some of the most notable and controversial intelligence operations of the Cold War. including Nicholas Shadrin, Georgi Markov, and John Walker. General Kalugin resigned from Ihe KGBndritic of the KGB and the Communist system. Today he is chairman ofa consulting firm based in Washington that provides information services to business in the former Soviet Union. General Kalugin is the author of The Firsl Directorate: Myears in Intelligence and Espionage Against Ihe West.

Mr. Paul Redmond, to my far right, was bom in Massachusetts and graduated from Harvard. Served in the CIAase officer and Chief of Station5 until his retirementr. Redmond's career was devoted almost exclusively to espionage and counterintelligence operations against the Soviet Union. Mr. Redmond played key roles in the investigations of some of the major spy cases of, including Aldrich Ames and Harold J. Nicholson, He served in East Europe, East Asia, Europe and CIA Headquarters. Since his retirement last year from the CIA. Mr.

Redmond has worked in the field of business counterespionage andonsultant on counterintelligence issues for the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in the House of Representatives. Among other assignments there, he's reviewed the counterintelligence policies and practices of the Department of Energy and the nuclear weapons laboratories.

Allen Wcinstein, seated in the middle of our panel,rofessor of History at Smith College and chairman of its American Studies Program61erofessor of History at Georgetown University, and then at Boston University5e'sheld visiting professor appointments at Brown. Columbia, and George Washington University,2e directed the research study that led to the creation of the National Endowment for Democracy.rofessor Wcinstein hasember of the Board of Directors ofthe United States Institute of Peace. Professor Weinsteinery long list of publications, and two of his most recent ones are particularly relevant toward the discussion here today: The Haunted Wood: Soviet Espionage in America. Tlie Stalin Era was publishednd Perjury: Ihe Hiss-Chambers Case, an updated version of his earlier work by the same name was published'd like to notese both of those books in theeach here at the Bush School. Professor Weinstein served as the historical consultant for two History Channel programs on Soviet espionage8e is currently the president and CEO of the Center for Democracy in Washington, afoundation established5 to promote and strengthen the democratic process in countries around the world.

To start our discussion, I've asked each of the panelists toive-to-seven minute presentation on his view of the CIA-KGB confrontation. General Kalugin and Mr. Redmond, as practitioners, will comment on the successes and failures of their own services, and also their perceptions of how good the other side was. I've asked Professor Wcinstcin to provide an historical perspective on CIA and KGB operations during, and to provide his informal verdict on who won the human intelligence war. [Laughter fromhat's right wasn't it. Allen? After the opening presentations, each of the panelists will have the opportunity lo address one or twoope will be probing questions to the othernticipate this will allow ample time at the end for questions and comments from the audience. Our leadoff speaker will be an extremely capable, professional intelligence officerorthy Cold War adversary. Major General Olcg Kalugin.

General Kalugin:

Most intelligence services tend to lose the sense of realism and modesty once they go public;atural phenomenon. Russian intelligence is the best in the world. Period. These words are not mine. They belong to the current chief of the Russian SVR, Mr. Vlasislav Trupnikovnderstand, wasisit toew days ago. Well, he singled out the Brits as the second best, by Ihe way. The CIA was treated with disdainhattered, shaken organization, which is incapable of delivering or performing today. He said this two years ago. though; things may have changedould not come here to disseminate propaganda. This is not my job theseould

certainly want to emphasize substantive differences between the former Soviet intelligence,as one of the Soviet Cold Warriors. I've never concealed the fact. Thereubstantive difference between the two services for perhaps two major reasons. The Soviets were obsessed with human intelligence and not only in terms of collection of intelligence, buteans to promote the cause. Actually, all the great collection of information provided by Soviet intelligence was subordinatedingle cause: to weaken, deceive, confuse, injure, damage, and destroy the other side. Well,nderstand correctly the CIA,as involvedounterpart for years, this country's intelligence was obsessed excessively with technical collection as well as analysis. We never had these problems, because the human sources provided us with excellentn fact, in terms of numbers, sheer numbers, we would beat any country. That's true.

In terms of ultimate, eventual outcome, well, this is where wechool of thought which says, intelligence played little if any role in the outcome of the Cold War. Economic power, technological progress, political imperatives, and geographic situations, they shaped the contemporary war. And yet, and yet, had it not been for the Soviet intelligence, we would have probably created and tested our atomic weapons not,. The Soviet intelligencerucial role in providing Ihe Soviet scientific community, veryouldn't doubt that, but with timely and precise information of technical nature which allowed us to becomear with the United States., Stalin thought we roll our tanks to the Atlantic shores. It was America's nuclear superiority which prevented Russians from going over the board. Now. and again,hink of John Walker, another guy who provided us with strategic intelligence.

1 may quote Admiral Studcman who said that "Had military conflict erupted between the two super powers, the compromised cryptographic material would have powerful war winning implications for the Soviet side."

Now, in counterintelligence business we were also pretty good al one point. For some time we did manage to obtain, there were several names today dropped like Agcc and Ames and others. But, in the longctually, wc managed with the help of Ames tohole ring of CIA spies in the USSR. In the long run, in the final analysis, the score wouldn my count in favor of the United Suites on counterintelligence issues. I'll explain if someone wants me to elaborate on this subject

Now, in the United States, analysis was extremely important because of lack of human resources inside the were no CIA assets in Russia. Theren the United States, Russian, Soviet assets.ust say that recent publication of the US News and World Report was fantastic. They claimed, the author claimed that wegents in the United States in thes ands. Absurd!ozen were run at that time.onsider this publicationypical piece of disinformation by the Russian intelligence service, [laughter fromow. let me go back to analysis. Well, we didn't have to have great analysis. Well, the CIA had several thousand people involved, right? Wer so. We didn't need that analysis because we knew that the Western societies will crumble down anyway. It wasean, by the very nature of Soviet Communism. Wc would never report in the political intelligence to our leaders, we would never deviate from the Party line, and in the final years of Brezhnev, when he was sick and really disinterested in anything, Khrushchev, the chairman of intelligence, would say. "No morehousand

words and never just upset the Party Secretary General because if he'sell, he was very emotional at the time, That was the political intelligence. In scientific technological, wereat job. In military we did very well. Inill explain.

ome toery important item and this would probably give reason for me to ask questions from my former counterpart, Mr. Redmond. It was Nicolaireat Russian philosopher, who said ins, "Communism cannot be defeated physically, it must be eradicated from thec claim the Cold War is over, Thai's true. Major battles are won, the fire was extinguished, the ideological clash which really threatened the very existence of mankind is now over. But the ashes are smoldering. Russia is not free from the old totalitarian and imperial mentality. If you watch President Yeltsin's performance in Turkey, and some ofthe statements and actions by the Russian military, they would prompt you and immediately alert you to the possibilities that Cold War may be revivedifferent form, not ideological but in another confrontation rivalry where my country-anditizen of Russia by the way-may pose, oncehreat to the world and to stability in the world. Well, at thatill handxhausted my time.

Mr. Redmond:

Olcg's quoting of the good General Trupnikov is perhaps the most comforting thing I've heardong time. Clearly they have no idea ofthe wonderful things we are

doingagainsl them. |Laughtcr fromongratulations to George, and he's finally learned to keep secrets there, apparently.

The United States recognized the Soviet Unionhey had major spies already in the State Department, whether it was Duggan, unknown codename "Willy" wc were just talking about who was not yet identified.nited States Congressman named Dicksteinontrolled source, agent ofthe NKVD.hink, was working by then. They had staff officers in place, both illegal and illegal, the great Boris Bazarov in New York, Peter Gutzcit in New York,hink came to this country to set himself up the great illegal. So what you hadt the latest,ell-established apparatus with many agents stealing us blind already by professional intelligence officers. There was no CIA at that point, there was no intelligence presence in Moscow, but we did have an American ambassador at that point, named William Bullitt, who said, "We should neverpy to the Soviet Union. There's no weapon at once so disarming and effectiveelationship with die Communists as sheer honesty."

Thai'start. That's where our collection efforts began. In effect, the espionage Cold War, in my view, began, before Worldf course then wc have the atomic spies during the War, exposed afterwards. Wc then have another distinguished American ambassador after the War, Joseph fc. Davies, (was he during theho said that "the Soviets had-he said this inmoral right lo resort to espionage because our not giving them the atomic secretsostilec got offonderful start, operating in Moscow, In thee sent two Chiefs of Station. The first had eight days of training, the second one hadours. Oneofthem

was almost blind, he wore glasses which fogged up, or ieed up, depending on the weather, so if he couldn't sec the surveillance on him because of his eyesight, lie certainly wouldn't have seen it was cold.9 wetation in Alaska, the job was to catch, go out on theuppose with the Eskimos, looking for beach drift, we're that desperate. It's kind of funny,ot of money was spent and that was what was going on. Of course there were the many cross-border operations out of Turkey, Iran, Finland, cross-ice operations, submarine landing operations, infiltration operations, allort of military cast,hink was probably understandable, given it was the military running the place and the war had not long over. Perhaps the most striking statistic about Ihe infiltration operations, the PDCOMP AS ADO group hadeople when tliey were dropped in,ere immediately casualties. Wc now know that Philby compromised at least many of ihem in ihc Balkans, and probably others were compromised just by sheer lousy tradeerall on our part, in March, Stalin dies. Wc then get into the business of legal travelers,unch of Yalies whose main qualifications as faran sec, was they could sing. This was big business, and it wasit dicey. They didn't have diplomatic immunity, and listen to thishere was oneour. George Blake was briefed on this program inn Ihe yearixty of these legal travelers in that program were arrested and of course, the program had to be slopped because ittile bit embarrassing. It gave the Stateajor case of the vapors, even by the standards of those times.

By the, lo go back in time, the first real spy cases began to come along. They're all defectors, volunteers. The ones who survived, defected; the ones who didn't were lost. The first one of any instance of any significanceuy,irst

came to work, was affectionately know to us as Leo Ihc Lion. He wasormer member of Smash, believe il or not; he looked and behaved like one. But he was really our first source. He came along in the very early'50s. Then, of course, Yuri Rastvorov oul of Japan and Peter Deriabin out of Vienna, both KGB officer defectors. The first in-place operation of any significance ranRU officer,olunteer, named Popov, who provided really the first major significant and positive intelligence, in this case military information, that we got after the war. including the initial one of his great coups which George Kisevaltcr, the great case officer, got the entire map of the disposition of the Warsaw Pact forces at that point from that case. Of course, Penkovskiy; Golitsyn who became very controversial later; another KGB officer out of Finland, Nosenko whom you've all heard about: and of course, Polyakov and Kulak in thes. The interesting thing, in retrospect, and I'd like to address some of this to Olcg later, was that these were all intelligence officers. We had very little luck Ihen. or frankly very little luck later, with people who were not intelligence officers. Then wc had the monster plot, the so-called Angleion monster plot where the theory was thereajor penetration of the place because of Golitsyn's information, Golitsyn said there was, which essentially paralyzed the operations for years intos.

In thes ands,ctually first really started working the program to recruit and run Soviets began toirection that made sense and began to produce results. Itassive effort worldwide, every Station was getting their posterior kicked if they weren't working on it. It was sometimes it was logical-recruit the so-called golden youth because they were spoiled brats: other times it was sheer insanity when we were told we had to shrink every one of ourven had to

sychiatrist presentas developing--not present, but sort of in the background at one stage in the history of thisas trying toerson in the Far East. But this major program started to pay off ins when we got Shcvchcnko. who was probably the best foreign policy source we every actually recruited; the likes of Bokhanc. the GRUGB officer named Mr.. They were essentially recruitments, notig change.

We did have one hiccup as time went along1 think. We had two major flaps inase called TR1GON. the Foreign Ministry guy, was compromised. The young lady went out to meet him, Marty Shogi; wasRU officer from Algeria, who was back there for Ihe first meeting in Moscow; our case officer got jumped. Again, allery brief period of time. That prompted Stansficlduppose following Navy tradition, to shut the place, the Station down. And it stayed shut downood long lime, which prevented us from picking up some cases, including the case that was referred to this morning, who provided the fabulous military-Jim referred to it earlier-who provided the fabulousnformation, once we were allowed to resume operations in Moscow.


Mr._Red_mond continues:

Over these years we also,ery American way,ery practical way, evolved and learned from our mistakes. The ultimate thing was to recruit somebody or

olunteer in Moscow and run them there. Tradecratt was developed in Eastern Europe, where wc had many more cases, that was elegant. It enabled one to do operational acts when you surveillanceear.hink, in this room somewhere who was actually physcially exfiltrated from an Eastern European countrytation that hadear, non-stop, and we could pull that off. We alsowe got caught we'd lose the tradecrafl. We'd make new tradecraft so we could actually run people in Moscow successfully. The technology kept up with againery American way.

So, it seems to meery American story, almostmall way the way we fought say World War II. We went into it, we can do anything, we got beatenot of people got killed, there were disasters, bul we learned from our mistakes and we proceeded along to thrive. So by the5 came along, wchad well into the double digits of good penetrations of the Soviet government, most of them being run out of Moscow. It did not cover the waterfront; we didn't have much in the arms control area.ittle bit comforted by that byeard this morning, apparently some of these negotiators, even if wc had recruited them, they wouldn't have been able to tell us anything because they didn't know what the Soviet side was thinking, even though they were negotiating. We heard this this morning. So itreat American success.

Wc thenreat American disaster. Wc did the offenseery nice, very effective way. Wc grew up, we developed, we matured. Al the same time as we did the offense, we did not do the defense because it is not nice. It requires you to be unpleasant, it requires you to be cynical, it requires you to think the worst of people, it requires you to be calculating, it requires you to be Byzantine, all those things nice Americans are not.

The net rcsuli of Ihai was Ames Ihe disaster. Howard Ihe disaster, which essentially wiped us out. So. my message was, weery American thing by success in the positive aspects of collecting, but weajor failure in the counterintelligence arena up until essentially the end of the Cold War. That's aboul all I've got.

Professor Allen Weinstein:

When Jim Olson asked mc to comeid notould be mediatingIA-KGB Gong Show, but here goes. First of all.erious note, I've been an academic forears of my life, whatever else I've done for my sins.ust say I'd like to join the Director and President Bush and everybody else who hasord to theommunity. I've seen campuses hit by tragedies in the past,on't think I've everampus that has responded with as much humaneness and has come together as quickly and in as remarkable way as this particular campus. My compliments to the administration, to the faculty, to the students and all ofthe others involved. I'll stop there.

At tlie end of Harry Truman's first visit with David Ben Gurion, the first prime minister of Israel. Truman looked at his watch and said, "Well, Mr. Prime Minister, I've really got lo go. You know I've gol theave the hardest job in the world.residentillionhatever it was. Ben Gurion laughed and said, "With all due respect. Mr.ave the hardest job in theruman was puzzled and he said, "You?e said, "Well. I'm the Prime Minister of one

million primeaughter fromhe fact of the matter isondered through the hallsaid to mysetf. whyp here? Why, in fact, are not any of you in this audience, those from the Intelligence Community past and current, those of my colleagues in the historical profession, many of whom have written very distinguished books including those on intelligence. Soittle bit of that uneasiness at the moment. Shame on our chairman for giving ushird of the time that the morning panel has had, but we'll deal with him later.

First of all, thisenerational gathering.enerational gatheringery important one as such,anted to share with you by way of opening my remarks, lines havereat deal to me over the years by the great French historian. Marc Bloch who talked about the bitterest disagreements among people often serving as their strongest connective tissue. We've seen that up here today. And Bloch's words were this: 'To be excited by the same dispute, even on opposing sides, is to beet me just repeat that. "To be excited by the same dispute, even on opposing sides, is lo behis common stamp deriving from common age. is whateneration. If you disagree with me, then if youeneral Kalugin, imagine General Kalugin trying to interest, for example, one of his Polish friends or one ofungarian friends in all of the crises of the former Soviet Union. Or for that matter, Paul Redmond trying to interest one of our French friends. Mark Twain once saidjust joining President Bush in this commentary at the momenl-but that "Human nature was located somewhere on the scale of evolution between the angels and theI .aughter fromhat was Mark Twain, not me. But the point is that we do share superpower existence over that almost half century' together in confrontation. And

wc arc firsi beginning to sort out Ihe historical legacy. I'm tempted, my father used to tell the story from his roots in Lithuania in the Jewish ghettos, stettelf the two farmers who arguediece ofabbi called them together and said to the first farmer, "Tell me yourhe first farmer gave it, and the rabbi said, "You arehe second farmer said, "But, rabbi, you haven't heard mce said, "Well, tell yourhe second farmer told his story and he said. "Well, you'retranger was watching this scene and said, "But, rabbi, surely they can't both bee said, "You know, you're rightLaughter from thehe fact of the matter is depending on which of my friends to the left and right, and what criteria you care to use and which time period one cares to talk about; I'll get back to thatinute. Each one of them can. in this incident. I'm not fudging it, I'm thinking, by the way, Jim is,ote in the end just because weemocracy,ould like to know what people in the audience think of this process, just to share the discussion.

1ould do something before getting to mynow I've got

about three minutes left, but I'll try toBy the way, I'm in, as Jim came, for the last

ears I'vemall business called Ihe Center for Democracy, which is aorganization in which we people who have been in my line of work and weot of time in Moscow during the periods wc arc talking about today and elsewhere. David Ignatius onceord,hrase, which I've always loved. He called us "overtasically what the CIA did so effectively often inerhaps should have transferred over to public transparency. I'll get back to the transparency issueumber of organizations have done in.

One of my Russian acquaintances is the result of doing this book is the person familiar to General Kalugin, although not perhaps one of his great heroes in Russian terms, who is General Vladin Kerpachenko, who has been Yevgeni Primakov's closest pal, perhaps over the [Kalugin interjects:andler, well handler, whatever,eading official in Sovieton't mention which one, but one of the four distinguished LX.'ls sitting in the front row here actually met General Kerpachenko in my home at one point, Ihey may recall, but that was another time. That was that honeymoon period dividing the earlier Cold War and whatever we may have ahead of us. Kerpachenkoemoir which got published in Moscow, not in English, and probably none of you, or very few of you, except for some of the real pros have read that memoir. It's heavy going, I'll admit, but there is one fascinating sectionhought sharing because it (its into this occasion. He described--rilinute to do this--he described the last meeting of the Warsaw Pact intelligence chiefs. If you will indulge me, I'll just givemall portion of that. "Our closest and most multi-dimensional contacts were maintained with the GDR's intelligence service of Markus Wolf and his colleagues and in descending order of intensity there followed Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia. Hungary, and Poland. Contrary to quote -experts' on the KGB and the US and NATO, we had no consistent contacts with Yugoslavia and Rumania. The last important meeting with our friends from the intelligence services of Eastern Europe took place in Berlin inur last multilateraleep in mind that,. "But Ihe demoralization had set in before the political consequences would become apparent. Delegations from Cuba. Mongolia, and Vietnam also joined. The meeting occurred against the backdrop of mounting political decay among the regimes of Eastern

Europe, and this obviously influenced our discussions. Although official reports affected an optimistic tone, corridor discussions among the participants were, without exception, cheerless. The majority of delegation leaders felt insecure since reshuffling of their state ministries had already begun. After returning to their countries from the meeting, one by one, the intelligence service leaders began to abandon their posts. At the Berlin meeting itself, thereeneral feeling of doom, with one epic nearly over and another still unknown in its details having commenced. One delegation leader complained to the rest of us, he did not know what to state in his formal report to the gathering. Another asked this riddle: 'What ise immediately answered himself, 'It is Ihe most difficult and tedious way from capitalism toLaughter fromhird stated in embarrassment, 'For us, there is noommunis! party. There are only convulsions IchYourth noted simply that his country was no longer occupied with politics but with the economy, and intelligence service work had to be subordinated to the needs of the national economy. We could not set the date and placeuture meeting. Noneofuswantedtotakeoverthatresponsibility. Wepartedpecial sadness, recognizing we would never again sec most of our colleagues. The cooperative work ofthe intelligence services of the socialist countries had come to an end."

Which brings me lo Ihe question of who won and who lost in this whole process? One of the fascinating things, most of my research has been concentrated using our archives, and to some extent their archives, on the periodhen, as General Kalugin is well aware and Mr. Redmond and all the rest in this room, it was not difficult to identify anti-Fascist or pro-Communist or Communist figures in the

United States and in Western Europe and elsewhere, who were willing to serve Soviet intelligence purposes for ideological reasons, anti-Hitler sentiment, belief that the Soviet Union was, in fact, the apotheosis of human existence and so forth. The interesting thing is the Congressman that Paul mentioned, Mr. Dickstcin, there arc only twoan identify based on the Soviet archives research, only two people my eo-authorould identify, who basically did this for the money. Oneongressman, and oneollywood producer who talked his KGB operative handlers into arranging for money so that he couldecord company. For ten years he kept the FBI busy and for twenty years the KGB, the NKVD, the KGB, whatever, hustling both services for money for his motion pictures. So you see, only in America, as we say. By the middle or end of, you could not find these ideological agents. After the Nazi-Soviet Pact, after the word of the Moscow trials had really begun to spread, and with the growing disillusionment with the beginnings of the Cold War, ideological espionage of Americans against their own country came to an end.

However, ami from this point on, you're dealing with illegals, very good ones at times and agents for hire, traitors of the sort wc have mentioned here already. The interesting thing is that despite the failures that Paul has mentioned in American efforts to rev up operations in the Soviet Union during this period, when Ken Philby and others, Blake and others, were passing along information so that essentially all the KGB had to do and their military associates [had to doj was just to check out where these people were arriving and when, just pick them up and do what they were going to do with them. But bys, and certainly increasing intoss, what you do is yourowing number of disillusioned Soviet citizens. Thereeneral named Kalugin

who joined Ihem in ihes. Essentially deciding that for the sake of their country, tor Ihe sake of Ihe values thai socialism had pronounced at the very beginning of its existence, and the democratic socialists of Western Europe and the United Stales and elsewhere had kept Io, they had to change lhal society or help change it by whatever means they could. And for some that mean! cooperation with Western intelligence services. In short ideological espionage hits the Soviel Unionassionengeance. And there was great vengeance taken after people who were caught, of course.

So, there are discontinuities here. How do you evaluate them? How do you evaluate our successes and failures? How do you evaluate their successes andot certain that you can in any coherent way. We also had, look, you talked about seven days [of training] or whatever it was, for the first Agency people who were sent over. Those of you who read The Haunted Wood know about my favorite intelligence chief, other than the Soviet ambassador whom they also, they gaveight job. Heay job as Soviet ambassador back in Ihes, and in Ihe evening he doubled as Station Chief. But the gentleman before himenlleman named Dolhin who didn't speak English, and was forever sending Moscow memos explaining how his English was really improving and he was getting lo the point where he could hold conversations and so forth. Bul, by then, ihey had no agents to call upon because of Ihe defectors, and counterintelligence was at least as sloppy and unimportant then as it was Io prove in subsequent years. The reason we learned as much as we did about Soviet networks in Canada and the United Slalcs and elsewhere was because of Ihe fact that Igor Gouzenko and Elizabeth Bentley and Whitaker Chambers walked across the line and

began talking to the FBI and other intelligence agencies. Tlie defectors were our crucial infonnation sources in those years. But Mr. Dolbin was good because (he Soviets learned something from him. He had two people left, and he pul them to clipping newspapers in the Soviet Kmhassy I'll stop after this. Paul-and magazines and just sending something back to Moscow. Miraculously, though it hasn't been commented on, somebody in Moscow must liave realized that, my God, this is the most transparent society in Ihc history of the world, in which most of what you want to Icam can be learned publicly, does not need tlie additional attractiveness ofecret, muchystery, as one of the writers, one of the speakers said this morning, and, of course, thai may have at least encouraged them in the absence of agents lo move in that direction. We don't exactly know at this stage in the game

topeally,ad toudgment on thisould say that the halcyon years, despite the value of material, scientific and military and other material that Soviet intelligence may have picked up in the post World War II period during the Cold War, die halcyon days, the golden age of Soviet intelligence here was still, when people did not work for the money but because of their belief in the Soviet Union. And the golden age, if you will, of American intelligence in the Soviei Union were the days ofsss, when disillusionment with the systemelief lhat the Soviet system would not, not, not reform itself. Thai spread widely amongst the intelligentsia, including those in Ihe intelligence services whose information sources were better than other Soviet citizens and they began moving in the direction of the West in very desperatehink I'll stop there.

Thank you very much, Allen. I'd like loew minutes now and have some interaction within the panel. I'd like to start by asking Paul if youuestion for any of the other panelists?

Mr. Redmond:

Olcg, when wc were sort of working against you guys, one of the things lhat always puzzled us was that you expressed, your service always expressed the belief that we were kidnapping you; one of your people, Russians or Soviets, would die overseas; there wouldroper autopsy done, but you'd still be convinced that the people had been murdered. Thatemember, once in Switzerland, and somebody jumpedoof in New York,ecall, and clearly your side,ay put it that way, was convinced that we, the American side, were kidnapping, drugging and bumping off people. When some of your people would go missing, we would have one of those quiet sessions when the KGB would approach us and the first line would be, "Well, why have you kidnappedhat wasystery why you people thought that because we weren't; couldn't have pulled it off anyway probably if we tried to kidnap someone. Now wc understand, largely from your book because you describe how you would actually even plan toIA officer in Beirut, and thanks to Mr. Andropov, that didn't happen. We now know that your service's involvement in the Markov business, the apparently inadvertent perhaps the best word would be to use manslaughter of

Artamonov Shadrin. Now thai you are living here now lhal you know us personally, etc. etc. We've been to your houses, you've been to our houses, would you like to comment on that?

General Kalugin:

Oh sure, no problem. Ihe Soviet mentality and experience shaped our view of the world, kidnapping, murder, lies. We thought Ihe other side was no betler. That's the answer, simple. Specific cases? Well, let's start with Artamonovlaughter you say? Well, lei's put il this way. I'll go back into Russia's history. In tlie manuals of Ihe Russian Okhrana.rist secrel police, there is one paragraph aboutean informers, of the secret police. The manuals suggest lhal these informers should be treated like mistresses, always taken care of, treasured, valued and protected. While the Soviet intelligenceot from these old manuals; don'l forget wc arc Ihe oldest, well, beside the British, service in Ihe world. When the CIAan by name of Artamonov Shadrin. the man who was sentenced to death in absentia by Ihe Russian Military Tribunal for his treason, lo send him lo Austria and get him involved in operational game with the KGB, which would never, never hesitate to kill him on ihe spot That was irresponsibility and recklessness on ihe part of the CIA, who should have read Ihe old manuals oftherist police. Well, inffered another solution which was not just execution but ralher kidnapping the man, and then parading him in front of the television cameras, showing Io Ihe world how greatly we have penetrated the Western and CIAean service. For us itailer of

propaganda value, not the execution, but it happened thathink this experience would have been always be on the minds of intelligence officers who deal with such delicate and sensitive situations. Markov's case?as the first to reveal the details and the plot behind, and discussions relevant to the subsequent murder of this Bulgarian dissident. You don't kill the messengers, do you? That'sill say.

Mr. Redmond:

Fine. But whatrankly still find it shocking that you seriously considered kidnapping some nice guys likeBeirut.

General Kalugin:

Oh, yes. In Beirut. Right. That was, indeed, thateat idea, indeed, toIA officer who was under the cover of Ihe mililary office in Beirut. The job was supposed to be done by the Palestinian, well, friends of ours. They would interrogate him while he was in captivity, with us sitting behind the screen or whatever. The plan was approved by Mr. Andropov, and as we were about to launch the operation, all was ready, the Palestinians were only happy and elated to do the job. My foimer chief decided to just remind Andropov of (he forthcoming great feats of the Soviet intelligence, and that was really the end of it He called Andropov and said, 'Tomorrow we are goingove in on that Americanlludden Andropov shouted in the Iclcphonc. "Listen. Stop itf Stop it! This is crazy! They will do the same to us, and they

arc so manyver Ihe world. Wc shallarfare among ihc inielligence services, and ihey have an advaniage over us in many pans of die world. Stopo, the operation was canceled, thanks to his wisdom.

Mr. Olson:

Professor Weinstein. Do youuestion that you'd like to ask one of the other panelists?

ei nstcin:

I'd like to ask one question of both panelists, buto, I'd like to putleahe organizers of Ihe meeting. Since our friend Pat Moynihan's name has come into everyidn't want him to feel lonely in this one. So I've just raised it myself because, of course, he deserves to be here as one of the architects, along with Director Tenet, of the release of the VENONA Papers which bas proved to be so useful and interesting to those of us writing on this subject for thai period. But il might be interesting for the sponsors to try to interview him, and perhaps include some responses of his to some of the criticisms that he has taken this morning, just by way of givingit of equal time.hought. Bui. having suggested that, to my question. The year, pick your year,, say. And each of you defects to the other side. And you immediately place yourself at the disposal of the director of the other

service. What are your recommendations, youruggestions, other than naming names, to improve the quality of the service?

Mr. Redmond-

ascinating question, because it's noi unlike the one the Bureau and our little group who were trying to catch the spy, Ames, who would turn out to be Ames, eventually. It's more or less the same question that we asked people that we interviewed, or the Bureau interviewed with uh. trying to smoke oul who knewope you're not trying topy here. To improve the quality of the service or get betteruess the samehink ihe first thing,ere advising the KGB in thatould have advised them to support the likes of Agce. which they were doing, and anybody like lhat. to embarrass ihe Agency as much by compromises, so we could be shut down again ihc way we werey Admiral Turner, shut down in Moscow. In other words, tos operationally as much as possible, huxthcr, to make the embarrassmenls as noisy as possible, so we would spend even more time down on Capitol Hill explaining ihem-insteadf our lime. The secondould have advised probably, and this isactical operational life-would probably be to concentrateandful of CIA DO officers in the division where Jimorked, who were alwaysreat deal of pressure to produce and recruil Soviets and/or Easternnd string one of them along or several of them along with an operation and eventually lower the boom on it and try lo recruit them that way,

thereby getting an insight over the longer term into our Soviet operations. So, that's the two things I'd advise, would have advised.

General JCalugin:

Arc you seeking advice for die US government or for the Russian government? Mr, Olson:

Seeking your advice for the Director of Central Intelligence ofthe US Government, in the, after your defection.

General Kalugin:

I would revive the clandestine arm ofthe intelligence service. This country has been confronted on several occasions with rogue states and leaders who are not capable of coming lo Icmis with the civilized world. Instead of bombing them the way this country did in Yugoslavia, or in Iraq, or elsewhere, with noean, actually, they arc still in power. Milosevic is slill in power, Saddam Hussein is doing well, Fidel Castro would have been long time ago suffocatedriendly embrace. Well, he is alive because, because, he is alive because he has been embargoed and sort of isolated. That's wrong. But,ean by clandestine service is. well, this is an old Americanully share, that intelligence is the front line of defense and also offensive. The result is an

alternative to the Marines, active covert actions. Well. Yugoslavia would have been isolated completely, economically, transportation, communication, in every sense, financially. It would be stifled because all the countries around Yugoslavia are friends of the United States or the West Russia would never be able to dare to break the blockade. Well, instead you chose to bomb. So what is the result? The destruction of the country. What Ihc Russian government is doing now in Chechnya is not only irresponsible, it is criminal, because they are exterminating, well, the whole nation.eel outraged and disgusted over this and what's going on in Chechnya. How many terrorists are there in Chechnya"illion? They never identified them except the two guys, bad guys, Hatab and Assai. Well, this may go on and on. They will simply destroy the country and destroy the nation. Thisrime against humanity. Well, where is intelligence? The Russian intelligence todayorry shadow of their old days and not because, what is true Allen said correctly. The Soviet intelligence thrivedreai cause for which we were willing lo fight and die. This cause gradually faded away and evaporated, because the system proved to be incapable of delivering the pledge they had made for so many years. The Sov let system, in fact, fell down under the burden of economic inefficiency and inhumanity and blunders of the Soviet leadership. Where is the intelligence these days? They are involved in interparty political privatized battles? Tliey are not doing Iheir job, and, well, fortunately this country is in peace and in prosperity. And ithance to improve its performance by reviving essential pans of the intelligence, not just collection, but active involvement to promote the interests, national interests und security of this country. Well, that advice is all right. That isave to say.

because they read smuggled hostile. anti-Soviet literature. Is that true that the CIA playedremendous role in eroding the moral and ideological fabric ofthe Soviet society? How much effort you indeed put into, well, subverting the Soviet system?

Mr. Redmond:

I think Hobkof answered the question and you just did if you lake those statistics from the effect of Radio Liberty, thai answers Ihe question at least from the Radio Liberty point of view. There were obviously, there were activities lo publish books, things like that.

General Kalugin:

Human rights organizations. We always thought lhat .Amnesty Internationalew other establishment were operated and supported by thenow it may be not time to reveal, well, who knows?

Mr. Redmond:

Oleg, scout's honor. We never had anything to do with Amnesty International. Thank God.

V. Ulwn.

Mr. Olson:

Olcg. we'll conclude this portion of our presentationuestion for another panelist from you. if you have one.

General Kalugin:

1 have one question, well, probably more than one. but in his memoirs, my formeriked him-Mr. Philip Bobkof, Army General. Chief ofthe Secret Police under the Soviet regime. In his memoirs about the collapse ofthe USSR, he states that there were three major reasons. One: the subversive activities ofthe CIA and other Western special services. The second: lack of power for the KGB to tight dissident movement in the USSR. And third,hink is correct: blunder, and inability ofthe Soviet leaders to adjust to the changing world. The question is: Is it, well, on the other hand, and this is something very important. I'm probably not well familiar with the question related lo Ihe (TA active measures innow one specific example.benyreat institution, by the way. Great institution, because it provided an outlet, voice of freedom for millions of Russians. Several dissident groups which (Hipped up in Russia were influenced by the foreign broadcasts, including Radio Liberty, BBC,esser degree the Voice of America,urvey by the Russian security police among the dissidents prepared in the middles, it was pointed outf Russian dissidents became dissidents under the influence of Western broadcasts

Allen. Would you like to comment"

Allen Wei ostein:

First of all, someone who wanderedreat deal around Central America ins and parts of southern Africa, as well as in your part of the world, Oleg. the fact lhat the National Endowment for Democracy and then the Center for Democracy,elped found, which arc totally and impeccably privately funded and have no relationship with the CIA or any oilier government organization. It was useful to have some of the bad guys perceive us as having some link, because it helped keep my staff alive, and I'm very grateful for that.ant to take this opportunity to thank the Agency and the directors and all the others for that I've said this is in lhat I'oss article (hat David Ignatius did on all of us back ten years ago.

More seriously, first of all I'm absolutely fascinated. So the KGBublic relations survey agency, did it? .And it took surveys on Soviet public opinion?

General Kal

No, no, dissidents who were jailed by the way.

Allen Wcinstcin:


I wanl you to keep in mind

Mr. Redmond:

In other words, an objective survey. General Kalugin:

They had nothing tollen Wcinstein:

Let'sind the process, you are in your jail cell and someone comes from the service nnd says.ant you to tell me, did Radio Liberty turn youhat are you going to say?

General Kaluitin:

They woulduestion differently. I'd say. "What influenced your behavior? Your mindny specific channelean. mc!I. sa> housingr some kind of mistreatment on his job. People would often, it's human fader, remember. Human factorremendous, always does, in whatever.

Allen Wcinslein:

There are many human factors. You know, ihc role of Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe, please don't forget, thai this was your prime source of accurate information during all those decades.

General Kalugin:

'Ihat'son't argue with that.


Devoted, loyal listeners to Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty were members of the nomenklatura, particularly in the intelligence services and the government, because that way they would know what they weren't being told by their own governraenl. Obviously, dissidents listened as well as did many ordinary people who got up the courage and curiosity to do dial. Bui look, you have travelers coming through from all over the world, you have people being able to compare, the process of globalizationlk about as it it began the day bctbfB yajMdQ btJH DMBJ QUfuiu tffkhings that makes people likeittle frustrated is this notion that somehow the economic motives alone are what are going to transform people. The Fast Berliners who pushed through the Wall and went west that memorable day did not go west only to shop.

to look in ihe windows. They went west because they wanted to assert their right to go west when they wanted to. The people who stayed in (he Bialydome for those three days during the coup were not people who thought Yeltsen was going to provide, put bread on the table tomorrow. They thought enough is enough, basta, and they were going to make their statement, as you did and as others did. This is global, Oleg, it is not something that is cooked up by the CIA or by even, God help us, French intelligence.ean...

General Kaluain:

Listen, when,an is approached by the KGB in the oldreeman, anduestion, "Why do you not behave according to Soviet standards? Why do you utter some remarks negative ofthe Soviete would say, "Well,ee lines for bread or lack of food or tools, housing,ut, in jail, they have nothing to lose. They will tell exactly why and how they werehink thisost objective surveyense.

Allen Wcinstein:

Those of you who are law enforcement officers, we have an absolutely new approach to prisons. We've got to start polling people in prisons who will tell you candidly, candidly, candidly, what they think, irregardless of what you may want them to think. So keep that in mind.

Mr. Redmond;

fuestion back. Bobkof was Head ofirectorate, right? In our image oftheirectorate was that they always had plenty of resources, they were everywhere. Do you buy his assessment? They didn't have enough? Or is this rationalization?

General Kaluain:

That's ridiculous, absurd. It's absurd because, unfortunately,chool of thought in Russia these days. Look at the memoirs of Krichkov, my former boss, in two volumes, never published in any foreign language.hink he deserved that kind of treatment. He says that there were five guys who destroyed the USSR. It's really,reposterous notion diat five persons would destroy the mighty Soviet Union. Well, number one, of course, was Mr. Gorbachev; number two was hy the way, Mr. Yakovlcv. Alexander Yakovlev. who, like myself, went to Columbia University.ften recall what Milovan Djilas, the well-known Yugoslav character, said years ago. He said thatroduct of thisontributed toave now become itsr. Yakovlev was one of the most outspoken critics and architects ofthe Soviet regime. In fact his memoirs arc coming most likely nexte is waiting for the exit of President Yeltsin, because one chapter would be absolutely devastating about Yeltsin's performance. But he will tell in honesty how heenior political figure in the country, when this great transformation of his political views and his views of Russia and

Russian society. I'd not advertise the book,ant you lo simply know that there are people who would be. will provide real insights into the Soviet system ofthe old days.

Allen Weinstein:

For Mr.itle for the English language edition of his hook, if it comes out? He could call it The Gang Who Coutdn 't Coup Straight. Sorry about that.

Mr. Redmond:

I'd add parenthetically that regarding General Kalugin and his friend, Mr. Yakovlev,ecall. Kruchkof thought Yakovlev was working for us. Kruchkof thought you were working for us. At one point he thought you had recruited Yakovlev for us, but then he'd forgotten Yakovlev...

(icncral Kaluijin:

| It was very] confusing, who recruited who for the CIA?, as far back.ypical conspiratorial mentality of the country whose leadership came to power by force through conspiracy, through overthrow ofthe rotten government but through illegitimate way.

Mr. Olson:

Thank you, panelists. The floor is now open for questions,sk that you please introduce yourself, if necessary, as you make your question,

Mr. Wwlscy:

Jim Woolscy. Washington lawyer. I'd like to ask Olcg Kalugin to give us the components his five-to-one scorecard of CIA vs KGB. Andightecond question, I'd like to ask all the panelists, given the materials that have been published privately in several languages and come out very recently, what is the judgment of each of the three with respect to involvement of the KGB and the attempted assassination of at least one of the menould cite as one of the five men who helped destroy the Soviet Union, namely John Paul II.

General Kalugin:

ITie ratio comes from the fact that at leastroviet KGB officers in the lastears cooperated with the Western services, theean defectors and moles in place, defectors in place. Right? The number of CIA officers who were used by the Soviets is, if you divide by five, well, that would be approximately that figure. Not only Ames andean those that did not succeed like say, Edwin Mooreelieve. No, no, no, I'm sorry, yeuh,, he threw over the fence of the Soviet Embassy inrown bag full of classified documents. It was due to

stupidity' and the responsibility of the Chief of Station, and our security, Mr. Yurchenko, by the way, security officer who called the Metropolitan Police. He thought iterrorist acl.issed opportunity, and Moore was sentenced to what, eighteen years or something in jail, see,issed opportunity, missed boat.

Mr. Redmond:

On the question of some new information in Czechoslovakia, out of Czechoslovakia, that apparently they've given the Italians, at leads one to believe,now is what I've read in the papers, there maybe have been some, at least if not direct Soviet, certainly Eastern European activity in that area. That's the latestnow.

Allen Wcinstein:

Let mcord of background here to the Washington lawyer, Mr. Woolsey's question. Our center backhe Center for Democracy,onference. We wereeries of networking conferences in Europe involving leaders ofthe new democracies, and wc held one on the proper role of an intelligence agencyemocracy at the request of my friend, then President Zhelyu Zhelev of Bulgaria, who was having trouble with some of the old Stalinist types in his intelligence service. Former Director Colby came with mc and that was helpful to have someone from the States. The Germans sent someone. Wc had all the intelligence directors from the region.egan urging them to release, the Bulgarian folks, to release the materials they had on, whatever they


had, on the Papal assassination, because there certainlyong follow-up review on that process by Bulgarian intelligence. President Zhclcv persisted and, in fact, they released that material, at least they released the material they claimed to have. It should be very apparent to people in this room, I'm one of those who does not read or write Bulgarian- and along with most other languages, but we justired some, privately, some people who do and arc very reliable scholars. And, basically, they came to the conclusion that I'd beenot of garbage. That if there had been material there that had been useful. it'd all been taken out. Thereot of news clips and memos fromoaying,on't know anything about it. Do you know anything abouton't know anything about it. Do you know anything aboutack and forth. Eventually this will all go to the Library of Congrcss-this material which wc have on microfilm-but.ust had an instinct onouldn't think the KGB was necessarily directly involved. But given the assassin's, or the attempted assassin's, Mr. Agca's background and the rest ofon't think wc know the full story. Which intelligence services were involved. East Bloc and whatever.


dd something'? The Bulgarians would neveringer tohing like that without KGB's approval. At (he time. Andropov was not bent on wet affairs, indeed, he was against wet affairs, even against targets who had been sentencedean, in absentia. Well, Ihe Vatican, that was beyond any one reason. It was like to assassinate the Queen of England, the President of the United States. No, (hat was. I

simply reject theave no proof again, of course, but I, simply knowing the psychology and practices oftheould never accept this. In fact, we always claimed itypical trick to just to stain our reputation.

Mi_ Olson:

Judge Webster first and then the second question. Judpc Webster

Bill Webster. My question is inspired in parteference by Professor Wcinstein to General Kripchcnko. losked the same question andather ambiguous answer. And also by General Kalugin's reference to the importance ofthe care and feeding of informants. And it has to do with Yurchenko. Yurchenko came here, as you know. He defected, came from Italy. He wasevel of treatment that we later concluded was inappropriate and reformed our whole defector programesult But when he redefecled, the question remained


Judge Webster continues:

as lo whai was going lo happen, his expectations were too high and for various other reasons.ore insidious suggestion is that perhaps he was sent here on purpose to divert attention from the mole in the CIA, and lhai was his mission. He accomplished it, and he left. This is one of the mysteriesish both Mr. Redmond and Mr. Olson would comment on the current state of theelt,as there, that heona fide defector, that he had given us information that led to the arrest and conviction of Pelton, information lhat led to the identification of Edward Lee Howard. And that while those could have been throwaways, it seemed toigh risk program for the simple purpose of diverting our attention from someone we had not identified or did not even know at the time existed.ave your comments?

VIr. OImhi:

There is certainly no doubt in my mind that Yurchenkoona fidehink heery disturbed individual and he redcfcctcd out of psychological problems that hehink his information was good,on't believe that there was any grand ulterior design behind his defection. Paul?

Mr. Redmond:

Well, those were very rough times. We had visitorsemember the head of the French again, turned up. This little general. And wc used to brief them annually and spend time saying, "We are going to recruitnd them saying, "Yes, of


nd Ihcn go shopping- This year, the only thing he wanted to hear about was how we had really screwed this up, "this disaster ofthe Western world, stupidhe head ofthe Frenchreat guy named Dick Kahane got sick of it and he said, "General, wc were doing just fine until wc took himrenchLaughter from'm sorry. Bill.

Now,lightly more serioushink thereot of reasons why Vitaly Scrgcivich went back. The main one was that we failed to recruit him. He came hereot of his problems; we debriefed the hell out of him. Itoat rodeo, to put it very politely. The requirements were pouring in on us. Wc even got one wanting to know about Raul Wallenberg, which we had toriver downebriefcr to southern Virginia to satisfy thecame from some Republican contributor probably. The debriefcr came back,uly reported that Vitaly Sergeivich did not know where Raul Wallenberg was and had never heard of him, nor did he know where Jimmy Hoffa was buried. |Laughter fromow, trying to get serious about this. The only way to cope with these times, ladies and gentlemen, was to have the odd laugh. Wc didn't recruit him. therefore, wc could not help him personally get through the prohlems of adjustment here, to put it verym one of the people who think thereood chance he was sent. Sandy Grimes and Jeanne Vertefeuille, who were the real heroines ofthe Amesmost of theust get to talk about it-say they have never been wrong when ihey agreed on the subject andhould be institutionalized for thinkingust think he didn't really give us anything current. Pclton was important bul Pelton was inactive. They had Ames,hink thereood chance he wasould add, finally to answer your question, there is not one shred

now of of source reporting that implies that. But my professional judgment--I'm out of the businessthatood chance he was senltarburst.

General Kaly&'B*

annotIA Deputy Chief of the Russian Division to defect to Russia to prove something. In Russia, in the old USSR, any defection,ookishing trawler, wouldolitical scandal. People were not supposed to run from the paradise. They were supposed to ask for permission. If granted, cleared, they would travelean trawler, fishing trawler.enior figure, Deputy Chief of the lu Department, to defect to the West is just unthinkable. Andandled all these defectionnow,an give% assurance, we did not practice sending as defectors. KGB officers or GRU officers, for that reason, to the West. Inevitably, it would leak to the Russian public, and they would say through the Voice of America Liberty, they would say, "KGB officers are running from this country. What is goinghis wouldajor blow to the purity and stability of the nation in the opinion of the Party leadership.

Now back to Yurchenko's reasons. Number one, the CIA promised that his defection would not be disclosed to the media. He would simply disappear. This pledge was broken. It was reported in the mediaenior Soviet official from the KGB defected. Second, he had in. he was my subordinate, so I'm sort of aware of his problems. He had an ulcer, and his mother died of the cancer, the stomach cancer, and he was very nervous that he may, well, die as well for the same reason. He tried all sorts of

cures in the USSR; none helped. He thought [that in)reat nation, [with its] medicine, surgery, whatever, drugs, he would be cured. Well, it didn't help as farnow. In this country, he was not cured. Third, heistress, her name was Mrs. Urieskovsky,ecall. Sheretty Ukrainianean wifeussian First Secretary. She went to Canada, and he thought he would lure her from Canada, and, well, they had an affair in Washington. When she went to Canada, he went to the United States. He went to Canada in the hope to, well, get her out from her husband'selieve, this is my hunch, that Aldrich Ames, who was by then operational, may have tipped the Soviets lhat Yurchenko will try to get his mistress out of Canada. And she was warned because she did not accept his offer to defect. So, for him itajor personal loss. He really was in love with her, well, at least as farnow. Then finally, he was overly protected. He felt his freedom to move around was sort of limited by the CIA and he thought he was looking for freedom and instead he was almost inean, not really, but the way he thought.

he final reason; Six months before his defection, there was another Russian literary figure hy name of Betovecall right, Betov. He defected in London and then landed in the United States. In several months, for some reasonso not recall, the internal KGB security investigated diis case. He came back, and said he had been kidnapped and drugged by the CIA. And Betov was pardoned by the Soviet authorities because they drought, well, inarticipatedimilar pardon procedureRU officer by name Chebatriov, who defected in Belgium, in Brussels,elieve. When he came back on his own. instead of execution orears inuggested that we play this record for all intelligence officers, Those who

erred, ihose whoean, who committedrime but found enough will power to realize that they were wrong and came back, they should be treated differently. Not as traitors, but, you know. In fact this case worked well. Chebalriov receivedears in jail, and was immediately, by the decree of the Presidium of the USSR, released from jail, at KGB's request, andiles from Moscow torencli at die local school. So, apparently the word well, well, reached Yurchenko, well, and he thought, well, if he is not well accepted in this country, why not try? And he tried,hink he will. And Krichkov, by the way. at that time, was not interested in poking this, you know, another defection. He had alreadyr so before Yurchenko, you sec. The Politburo looked wiih great suspicion at the intelligence service at the time. Then Ames already was operational. And indeed to cover up Ames, he was shown to the Russian intelligence officerasualty of the Cold War machinations of the CIA. lhateliberate policy to fool our own people, with die exception of those who knew, and the public at large, the whole of the Soviet Union.

Mr. Qlson:_

Allen. Some brief comments.__

Professor Wcjnstcin:

First of all.ope that clarifies everything. Andas kind of, generally to thenew anything about this case, what Jim said made sense to me.

Wilh ull due respect lo Paul. Bui I've just listened to Oleg'seasons tor the redefection of Yurchenko, and it has opened my mind on this one again, at least each one of them sounds in its own way somewhat persuasive,on'ton't know. You obviously have thought aboutot yourself, and it may be that there's still something you don't want to tell us.

General Kalugin:

Whyry to fool you? Professor Weinsicin:

Why not? Nigel West:

Nigel West, English author. Thank you very much indeed to the panel and the conference confirming my anti-Gaulic prejudices. Last week in England, an American traitor. Doctor Theodore Hall, was buried. He died the previous week, and he had been identified in the VENONA text as havingoviet spy inside the atomic bombew weeks before that, Mclita Norwood, another Soviet spy whose codename appeared in VENONA, was identified through Vassily Mitrokhin, and she got up and she said that she was proud of what she'd done, and she had no regrets, and she would do it

all over again. My question to the panel is, why, what is the justification tor redacting, for concealing the names of traitors from the declassified versions of the VENONA texts?


Paul or Allen? Well, well ask Olee. General Kalugin:

[Some words inaudible]ay be wrong. Well, there was no evidence. Her admission of the guilt, and there was no name, was there, in VENONA. her name, was it there really?

Professor Wcinstcin:

It was not in the VENONA material. In her case, actually, we mis-identified here in our book. We had her identified as Tina. She went by apparently another codename as well. But the organization was the same, and I'm certain it referred to her. And that came directly from the KGB files, so presumably that was accurate. In terms of redacting names from the VENONAnow many of the people, some of them, at least, who used to work on the declassification process there,on'tust don't know why they should, at this stage of the game, not identify everyone they can identify who has been in the public eye. In thisuppose the one factor was that he

was never arrested, that he lett the country. He talked at length, to, as you know, to Joe Albright and Marsha Kunstcl for their book, Bombshell. He didn't quite concede that he had committed espionage, although he kind of tiptoed around that point in that memo of his, or that apologia at the end of the book. And he, too,elief in his youthful convictions,elieve he referred to them, into his old age.ave no real answer to thaissume it had to do with concern over privacy rights. Even of, it's one of the. one of the [voice in theand doubleardon? Try and double back. Well, indeed. But at this stage in the game.on'ton't know.

Mr. Olson:

Time for one more question, I'merry Schccten

Since we're solving mysteries thiserry Schecter. riter on the Cold War. I'd like to ask Mr. Redmond and General Kalugin. How did the Noscnko and Golitsyn affairs play, in the sense that Golitsyn you referred to as being part of the "monsterid that really disable the Agency? Was the KGB aware of the internal problem created by Golitsyn and Nosenko? And is the Nosenko case really over? Has it been resolved?

Mr. Redmond:

I don't know if the KGB knew it at the time. They subsequently referred to Angleton as one of their better assets, not in the sense of being an agent, but ofig help to them. His policieselp to them in pursuing their business. The "monster plot" essentially boils down to this: When Golitsyn defected, he said, among other things, that therepy inorget, in the DO, or theuess, at the lime. Ihe first name of..had an initial; I've forgotten what it is. Heust add, he also said that the French intelligence services were penetrated top to bottom, and he was absolutely right on that. In any case, he also said that they will send somebody after me to discredit me--aftcr mc in the sense of time. Nosenko turns up and, in effect says, no, there's nol big spy in CIA. People then came to the conclusion thai Nosenko had been sent to discredit Golitsyn. That led to all the unfortunate events with Mr. Nosenkoncarceration and interrogation, and to Golitsynit lionized and further, which is the main "monsteras. if. it's pretty clear from this reasoning, if you believe Golitsyn, lhat thereig spy. If thereig spy, ihey must know everything we are doing. Either the cases were controlled from the beginning, and, therefore, they knew about it obviously. Or they found out cases wc were running and were controlling them, controlling the information. Thai essentially is the SE or SB Division part ofthe "monsterhich essentially paralyzed the placeon't know liow many years,ew years. As for thean tellame to work inappened to be lucky to beob of supportingeadquarteis end of an in-place source in one ofthe Soviet intelligence services of an

extraordinarily high rank and extraordinarily high access. And he was providing us, literally, wilh hundreds of spy leads, including two illegals, and nobody believed him because everybody just assumed that he had been sent because ofthe "monsteroes that answer that?

Mr. Olson:

Oleg, do yourief comment oneneral Kalugin:

Golitsyn provided the US government intelligence and counterintelligence with valuable information about Soviet assets. And when he stated, for instance, in the United Suites and elsewhere, when he stated the French intelligence and counterintelligence were infiltrated from top to bottom, he was correct. But he suffered from the same conspiratorial mentality as many Russians did, and this obviously affected some of his handlers in the CIA, including James Anglcton. For that reason, they treatona fide, genuine defectorpy,ouble agent. Had they had at the time, the CIA, any source inside tlie KGB-by the way. for me itood indication there was none at the timc-thcy would have found out thatussian KGB officers, intelligence, including myself, were punished or recalled from their jobs overseas and even fired in Moscow because Nosenko and some of his buddies would go to the same girlfriends and get drunk and things like that.ere punished for that. Well, since

this was never knownan was treated the way he was,hink this is another indication how accurate people must be, many intelligence agency with human,umans, particularly those who chose to become agents or defectors, andemind them, since we raised this interesting issue. Another case of Tolkachcv, the man whoIA source inside the USSR. The man who was shot by the Soviets, thanks to Aldrichelieve. His wife, who collaborated with him, was also briefly jailed. She was released after Gorbachev cameean afterelieve. Well, anyway, she was released from jail. She went to the US Embassy. She said, "Em Mrs. Tolkachev, just from jail." And she was turned away and she died ofear later. That's another example of. and of course, the latest one, Mitrokhin The guy camereasure throve of information to the CIA Station in Riga, Latvia. He was turned down. The Brits were good to pick it up. pick him up. Oh, that's another case.n intelligence officer must always be alerted to an opportunity and neverhance. That's my motto.

mr. olson:

I know we arc over time,hink, Paul, you just need to respond to that if you'd like to, and then the last word from our historian.

Mr. Redmond:

I don't know about Mrs. Tolkachev being turned tell you is we were going to incredible lengths to try to find the son, to get money to him and help him out So, it's inconceivable to me that the Agency would have turned Mrs. Tolkachev away. Further, we have gone to unbelievable lengths through thes and all the way throughs to get money and assistance to the families ofthe people who were executed or put in jail. Always having to keep in mind, however, thai we don't want to cause them problems. They had enough. We had to be very careful how we went about this.ort of reject the assumption, reject the assertion that wc turned her away.

General Kalugin;

It's not an assumption.act. Mr. Olson:

The last word from Professor Wcinstein.^

Professor Weinstein:

Three quick points.hink wc all, particularly those of you in the Agency, past ami current, would like to thank General Kalugin for his suggestions on how to improve the administrative processes of the Agency.anted to make an announcement that the next meeting of the Alliance Francaise will be in the lobby after

[laughter Irom thend,ant to hark back to, the historian in me wants to hark back to some of the issues lhat came up that morning and which we have, I'm happy to say, assiduously avoided this afternoon, namely discussions of the lessons of espionage and counterintelligence. But there were some very important points. One of the speakers this morning, for example, pointed out,hink, that the lessons of the intelligence issues dealt with in the Cold War do not necessarilyodel for future, for understanding of future intelligence issues. But, whenever the questions of history comes up, one of my favorite examplesseful discussion of this matter was an exchange between the great American historian, Charles Beard,lose friend of his, George S. Counts, who was then president of Teachers College at Columbia University in New York. They were walking along Riverside Park some many years ago one nice Sunday. Counts said to Beard,hisisall in Counts'memoir if you want read it, the more extendedhat have you learned fromeard said. "Well, don't be ridiculous.uestion that would take months to answer, years in fact, with what I've learned from history'" As they kept walking, the years and months became weeks, and Ihe weeks became days, and the days hours, and the hours minutes, and finally Beard glowered-they were coming to the end of Riverside Park-and he said, "AH right. I've learned three things from history. Those that the Gods would destroy, they first make mad. That the mills of the Gods grind slowly, but they grind exceedingly small. And, at the same time, that the bee fertilizes the flower itell, Counts kind of shrugged his shoulders and said, "When you ask questions likehould expect an answer like that,nd they parted company; went their separate ways. And0 in the morning on that Monday, the phone rang in

George S. Counts' bedroom, and it was his friendhould perhaps mention that the date was Decemberhe day after the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor for those too young in the audience to have lived through that day. Beard said,ustearned one other thing. That when it gets dark enough, you can see thend I've always felt for all of the historians who have given me important, useful lessons on what one has learned from history other than the obvious inexorable law of unintended consequences, or that one thing leads to another, that the Beard-Counts dialogue has been one ofthe most useful ones. Thank you. Chairman, that'santed to say.

Mr. Olson:

I'd like to thank all of our panelists and all of you,peak for all of themay. we look forward to continuing the discussion in the corridors and the meals during the rest ofthe conference. Thank you all very much.


Original document.

Comment about this article or add new information about this topic: