CENTRAL ASIA AND THE SOUTH CAUCASUS: REORIENTATIONS, INTERNAL TRANSITIONS, AND

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Central Asia and the South Caucasus:

Reorientations, Internal Transitions, and Strategic Dynamics

Conference Report

The views expressed axe those of individuals and do oot represent official US intellipeocc ot policy positions. Tbe National Intclligeoce Council routinely sponsors such uncbssuled conferences with outside experts to gain knowledge and insight to sharpen the level of debate on critical issues.

Additional conies of this conference report can be obtained from the office of the National Intelligence Officer for Russia and Eurasia, winch can be reached

Central Asia and ihe Smith Caucasus: Reorientations, Interna) IVaiisrlions, and StrategicReport

Executive Summary Inhc National IritelligCDCe Councilonference that examined the strategic dyriamics of tbe Central Asian countries of fozakhstan. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan. Tarhracnistan, and Uzbekistan, and the South Caucasus countries of Armenia. Azerbaijan, and Georgia. Thebrought togetherovernment and outside experts, including officials and scholars from tbe countries concerned. It consisted of six panels with presentations from more thancademic and regional experts, followed by question-and-answer sessions. The purpose of the conference was not lo arriveonsensus bui to deepen undcrstariding of the region. The views expressed are those of the todi vidua!and do not represent in any way oJHcial US intelligence or policy positions.

Keynote presenter Gen. Anthony Zurai focused on theey challenges facing Central Asia, svtueh ranged fromational identity andthe role of Islam in society to coping with political, economic, and military reform. Dr. James Scbksingermch presentation that cast doubt oa the realization of the Biuea-Ceybnn pipeline project, given tbe trade-off between means and ends.

Participants and panelistsumber of salient points during thethat should be considered by those who analyze developments in the South Caucasus and Central Asia. These observations and judgments, bow-ever, do not necessarily represent the views of tbe conference participantshole.

Outside Influences and Relationships

Ceeual Asia and Use South Caucasus we important because theirwuT greatly affect the power and national security planning or large origbboring or interested states (principally, the United States. Russia, China, Iran, Turkey. India, andow these states and others think and act strategically In Central Asia and the South Caucasus will influence geopolitical alignments In the region. It is also important to grasp how these states, and others whose interest is acute though less direct (for example, Israel, Japan. South Korea, some Gulf Arabactor Central Asia and the South Caucasus into their strategic thinking.

Conversely, ihc states of Cenrr.il Asia and tbe Sooth Caucasus aredealing with countries other man those wc tendee as having ihc most direct interest and naturalIran, and Turkey. Tbe states of Central Asia and the South Caucasus are looking to a

i

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number of otherexample, India, Pakistan, Israel, China, South Korea andnew trade possibilities and security arrangements. All of these Mates are increasingly active in both Central Asia and the South Caucasus.

Strategic dynamics now cascade across geographic regions.in one region can have extensive direct, and second- and third-order consequences in other regions. Analysts must broaden their focus and not view the regionraditionally defined set of states. Central Asia and the South Caucasustrategic crossroads. They must be understood and analyzed in tbe larger Eurasian/Asian context if analysts are toall of the cross-regional dynamics that shape these two regions as well as the broader geopoUncal landscape around them.

Iran is potentially tbe most influential near-term variable. If aof US-Iranian relations takes place, the entire regional picture would change dramatically by changing the strategic calculations of all the regional actors and the major external actors in the two region.

Russia's policy wuT not necessarily be more coherent or benign under President Putin. Russia probably will continue to be weak but reirtainstronger than its neighbors and possess more leverage than other actors to the Central Asian and South Caucasus regions. Several panelists suggested considering the implications for Central Asia and tbe South Caucasusussia in which power is significantly devolved to itsor that is even fragmented politically.

So long as Afghanistan remains in chaos, which it probably willairly long time, it willrincipal contributor to the most worrisome threats facing Central Asia: the conjunction of narecmfueWng andIslam, terrorism, and political instability.

Need for Clarification and Differentiation

policy has been,arge extent, uniform with respect to the states of the twiner Soviet Union; encourage political and economic reform, rninimize their dependence on regional powers, and encourage intraiegionalwith an eye to creating an mrtorsersdent, generally Western-oriented, belt ofumber of ctmlerence speakers argued that this policy may be too general and too oporaisoc because the political interests, ccoriomic conditions, and security concerns of these states are diverse and changing Their destinies conceivably could differ substantially as well, as their interests pull them in different directions.

Regarding the internal developments of the Central Asian aod South Caucasus states, one participant observed thai analysts have had to adjust expectations on the pace and manner in which these states will move toward democracyarket economy. These two regionsery unsteady movement at best and great (hsillusionment with bothand markets because of widespread economic hardships.

A student of Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) noted that the Western tendency to focus on the work of capital-based, English-speaking NGOs leads to imsperceptions of .civil society in these regions, because these NGOs are in touch withmall part of the population. The Western models for civil society overlook the importance of clanwhich are small but extremely influential in these new states.NGOs also neglect large segments of the population, such as industrial workers, farmers, and pensioners, who need to be brought into toe political system.

Social Cost of Transition

A panel of young scholars with recent experience conducting research in the field gave many illustrations of the socially debilitating and politically destabilizing impact of economic hardship. For example, one researcher noted how traders use children as collateral to be left behind until they return with the promised goods or money. Others argoed that pervasive poverty is eroding traditional social and communication networks.

The long-term implicationseneration growing up in poverty, lacking basic education, and increasingly enmeshed in sermcruninalized societies are oUstnrbing and run directly counter to Western goals for the regions.

Uncertain Outlook

Several participants and panelists noted the uncertain commitment to political pluralism and market reform of the probable next generation of leaders in thesentries. Other panelists noted that political strongmen will continue lo bold sway for some time.

Participants from the regions warned that democracy and civil societies mustthin the existing cultural context, not as some kind of unnatural foreign imposition.

Some participants croestiooed the long-term viability of Central Asia's current borders, noting that many borders could be redrawn over time.

This conference report consists of the precis of each speaker's on-the-record presentation, whkh were provided by the speakers,ummary of the

ensuing not-for-attribution discussions. The report is intended to capture the salient points and original arguments of the proceedings. During the panel discussions no attempt was made to ascertain the general view of the panel or audience. Many of the points highlighted in these summaries of the panel discussions were noted because they were thought provoking or outside of conventional wisdom. They illustrate the richness of the discussion, but they do necessarily reflect accepted or prevailing views at the conference.

Contents

Page

Summary

Remarks

Address

I

Challenges to Slate-Building: Interna: Fault Lines and Impediments

From the Discussion

H

to State-Building: The Impact of Megatrends on the Regions

From the Discussion

ID

Dynamics

From the Discussion

IV

Prom the Periphery

From the Discussion

V

Impressions From the Field

From the Discussion

VI

Roundtable: The Outlook of the Larger

Environment and Key Variables

Conference Agenda

Participants

F

5

Opening Remarks

Kelt, NIOfor Russia and Eurasia, National Intelligence Council

engagement with Central Asia and the Southn their own right beganew years ago. Not surprisingly, there is much we still have to team. This conference attempts toew and deeper understanding of changes in the political, economic, and strategic orientations of each of the states of Cennral Asia and the South Caucasus and to explore bow these states fit into the larger regional context. Thewere designed to examine the character and extent of these states'transitions, and the effects of these transitions on international orientation; explore how and in what directions the states of Central Asia and the South Caucasus could be reorientating both within the region and beyond; and assess the new strategic dynamics that are unfolding

the past we became accustomed to tMnking about Central Asia and the South Caucasus through the prism of Russia. Today. Russia's shadow looms large in both regions but most states have moved in new directions. This conference seeks to move beyond the traditional Russia-centric filter, but is not intended to be anti-Russian in focus. Russia will continue toole to play but it will be one among many acton in these regions. Essentially, we do want to explore each of these countries and regions in their own right as well as the connections between them but without equating the two regions.

Presentations are on-the-record and will be includedonference report-Discussions are not for attribution, thus speakers will be identified only as discussants, panelists, commentators, and so forth. The views expressed by participants and panelists arc stricdy their own and not necessarily the views of the NIC or the United States Government.

Keynote Address

A US Strategic Perspecdve on Central Asia

Anthony Zinni, Commander in Chief, United Stales Central Command

Central Command (CENTCOM)ewcomer to Central Asia. After the demise of the Soviet Union, several of the military commands sought to bring Central Asia into their area of responsibility Long deliberations ensued over whether to include the region in the European Command or in the Atlantic Command, both of which lobbied to take over responsibility for the region. CENTCOM, which is largely focused on activities in the Middle East and the Pernio Gulf, did not seek out new respcroibtlities. but the Department of Defense finally decided to gram CENTCOM responsibility for the five Central Asian states in

initial im press ion* were that the new states in Centra] Asia areut that the region is importantrossroads for great powers. There areey challenges that must be addressed by the governments in the region.

Fondameritalism and the Role of Islam In Society The governments must reconcile the role of Islam in society to counter the new fundamentalism emanating from Afghanistan and Pakistan and tothe effects of the turmoil in the North Caucasus. This "new jthadism" that consists of disparate, radical groups coronating their activities from Afghanistan and Pakistan poses the most urgent threat to stability in Central Asia.

Reform

The Central Asian states have inherited Soviet militaryexample, heavy motorizedwere designed to fight the Urnied States and the West. These systems are not compatible with the secsrity problems that these states face today; the most irnmediate security concerns are border security, internal security, and narcotrafikOdng.threats effectively, the governments in the region needquip their rnihtaries with light, highly mobile units that can operate in mountainous terrain. This reengineering process will require support in the areas of education, training, and leadership development.

Power Plays in the Region

These fragile states are pulled in all directions by China, Russia, the West, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, and other actors with an interest in the region. Each actor is drivenifferent combination ofpolitical, strategic, cultural, religious, or social. Energy pipelines represent ao

example of the external dyriamics that will funo^mentally shape central asia and the south caucasus. which direction will the pipelineeast, south, or west? all the surrounding stalcsentral asia's energy riches.

regional identity

these states do not view themselves through the same prism that we do. we think of them as thehich are partiscrete region that is defined by various regional organizations, such as gutiam (georgia, ukraine, uzr>efcistan, azerbaijan, and moldova) and cis (conimonwealth of independentt is clear that each country has its own view of the security threats in the region. if security cooperation is to be successful, it cannot be imposed by external actors but rather worked out together by tbe external actors and the individual states in the region.

economic development

the initial euphoria about the energy riches in the region has led to high expectations. until now, those high expectations have only led to disap-pomtment in the region.

soviet legacy

the new states in the region struggleove-hate relationship with their soviet legacy. they seek to discard their soviet identity, but would like to retain the social protection that the soviet system provided. artifacts, such as national borders that poorly correspond to ethnic groups, impede the development of new national identities.

search for identity

each ethnic group is searching for its own identity after years ofgiven the constraints within which they must operate, ethnic groups are striving to reestablish themselves. the ethnicity mapecipe forfor the governments in the region as this search for identity unfolds.

speed of democratization

the united states is cotrmitted to democratization in the region, but there are substantial obstacles.

environment

the region suffers from the horrific environmental legacy of the soviet union. the department of defense (dod) is focusing on water-related problems in the region. water, not energy, probably will be the causeonflict in the region within five years.

Corruption, Crime, and Drugs

Drug trafficking Is tied inextricably to Islamic extremism. Afghanistan,eading producer of opium,ource of revenue for extremists in Afghan-istan and Pakistan.drug- and nto plague all the governments across the region.

The United Stales must pay attention to this region because of its ccntralily in Asia and its strategic importance. This region wiS continue to be an area of great power ccropetitioa The challenge for the United States is totho threats and interests in Central Asia and assimilate themay thut will intersect with US objectives.

Pud 1

Challenges to Sttte-Bnilding: Internal Faoit lanes and

[and caimmed rbr ztrwnal ccodiuocs aod cbal-Krreei (hat the sovtrsnsmcowa. ihey modernize ibter poJiiieal and ccodocuc instttu-dons. Tbe panel also explored bow the history oflheaeis shaping rhcir future direction and what might be expected of the new generaOoo ol leaden who will inevitably be taking control during the next decade.

Chairman:nders Wtabuah

tUKiaitt, Inc.

Modernizing State Institutions in Central Asia and the South Caucasus Gregoryeason

Umnrnry of New Mexico

In all of the Halts ol Central Asia and the South

ice pubhc sector has undergoneanccal asdrpfodenct.e areihenesssates of the region*

i as they approach rhe clow of thef natioAa] ifidependcaoe? Hava (he Male* modated uMeanaaceau standards rf goodest practice? To what extent have the pub-

lo accommodate ihe emeigiogf thei century? What necessary domestic (nshmoooal changes have been avoided or poviponed In tbu fim decade, and what do these tacts imply? Finally, what are ihe dynamic* at work and thecoodinom at play in public sector redesign in thus pan of the world? How can outside actors Influence those?

Centra! Aula and the South Caucasus are politicalthai refer to crtrwera rf countries tied together by iDterdepcodcocics resulting from pofiticaL economic, limn pert infrastructure, mariiet linkages, and cultural factors. Central Asia includes Kazakhstan, Kyr-gyzsue, Tajikistan. TurkmcuSM. aad Uzhetostsn. and ihe South Caucasus includes Armenia.

Aiaroarjnn, aadurvey rf das respes reveals tome suong coraasoa trasoeacins:

Soviet-era politics! leadership remains in place in most couiarieS-

The poblic sector continues to dominate the private lector

Social inequality has grown substantially in all countries.

Violence and lawlessness have grown substantially within Use societies.

Gray area transnational violence (terrorism and a) is growing.

problemsand ik qoality. industrial potluuoo) haw not been addressed ia any bgaifcani measure daring the pbs decade.

Nareceusisess is grossing. It should also be Doled

There are no interstate wars in tbe two regions.

There has brio no revolutionary upheaval alter ibe fnll of communism.

Macroectsnornic policies in most countries areor acceptable.

Many rf ihe countries report nearly balanced budgets

IS

To whoi eitrni hu reform of the public win and the uannUon of the Male been accomplind conirib-uied to wry of Iheie outcomes?

Then iafundamental peraooi tn Die. role of thr net(loiokiif*J" ebon u

tt^jti to cowtroi if*erf pubbc arrasesoHo pc*erfal enough so abuse (hoa* UuOutmai and wIvmicis Id an effortflacourhy ihr uato. many crWcs of Oka tnodam lutr or gutublic sector Hut iim

uti SCOpa Ihey alio argue thai imrcairil fiuumi:

efficiency is correlated with ileccnoaliratson. Iceal control, ami lueal irapimsivrnesa. The dtihalrIh* Hit and Kope of Ihe "peal-Comrounot note" renters around thr fact dull (he Male it bolb theuJ V-a" Kite in the peweal of

Conmuaiu dmralafKeboe

ofpoLtxal theory. DM role r< tbe state haa undertone mbeartal recoeaaderaoon ia recoil aecadra. Forty yean ago. aunty Keyoetun economist! nnd public rrtusagcrs regarded lha Hate at che "meine" of development. Thla view, ia coiunnc-don with ihr failure of rruutct* lo provide public tool? and te rvicev lo effectively regulate ihe use of public undue* and natural monopolies, and to provide proirciiati far common resources suchfiihenes. forests, and rWan,ssQeoak for -scoot. uatrV outbe cangfrite of seiTrulatmj: pwdi ce ssssar*eeta| ia aaartccsrotectpasbo* ictrrest

In some cam increased statearkra led to affective, and pubtely orierard pol 'cacs. but in many caaei eovinimmls embarked on ill coetci'vd. grandioie. and fanciful, schemes that led to oveteaten-ason ol the public sector while squandering public resources I'nlurra of govcrornrjil often kil to redoe-bleil elf era through coerctac to bring about the desiredhe fusion of gnvernrnrni anded- ias of irraaant

lobahreJbac is.v1L mode: of the effective state it movjig mj rrccn the role of lie Hale as producer and provideriii- img* ot goods and cervicesote circins-tenbrd role as infufttialion manager This rote enrphi-aliei the provision of core piibtic goodse facliimk* and regulation of the production ol privale

services and Goods, fullnd coenmce pool resources

In societiesvOnuucJoo. bribery, and abuse of public office ar* commonplace. Ihe reduction la the arena of control if tile state amy be justified. But at (be iame tunc, dipeaiabllshing die stair can be cipetted first of nil lo Lead lo detrimental clfects on

rbc lean piwrcful and leans-CT3ii of the

toddy Thcae taoasnsi so the sunr on apt to cacum-vcd ue cflecta it reOUred site art] influence, nuns ferrier. tie rem of dowasutng o* rBnctkoal redrawn andante ansa rormraCy jadltastattal Thus, in Ctasttal Asia, redjetxa ir. est nn ca* Oat paMk sector is net by itselfforraua* foreve eqciabie. aeore coenpesmL |taavane knot public ssseax

Thereariety ofn> me*iimng rht public sector via-avvis the private sector. The most foremen ore:DPorce comparison.nalyui of the governmeni ^gulotory "footprmr; andubtte spending raboi. Utiaf; rbesc measures, the publictn the Central Asian and South Caucasus Stain lUutnatrntuitions net unlike mote of the modem stawi tn other pans of the non-Corrununitl world. "Pov-Conimutiist rratauJoeT may noi be sifjurioinuy ablTinni fium the rlobabJa-neo perxesaea we ate wiusrauiig in many parti ot the

LeearSe* of the Pan and New DsrecUotw taowrh Casacaaaa

Stuadt

Hlstury

liincey alwayi maneri. *tieihei or ace esdrndiaari era aware of it Fusding Ex raSevaal kgaeata requires leoking deeper into ihe pan than one geesere "outline" orurlbeimon. "tassory" rs caatnxted oa the batiaarUcutar qneatlons and selected documents Myiha and memories nsiy olioan Thut ihe "use" of his lory it neither slmpkight forward SotneUiaeaeople's beatsfa aboul the pasl Is mora informative Intoday's motlvaa lhan In knowing all Ihe details of documented and verifiable bunncy

14

Ill ihe Caucasus, history, even including remote his tory, which is difficult to verify, has an immediacy that surprises most Americans. Present-day territorial claims and visions of sovereignty can be shaped by beliefs about events as far back as the sixth or second centuries.

One rx>werful sborl-term legacy is that of Russian rule under both tsars and commissars. Russian rulenot only cultural features of the Caucasus such as tbe use of Russian language and the types of schools, but also <i; tenriinsd today's borders (aside from tbe de facto change in tbe Karabakhuch of tbe eronorroc division of labor, and tbe basic pcJirical culture. On the last issue, an authoritarian mentality of control is an enduring feature, both inside and outside governing circles.

Each republic, of course, has Us own legacies that are shaped by its native culture, including religion,and its history prior to the Russian conquest early inh century. On that basis, each was treated differently under Russian and especially Soviet rule; each today has its own ccruigurcuon of "friends" and "enemies."

Salient legacies on which democracy and the rule of law can be constructed am profoundly lacking. These include Western traditions seen in the Enlightcnmcni (though rooted more deeply in Western history) of individualism and tbe belief in the ability of human beings to think and loam rationally, and respect for the rule of law and legality. Whether these can be "imported" is an important and fundamental question for all former Soviet regions.

The New Generation of Leaders

The new generation of leaders In each republic is, of course, shaped by both native culture and beliefs about history, and by the Russiars-Soviet legacies. They are also, however, affected by tbe changing situation of the late Soviet era and the first decade ofwhich thrust these republics into greater regional and global interact:on.

The oldest "new" generation includes those leaders who led anti-Soviet or pro-independence reform movements in the Gorbachev era. They were generally people inn theho are now in

. Oneway to view this younger generation is to determine whether they were "insiders" orwith respect to the old system. "Insiders" were not merely party members but those who madesuccessful within the party and old stateThese people tend to behave like authoritarian Soviet-era leaders. Someowever, arc prone also to use strong-arm tactics and intimidation perhaps because this was the only political culture theywith power act like people with power. They have not yet entirely integrated their democratic ideas with their personal actions.

The political leaders now inrc even further removed from the Soviei political culture.their direction is harder to predict Some political figures inxhibit an authoritarian streak, and societal instability seems to reinforce tliis. Yet the age group is quite mixed, and each mdrvidual must be examined sersarately.

Directions

The directions (hey may take the Caucasian states are rooted firmly in their own amtudina) and behavioral tendencies, but will roost likely be responsive ort would be hardew generation to initiate innovative policy; it will be forced simply to react to domestic and regional (as well as broader international) pressures.

It would be bard to imagine, to lake onecenario In which Armenia came to regard Russia as an enemy or in which Azerbaijan became hostile toarmer Armenian response to cautiousby Turkey (which have already takenowever, could open the door to unproved Arrrsenlan-Turkish political and even commercial relations. Armenia would clearly benefit from this, as would other states of the region. It would, however, disrupt the current balances of political influence in the region to Russia's (and Iran's) detriment. Russia might respond aggressively (likely under any ruler, butmore so under Putin) to keep the region from moving too far away from Russian influence- Russiaheck on such significant realignments of any one state in the region or of all three.

IS

Subtle internal moves could be more effective: market reform, tax reform, and privatization as onend greater political pluralism, institution of the rule of law (and an independentndof civil rightsecondhese packages would slowly "restructure" the Caucasian states individually and mow them, de facto, further from Russian influence. Most younger leaders seem inclined to move in this direction but could be derailed by unrest that seems to require authoritarian measures.

Dynamics of Succession

The dynamics of succession have been and are likely to remain stormy. Armenia has had several elections with varying degrees of falsification and coercion. Tbe events of last October show that violence can lurk just beneath the surface. Several parties contend for dominance.

Azerbaijan and Georgia present especially thorny cases because in each, an authoritarian "grand old man" of Soviet and national politics will, within the decade and perhaps in the next year or two, be ending his rule. Eachingle dominant political party as others strive to gain strength. The instabilities and unrest io each republic in the past show that the loss of the "strongman" canepublic intoussian role inransition cannot be ruled out. This political puzzle, more even than oil and gas production and pipelines, shouldocal point of analysis of this region.

Legacies of tlie Past and New Directions in leadership in Central Asia

Martha Brill Olcott

Camegie Endowment for

Iniernalional Peace

In many ways the Central Asian states are frozen in time. In every state but Tajikistan, tbe old Soviet-era nomenklatura is still in control. This is the sense in which history counts thewho were on top at the time of the collapse of Soviet rule intend to stay on top.

This history of the past is being rewritten to make this more possible. In Uzbekistan, Timur the Lame has become the central historical figure, helping to justify Islam Karimov's strong rule. In Kazakhstan, the role of the Great Horde is being emphasized, as this is the

group that long dominated the Communist Parry. Turkmenistan isynthetic blend of medieval Central Asian and modem Turkish history around the person of Niyazov. The Kyrgyz trumpet Usenature of nomadic society.

With the exception of Kyigyzstan. none of theseprovides any basis for transfer of authority from leader to leader or generation to generation. Themodel facilitated it. which is one reason why the Kyrgyz seem to have abandoned it. President Akayev tees that his position is threatened by these democratic priociplcs-

la general, the authoritarian and serruauthoritarian nature of political rule in the region has led theseto be more static than in some of the other Newly Independent States. One of the serious consequences of beavyhanded politic* islass of independent entrepreneurs has been stow to develop. This istrue in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, wbere there has been great resistance to radical economic reform. The lack of an economic elite with anpower bass enisle* pent up demand in each of these countries and makes it difficult to predict how the inevitable succession struggles will unfold. This makes it very difficult to predict who will come to power, when, and how.

None of the region's leaden are likely to give up power willingly. Yet each country will becometo interehte struggles as he physically weakens. Taukistac has already experienced one such struggle, which resultedengthy civil war. The cutein Uzbekistan is still complex enough, even after moreecade of Karimov's rule, to permitbehind-ihc-sceDe* power struggles The process of coalition building could lead to the empowermentadical alternative elite

Kazakhstan alsoighly complex pattern of elite relations. There isisk of upheaval here, in part because the country ia further along in iis econc-mic transformation. The sire of the country and theof relative isolation o( regional (and sector-specific) elites makes it unlikely that there would everoup against President Na/arbayev. Should be try

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pass power to tbe younger generation, however, theould most likelyonsiderable challenge in consolidating power, it is roD too early co know how pro-Western or pro-Russian (or jms-Chinese) the next generation of Kazakh leaders win be, Much depends upon the success of economic reform and tbe speed wilh which Kazaklatan develops iu oataral resources.

The pattern of eliteess complex in Kyr-gyxstan and seemingly so in TUtkrnexdstan as well In both cases, tbe ruling family seems io be successfully consolidating economic control, but is doing so inways. Tbe difTerertt economic patterns in the two states make it difficult to generalize across tbe two.ecade or so the Kyrgyi ruling family may decide that oondiaoos in Kyrgyzstan are to bleak that it prefers to more its assets abroad, rather thanifficult succession struggle. The "prize" inis definitely worth the struggle. The shape of the

Struggle, though, is more difficult to predict its rradi-tional Turkmen society is relatively opaque to theobserver.

Economic Change aod Modernfctafloo: South Caucasus Ben Slay

PlanBcon, Inc

Despita some commonerms c4 history, ge<sgrapoy. and Soviet rule. Use economies of the

South Caucasus present as many contrasts as corn* rapHaatha

t'omrDonnltlcs

First, the region is at low levels of economicWhen measured at market exchange rateseorgia had tbe highest level of per capita

incomeollowed by Azerbaijannd Arrnenia' Wben measured via purchasing power parity (pup) exchange8 per capita income was greatest inollowed by Georgia and Azerbaijan

Second, all three countries wentransition shock during the, when steep declines in output and high inflation rates were recorded. Theshockumber of factors, including. (I) disruptions in economic activity that accompanied the dissolution of thenflationaryof price liberalization In the contest of the rubleeaknesses of nascent economicinstitutions; and (a) military conflicts over Nagomo- Karabakh. Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. Ihe introduction of national currencies, and die conclusion of agreements with use International Monetary Bind (IMF) and World Bank allowed these countries lo sharply reduce Inflation rates. But despite ihe rapid growth recorded by Georgiand by Armenia and Azerbaijan, living standards for much of the population In all threeprobably remain well belowevels.

Third, Russia remains all three countries' mosleconomic partner.eorgia's exports to other members of ihe Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) wasercent, for Azerbaijan this ratio wasercent, and for Armeniaercent.had the highest importercent),byndhen compared with datahese sharesharp Call fromercent of both exports and imports.

Differences

Pcrftjps ihc largest diflerettce among these threelies in the fact that Azerbaijan is ertaosved wirh significant hydrocarbon resources while Georgia and Arrnenia arc net. Although much of its potential remains uoexploited, Azerbaijan's oil sector accounts for more thanercent of industrial production andercent of Gross Domestic Productil-related investment trade, and service activities

account for additional large contributions to GDP The approximatelyilhor. in foreign mvestrnent that Azerbaijan is now attracting annually translates Intoercent8 GDP. On Use outer hand, theeconomy is potentially quite vulnerable to swings in world energy prices.

By coo oast, the nonhydrocarbon economies rely more extensively on agriculture and the service sector. In Armenia, agriculture produces aboutercent of GDP. In Georgia, agriculture accounts forercent of GDP, and industry and trade account forercent each. Armenia and Georgia ore also quintessential small open economics with large current accountthat are financed by transfers and concessional tending from abroad.

Economic trendshird major difference. Azeibaijan aid Armenia were the only two CIS countries to report strong GDP growth8il production and oil-related construction projects picked up in Azerbaijan,umper crop in Armenia boosted the all-important agriculturalGeorgia's GDP growth decelerated sharply fromercent7ercentnd toercent last year.

KconorrUc Chang* and Modernization: Central Asia

Boris Kilmer

Harvard Univtniiy

As one examines the post-Soviet economies of Central Asia, most exhibit the following characteristics:

Ossification of the ruling regimes.

of the economy.

G^rreJiaoce upon natural resources as the main source of economic growth.

A lack of rational improvements In the industrial structure.

' Al data in dtfl ptpci consc tnwtnlicrctcvmKOJMika'iUiiiHt-al oflsccs ana noikmat banks, isiom ihe IMF, Wuld Dank, Tacit, and echefm ics.

The incapacity of domestic investment* in the indus-trial structure.

The increasing lims tattoos on tbe ability to attract foreign investanenL

raonig of the halaasoe of pay mean

Tbe growth of foreign indebtedness.

lucotijslebrriess of refotm in the agrarian seclor-

The use of agriculturedonor" to support other sectors of the economy.

An excessive reliance uponwhich is by no means always justified.

AH these negate dynasucs threatenoom the ccorsccues of Central Aaia aa prutraeied stagnation at kraal so tbe fcvueeaMe hrtare.

In assessing the current stale of affairs in theseit is essential to acknowledge tbe paucity aod unreliability of much of die statistical inform anon emanating from the region, fnrticularty important is tbe lack of accurate data about ihe scale of tbe shadow ecoDomy. which some experts estimate to be as high asercent of the GDP. Much is also written about tbe enormous magna rude of the drug business; in the ant phrase of some, the medieval "silk route" has turned into the "narcorouteespise the importance of illicit activities, it is impossible to determine the actual scale of production aad tratrViJng

During, theof ra^Scrvsei Ceestra) Asia have had toortuous, twistedone that has led themuphoria of unbounded hopesood of profound despair and disenchant-ment- Tbe exhilaration thai accompanied the sodden

Start of the decade has given way to ir.ten.ie public frustrationervasive economic crisis.1he level of economic activityercent in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan,ercent In Turkmenistan, and oejin Tajikistan The exception to this pattern was Uzbekistan, where GDP decreased by less lhan 10

percent during this period Although tliai country exhibited some signs of modest economic growth (at least according io official statistics) those gains are highly misleading: Uzbekistan has actually been retxuidiag the Soviet eccesocntcolicy that will mow likely lead only to stagnation arid perhapsrash

This economic crisis- has been unfoldingackground of continuous tomographic growth. The impovcrishnicoi of the broader population in the region has reached truly menacing proportions; the golf between tbe fragile stratum of super-rich ruling elite tod (he majority living below (be pointy hne has reached dangerous levels.

The main factors contri raiting to economic growth in Central Asian countries have been foreign trade,investment, and foreign loans and credits. The economies of tha countries of the region are critically dependent un foreign trade. The foreign trade turnover in these countries representsoercent of the GDP. In all countries, imports exceed exports. So, the drnacxci of the Centra) Asian ecoriocases are totally determined by the conditions prevailing on world raw material markets. The sharp upturn in world prices of oil, metals, and cotton brought about an improve ment in the economic situation in Central Asiarom tbe previous two years. If ooc disregards the lowpoint, the growth can appear quite impressive. One should not rash to any conclusions, however, about the iiiliiljl) ia*ltiM illaSliilln) iniinni sodden decline in world prices could burst this fragile bubble of pro* pets ly.

It became Increasingly apparent that ihe model of development chosen by Central Asian governments is in need of sersom correction. To Judge bom theevidence. Use opportunities for extensiveof exports are drruirtishing. The exception is Kazakhstan's oil despite some delays, the Caspian Pipeline CoBMortiaao is making peogms in its project io enable the shipping of oil through tbe Russian port of Novorossiiak. Once complete, this pipeline will permit Kazakhstan to increase Its export of erode oilrofitable market.

Macroeoonomic stabilization, together with political stability, make it possible to begin large-scalechanges and to give greater attention to the domestic market. The agrarian sector should become the main priority of development, at least inand Kyrgyzstan. In both countries, agriculture provides employment for aboutercent of the total labor force, produces between one-third and one-half of the GDP, and accountsignificant part of exports that cam hard currency. In both countries,policy actually discriminates against thesector, which bas been transformedource of reserves for impon-substitution in industryr which is used in the interest ofintermediarieshe proportion of budgetary, credit, and Investment resources for the agrarian sector does not correspond to its role andin the economies of the Central Asian states. By functioningdonor" for the other sectors of the economy, the potential Is rapidly increasingrisis to beset the agriculture sector itself.ignifi-cant degree, this discrimination against the agrarian sector explains the depressing social and economic situation in these countries. The eradication of poverty and indigence is not possiblehange inpolicy addressing the needs of ihe agrarian

Top priority in the policy of development must also be given io the expansion of light industry and theof agricultural commodities. Il is precisely these branches of industry lhat have been subjected to the greatest destruction during the processes ofand that are now situated on Use periphery of attention in official economic policy.eorientation of investment resources to these branches, the Central Asian states are doomed to remain exporters of agricultural commodities and productsow level ofIs to be seen at the current time.

At the dawn of the post-Soviet era. the union of the Newly Independent States of Central Asia at first appeared to be entirely natural and realistic. Indeed, many regarded this unity as an important precondition for political stability and economic development in the region. By the end of, however, the hopes for any kind of unity have receded into oblivion. As ethnic elites built their stales and consolidated the

authority of their leaders, each head of staie began to play his own game and pursue his own interests. Tbe breakup of the Soviet Union actually served tothis regional disintegration. The post-Soviet era has allowed differences in the economic potential of individual Central Asian countries to become clearly apparent. The states of Central Asia follow economic strategies, which arearge degree, incompatible. Whereas Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan carriedolicy of reducing the stale's regulatory role in (he economy. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistanontrary course, ll should be painfully evident that this institutional discordance can hardly contribute to the process of drawing these five states closer together in the economic sphere. In this9ear of unprecedented economic confrontation among ihe states of Central Asia The disputes erupted in those spheres where economic interests of thestates intersected: trade, energy, transportation, and water.

Inhe states of Central Asia began to impose severe restrictions and customs duties on imports inside the region. Kazakhstan. Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan established trade barriers against each outer. It reached tbe poini where President Akaycv of Kyrgyzstan accused his neighbors ofrade blockade against his stare.ransportation war" enrpied between Kazakhstan on one side and Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan on the other. Uzbekistan regularly cuts off the delivery of natural gas to southern Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. InKyrgyzstan, as an upstream country for all the major rivers in the region, shuts off the delivery ofwater to southern Kazakhstan in springi did so after Kazakhstan failed io deliver coal, as stipulated in an agreement between the twoKazakhstan has its own grievances,

This suggests that economic relations among the countries of the region have been increasingly tense Antagonism is mounting and could lead to more severe confrontations if these trends continue.

Ilighlrght* From tbe Discussion Economic Development

Regional economic statistics are important butIo addressing tbe presenter's point about tbe imreti ability of data, discussants focused on two likely reasons for this problem. I) Data collection by local governments is nnJetfuuittd. aadesult, il tends to be sporty and erratic; andven if data areprofessionally, they do not accurately reflect the economic transacuieis in the informal economy (for ciample, tbe black market and drugor do may reflect real income levels. One panelist noted,that available data do reflect trends and suggest where the country ia beaded in the future.

Economic challenges lie ahead in Central Asia and the South Caucasia. One panelist argued that the social and economic data en the region suggesteconomic stagnation in the future unless drastic measures ore taken. Even if specific sectors Sourish, their success will fail to translaterajectory of growth. The discussionumber of economic challenges that were outlined by the panelists. These baues include:

Optimism over Caspian oil and gas is waning because of the uncertainty about the size of reserves: political, economic, and technical problems that cerorsbeste exploration and exnacuoo; and thepolitical and strategic Interests of outside states with interests in the region.

NaicotraOiesters are establishing growing stakes in tbe economics across the region and arc atrracririg an increasing number of people into the lucrative drug trade.

The economies of Central Asia will be unable to deal with demographic realities in the future-will be exacerbated by the high population growth rates. Moreover, production in thesector, where most economic activity takes place, has stagnated, and the capital-intensiveis unable lo meet the social needs of the popula'aon.

Foreign direct Investment and memo! assistance art die most important driven (or economic growth in the region. Panelists agreed that foreign direct investment (FDD is essential for growth ia (he region, but lhaovernments must attract PDIange of sectors, not just the encigy lector. One panelist argued that economic globalization could assist the regie* in two ways: I) ID! and foreign aiiUunce could provide alternative tonnes of eccoornic opportunity to the drug trade, andlobahrauoa could Duogaccassociated with the regions' efbjucajjy andirrational border* Airractiaf lasssrrsssrioaaJ capital, how*wit. requires rjohixauy sensitivereform

To boost me economic prospects in ihe reason, Western assistance should be focused oe three areas:

Transportation infrastructure

Communication infrastructure

Education infrastructure.

A contrarian view of Tajiklitan Conventionalholds thatuie plagued by rcpceial divisions and violence, ia the meat dramatic failure among Central Asian state* Several discussants,noted bright spots, including the recovering eeooomy and thet-Lir jI pluralism ic the crsTJBiiy. Some paoelistt also expressed siarprise a! how ojaaeMy ceeoomx growth started, once the Ovil war ended

Political ResVwaa

Dtmocrali&Dcy ts pfblfnatic. ParUcipaa'aexpressed rhea views genreally agreed that democracy was not aboul lo bloom in Central Asia and that our* rent leadership will not willingly transfer power. Even if successions occur peacefully during the next several yean, new authoritarian leaders probably will replace tho current ones. It was noted that the Russian model, where elections of local officials have limited the power of central authorities, may apply in some stales, but each country ia likely toistinctive path

- -,

One panelisi argued lhat Kazakhstan ia the irani pluralist of Ihe Central Asian states and could he quasi -democraticeneration. The country has highly developed state institutions, adiverse economy, and an elite group that will contest for power over Kazakhstan's resources.once was the training ground for political leadership, but its power has been stripped back: so many times that the economy will be the place that creates political contenders for power. The panelist opined that we could sec economic powerfor poiiticnl power. Kazakhstan probably will not emulate the Russian center-region power-sharing model. One panelist worried about ihe dangerSuharto-type" democracy emerging in Kazakhstan in which all power is concentratedamily.

external issues that imped* the development of democracy in the region They include (he following;

Luc* of national saVn/tr. One discussant argued thai none of tbe (tales in the regie* has earned rhe right to besaooo slate, having been thrown haw impendence by the breakup of the Soviet Uasoo, and the elites -who are moat interested ia power, money, and personalin these countries have failed to communicate "national" aistom thatational identity Cc*ietfueot!y. the states are goingeep rdaattrty crisis How do people defineethnicity, religion, or clan? Another discussant suggested that theinconsistent borders also contribute to the identity problem. Globalizing these stales could diminish tbe importance of borders.

Some arguedluralist society is developing. Despite continued regional divisions and weak state institutions, panelists pointed to the nascent political civil society andergingof informal political groups site are engaging In dialogue about their problems. One discussant observed that only tbe Tajiks have gone through tbe process ofational identity, which strengthens the legitimacy of the state. There wasdiscussion of these arguments.

Kyrgyziian. Panelists fear Kyrgyzstan Is moving backwards. Initially it went furthest towardwiih contested elections and general pressBui President Akayev realized that this threatened his hotd on poster and has systematically clamped down on the opposition and themedia in the last four to five months.

Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Panelists andwere most pessimist about democracy in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, where strongmenirm grip on power. One panelist predicted that neither country would develop Into anything Similarestern democracy during the nextears, although she has observed pockets ofdeveloping in Uzbekistan.

Slates fact common political probifias. Despiiethe different political and economic situations in each country, discussantsumber of internal and

lock of genuine oppotillon parties Often, theIn these regions Isval ethnic,or family clique,road-based democratic opposition.

Bfesrem legal traditions not easily iransfrtabU.estern legal approach creases abetween tbe official system and the teal authorityecentralization of powerwith order couldote affective approach. One panel ut argued thai the region needed the "rule of Uw" not -rule of lawyers."

Lot* oftaoabU- Tbe discussion: showed that bothof the peevt-oos system aad -outs^ers" would have Afrfcssliy implemenemg poudcal reform. Insiders, svhobare been vetsrd by rhe Soviet syssecn, do not necessarily possess die skills toountry.leaders without priorholding power, such aa dissidents orbecome the most autocratic and corrupt and art usually not accustomed to working in the system. One panelisi opined that enUenchcd bureaucrats may bo the largest obstaclehange and lhal there islass ceiling for Westera-traincd, young leaders who ewe* tho government. Younger leaders who tins more edocable offer Use Wot in oppoiiuiillyxen more influence

Panel II

Challenges to State-Bu titling: The Impact of Megatrends on the Regions

This panel examined the impact of global and regional treads that ore shaping tbe region and bcyood, and explored how ihe Hates are dealing with theseand oprxnturnBes.

Chairman: S. Endcrs Wimbnsh

isoctaUs, Inc.

Globalization, Fconomicj, and Communications Rajan Menon

Ijrkigh UmveriUy

There are, of course, significani variations between and within Central Asia and the South Caucasus no matter what the topic of comparison, that said, if one Incases oa the contours of the forest, and not theof theossible and approprista to make gersenditanoos lhat highlight broad trends.

In virtually all eight stales la these two rug loos, the economic collapse icllected by plummeting Gtcts National Product (GNP) values has been arrested and recovery ha* begun, albeitsy low level. While thi* in good news, it is clear tint it was bound to happen: economics bit reck bottom eventually: output does not descend to zero, Jj> the racantima, however, the toll taken on public welfare has been Immense, and the implications for the developmental injecturicx

Trade patterns show that while the activities ctf Turkey, Imn. and the West have reduced (he role of Russia in some post-Soviet states, the commonplace view that Russia is an economic disaster is false. Russiaignificant position in the tmde profiles ofthe cotm* tries in Central Asia and tbe Caucasus. It leads the West asa whole in trade with Azerbaijan. Kazakhstan, Kyrgysstan, and Tajikistan, andosition thai is

are easily understandable. The outside world is still relatively unfamiliar with these two regions. Many of ihcxu have ocaasy for Western firms to forge ties. Tbe ruling elite {regardless of the the tone)ussified stratum forged hy the Soviet system.markets and communications mutes Lead north, not east, south, or west. With tune, Russia may yet be displaced, but any notion thai it it nolayerase of wishful thinking.

Nor is there much evidencelood of foreign direct investment (given the near absence of viafcle capital markets, there rs no portfolio investment to Speak of) will render Russia irrelevant. As compared to other parts of the wo rid that qualify for tbeEast Asia orouth Asia, ihe amount ofs pitifullysmaller still if one excludes the energy sector. Because hydrocarbons

t from abroad, Azer-

aad budget deficits have likewise been brought under control, due ineasure lo the tutelage and discipline of global economic institutions such is the IMP and Worldowevcr necessary this stabilization mayconceding that it hasetter climate for growth aadthe hardships imposed on ciriiens by cuts in expendi-

avenless improvement* ore carried out, the support for reform could dry up Inasmuch as it will become identified withacklash in tlte form of instability,nd sub-West em scntimerrts cannot be ruled out.

picture. Outside the oil and gas sector, it is other raw materials, no: mxnufacturir.g. which attractThis makesattern with potentiallyconsequences that arc well known to deselopciteui economists: itiven that die prices of raw materials and energy lend to be volatile, there arerisksanking on growth spurred by foreign direct investment that is so sector specific

1': 'mn Uir mailpari of the economic itory ha* in tin wiih popular welfare as Indicated by UK data on unemployment, hit omn inequaSiry. corruption (whiefi peimaty benefits the wealthy and powerful) and pubtk tomees- Ai at in* at roost (tut act *U) of tie cou-So'tet tepon. the tntojo* ablest. Peopk are pom? and leu tf* in be employed, and mourn* eoutlitruch larger thano make nutletsthii icallty eiiwi alongside teveie cult In pub-He ipettdinj and (he social latelycerbating the vulnerability of the foot the public health nyttetrs iaight countrieshaiaMtS, ftetarter (roto everything ringingV [try nnd unsafe school*ack ai ttuboots. Th* bonom tine it mot the human and payi*-al capital needed foi incoveiy tad robusl gi owth in the new con-tuiy ii noi being crested. This does not aueui well for the ptotptcts forderooeiacy (wniehisnot paituuliuly fond, in any oei outside Georgia and Armenia, andKjrqaJMitngyisun) and civil peace.

CloSaliranon tttsotvenlor Norh Korea l. iihe realn y. if by'.ion we meant the rapid and multiple ways in which what is familiar it shaped by what is beyond and unfamiliar Having been oficiwd up lo ihe world following the Soviet llnun'i collapaa. Ctatnri Asia and rh* South Caucasus will earenrac* these pcttnCaUy aroauno cfleets of fky

UIhim prior v

ihe cceiw-autw effects mil be benign (greater act eat to iilomuaan and a'tiratiie) irheri will or eould be mttignchallertBCt to tradition. eapneta-liuni lhai are raised by aiiemal influences but that cannot be fulfilled by intrrtstl authentic*.

Craw tl Atta *ad the Sou* Cancans are at-or**

-> -' bef the

adiuu to me thoekt of globaliration while tatnng advantage ol its Opporturauet They have weal poli-iiet thai tie, albeit to different degrees, "ovetper wool

Irid"oteover. the pOSi-So-iet aint^ctniauon hat already totted them lo lake ongreat deal without flsdr having so contendth* social rsabihtaooa and mstceabon that gfo-haiitaiKa could bung. Wont of all. they may be unable su harness tbe many berwflu of gkibohuoon What wilt be the net efrect? At Thou Enlai said onte when asked about the eft net of the French Revolution

oo early to say."

CMl SecMly: Gnutiro.OrennoaUooi in the South Caucasus Stephen June*

Mi Hotyvt* Ccll<t*

Kh ciarotial hc^ijc* ct aery cSHitiatx Bolethe creationegal arid economic framework for civil society isttnoceacy is mcaninglost without theof aiiMns to participate in policymaking. In the South Caucasus CJtet. ihe elements of an effntive avicteH-'merest. rsuCaJ oust, bteucotal bmU between groucs. ecssssflatsc iade-prodence. and respect for rhe rules tee weakany treat outside the capitals, Doneiisanni InAimtnit ud Aieibujtit. as in other pott'Com-rouiasthe cbsiacbr* lo issterest and

STsSSif-iv*Tri-

pleafatmce of tin* axialraised cceatiousarat of cctstssoa jtssenstta. orgatBm-tionBlthe eif more traditiootl loyikie* io kin and psironi. orrl ignorance of now laws.

Usst it* SOvM legacyonlyfrcbttntt The new gom have, oa (heitlttcd the famtl tiamrwork for iht caitnmce of oatocauonal

and Hiieiru groups, but ihey cannot or will noi meet Other ituportattt requueitsrnU for rhe establishment of

adrokxnalic civilould list

testroaanaae order Of irepurtonee to b* sn;*'dnt asrves OW pc^otaooo'inrerh; en eflectrve aw eapubir irf iniplroeating.ing. and uirreccmg rmtsnanaged pDlxies;relatively dean govertunctrUovernment that titrmpu io control coemption: and lha public jecountob.Uiy of et ecu Uvr ud legataUve Hi uc tares.

Crnl sesrtttyartssteship between state and tost-ety. but in die CaueauiF thr ttanu are on longrr ptn-nen. Ihesttiet" wrtbdrtwal from their reiponiiWJitics In major tec lots of economic life ha* undnrmlned ihc capacay o(iy of (be por*itauoa lo ptMici. pat* In pet my ted vasdy taajuoi aecoss to fJi'Jeal sower, tncieased Bse teopc tor eceTUpaoa and Theof powerful uDoectuntahle pervate intere tu. widened the gap between tune and lortety. and teniforced popular cy incncn I. K. Onlbrtith't remark ibui "nothing .euttroeger limit oa the

24

liberty of the drjzeeoul absence of money" is particularly appropriate in Sooth Caucasus societies.

Michael Mann bas pointed cat that the active involve*f the state incaUs*uifrasoruc-turalr the state's ability to centrally coordinate and regulate civilperfectly compatible aod necessary even to effectiveSuch regulatory involvement withot the same as "cespooc power" or the stare's ability to arbitrarily exercise power over society. Mamtaininp. infratuociurai slate activity in society rather than emphasizing its. separation from society Is the best means lo democracyunctioning civil society. This Is true particularly ID the conditions of systemic collapse and political transformation when tbe stale has to create the authority, consensus, and rules that sustaineak state in terms of an absence ol inirastructural support for its population, which is the situation in all three South Caucasus states, will produce the very elements that undermine liberaldecline, gross inequalities, nnd public cynicism.

In this coolest, civil society cants at three distinctin tbe South Caucasus, Tbe tendency to focus on one level, neglecting the other two levels, wincha large segment of the populations hi rhe South Caucasus stater, leadsnisundentarsding of tbe level of development of civil society in the region and to coumcrprodoctiv* policies Intended to foster civil society. The three levels of civil society are:

lever" one leptescnts the local uon govern men ul wgani rations (NGOs) thai operate mainly in the capital cities which receive support and financial assistance from the United States and international organizations. Their operating language is Fnp.lirth. and their activities promote democracy in the region. Theyragile network in the region that focuses on issues such as hi)proving access topromoting human rights, and increasing and sustaining public confidence in the government. Their activities are highly visible to the international community, hut often these NGOs run amateurish operations that base little local support and probably will not survive without external funding.

Level two embodies the asvragc worker in South Caucasus societies, such as the government clerks, farmers, and factory workers, who are disconnected from public life. Ibis groupacuum in the middle of societynorganized and cynical about tbe political and ecooomic changes, and that has no incentive to participate in civil society. Tbe focus of external NGOs should be to bring these

' level more includes the traditional dsn. kin, atal cli -eot/patron relationships that keep the country roo-nlag. These networks lead to be corrupt and exist outside of the government. But they are thethat Support people's daily lives in the region. These organizations can erode tie power of states, but are necessarily inimical to tho slate aod civil society. These networks that affect the daily lives of all citizens must also be accepted as an integral part of dsil society.

Civil Society: Grassroots Organizations in Central Asia Florsa HID

The Eurasia Foundation .

At the end of, rhe common view of the states of Conn a! Asia Is that ihey have been effectively transformed into oligarchies fit her than representative democracies and that there are few oppottunitics for citizen paruBpauc* in government or civic andaffairs. Although this view is not inaccurate, it is certainly to complete. During tbe last decade, there also have been some significant pofclive achievements in the new states of Central Asia- Perhaps the most important cteveJopmcnt fs that as state Institutions have collapsed, small and medium sized enterprises, business incubators, professional associations, new and innovative educational uistitutiorrs. Independent media outlets, and NGOs all have appeared.

A decade after itxlepcoctajcc, these grassroots efiorts are in fact beginning lo make their presence felt, to engage with governments and ceriainly to shape tbe civic aod economic landscape, even if ihey have sot yetajor factor in domestic politics. They offer both opportunities and cbalkoges I

ippidumlies where ihey provide crucial willthai governments casinoi affordass scale, -in' helpinglleviate soci.il pressures; andwhere (hey question government policiesall for new laws or major change. Internal andNOO programs io strengthen the independent media hose perhaps been the most challenging to kcal governments, although programs by groups such as Imernews lo offer broader access lo information for mass media outlets.

The paths taken by the five Central Asian states since independence have been very different, ranging from re la live openness and attempts at reform inlo the main lea anceermcicoed society with ihe trappingsommand economy inGiven the growing political and economic differences among the states,ifficult to moke general sutcments about grassroots organizations In the region, and the NOO sector and its relationship with ihe state is different in each country.

In Uzbekistan, most NGOs are really whai one might call GONCOs (govcrrrnient-crgariizcdhey have full government support and do not openlythe government on issues. The government also makes if very difficult lo register an NGO. especially ir itandate or pome that might appeartroublesome by mentioning the wordany NGOs listed in Uzbekistan, therefore, are not registered by the government The linesore conventional NGO. government, and private enterprise are often blurred, with many self-pro-claimed NGOs operatingee basis. Indigenous, traditional models of civil society have been naively promoted by the government. Including Makhalku or grassroots neighborhood associations that existed in pro-Soviet timeself-organizing body for groups of buildings and streets. MakhaUas arc now seen increasinglyource of local leadershipechanism for small-scale assistance, such at loans and microcredit as well as welfare payments, and external NGOs, such as the Eurasia Foundation, have begun to work with them directly. Within Uzbekistan. II Ihe su[regional level, there are differences inbetween government and NGOs.

In contrast to Uzbekistan, in Tajikistan, many NGOs are truly grassroots organizations, tlere the chaotic slate and fragility of the central govern mew in the wake of7 Tajik civilaunting

array of social and economic pi ob tents, and poor interregional corruriuniea'iitria, have distracted the government nnd loosened controls. NGOs have Sprouted throughout the country and often joined forces to discuss key issues of reform. Public debates have taken place openly and regularly io Tajikistan that would be rare elsewhere in Central Asia Tha Association of Political Scientists Id Dushanbe, for enample, has become the pretttier uipBsiaationthe prublcfnt of fitiKi.hmg andultiparty system rc Tatduttan aad lot discussing the role of parties at tbe gcivetnrtsrm

GraaSeccts crgnaiioexcis have also stepped ten taste direct action to address the cotuafry'a proiaeena. The Tajik Center forandnorthern Tajikistan, for example, and other organ iiatKOil like it. bate treated training pro grauni in accounting, finance, management, markedng and basic business skilla for fanners and would-be entreptencuis.

in Tutionenittan, gnssrcou OrguniaaUnnt are few and far between, and the number of ret) tie red NGOs can be counted on one hand, (hose that are officially licensed all managed lo slip iheir icglstrauonpcui some leu than attend ve governmenta few yours ago. Most focus on environmental issues, although there areumber thai offerresources and social servient. The Turkmen Gov-crnrrseni deals with graasriiott organizations primarily as challenges and/or threats to Us author!iy.

In Xarakhsur. and Kyrjyritan. use txowrh ofcttaniaaucoa rs slow but de finitely movingm Kazaihitarn, private enterprise NGOs. such as bnaasesa and prtrfeaauoratirobably have had the roost aascceaav That IcealeeorD-ing iocreasiisgly fleaiNe (rather than oWaucOceiist) ia this area and open to innervssfsoo. cacartiaUy ar the rnKTOSevel For eaaenple. in AI maty, the mrarpendent "TUS" Law Center, which is affiliated svsth the Ad Jet Higher School of Law, haa created an orfutraootithat offers an ahemaUve mechanism lor resolving ecooomic and commercial riitpuiea to the still unre-formcd court system. The center also offers assistance lo NGOs, small businesses, and othri jHofen.uiial asset jatiuns in addressing financial and legaland is lobbying for the postageaw on arbi-oatioti with the govrnnmeni.

In Kyrgyislan, independent financialGOs, nod other grassroots ragazuzatiorts are allart of lhe political and economic landscape. The NGO movement also seems to beoice with the government. It is not uncommon lor NGOs to advocate through the courts, parliament, or legislature. In the Ferghana Valley, for example, the Osh-bascd Fund for Legal aad Ecoooerjc Refortm offers legal support for NGOs, israveling legal clrrac to address land disputes throughout the Kyrgyzof the Valley, and is lobbying the government for court reform and new legislation. This programestament to the people's growing belief in their ability to influence domestic politics.

In spite of the cUfferesces. regional NGOs share com-moo problems, not least of which are difficulties in ohrainirtg funding. Moreover, and the axaniries of externa; NGOs are hindered by legislation andin retaliation. One major pchten with NGOs across Central Asiaackonstituency base or rxsembershlp. An additional problem in Central Asia is the growing "technologyonly with die West, but also with Russia, and between the regional capitals and provincial cities and ruralense of information deprivation prevails across the legion, which is particularly acute In the more remote areas of Central Asia, and critical regions like the Ferghana Valley Grassroots ojganizadoos have serious Jiffi -cutty in establishing contacts with similarto share rapesiences and best practices. NCOS and citizens Ba Central Asia are reaching out to catch other at the same time that regional governments arc moving further apart, focusing on state-building and consoiidatioo. and carving out spheres of influence.

In sum. lo spite of the obstacles, there axe numerous new and potentially significant developments al the grassroots level In Central Asia Although these are sail in the it infancy and it is difficult to project just bow these efforts will shape the region, clearlyartan presidents, oligarchs, and corrupt business and in nl elites an not the "only show infl Central Asia, the states are aiiffsccitartan, notThis means that there are cracks in tbe political facade that civil society is able to push through With patience mid funding, indigenous grassrootsand external NOOs can work there in Ihe larger interests of Uio people ofthe region.

Islam and Other Idrulogics Olivier Roy

French National Center/or Scientific Research

Political Islamic movements ofave moved in two different and contradictoryOn one band, the mainstream movements became more moderate and iniesrraaed'On the otherore conservative Islam is emerging that is not revolutionary, but is moresupeanationalist, and and-ted States in its orientation

Islamic muienatim. Tins rrsovemect represents tbe integration of Islam into the political stale as seen with the Islamic Republic ia Iran. Refah in Turkey, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in Algeria, and the Tajik Islamic Movement in Tajikistan. For example, in Tajikistan the Tajik: Islamic Movement recognizes the rote of the stale and now promotes on Islamic identity, not against secularism, but against Uxbclditan. These Islamic parties focus on political Integration ami nationalist foreign policy. Shariar is Ins andeferee-ce point for them, although they pushonservative social order.

Salop Jihadiit.This movement is attracting either rootless (Ramzi) or committed nrternauccialisi (Bin Laden) militants. They discard state borders, fight for the jihad, aad seek to re create the Muslim ummah and shartai as tbe axis to build an Islamic community. They are both conservatives andand are connectedlobal network thai attract* Muslims from all over the work! to right

in Kashmir, Bosnia, Chechnya. Afghanistan, and the Philippines

Islamic fundamental!im tn Central Asia and therefers to the salaft-jthadlat model, except in Tajikistan. But, despite its Internationalist claim, the saiafi'jihadist movement In Central Asia and thetends to be more localized- an expression of local identity in areas such as Ferghana, villages in Dagbcstan, and upper Gbarm valley- rather than national or even supranational movements. Generally speaking. Ismrnk radicalism tends to reenforec

national, ethnic and regionalometimes the ethnic and national faultlirjes match, but mote often they do not-entral Ana rime sckifi jthadtti asoYernentvivrsrve factot and am - - Of -

The Central Asian states arc secular. Islam shapes society, but doe* not influence the politics. Thein lite region give Upservjce to traditional Islamactor of social conscrvauim Tho govern. menta in the region seek to control the official clergy, which have power over the great movefiles in the region. But al the same time, we see cocstrvaovetrends where Islam is Wended with bashtsort. Polygamy io Tetkmcr.isr^r.. eiimple of tbe social influences of Islam in tbe regionoes not leadolitical mobilltatsoo In most of Central AsiaIslam iihreat to the stair In Tajikistan. Islamic nationalism hasritical driver of state consolidation This has also been the case in Iran Uzbekistan, however, represents the only country where political Islam may challenge the ruling wiser.

Islam does notule in the foreign policy of thesexcept when the government!hreat, such at the lalafijJiadist threats emanating from Afghamtian. Pitman that isdiied instability.

NarcotrafTkblng and the Rise of Independent Militias S. Fredrick Starr

Central Aila-Caucasus Institute

In Central Asia, the traditional Western definition* for drug dealers, mafias, and mi It aaa blur. All threehave become to inextricably linked that one caatnot distinguish one from the other. The activities and support of all rhrce categories are far more rnter-national than eve* before, particularly In terms id funding

Na reotr aJTlc fti ng

No de^nrlorsrnctst in Central Asia bat greater gcopolio-cal significance than the worldwide shift of heroic prrxsuclkei front Burrna and the Golden Triangle to AfghanistanS and the preaenL Whereas the wholesale value per kilogram of cocaine in any major world capital is betweenollars, the corresponding value for heroin itfghani iran (and. incrcas-irigly. adjacent areas of Pakistan. Tajikistan. Kyrgyrsun and Xinjiang) prcxtoecs irsd/or prccessespercent of heroin consumed in Eur upe and alsoaptdty growing percentage of Asian (mainly Chinese) demand. Ninety percent of tha raw product derives from Taliban-held areas of Afghanistan.

Central Asia it now by far the largest of four main export routes (Iran. Pakistan-China,he traffic is dominated by mtrsmssorsnal cartels based increasingly in Moscow but also in Nigeria.he Ctsartttnt. arsd the Batten PcnrerMlotssl traders arc reapceoibk forn lemunas and are paid by the cartels "inhis is leading to the rapid growth of consumption across Central Asia.

The value of drug trafficking in Central Asia is not known but It probably now constitute* the largest national income stream in Tajikistan and close to that in Kyrgyistan Both opposition and official branches of the Tajik Government receive racmey frrxn dais source, as do torne law enforcement offtccn. customs officials, and military officers in ihe other countnei. according lo local informants.

Where is Ihe focus of activity? Il i* found not In the urban are si but principally in the mountainous rural areas, where other economic atorMthrM are scarce. The drug trade is fueled by the poverty in the most rteglecicd regions The Ferghana Vattey hasenter of activity Despite the efforts of Uzbekinterdiction hovers atercenl.

Independent Militias

Lake tbe drug traders. militias ate almost always idler-national in character, formed at bases outside ihe former Soviet space, and suppoited by Middle Eastern and Pakistani patrons and drug dealers. Militias feed oa tmemployment ratber than political repression. Interviews with dozens of Werner Tajik nub'tJanow in tbe Tajik army indicate that the promise financial rewards, often extending to their entirerather than reaction against repression or tbeof an attractive ideology. Is the main motivation for cartkapating.

The international community can take stepsut back the drag traffic and miUtias and reduce demand for drugs. Drug production is demaad-clrivcB and the main consumers arehe West.

Stanch the flow of international funding to militias. Support for militias not deriving from drugs comes from several of Aroerica's closest allies, including

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Enrirates. Address tbe chaos in Afghanistan. Were some form of stability to be established in Afghanistan, both militias and the drug trade would be denied (heir essential feeding ground.

Provide economic alternatives to poor, mountainous regions in Central Asia.

Hiihlight- from the DtxaaHtM The Impactlum

Conmuniaiori should be min<tyWow ihey talk about Islam. How we define Muslim nates and refer to Islamic groups or movements It ceo strained and diit.ifted by terms, which are inaccurate or itby the west. .Several examples were ranted during the conference:

and Mxalkm Surer Tea diffcrcncr becweee

nd MM tin

pau several yean. paracwWfy as Islamic petn emerge in nadftKmallylira stitn. sorb as Egypt aad larfcey

Ffaiismwrnfdtiilinrnmi Out discussant cautioned the paselitu lhat the term "mr^arncntal-ists" carries Ognihcaflt rtarogaiory baggage Fund*-mrii jIum in any reJigoe hold strong views, but they are dm taaceatarily violent or anttsiate-"EatrerruaT Islam may be more appropriateescribe the dangerous Islamic movements id Ihe region

n Central Asia. Wahabls refer tofunda-menrallsu who come from Pakistan ut Afghan: nan. but they are actolitical movement. For example, wahibstajikistan do not recognize themselvesohbcaJ alignrramt. However, most Corns! Asian regimes use the term Wahabi more broeclyescribe Islasnac rcbgiuus mcneenenes collide Oseoafrol

W foit erf ItLnm tn Ctnnral Aaa rmi ftd Thereas seme ihiacnrerutfethre lisnarc-WbCi JnC losiWlily is the regjea Several passciisxs argued rhtt IslamxSerne force ia Central Asia Others observed thai Islam strengthens national and r'ti.-in identities and fuels iniernal teou.ti

There wasthai Central Asian lenders may exaggerate the threat nuns Islamic rilrcmitts lo attract sympathy aod aid from the West and that In reality some of these. guveiniiienU are treating their own internal stab* It ty problems by repressing evenexpression of Islam. One discussant, on the basis

of his time in use region Interviewing captive Uzbek and Kyrgyz islamic militants in Afghanistan, argued that the growing number of Itlnntie militants are largely "pushed" out of their countriesscapediscrimination, police tfxise.ack of eeo-ntxasc opportunity, rather man "pulled- byppeal of eEreraist Islam.

SiabUiry and posy*ruy mull emitoLaon cf rheanAfFhaiuttaa is the nexus for training nnd ttaginn of Islamic militants and the nar-cociarttcking lhat sweeps across tbe continent from Burma in Turkey. Instability at the core of the region inhibits energy transportation Russia will continue to use instability in Afghanistan to justify its presence in Central Asia.

Ailiirci feeds Jie Afyhani tian pmbtim One discus lant highlighted the inei tncabkt Link between ihe AlghtrrrUJa prooiem and Pakistan by cWcnhcgem-ac of One Pakiuae* mleary sn Sao tntiataag and haedout of 3se Taliban and easier islarte tsssTkants. He wstrsessed the Unpromu of weapons and food from Pakistan to framing greaiads ia Algharustan. Therefore, policy ehreeled at solving die Afghanistan problem will have to (ontrnri with Pakistan's eootrlb-inrwy fnfiurree.

A liable Afghanistan Ii ho panacea While theseagreed that the Afghanistan conflict must be resolved to bring stability to Centralnula-pconged approach it required lo address thersi. the dtmand side ofthe cocaine odrot-em must be httrued in effectively sryrciedrug trafficijei; Sevoed. ittrsin r. ck* slopceene programsfocas on cresting aheroa-tiT eetecraic opportunities lu> populaatos lhat are forced lo live ofl :he drig trade, iwrticulorty in ruraltable Afghanistan will reduce the msrediase Islamic threat in Cenutl Asi* bul will notIslamic militant movements, which are inaeeueesonal andasi network of lupponert across Asia, from the Philippines lo North Africa.

=0

Problems and Opportunities in the Development of Civil Society

Centra! Asia and the South Caucasus may be facedlost generation. "The flight of human capital, combined with declining resources availableritical problem in both regions. Education infrastructure is rapidly deteriorating, leaving die young generation to grow up with little or no formal education. One panelistumber ofcontributing to the education problem.

Tbe dire poverty of many communities in the region inhibits the schooling of children. Many are required to stay at borne to help on farms or are put to work to earn money. Many children lack schoolbooks or even shoes to wear to school

The dilapidated school infrastructure is unsanitary and lacks sufficient beating facilities, which keep children away in tbe winter months.

Textbooks arc scarce, and those available tend to be poor and unbalanced.

Because of the regimes' inability to pay teachermany of these countrieseacherparticularly those qualified to teach languages. For example. Georgia ishortage of Instructors to teach Georgian to non-Georgians, which exacerbates the integration problem.

Some panelists noted that these education problems could pose insurmountable obstacles for the economic development in these regions and that these countries could be telt behind in tbe era of globalization.panelists commented that private institutions fu ruled by variety of international organi/slicns have begun to fill the vacuum created by the collapsededucation infrastructure. But for the most pan only the elites have access to these private institutions. One panelist disagreed, however, with this assessment in the case of Uzbekistan, where public education insti-mtions have shown great resourcefulness in managing scarce resources and in instituting fee-paying programs under tbe auspices of the public otgariiza-lions. Re also rioted that erureprenuri al ism in thesector is fueling the establishmentyriad of educationalsecondary and higherUzbekistan, which are not only available to thetry's elite.

Civil society projects should focus on the microlevel. Several panelists and discussants agreed that large-scale change is difficult to ioiriate, but that significant progress is being made at Ihe local and mtcrotevels through targeted assistance and tbe work oftermed the 'Thousand points of tight" approach by one panelist. Microlevel change can only be achieved by working on the ground with the local people,in the rural areas. Numerous small enterprise associations are developing in Central Asia. However, more rrncrocredit is needed for such enterprises toarger coritrirsuiion to growth and employment in these societies. One discussant, whoative of tbe Central Asian region, lauded Ihe Eurasiafor its dedication to sustainable projects. Several discussants observed that women in Central Asia are taking leadership and decisionmaking into Iheir own hands to improve their situation, especially inand Kyrgyzstan.

NGOs are shaping civil society but must focus on sus-rainability. To be successful, the organizers of external assistance programs must make an effort tostate and civil society relationships in these regions. Much of tbe civil society activity in these countries takes place among labor groups, farmers, and pensioners that live outside tbe capitals andare currently neglected by Western NGOs. One panelist argued that international NGOs must focus on developing local, self-sustaining NGOs. Currently, active, uternational NGOs in theses regions tend to generate resentment among the locals because they often fail toense of equality or partnership with domestic organizations. This resultsrowing dependency on the NGO and little preparationpost-NGO" environment. Consequently, when the advisers leave, the communities are ill equipped to carry on by themselves, making many civil society-building projects unsustainable.

Pant IDJ

Regional

teznined bow each new tutc views Its relationships with iiatoucefag nana. iacktnkng both other Newlycnlwln uf law fornaex Soviet Union.cponsl approach, not an inerarcgitnal approach. This Dew regional coolest has many new features th* also insntve outside slates. Speakers- from the Soothand Central Asian regions were asked to outline bow each of Iheir respective countries hi thinking tbect its sc-atrgv: universe

Chairman. Tom Zeaaceeay

Ofiterc ofuropean Attain it

Stratcgle Universe uf the State* in Ihe South Caucasus Paul Until

RAND Corporaatt

Russia's shartow hangs heavily over the eanire South Caucasus region. All the stales erf the SouthAzerbaijan, andfrom the effects of two centuries of Russo-Soviela form of colonialiso more pernicious than thar eapeneoceO by most Third World countries. Seen in broad hiitotie.il peispeerive. Ransom impecsal dorci-catjoa enforecdin rhe regies led generated eeoThese were poslu'r gtins. bet TO years of Soviet rule badly distorted Caucasian coon-tries' evolution, tuliurdiniting economic development an Mscow's priorities,nise of political powerlessneu ami impossibility among theand laying the basis for Inmnsthed ethiuc ten-lions cace KGB CCWCrota were relaied

To ccenTOutrl matters, Russians <wnf.-lthcis raying degree* of governmental support) engaged io inespoaslblr political maneuvers during and after the collapse of Soviel posset which haveof uruettlcd cucuTktJ in each of these countries, lainstability in Caucasian regitaui thai remain ssTifaegiiiiia aaaaasateNceihCauearji coniiraues so agectsnntriii cat Ban soststsa ndt of Oe Dounains- Russia has been usable so develop aCaucasus policy or so rein in military id venturers.

old Communists, and net*Imperialist nationalists. Thus ll has stumbled from one brutal intervention to another in bora North and South Caucasian affairs. Il bat groeneed fear and dutrust in Cecepa and Arer-baisaa It has caaceibaaed political eceecerac. aadetans in its Ncedi Caucasian repubhes

Strategic llrilverse

Gears la and Azerbaijan thare deep distrust of Russian neo-imperialist tendencies. Both blame Russia fee etacerbating msensal ethnic units. Both tuapeel Rns-sla of ahernhg assassmatton anetnpts agajtsi iheir letdrri Both wish to reduce residual dependence on Russia and reorient all iheir relationship*est-East, rather than Nortli-South direction. Both give high priority to good relauoni with Turkey. Both desire deter rdarjons with NATO Both aspireecctnirtg part of an enoentc corridec encoding from Eaatere Europe ntrrugb Cccentl Asia all the way to China

The tact that the pocolatioa of Georgia isOrthodoi Chris liar, utile that of Azerbaijan is rirednminately Shia Motion boa little effect on public ametlet or on these couaencs' poUXal oricaeaitoa Beat give tooperaare reiaooet with each other high prionty. Georgia values cluse relations with Turkey. Ukrainr. and Ituropr, eapecially with Germany. The United Stares looms large In Georgia's Interests and expectations Georgia also aspires to close reLuieru with the FSU Stares of Central Asia, particular ty LMvaatean. ll has dote rektnoai wirh Israelairly ckste reiabccnzop with Iran Arrrbeijtn hat aa

e-iflc livii-iilrr'.

links wilh and interests In the much larger Arerlof Iran. Azerbaijanood relationship wirh Israel. In almost all other respects, Azerbaijan'tei toward other countries and peoples, mcluil-cg the Unseed Statesrope, paraDd those of Georgia

Armenia continues to be led by men who favor Russiarotector. Armenia payi lip service to notions of

3}

regional arsJ.Souln Caucasian,ojiciwiiiii but hu isolated itself by lu nigresiioii against Aierttsijjn. Russia's Inabibry lo formulaterational, fc*wiud-looking Caucasus policy leaves It locked into in old imperial habit uf eiplojiinj Armr-nnut fa pcditicking in the rtpn I'm nco-impenalut Pmmu Anariun return dunce with Tarkey (vhpthbring the ceterar)m> aaaiirit uttdcmrable. atwasa enjoyingtlaoeen "nth id crcpo&QcaJ

aagai . .itasi am Armenianiscouragcd by diatpraa nuemitlt. hovet; been niubM tn eatricate themiclvet hum Hi" piedtcantral.

Armenian* air heictrmenia (mIi bed to Russia levee Btouajh rt cannot ilnji truu mj tntMan altneauieetote Itakt to Creece- Armtaia ieofcs to Iranactual fnend and ihares man? of the con veotionsl itluudct of Russians toward Arab and Btl-kan counUtn, seemingly preferring raifcitli and mavericks among them. Among European coanuiei. Anncr.it forli warmetl toward Franca.tie re therearge Aimmiaii dim port. Armenia wltbu to becjiopcen/Writem country, but Ut cloie linkt ioimit the enthusiasm wilhilia Faaopean and NATOArmenia rs-garOs Uw United States at tn impoette* rrtrndboteat its otttpota at America to prtuaoa-Itreii. agaioti the drum ofthe Eiecuiie and pttibe opinion, id maintain punitive rreuures Jgatntl Azerbaijan

Regional

The moil contcruenve alliance for Ihe South Cauca-ttn uih en would be oast lhar braaghr all three tofeibnommon market with tmnilty and polio cat ctnauori at well at lar-reacBug tceatotaie ceoc-ctaatoa.ulll cliherrncet btlwetn Amteeoa and Aacrbaiita There it good reason to relieve that Russia, at preteelly led, would goonsiderable length to tbscourage anuVce block trail ration of any South Caucasian all lance, pre [erring to deal separately with each South Ctucatian country and return the option of encouraging rivalry aad rtrain among them.

Whit makes these tlliancan postouth Cauca-tut common markrt would be logical from anand energy viewpoint: It alto makes gcographx tense, fives the importance uf cspaodlng nil forms of transport through then ceorfaiaird fashion. Sccariry coeeeranon nang the DMm ta aavntber- ilocId be rataauiry beoeS Cut ia scatuolnag trrwggbag. crag traBx. and aBBuaaam

1 .irur.tosiiU IntUtuOoea

Georgia and Aaerhai>in grva treat importance to allirtntjmienti fc* cooperation with NATO, the fsuropten Ihiion and the Organization for Security Cooperalkin In butcue (OSCEk both countries are cnthutlauicil ate ml and uniltj-

ilitaryiint-West

transport schemes.et eoceerttian rHorts. and retpocO cccoioenic ceoprrttioii im'tiauvet with Middle iuutere cDBntnn to the south llu loooresee how GUUAM wvll orvrJop. hist GeoTfi and Ater-baiyas see it asigauScaai fuoare with the fowaalrand alliance tfTiagR&ema None of these regional cooeeranonet faDy strue-eared; rnoat are drfrndrnl on iracDngs between crest-deaes and eerier foUu. al leaden which icenetunes email little foliowthroiian.

All three South Caucasian countries valuela ihe United Naimist and moat of its subordinate organimuont. All recognise Out il provides afee some degree of iiutlajeUcm of lerrhceitl cotll welcome the vanout kinds of assiitaiKe that UN agencies can pruvida None of Qiest emsatries. however, bat wnrcdiaUc etsweuoleea about tbe UN'l absarydeal tmti ufor prcctstte aad am of

At kaagas Aontaii roam close (Dategic fabtas likely en b*oo-intl ptroei-pant in moit of the uoupwalive BUKgrn^nu thai Gecrgst tnd AaerhaJ)an value. If tht rttrua of Nagorno-Karabukh were to he rrgu.tnred aod acrOMtclllotion between Armenia and

mpinkd tx tfoBowed try totiptonagonoftl nditioiubtp between Arm tola- %mdctetfe nm& *tfor AnnenLiVt whole-nondinctt^mdv*p. Rn&uiii* rrur^rv

at erf tasocrncy.urf} nnd cOT.omk proerent in it* Soalb Cnucnuu will he pen-Able only whra Kraut ixcojialfti itneli to ihc lou of Ltycrvi) cuaquMU tn tbe jetfco indonv itrucure cMtifpi v( ibe foni

1Uiiiujjiit

t-Jvemly iffec< th* economic pcti&cji dtvetopiivnl of beencctatwi lib**

1 fcafci'j:^in AartWjnn. tat ii *

fttOCTitt ivmii nnd ttcn*3cnc tnetitav Tan nwan of

aed try AirKThM nr*lc tttfjatka Thr MB*of Ok tvttuat.ee id AbMut-

ttrct^ [xtliLVal icsxico. asi relative resultedr.jruirit* propOtTJLty

Georgia, and so taIhe

w->]

d& Com of JuhnlflinnnYn] of both ol tneie Area will increase inHdlly tf**tangertbc tUk^nttn pentsL Tbe

r^orttai

oUocal chuiCM in tbe

iiyiwrn comtuated by twoKuum uticJ WeA

AJteifeofppbbc nwy >majfj>

pica nodu cotopirrd id ttroirt agot (hit fun da ^

rocQCtJ bipoiir view of thn politictJ iltuoiicn in one

rcftai I: tit nc( ctoncd. ind probnbfy wiJJ duI cbugc

bBawfcwiF-ihltl^tv

liit-fit autiilfhe

cewly ^uifTd OeotgiBM loJtpeiHleacc tnd AyioboJ

bci th* pntt wtkte dw Wmi trftUmWtMf >rcu-

(iiy ptWDoo Md ccwlklutag InckpfvdM wifhv.! ' IhMl Inl

4ui Ihr RiKunc.afcJy iraUwJ tfirvuch

pOfT of jniriT-ii KpArVifl fcnirnwttfetxiJUi

ftad OtieiUo nXrVawiiU, o* Krolu^Lbl (utcti, inch mheader AhentfUdBe. AAovgh lUrw two tfiaern*ivwCyLxcfi^ii fi^Tcr

tXtmaken an ikicmtx prcitrru braf pcr> WcWwti uiunlly mttr* *upportn^ .fcrwntic nnd

nuLf* rtfcfm* itLhorur.im iiirinaini

TiminW vatJanoM

^tiiij^ ^bxixeninry nnd nrrwlrri

logtcnl dilTefeaco tecwocrj "IniT aadlo be [be matt ca^iCooui oMdiog hoc bnween

nd ?ttC.TJciirert

ChCtbnyB.y

tod Aatrttttjtin forltllLMprf ftcnocnuhefc

ii Jn^uWy tflcctrJ by dmloi^nonei lotiencctiv Sovint Umoc wru neva *b>nasfrxcory jKilifkal approiirn to the entire Ctuctsu* region ind mttand fell tuckbn

Tnriit bib* ot tfivtaW Tbe ;ree*Vra Su

bj Innf JnCm MMm. fliPTd to mert thf cWfenp?

on Ihe fevcJ of pnliticnl *om (as tbe Nntlyw of etac diif oufmthow) nnd wide public (ns it clearic opktonTbem any be IbeU.omibntint dcfcaigaiiutbkbadnatb4nciled itjeif to tbe tfjtsatraifipc taieU*te of Rniua. Jomtng CISsmkjfied flnt mo to tto

direction, followed by agree menu on Russianin Abkhazia and on the Russian military basesver Georgia- Although these decision* wereHumiliating, ihey were also widely popular, because the country felt it had exhausted ia resources in resisting Russian pressure. Geotgia later stabilized and slowly but consistently drifted away from Russia and toward rhe West This meant rapprochement with individual Western countries [first of *J1 the United Stares) and irecmtttonal erg am radons. Cornpenuoo for pipeline route* for transporting Caspian oil to western coovurrsers has been the major context In which throe policy changes occurred, but from the Georgian point of view the geopolitical meaning of pipeline project* far exceeded their purely economic aspects Building the Baks-Supta pace!inc. joining the Council .if turope and World Trade Orgarurebonstablishing closer coorsrs-aooo with NATO within the Partnership for Peace program, and. on ihe Other hand, the departure of Russian border troop* and the agieemeni to close ol the Russian bases, represent the moat important achievements of the Georgian Government in its pec- Western course andteady thift toward rhe West. President Shevardnadze has stated that Georgia will knock on NATO's door

While Georgian* do consider the Western optionenerally preferable choice for theneve,-oprnent. Isosvever. actual pro-Western orientation of the Georgian politics cannot be taken for granted. The Georgian Government and public are not confident aboul continuous commitment of Western countries to the region. There isear that the Weal will change its prioriSes or "reOtm" Georgia to the Russian sphere of influencean at* some behind-the-scenes deal. This is why President Shevardnidze never openly challenged Russian leadership la tbe region, and there were never clear demands for the Russian military bate* io leave Georgia The country's political elite may be mainly pro-Western, but it it also of road of being left "one on one' svKh Ruts*ritical moment

Putin's ascendance to power in Russia revitalized fears thaiore consolidated and dynamic leadership, and having put Ihe problem of Chechnya behind ii. Russia may again because marc assertive in the South Caucasus There it no guarantor of any out side protection. On the other hand. Presidenthopes that with more rational and predictable

leadership in Russia, some acceptable deal on accutity issue* may be reached. which was impossible with Yeltsin While Pistin teems to be ar, enigma for the whole world, rhe Georgian kaderahrp tries to keep its options with Russia open.

Relation*ll other countries are mainly secondary to this major dikrtuna. Turkey is consideredtliaoor lo NATO, which makes this country Ihe closest aDy in the region. Azerbaijan is another close ally becataw il has suotlar problems as Georgiais Russia. Among different regional organitons of which Geotgiaart. GUI JAM may be based on the moat genuine interest and prove to be the most lasting one, although allare reluctant to make this group too conspicuous lo avoid irritating Russia loo much. Armeniape-etal cmc" Tbilisi is smptcsou* of Yerevan became of its close security ties to Russia, but good relationsorma are crucial for teveial reasons:ood re lai luos with oil neighbors will allow Georgia to present Itselfivotal cnuntry in matters of regional cooperation;eorgia needs stability in it* Armenian-copal tied regions: andeorgia wants to take advantage o! being Armenia's

Today's volatile stability In the region is fully bonedhnky balance of power between Russia, the United States. Turkey, anil local state and subtitle actors. Thit balance has been relatively stable for five yean. Preserving exiseng trends in the near future might mean changes is details (Russian militaryin Georgia may diminish still mere, for .nitjr.ee) but nut in the general picture: conflicts In Abkhazia or Nagorno-Karabakh probably would eonUnue in or deadlocked stage, the South Caucasus will be seen at mainly an arena of Russian-American com-petition, and so forth Even the pasting of such quasi -eternal leaden, sacb as Shev ordnadze or Abyew. would not change much (of coarse, if these countries master orderly succession ofike exchanging Trr Petroatlan for Koclserian did noi bring much change. Local actors seem lo be preoccupied with Internal problems andnit-and-see attitude with regards to the "bighereague feel-mg in (he ae that something may ttart to change in theut nobctty knout in what directacas.Georgian politics are snick. Prodcrrsocriiseit waning and the direction of the country is no

longer dear It needs anew direction. If change docs occur, the initial push probably will not come from within the region, at least not from an intentional change in policies.

Azerbaijan's Perspective Leila Ajjeva

Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. Johns Hopkins University

The major challenge for the Caucasus states in the post-Soviet era has been integrating the region with the world community, above all with the West, while at the same lineafe and secure regional environment for the process of state-building. However fragmented Russian foreign policy was toward the Caucasus, tlx strategic importance of the region in the post-Soviet period put these countries under the permanent pressure of the ambitious hot economically weak former Soviet metropole. Russian foreign policy has been tbe result of complex relations among competing institutions, internal politicaland international factors. Despite its gradually shrinking resource base, Russia did not back away from these pressures in dealing with the Caucasus states- Instead, Russia remained faithful to itspolicies of "divide andraditionally strong Russian security agencies supported theof weakening and desttbilizing the new states, lrrrprxtantly, Russia has notubstantial resource base to support these aims.

Two major events1 have underminedInfluence in tbe post-Soviet Caucasus: the Chechen warnd President All yev'idie "contract of tbe cranny" with the majorenergy companies

il has played quite an important role in the foreign policy strategies and security of theand io the politics of the whole region. ForAliyev, natural resources nave been an Important tool in his corssolidation of power domestically, as well as in his foreign policy. As in tbe other South Caucasus states, tbe itutia! stages of staie-building in Azerbaijan were affected by internal and externalresidential form of government was favoredarliamentary government because of

the weak state institutions and Soviet institutionalRevenues from energy resourcestrong incentive for the government to maintainover them as well as use themeans of Stg power through patronage.

As iho external and internal threats diminished, the new political institutions started to shape foreigndecisions. Strong, centralized executive power tended to make foreign policy dependent on personal capabilitiesew leaders, on subjective images, and on strategics largely shaped by the personalof the leaders. At tho same time, strongpower gave tbe executive branch extensive freedom in its foreign policy formulation byH from the influence of different interest groups and the parliamentary resistance. In this context,decision-making also became increasingly dependent on the consolidation of power and was driven by tbe leader's desire to protect his regime.

The post-Soviet leaders of Azerbaijan viewedof foreign policy similarly, but differed in their understanding of the nature of international relations and in their strategics for pursuing those objectives. In spite of the piedotnirutntly Muslim population, post-Soviet Azerbaijan's social and political elites haveonsensus with regard to their country'spolicy orientation.

Tbe post-Soviet foreign policies of Azerbaijan have evolved over trie past decade:

uring this initial period, an idealis-tic/ideo)ogical ariproach to foreign policy prevailed, particularly among young intellectuals.

xeri leaders begun ioore pragmatic approach to foreign policy. When he became president, former Communist leader Heydar Aliyev used Azerbaijan's strategic energy resources as an asset to attract Western interests andin the region, thereby creating alliances to counterbalance Russian and Iranian attempts to expand their influence io the South Caucasus.

o the Present. The piesent period iiby giowing Wesicrn econoinic and security interests in the region, which have resulted in adialogue with the West and the diminishing of external threats lo Azerbaijan's security. Today, commercial interests and individual securityare becoming more salient in Azerbaijan'spolicy and arc contributing to competition among tie Caspian states. The countries in the region are feeling more secure and confident and have begun lo balance iheir interests among the regional cowers Factors affectinghange of leadership in Russia, which appears more amenableialogue with the West and NATO, the totalization of Ihc regime in Iran; and the prospects for an Iranian dialogue with the United States.

These changes in Che regional cnvironme nt coincided with the difficulties in liftingection of the Freedom of Support Act and the disrupted Nargorno-Koribakh peace prtiecs*ie laitei hasesult of Russia's meddling in the South Caucasus and the spillover effects of Russia's incursions in Chechnya. Both the Karabakh conflict and themendment in tho United States remain crucial issues that influence the foreign policy behavior of theleadership Different outcomes could either strengthen or weaken Aliyev's regime. Putin's interest in gaining the support of the South Caucasus stales forced him to recognize, at least verbally, tbeintegrity of Azerbaijan and Georgia and express his willingness iouarantor of the peace agrce-rrserat between Arrnenia and Azerbaijan Theof President Putinegotiating partner, however, does not guarantee his ability to changepolkaea in the South Caucasus. Fear of leasing tbe South Caucasus aod lack of support from his power barse will put serious ccesstjajnts on the degree to which he can fulfill his promises to leaders ia the region.

Arrnenia's Perspective Gerard J. Li bar id inn

East-West Institute

During Ihc last decade there have been essentially two opposing views in Arrnenia concerning regional dynamics and future alliances. The first may be called the ideological. Proponents of this view. Communists

and some nationalists, argue that there are unchanging and unchangeable circumstances in the country's interests which compel it toussiancomplemented by close cooperation, if not an alliance, with Iran. This would counter the East-WestIs perceived to be the goal of some countries. This position was also the dominant conventional view0 and relied on the premise lhat Turkey is the eternal enemy. All other foreign policy and security coiisi derations tTow from an alliance with Russia, inclanti-Arrtericanism and an "historic" antagonism with Turkey. It is worth noting, madeauuTy, that byhe basic assumptions of this position were also shared by most organizations of the Armenian diaspora in the United States and Europe.

The second view, the pragmatic one. was put forth by the Armenian National Movement (ANM) ant) its leader, the former President Ter-Pctrossian. It assignedriori and permanentotto any of the states; it rjroposcd nonrialization ofwith all neighbors as the goal of foreign, policy and sought long-term security in resolving problems with neighbors through diplomacy and regionalThis was the dominant view under Tcr-Fevossian. The Kocharian Adrrnmstrution has not, in principle, changed the basic premises of the policy. Tactical steps taken recently, however, haveits substance.

ractical level, conceptualas they relate to Baku andbeen mitigated, and actual relations have been determined by tbe course of the Nagorno-Karabakh war and resulting economic realities.

There are plenty of reasons for Armenia to develop strong cooperation with all its neighbors: energy, transport, creation of and access to larger markets. and complementarity of economies and resources. The Nagorno- Karabakh conflict have also made any kind of serious regional cooperation or securitypractically inuposstbte; for Azerbaijan to permitelationship would be tantamount to aiding the enemy.

Tbe Nagorno Karubakh conflict has undermined Tautest-Armenian relation* upon wbkb (be pragmatic policy tested. The linkage Turkey has made between the Cfciabi PshmetH of diplomaticrd tbe operting of tbe bolder with Annraia to the resolution of the conflict lias weakened the credibility of tbe pragmatic view and de facto compelledoloser association with Russia. Instead of becoming part ofthe rotation, Turkey has remained part of Anneto'a's security rroblera. real and/orTurkey's full diplornatic support toposition in the Nagorno-Karabakh negotiations and participation in Azerbaijan'sof Armenia has served only to deepen the historic mistrust that exists between the two peoples, ttanner-raore. Turkey's position stands in sharp contrast to Iran's ceutraiity regarding the conflict and its fulland economic relations with both Armenia and Azerbaijan, despite tbe theocratic nature of its regtroe.

ractical level. Artccnia has not been abac tosup-plant Russia as the country Ihul provides tbe most assistance to Armenia: energy, loans, markets for its goods and escorted Labor end, of course, arms. In tbe absence of visible and concrete progress In relations with Turkey, Russia will be seenatural tailback country, litis teinfuecs tbe position of thosero-Russian crientatkrri. despite tbe dear signs that Russia does not support Arrrsenia's position in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and that it has obvious interests in Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan, In Dim, relying on oil-and-gas diplomacy, has attempted toRussia through an apparent rapcrocbctnccr with the West, especially the United Stares. One of the mu sequences of the conflict has been the emergenceeo-Cosd War in the region.

ocumtcs outside the region are teen largely as friendly. Relations ate significant from an economic point of view. In principle. Armenia accepts and encourages all forms of membeniiip in andwith regional and mternational organizations antl projects. The CIS was originally seenaa sary mechanism for thetioii of tbe empire and is still usefulediating imtitution, certainly from the point of view of practical gains in the securityTU AM is viewed with caution. It could

becomesehjclc to antagonize Russia, which would compel Armenia to make tough choices it cannot afford to make at this time. European structures are viewed positively, though not yet from the point of view of security.

ban is seennendly. though difficult, neighbor Geography and Iran's difficulties with the inarms-ccectl corarouznty. as sveO as Iran's trade policies, make it cUBcBft to deveiop these rrlstaocs to theii poreotial Armeies baa resisted, tsocetheiess. sog^es-neosslttertl Wateapc coopcraoooikely to so in tbe future Armenia baa taken part inarwgerrertrs thatbeen proposed by Irae with Greece. Turkmenistan, and Ukraine. Purthei-raoie. for Ik'Ji adminisir adorn, the conceptegional ssncurity pact would Irachide Iran as well as Russia and Turkey.

Much more so lhan the previotai one, the current administrolion's slew of Its relaUoua wilh NearEuropean and American stales includes tbesupranational "Diaspora factor" orhich tome view as thr equivalent lo Azerbaijan's oil

A balanced foreign and security policy is still afor Armenia. Tune la running out, however. Armenia, like Azerbaijan, may be losing us capaciiy to make sovereign decisions, particularly wilh regard to Ihe settlement of the Naxonso-Karabelh conflict. That conflict ternaina the unglc-mosl important factor In the future of ibeia two rrtiublica and Ihe mosilever in Russia's policy with regard lo ihe region. The increase in rhe stuanber of recposals for regional "seenr-.ty pacts' tssecoa to be directly ptcapottjoua! to the decrease ia the sbstir. of Wafers so rracb and deliver KtuOoos to local conflicts Cmsmake repooal cocperaoce on any level pissihte

Tbe rise of Putin rosy change the rofc of the CIS Tbe war in Chechnya aod its spillover effect may compel reluctant members, such as Georgia and Azatmijjji. toider role for that orgarnitation Putin may be able to dampen the enthusiasm of someWest-em'* or "NATO" crietUatloTL Finally, the question regarding Russian policy Id (he region can no Winger

-

vfaeihet Riasii wants pern and stability in ihe region or ox- Russia hot impo&ed both In ibe region in (he pan. Thai, ih effect, is the substance of pai Sovie-lies. The question is whether Russia has enough

and inilwncc tov. Ruilica.

andax Americana

There are three likely scenarios (or the future of ihe

SCJth CnucMUs:

Sock team of Western accommodation with and improved US relation* ssnh Iran rhat permit economic and political ccenpetition ia the while allowing the three reo&WJes to cooperate closely and retain much of their

lo happen at some point in the coming period. Thee* remarks seek to charocterite the regional dynamics of Centra! Asia in the period before and after such a

More than any other state, inchiding Russia and China. Afghanistan hot defined the regional dynamics

servedfee Russia's cccatuiuing military presence along the former southern Soviet borderl has prevented the export of gas. oil,inertH. and raw cotton to nearby andlucrative markets in South and Southeast Asia, in the process Uscrcasang the region's cenendcoce on mutes and markets cceatroued by Moscow. Fears over

The region my become the arenaew Cold War it waged, given the weaknesses of the three republics and their inability to avoid strung external alliances. The furore of tbe region would be uncertain, if not chaotkr.

' Tbe three stales may gradually slid' intophere, without necessarily losing (heirRussia's vveatoaeascs nee many and serious; but these are weaknesses as compared lo Ihe United States and other major states, not in the Southrepublics. Furthermore. Russia hasi of influence. Finally. Ruins hasabetsce anel piomr.ity. which the West may be lacking.

in Afghanistan have contribaned touthoritarian character of all the repine* and lo their defemiie iscSaticci tram case another.

An opening to the Scuth could occuride variety of regime* in Afghanistan. It require* amply that liability be established there and lhat the Afghan Government put ao cod to the use of its rerricory for ts against its neighbor) Howituation within Afghani nan alter the regional of Central Asia? Obviously, any answer

ive. It it useful to try to ianag-

drteloccKnis ir. -jLiee

it. acd security.

Universe of Ih* Slates In S. Fredrick Starr

Ciniiol Aila-Osvoiui Inn tout

The southern and eastern border ol (he USSRfor decades the wortd's longest and most tightly sealed iDtcmaUcoi) boundary In that sector of this border, which fell within Central Asia, however, il vas athai severed age old links and ties thai embraced Untie, culture, and security. Following ihe collapse of the USSR and tie esaaDtishmeot ol eight newadjacent lo or near this boundary. Ihe nararal course of events would have led so rhe recsuhbshmui nfies Because of continued concernsIran fears regarding Afghiriiun.as not yet occurred.s bound

The loll of the USSR ted to rhe opening of direct air routes to many cardials tcid trading centers beyond Soviet Central Asia. Three reeds have been opened u> Cnina. and brorOer East-Wen links -are em ihe drawing boards. Bat no significant road or rail links yet exist lo the Scuth. Consequently. Chin* has been able to(he Central Asian market for cheap goods,onsumer of electricity and, potentially, oil from the region,trong presence throughout rhe area, and establish itself at leastar with Afghanistan and Russiaactor in the security dynamics of Central Asia.

40

Theof transport cortidorj to Iran, Pakistan, and India will drantaucally shift these dynamics. Indian and Pakistani Uisnmjmeri andre quite bhiot about their desire to supplant Ouiaource of goods lor Cereal Asaa. Both cocuatnes have assigned povrinmcnul commissions to explore tbe devclopfarnt of (rampart to bring this about.

Tbey sec their advantage as deriving from the fact that they would, at the sameecome markets for Central Asian gas, oil, and electricity. On the Central Asian ride, ail cciurse-vcs ice India and,esser extern. Pakistan,ess threatening; partner than China (or Russia) andeans of providing some coonterwetght to Chinas growing presence.groups of Indian businessmen visiting Central Asia with this writer have declared their readiness to invest in tbe region, once direct transport routes are opened.

Central Asian leadersommon sense oflack of control over their reality. They all seek an area lhat ihry can control; this need is rootedack of rjower.ense of power. Surrounded by great powers. Central Asians tend toefenv si ve strategy. Tbe West should seek to understand tbe intraregionil relations and the strategic agendas of each of the states. Despite therr weakness and tbe

complexities ofthe environment, the only immediate

threat to their security is Afghanistan

Tbe reduction of the threat from Afghanistan (andpositive changes in Iran) will significantly affect other aspects of Central Asia's regional dynajrncs.

will undercut tbe raoooale fee Rossis's attempts toecurity presence in tbe region andRussia'* transformaticeiasteolacia) threatormal traveling rsnrtner.

With the Ifircat from Russia reduced. It will diminish tbe sense of urgency with which stales in the region now look to tie United States and NATO for security.

openinp of South Asian markets for Central Asian gas and oil win advance the cause ofpipeline routes" und hence reduce Russia's

control over the region's exports, even as it(but does not eliminate) prospectsajor East West energy corridor

* The establishment of stable conditions inwill sharply diminish the causes of tension among the states of Central Asia, sjiexifScally theur concern to close their respective borcWj againstMarmc radicals, aod tiarcoerafTickefSwho are often the same people

What are the chances ofositive turn of events in Afghanistan? Experience has made fools of rnost oprimiui on this issue.umber of recent develoeaacms. which wiD be reviewed in derail in tbe oral report, suggest that chances arebetter now than at any lime since the end of the USSR. Let It be noted, in cottclusioo, that everyentral Asia cow places this as its number ooe security issue and the key to Irrtrsios-ed regsooal dynamics and well-being.

Uzbekistan's Perspective RaOk Sh. Salfulip

Institute for Strategic and Regional Studies

The growing interrtational attentionbe problems of the Central Asian region shows that the states ofAsia have gained considerably in geostrategic importance foUowing the USSR's collapse, 'rhe future of Central Asia requires tsew understanchng of thehistory and an appropriateof its role and place in formation of the new world order and both conventional norms and values.

When thinking about "Central Asia tomorrow" it is rser*ssery to answer tbe fttUowing questions:

How do wo imagine the world tomorrow, tod how will Central Asians represent themselves in this new world?

What will tbe Central Asian regtoo look like in the future, and wtiat values and systems will prevail in the states in the region?

How will Central Ant be involved in Ibis new world, and vhii principle* will dominate Hi develontneai?

Tbeto iheie qurtfjrre wtrry oot onlyol the Central Asian region, but alio in many respects arc unalar to ihotchich arise in uncut pens ot* lha weald regarding the fcrure of ihe global order

The Central Asian piece of the new wot Id rnottkQualitatively new character. Centralnot play the main role in formation of aonlei. but events, occurring now in thenot only local importance, batargealso capable of influencing neighboringia this leascei. the Central Ana: I'jiti are rrfpottaloi rrulera

,Vr eg WRMA

An essential feature of Centralhat itaul-Ciethnic tnd iiHiliinaiiocal region rich wiih cultures andheiiijge of different ervilizatioru. Central Asmich positive experience in the maintenance of equal conditions for all multinational grouna living In the region, and the "Centra) Alian tomorrow" depends oa Ihe ability of thr present and future generations to keep and to develop this position.

Uiiderstanding the Central Asian role in the new rnttl-Opolar wand ss connected wirfe tbe gecooliticalaad econonac poeeraaJ of the region But at the same imr. ensirg Kaodards. coemnijcealnd Central Asian values farm an important base (or thertnburjon that ihe region is capable of brinnirato

The Republicxhekiiun not onlyominant role, but also for many objective reasons It beats responsibility for how Central Asia will enter the future world. The Republic of Uibckistanocal point for centuries-oldloes culture andTbe tmportarit laaka of the present and future generatiom includealues and adaporif ccisona traditions and hen ugc to the global civilized rsorrns and values.any respects the Uzbek tapmeace of state corasrruriaoe. tbej ilkaue secy, assdporuJ identityrowing new sauce are unique

The purposes and the principle* in which the Republic of Uzbekistan adheres tail prepares fnr tbe future are simple, char, and obvious They include:

Revival of its centuries old cultural values andwith us neb spiritual and historical heritage.

r fromind

Separation of theactical interpretation.

Continuous search of their combination andof old norms and values with all advancedand new ideas.

Balance of inicmu of various notional, eehnic. and regional groups Irving in the country andof their real equality.

Tbe revival and strengthening of Uzbekistanledge for strengthening and developing nationalcitizens of ihe Republic of Uzbekistan, Irrespective of their nationality, ethnicity, and reuglon.

Central Asia, the Islamic culture dominates, but the region's view of development of economic, political, legal, and social system tends to be secular in nature. The future of the Its so-called Muslim world in many respects depends on how this orientation will berealized. Uzbekistan docs not want to repeat Russia's mistake in Chechnya, in which Russianof Islam created the conditions for discontent and ejt/emism in the North Caucasus.

Etch Central Asian state is unique. Despite this fact, everyone in Central Asks Speaks of regwnalIt is too early, however, to talk about regional integration. Each of the Central Asian states isdifferent national strategies and is moving toward different goals and in different directions. Civil society and democracy have developed in different ways and at various levels. Each state has employed a

different economic strategy that has taken It in diverse directions. Tbe states endowed with rich energy resource* bc^ed these resource* would be the key to their success, but the process is slower than expected.

The Centra] Asian stales have beenegional security architecture,umber ofhave emerged. The obstacles include:beAula states view their threats differently and apply different approaches and levers of attention to these threats;ach state possesses different levels of readiness and military capability which mako asecurity structure unrealistic in the short term although it has been discussed.

Uzbekistan has no illusions aboul the interna] and external threats thai it faces. The Uzbek military seeks to increase its forces, enhance its readiness, and broaden its military doctrine. Uzbekistan's current focus ia protecting its borders UMrnaiely.security would benefit most if tbe United States and Russia could work together in tbe region on areas of common interest.

Kazakhstan's Perspective Ycrtruuhamel Yertysbayev

KeaakJuian Insiiruw of SUairgk Sludlts

Kazakhstan cannot change its geography. Its national security policy is do mi nn led by the fact that It lies between Russia andtwo difforent wotboth of which are unstable and going through tines of great change.

Kazakhstan's geopolitical strategy conttui of thefive duecuoro:eyond theWest, with an emphasis oaelationship villi tho UnitedouthernUzbekistan and Afghanistan;orthernasternChina; andestern directionenergy cootro-versiea in the Caspian Sea. In all of these directions. Kazakhstan ices threats.

In the South, the chaos and instability in Afghanistan will continue to spill over into Central Asia. This cou-fhci does norirect military threat into CexiraL Asia, however. The more real danger is the drug-trafficking and the Qow of refugees into the legioo.

The Centra] Asian states must coordinate their attempts to resolve this conflict and stabilize Afghani -Stan Al the same time. Kazakhs are wary of their smaller neighbor (Uzbekistan) whose populationKazakhstan. Kazakhstan's relations with Uzbekistan remain tense due to disputes over land nod control over water.

To the North, the signsesurgent Russia, shaped by either nationalist or imperial motivations, are emerging. Putin's asceodance to power makes Ihemore complicated and less predictable Any indicationsesurgent Russia worry Kazakhstan that it will be one of Russia's first targets Nceihera Kazakhstan is most vulnerable since Russiansto outnumber Kazakhs. Kazakhstan is more important for Russia than even Belarus in terms of geopolitical interests. Despite the sovereignty and security guarantees given by five powerful states (the United Slates. Russia, Qcna. France and UnitedRussiahreat to the territorial integrity of Kazakhstan.

To the East, Kazakhstan hasormal rela-bonship with China. Although currently China does notirect military threat to Kazakhstan, one should not ignore the possibility. Tlie military threat itself can be defined tn different ways, which are linked to the ethnic, demographic, economic, and politicalhina and itsor exin Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region, the external support of Uighur separatist tendencies could potentially cause ethnic conflicts between China nnd Kazakhstan China will never allow the Uigburs toeparate nation. Tbe Uighur problem could cause problems for the oil (flpehne that tbe Chinese plan to build across the region.

The Caspian has been the gateway to tbe West. After the breakup of cbe USSR. Kazakhstan sought ahrma-tjves tonfluence. This taskey component of the development strategies of all the Central Asian stales. The Caspian energy resources and their transportation to tbe world marketeans for Kazakhstan io develop viablel factor" has lead to the creation of an East-West energy transport corridor, and Kazakhstan intendsentral role in this eon text This will

peomote nol only economic development, but also regional cooperation in Central Asia Initial regime pessimism about the Baku-Ceyhan pipejme has been replacedeliel" rfaat the East-Wesi corrtoor wsil strengthen rhe sovereignty of ail of ihe NewlyStates and strill build stronger links between chem. Control aver its energy resources and theroutes It crucial to Kazakhstan's geopolitical position. AlUtough the pipelines will fosterbecause of tbe variety of interests in the Caspian, it is the I''of Central Asta."

The poteweal foreal bul does rso< serve rhe interest of any of the littoral states, nor thecommunity invesiing in the regiontruggle for Caspian oil and the geopolitical influence in this region between the West and Russia cannot be ignored. The Russians iocretsingly feel excluded from Use Trans Caucasian region. An alliance between Baku Tbilisi is al the centerarger axis of countries: Ukraine. Georgia. Arerbaijan. Uzbekistan, andTha* "Tranaemcasaan corridor" seeks to exclude Ruusa from Transcaucasia and create aof the former Soviet republics oriented toward the West. We mayew policy emerge in

Russia, however, in it action to this Transcaocasian corridor lhat will lead to direct pressure on the Central Asian states and above all. Kazakhstan

All use factors mentioned above, taken scceratciy or cotisadered together, have the potential to threaten Ihe territorial integrity and the statehood of Kazakhstan. At preaeni, however, they are more latent than real threats. Today in Kazakhstan internal securityam the dominant threats for Kazakhs (an and for Central Asia in general. Internal insecurity willuntil the sharp ccastradicrion between the eco rioanicej necessity and rhe pohtKal possibilities in this regson art addressed. One should rccuamire that rhe social-ecceurruc aod pouojeal traaif ormanon bat caued tremendous social difficulties and destabilizing social conditions

Highiighu From ihe Discussion

Russia's Hole and Regionalariety of views were expressed on bow iheconflici will impact Russia's strategy towardAsia and the South Caucasus. Some panelists argued that cooperatioa with tbe South Cancasian stales "made sense" for Russia in order lo bound the quagrnire in tbe North with stability in the South. In contrast, several panelists declaredhift inpolicy to be unrealistic and that Moscow is more likely to continue to exploit opportunities to foment separatist activism, its most effective lever over these states.

One discussant argued that President Putinay to end the impasse and that the conflict in Chechnya bad created conditions in whichwith Georgia and Azerbaijan served Russia's interests. Another regional panelist also commented on this significant rhetorical change in Georgia and Azerbaijan toward Putin, but cautioned mat theperception in the South Caucasian societies is one of uncertainty about Putin and fear of an increasingly vigorous Russia.

A second paoelist Irom the region added that arole for Russia is highly probable. Russia needs peace in the South Caucasus to manage the Situation in Crtcchnya, but the realhose peace will be acceptable. He posited that Moscow couldtable situation in the regionPax Russica" arrangement in which Russia would be preeminent

Among those whoegative view on thisanelist noted that no constituency exists in Russia whichhiftorepolicy toward the Caucasus. Putin's rhetoric and personal desire alone cannot shift this policy.

Panelistsange of views on the potential for stability and regional cooperation in the Southif Russia minimtzrd its presence in (he region.

panelists opined that many of tbe ethnicand separatistexample. In Abkhazia and Southdissipate in the absence of external (predominantly Russian)

Support. Although another panelist believed that if left alone the South Caucasus countries could resolve their conflicts, he cautionedumber of theexample, Abkhazia. Chechnya, andbeen created by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the politics that ensued. These problems will be difficultnother questioned whether Russia wouldeace between Azerbaijan and Armenia that would minimize Russia's presence.

a panelist from Central Asia believed that more conflict io the region would emerge if the Russians withdrew. But because this instability could have oegative spillover effects in Russia, Moscow will not pull out of the region. Therefore, the regional actors seek to balance Russian presence with support from the West.

Discussants raised the question of how Russia would react if Turkey tookore prominent role in the South Caucasus. Several panelists noted that Russia and Iran will be threatened by the prospectarger role for Turkey in theanelist from the region opined that domestic constituencies in Turkey and Armenia would noturkey-Arrnenia rapprochement, and thatas outlived its usefulness, becoming moreurden for the regionenefit for Arrnenia. Another panelist posited thai today Azerbaijan would probably support Turkey-Armenia reconciliation, even though it had used these hostilities to squeeze Armenia andever against Turkey.

There was also some disagreement over how the South Caucasus states should manage their strategic options. Several panelist agreed that these states should focus on distancing themselves from Russia by pursuing opportunities and relationships with each other and with other countries, such as the United States, Turkey. Iran, and Israel.trategy would insulate them from Moscow's attempts to destabilize them. It was noted that Azerbaijani President Aliyev hasalanced foreign policy strategy successfully.

Another panelist argued lhat none of the three South Caucasus states could hope to play "the big game of geopolitics" with Russia, Iran, Turkey, or tbe United States. Smallor withoutfocus on modesi and defined foreign policy objectives. This panelist noted that tbe region should be thinking about how to decrease the role of external actors,that the independence and security of the region will come through regional cooperation not the influ-ence of external powers.

Uzbekistan

Control over its securityestern orientation drives Uzbekistan's military policy. Thereense of crisis on every side for President Karimov.seeks to gain more control over its foreign policy, prevent manipulation by outside powers, and assume more responsibility for its security. The panelist from Uzbekistan argued that his country seeks toegional security cooperation regime that couldcross-border problems, but it recognizes that iis neighbors do not have the same security concerns or control of their borders. The panelist also warned againstegional structure lo addressissues to be established in the near term.

The Uzbek Government assumes that Russia will remain assertive in the region, but Uzbekistan'sorientation will behe West. Uzbekistan sees the West, specifically tbe Urtited States,ource of technology and foreign investment, but more important, it would like assistance for military training and leadership development from the United Slates. The Uzbek military, however, will continue to rely on Russia for equipment because it is cost effective. But Uzbekistan hopes to receive more assistance from tbe United States. The panelist reiterated thatorientation will be increasingly toward tbe West, despite tbe fact the population is approximately SO percent Muslim. Tbe elite seek toecular Muslim state lhat is linked to the West.

Panel TV

View From the Periphery

panel explored how the major cxurnal actors view ihe new relationships thai are unfoWsug between and anions Central Asian/South Caucasus states or their neighbora.

Ch airman: George Kolt

National Intelligence Council

Iran

Mohiaddin Mesbahi

Florida International University

Iran's rseteepcioa and expectations of gains in the region arc heavily tempered by lis anticipation ofthreats and losses. The inevitable ceotrabty of Iran in shaping both the discursive and policyof the legion's geopolitics, the international political economy of energy, and the geoeadtnre of identity and ideological preferences, constitutes the complex web of dynamics within whkb Iran'sof its policy and its "reading" of tbe keyof the regional tsancms arc developed and articulated.

Hve critical factors base shaped the Iranian corceptu-aliratioo of the post-Soviet wo rid.

A sclf-perccptioo of Iran's cenDality as ibe natural political and ccoootnic actor in shaping the key gco-pedidea] and economic patteens of interactions io the South Caucasus and Central Asia, or the Caspian Basin at targe. This self-perceteioo is derived from Iran's assets and b'abtlirics as annd its own mtenrally inspired Tegiti-mate" ambitions ofowerrul and self-respected regional player. Tbe belief that al) key decisions and their coriseouerit dynamics have been and will be affected by Iran, either dehberatoly or by default, is tbe most important onctapiruang of the Iranian conceptualization aadf the regional patterns and developments.

The "identity" of Iran as an Islamic revolutionary state, either real and self-described as the Ummu'l qora' (the Islamicr

perceived and labeledrogue stale,'" This ide-arional factor has been at the core oftheof Iran's opportunities and constraints,ey ingredient of the "threat model'* employedost of otherwise divergent regional and cxtrar-egional acfors In their assessment of and attitudes toward Iran. Tbe complicated "reward structure-attached to (his "threat model" in this region, like elsewbere, not only affects Iran's choices but fuithcr iafwms Iran's pcrtepticos of regional dynamics and strategic patterns.

Tbe significance, if not the primacy, of relations with Russiatrategic balancer (regionally andf not partner,ource of trade and arms, rindartner in political and economic regional patterns. One might even observe, in view of Iran's policy In the region, especially in the Worth Caucasus and Tajikistan, that Tehran's regionalhas beccsrne increasingly "Russiat remains to be seen whether the longstandingmistrust and the absence of real structural mutual interests, which tradiOoruilly usforrned Iraniantoward Moscow, will be replaced, wader the incrensmg rneastueof the United Stales and the threatening pattern of regionalolid strategic rorwergcoce of virion, intetcsts,ore assertive Russia.

Tbe future nature of US-Iran relations is among the most important extra regional deveksprnenrs with strategic impact on key security and economic pat-lerns in tbe South Caucasus and Central Asia La this decade.

The specific historical, ethnic, irfeanooal, andfactors that determine the nature, degree, and scope of the bilateral and multilateral ties and Itiietactions between Iran and the new. independent states in the region. Different dynamics, foraffect Iran's relations with ujuostan andThese bilateral differentiations, while significant on their own terms, nevertheless are all heavily affected by the abose-fbur foundational factors.

Objective! and Perspectives

The central Iranian foreign policy objectives are:

ensure lhat rhe uncertain dynairisea of rhe Socrh Caucasus and Central Am will not undermine Iran's rational security aad territorial integrity (that it. crttocHnrriwriil raarhou such a* Nagoroo-Kanbakh)

be actively engaged, through biUrieral and mulb-laieral net, in shaping, the geopolitical em'ironmeat of theerm* molt favorable to Iran. Iran win oppose politico-military alliances that deny Iran meaningful participation in regional dynamics.

ensure,inimum. Ihe involvement of Iran In the emerging structures of the energy sretots io the Caspian Basin nnd. optimally, to position Iran to become the key logistic linkage of the Caspian Basin to rhe outside world.

avoid and bypass coeaaaneca suasegics through simultaneous parson of bilateral ties to all the new Central Astae Haiti, in addition to irututing ormate hue ral or tripartite uhinn i. not onlyregional stases, but alio wiih eatta regional piayerc.

dctceuriunt litem and Iran'i ideological image by untiring the peesumod influence olatio Islamic cultural milieu, capiialiring on the "new" democratic Iran, and downplayingavor of an "Intinclvilirationar interac-lion and dialogue.

The most seriously perceived long-term strategic threats to Iran air the US-led or encouraged regional, political, and economic coalitions that eaclude Iran. Iran fears that such regional schemes will eventually lead to military alliance', organized around what Tkhf ihiriibti as the notion of "US vital national interest in thead made up of Iran'sS neighbonas Azerbaijan aad TBfcey. posa-bty wish so eager otraiemsnrial aaiagoanf, such at Israel. In this connection, relations with Areitiajjao, givee obi-ioji and complicated cdino-ienitoiial. bis> torical. and religious aJITIiationi. will remain crttical. In Central Asia. Iran's main regional antagonist Is

perceived to be Uzbekistan, (he champion ofmental ism" whose regional hegemctuc ambitions against Iran's clvliuaiional kin in Tajikistan could be reinforced only by its poll Deo-security cooperation with the United States in the containment of "religious ritrerrtism."*

Iran's natural ceopeutot. both oalkatnraEy and rcgK*-ally. is Russia Yet. the overwhelming irnoact of the US role has runted Russiaey regionalootiout close relatJoAship with Anorran has been designed to provide the balancing measure,otential tripartite coalition with Russia and Armeniaesponse to the US-Turkey-Azerbaijan-Israel line on the horizon.

Iran will continue to count, cautiously, on theneutrality" of Turkmenistan, with the expectation that through both hi la rem] net and Human pressure. Turkmenistan will act jeopardise its re tancos with Inn in pursuitS centric policy. Inn's coceern over the future coarse of Twk^MaBMaHrrader South Asian angle, as Pakistanahbee-kd Alehanistan have been competing with Iran as an alternative source of energy transport

In Central Asia, an Usbek centric securitynnd supported by dte US/NATO, and organized around die notion of containment of religious eiticminm- it being pursued by Tashkent. If the West accepts and supports UibckriUn asegional coaliUoo,anooseRussian. Tajik, and Iranian coalitionistinct liitrasove response. The Tajik-Iranian defense treaty, (bough largely sysnbohc. is indicative. China, already in fa>oeloser security cooperation in Centralii favor rhe beta sotrategic USon its border. Ftirtherroott. China's increasing political, military, and economic tics to Iran have been UDCfcrscored byg-Tehran Moscow corjceptual convergence of interests In opposing perceived USot only globally, but regionally. InAsia and the Caucasus.

Tbe rationale lbsi drives these possible patterns of coalitions, and the glue that sustains Ihem lacks, wilh oae exception, serious, meaningful and positiveor identity content (that is. coalitionf "pan-Turkic"he rationale remains mostfy materially motivated, but these ate also traditional geopolitical calculations in balancing and "bandwagonmg" (that is, distance from neighboring hegercxtic Russiaroximity to the distant winner, the west arid the Unitednd the so li oca! economy of access to energy, capital, and markets.

hiu no serious ethnic, religious, or idcologi-cal source of tcumiAScatioc strong enough fotcosli-boa-building and its suster-ance.gut. but powerful, preference for secularismundamen-talisiTsiamist altematrie. This dichotomous identity struggle between "secularism" andeal or manufactured, hasriQcal discursivenot only for exdusion/containnjene of Iran, but more sjgmficantly.onduit to connect domestic politics and security with regional security. Domestic repression of the opposition, especially In Central Asia, is mostly theorized and implemented via the "domestic-external Islamicat timeswith drugnd regional security schemes and justification for military intervention are discussed and pursued in the same vein.

Tbe process of securitization of the domestic polityeliberate rcijuction of regime legitimacyight against "internal/cxtcrnal extremism" may serve the ruling elite in the short run. In the long run, however, the enormous underdevelopment of the region, increasing corruption, and the incrediblegap between the elite and the public posedomestic security threats to existing regimes: too close and uncritical Idcatifkation of external actors will inevitably lead to tbe unintended consequence of snaring the blame for existing repression, and paying the price in wealth, security and prestige. Thisreduction has camouflaged tbe serious impact of absence of structural legitimacy at borne as one of tbe long-terrn security problems la the region.

In this context, and la view of tbe impact of theoo US-Irani an relations, the recent changes inand the relative opening in Washing:on-Tehrar. relations may constitute tile harbinger of delusion of

securitization of Islam io the regionhole. Tbe reward structure attached to being distant from or opposing Iran has been part of the foreign policy and

actors since the collapse of the Sovietrastic positive change in US-Iran relations will thus be

t geopolitical, geocco-nomic, and geotdeationsl patterns of cooperation and

Alternatively, the continuing or even worsening of US-Iranian relations will lead to fluid but nevertheless discernible rivalry in tbe region. What makes thesecenarios trotc critical is their organicwith, and impact on. the Middle Eastern and Southwest Asian patterns of security in which, foror worse, Iran, geopolitically. gcoecoaomically. and ideatiooally constitutes the key linkage.

Turkey, Middle East, and Israel John C.aly

The Middle East Institute

In tbe emergent post-Soviet power vacuum in theand Central Asia. Turkey and Israel have em-rged as hnthrtnew and potentialfor deselopmcni. For many emerging nations, the two represent models to emulatearning to bced. The one common thread running through both is

Turkey emerged from the collapse of Coiratnunism in the USSR in1 with both opportunities and barriers to establishing historic linguistic andlinks. For Israel, tbe collapse of Communism meant both an end to the Soviet tilt toward Arab nations along with an opportunity for highly educated Russian lewith tefusniks to reach Israel, enriching Israeli society with their talents.om fries remain America's most steadfast regional allies.

Both countries have resources lhal interest die South Caucasus and Central Asia, most notably, theirpower. In the decade since the collapse of ihe USSR. Turkish military academies have trained moreilitary officers from lire Caucasus and Central Asia. As these officers move into middle

management prasirjons. former Russian naftueocr is being urppkcted by the secular KcrnsJisi influence line; ints mfuow of cmigrra imccof the USSR. Ail influx banInl CIS Tiiifcey,foriu (W. Ms feetg-csrahJishcd act. of laruruagc andiucorbtfig from the Balkan* to Xinjiang.

Sonne counlnes ia the Sooth Caucasus and Cential Aliaesource of immense intereii lo bothand Israel inexpensive energy reserves. Both countries arc energy poor, and look ai these reservesroximate, non-OPEC source of supply. In nut. Turkey has immense irvfluence over two of ihe four potential expon routes. In the cases of Baku-Novorostiisk and Baku-Supsa, Turkish influence alarms Russia, which sees an American-Israeli -Turkish "tone of influence" replacing ihe Soviel one. Turkey finds Itself in direct competition with Russia for energy transit routes, and Turkey will continue to block rise un or the Bosporus Strait for rhe export of Caspian oilew government innclear how wrongly Western inroads into these

Last but rvx less!.Turkey aod Israel ofln tec cesirid models to theagM aaotagtts of the Caucasus and Cereral Asia of how to deal with mter awl msutgencies. Israel's handbag of domestic Mas-lim rurvdssmerstalrst tmceisaa and Ttsrkey's successful suppression of its Kurdish IosrjrrecUon offer notable esamplcs of how to control unresolved separatirtProm Georgia's Abkhazian separausu io llrbrkistan't Hizb al-Tahrir. and from Kazakhstan! restive Russian minority to Kyrgyratan 'a southerntroubles with neighboring Tajikistan, these slates look at Turkish and Israeli success with admiration.

Both Israel and Turkey have great potential foe expanding their influence in the region. Their ultimate success, however, will be determinedomplex skein of energy and military issues within the larger conf American-Russian bilateral relations, as the guarantors of iheir respective clieoi states.

.Willi

t hi...

Cewser fa/ Security Sz^ltcs

Shying away from any neat conceptual rrsraewert, one caw argue that China's strategy toward Central Asia is driven by five factors.

iof Centralf support for 1

China Mani potential lo nerveaa. extremism andor the restive Uighurs of Xinjiang, But the alarm lhat cliarocierited the views of rrrarry Chinese officials ineriod has ebbed as China has gradually and successfully pushed for tighter ritstrietions by the govemnsents ofthe Central Asian Republics on domcslic groups thai sympathize with dissroenrs Ituude China. Forisitor to Almaty inf IW9 reported that pro-Uighuro be led by inefl ecove poseurs ano. in one serned toreation of the Kazakh secretTiny uridergioiind groups are said to existm very I, mi ted in whs. they can do. Nevertheless. China cotinnucs soose eye caa this potential threat, as any t

Publicly. Central Asian leaders acceptuns ihai its kong-tertn strategic goadsis the

But. looking just to China as all tha fads that

private and candid views, at least in Almaly. are exactly opposite the official stance. Tins is perhaps because of rapidly rising tensions over oil and waterhetlser Use irncrviewees were high-ranking Kaxakh Government officials, acarVenucs who had been anointed asof China or hard-isosed pro-Russian strategic ihnikcrx. the author round two schools of thought. The first is that China'st to occupy physically and militarily at least uflcarst portion of southern Kazakhstan. The

'only

lo wrap Kazakhstan so firmly inside its sphere of influence thai it Is no longer an independentis energy, natural resources, and other economic issues. Interestingly,ingleexpressed any hope that die US could or wouldignificant role ia helping KarakhsanChinese pressure.

China hat been very careful about pressing its huge advantages in Central asia to the full Tbe mainis that China's Central Asia policy today is in dacy ways subordinate in, and indeed an integral part of, its Russia policy. With admirable astresupesa, rising Chinaelatlcaxahip with dcclsangthat wuT lease China as the undisputed senior pan ner. Giving Russiait as if it rsnotin rtnr linti entral part of Chinese policy. (Sira makes every possible effort not to embarrass Russia and confront it with its weakness, particularly inAsia, where China is quite willing for now to acknowledge Russian primary. All the while, China slowly increases its influence in the region and avoids oiaking any significant long term concessions toke

The toog-arrm trend is cheat-hroaree bind fas theFar Fait5eri!-Aad, akhocgh there hateeuclear tea Chins now seems to eejoy aat efrertrve veto overAsia poBcy. Both trends ate only augment grcw-ing Chinese lnfaoance iu Central Asit in the soog term.

Ecottorritcs

ecame less concerned in thever potential threats from the Central Asian stales. Beijing has viewed them, especially Katokhstan and Kyr-gyrstan, aa both poteaual inarkets and sources of Imports particularly, of course, for Xinjiang. Part of China's development iiruargy for Xinjiang includes closer economic ties to Kaiakbstan and the ether Cee-traJ Asianod efforts are even satde to goe Xinjiangpiece if ihe action" in experts of goods rnarnrf termed on Chant's east coast

Pot mmecade, there has beenNew Silk Road" of highways, railways, and pipeline* Unking China with ihe Centra] Asian

stales and ultimately. In some cases, luiropr itself. Progress has been slow but roads and rail lines coo-time to be bulls.

China continues to see (he Central Asian stares as an ideal market fee ihe irsespensjve cottstsainr goods thai it prodiieet. and indeed, markets ia Almnry aadare full of rame QuiKse goods than modest trade data suggest This is due in part to smuggling, poor rccoidkeeping and third-country transit (on inquiry, il turns out that many Chinese goods on sale inore imported via Kyrgyzsian. whichuch "softer" border with China than does Kazakhstan).

Tbe "net corder" pofacy of China sail haw yet so he exseujirdy discussed. At Quai reached border dctuarcatJon agreements with rhe Central Asian stales during. these were rightly cued as evidence of China's desire for liable borders. However, what largely unremarked was that China demanded a

the movement of people and goods in both directions Naturally, this osiciwbelmingly and tiisprepoitinutely benefited the larger and economically robust China. It was this new "soft border" policy that led to an initial slew of reports in thebout floods ofmigrants and goods. Although many countries

ininstitiitingsrgnifis^ilymoresrruigent regulations This was probably only because China had been shaken by disturbances In Xinjiang3 and saw ccosidcrabte virtue in this particular instance tn retreating from its "soft border" pockcy.

Ersergy

Just as China's Central Asia policyn many ways subordinate to us Russia policy, China's Central Asia policy must also be viewed as aof itsenergy strategy. Fearing that it it becoming iracreasingiy vulnerables its ocean-borne Emporia of oil inexorably increase. China isar.l res col soppry frotn ceuatnies on its land rmtccrt. start-isg with Kajakhstan One need only recall the esjetv stve maieital relating to China's purchase, or right to purchase, two major oil fields la the eastern Caspian and its widely publicised comrriirncnt7 to

buildlengthy andexpensive oil pipeline lo unnipott ail (torn those and othci lields id Xinjiang and then to east central China. The conveotxeiai wisdom coouo-uci ro auett thai the econosruca of that pipeline are lain if Jl il will never be bcih. Aooourxetncnti inhat Chnu and Karakhuan had halted UlVa over the pipeline were umversaily viewed at accurate. ThU ww noi the case. According to etUaordtnarlly well informed sourcea in Almaiy. negotistxxi* have never ceased. The negotiaiMOS are tense and at times Niter, but both sides desperately want the line to be buiti for both ceramic and vuueperedicteline will be built aad that ccosaacooo will start witnin two yean. Alrredycaiiructing and improving what will be the domestic Chineseol the Kazakh line.

Closely related to the energy Issue islltle-noticed but esircrnely important conflict has been trowing between China and Kazakhstan over China's metsooci to divert water from the Irtysh River tonewly opened cotton fields in Xinjiang Although no one agrees on the einet numbers, it ss generally agreed that China bas ftnished iimitruc&ori ok* an Irri-git ion canal thai could potentially reduce the waier (lowing into Kazalthatan byoercent. The Kazakhs Interviewed In the autumnnside and osstisde government, were in what could bew br describedcale of "controlledover die situinside KazaUsstan. tome sis to eight notion Kaiaahs live snthe Inysh basin or depend on its water for drinking, irrigation, and hydro power The Chinese have indicated that they will reduce the flow of the trtynh by "only"igure that few Kazakhs find icsuuniring. Two knowledgeable Kazakhs argued thai rhe Chinese, without aver being explicit, have linked Ibe wafer rune to the pipelinethat Kazakltnafi should make ccoccsMonJ on the rape-line negiJUirucms if it wants to be certain lhat China will Dotster crisis on the country'.

1 Observations

Careful readers may have noticed the contradiction that has crept into this pteseiuation. The presentation began by asserting that Chinaatient, long-term strategic approach lo Central Asia, bat concluded by describing twoandare

It will be iii :tresting so observe wlsether China can pursue these interests without orTrndirig Russia. The evsdeocc so far suggests that Chiu will succeed in doing so

Pulling back the strategic locus. China may well betrategic crossroads itself that will impact ju future strategy toward Centra' Asia as well as Russia There itebase under way ha UK Chinese media over bowof ats de^lorsissesstnl resistances China should earmarli tor devetoprnrni of its westernTbis iccios lo be partargo debate or strug-gle thoi has often preoccupied China over tho centuries: the maritime school versus the continental school, ihe merchants of the south and east versus the soldiers and bureaucrats of the north andThis in 'era relates todayebt* over how many rcsttsurcc* and how much political capital should be expended on conquering Taiwan.

driving Chinahort-term assertion of its

Robert tigroid

iwriry

Russia has no stogie, integrated strategy toward either the South Caucasus or Central Asia.ussia never lias and likely never willingle,strategy toward either region due to the dirTet-eni challenges and opportunities presented by each

The fundamental reasons for this arc foarfold. First, rhe number of doeneitx actors governing Rmsia urate, its ability toonurun approach. Foreign Minitiei Primakov brieflyense of order during his tenure. Second, cr dm cutting purposes alio limit efforts at coordinating foreign policy. Russia Is still trying to balance its security needs with lb eiOrvJOJi" interests Third. Rusaia has bid difficulty reconciling the Defective* it put sura in then* two ret iih its object res i" Ihe*orid fo-rth. KlatKsnships with these cnuMnes have ramifican**ns that Russia has not adequately prepared for.

Consequently, Russia's policy is inchoate andIt is occasionally incoherent, has shifted almost

egrees during the past decade, and could easily shiftegrees in tbe near terra.

1s Russia sought to recover from the shock of the USSR's dissolution, it reduced the burden imposed by the struggling Newly Irtdependem Stales. Russian reformers such as Gaidar tried to cut loose the nirraoa-ridden Central Asian states as an economic burden. Foreign Minister Kozyrev did the same in terras of foreign relations. During rins period, "freebooters" in the Russian Government (Parliament regional goverruneo is, tbe rrutitary) had control of Russian policy toward Central Asia and the Caucasus.

, Russian policy had shifted to one of defending Russia from potential dangers in rhe region and to restoring Russian Influence (though with no desire to restore the Russianussia sought to ensure that no outside power would rnedorninate in the region and abrogated to itself respcosibUity for keeping order within its liniited mean* This policy had crystallized4ual policy of securing economic advantageis the two regions and winning Ihe strategic corirpctition In (be region with the West in general and the United States in particular.

Russia's power over the region derived from itsstrength in relative terms. Irom itsrom Its control of regional piraelines and transportfrom its ability to siraujisaxotisly create threats for those states that refused to cooperate (throughand mitoary aid) or reinforce tbe security of the more compliant In addition, Russia eouM often benefit from tbe outlook and orientation of the Soviet-era elites still holding power in Central Asia.

Economically. Russia had the power to support and keep truces in the conflicts in the region, but lacked peacemaking abilities. Rcseatraent of Russiandociiivartcc also deprived Russia of its legitimacy and capacity for leadeiship. Russia's overall weaknesstate also led to growing impotenceack of tbe means to achieve its ends in the region.

Three conclusions follow, none of them yet much noticed:

to the extent that Russia remains engaged in Cearral Asia and the South Caucasus, It is likely to rely on economic sticks rather than carrots, attempt-rag to use the leverage of prjelirjes, debt, and Rns-sian markets to secure the ecoriomic outcomes lhat its seeks. For the rest and with powers from outside the region, Russia, if it chooses to iranain engaged, is likely to compete on security terms, offering the Ccrttral Asians, for example, surer protection againsi Ibe threat of Islamic extremism than the West can musts r.

Second, and notwitlistanding the first point the greater danger isussia deteirrrined to restore its sway over these two regions,ussia that begins to walk away from the problems of these areas. There is an isolationist mood stirring among both the public and elites when it come* toonstructive, large-scale Russian role In the troubles of Central Asia and the Caucasus would impose. The prospect of Russia's defecting from responsibility for peace and stability in Central Asia and tbe South Caucasus goes urinotked by most governments in these regions, which continue to see more coherence and rrtalevolerjcc in Russian policy than is wrtrramed.

Third, and somewhat in contrast with the last point, at tbe moment, the strategic rivalry stirring between Russia and outside powers in the Caucasus andAsia tends to reinforce another trend in therelations of the post-Soviet states; that of polarization among them. Competitive alignments such as GUL'AM (and severaln the one side, and Russia's alignment with Belarus,Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia, on the other, risk creating Dew sources of tension, cornpUcatingrivalries.

At Ihe moment, these are only incipient strategic alignments, but theyestructive poteotial that bears watching.

Sooth Asia Jull A. MocDotiald

Science Applications International Corporation

These remarks ore hated largely on extensiveand discussions with strategists and pobcyin Pakistan and India during die post year. They will focus oo how India and Pakistan are thinking about Centra) Asia,ound link interest in tbe South Caucasus during my research.

Central Aria it prominent in the thinking of Indian and Pakistani strategist* today,endency in the United Slates to discount South Asia's role and Influence in Central Asia because of its lack ofcontiguous borders to the region. The historical and cultural ties between Central Asia and South Asia remain strong andarticular ly strong resonance in twthern India This year, rhe two reports will cele-braie their cultural affinity withth annisersary of the Moghul Stare in India. Indians seeksse this celebrationtrengthen cultural and scientific tela-laofuaups with Central Asians. Moreover. India'swith Central Asia was strengthened by close ties deling the days of tbe Indc-Sovset relationship, when thousands of Indians were educated and trained In the region, particularly In Tashkent.

Beth India and Pakistan squandered opportunities lo develop closerh the new Central Asian states in tbe. Neither suite bad much io offer the newtn ihe way of technical assistance, trade, or aid, which Is what the new scares needed most. However, the cireumstances have changed since the early days of the post-Cold War era. Today Central Asiaritical cocoponeol of Indian and Pakistani thinking as both countriesrhe fundamental changes in their strategic1 see four areas in which Central Asia factors Into India and Pakistan's minklng.

First, Central Asiaomponent ofthe competition in South Asut. For both countries, Central Asia is an extension of their strategic universe. During my time in New Delhi, Indian rolicymakers repeatedly referred to Central Asia as chew "extended strategicandegion with which theyange of strategic interests. Pot Pakistanis. Central Asia kt important because il gives Pakistan what they referred

to as "strategicn this context. India andarc competing with each other in Central Asia for influence, for political suppon for their position on issues such as Kashmir, for energy in the future, and for access to markets.

Pakistan had hopedombination of Islam and proximity would give It an advantage over India, but islam proved toiability for Pakistan with current Central Asian governments when il began supporting ihe Taliban in Afghanistan. Pakistan is widely regarded as ihe training ground and supplier of the Taliban and other octtstate militias in tbe region. In Oiks context. Pakistan's relatively favorable geographic proximity has teen neutralized by the ongoingin Afghanistan and in Pakistan itself. It is bardee how Pakistantate will project influence effectively into Central Asia under these conditions, but Ii is clear that some nonttate groups Inparticularly Islamic groups andeven factions of the military are and will continue to make die effort These activities are largelyfor the region. In con mast, Indians in manyuiink deeply and coherently about Central Asia as part of the emerging competition. Centtal Asia has captured Ihe attention of strategic thinkers, roitiiary planners, energy companies, and many others. It it nol simply by chance that India today sends some of its most seasoned diplomats to represent It In Central Asia

Second, Central Asia is seen ai on arena that isto larger geopolitical competitions andThe Indian strategists who are looking beyond India's bordersumber of threats andin Central Asia, fust, Indians are thinking about bow to contain China In Central Asia They see the Chinese threat encircling Irsdia. as China strengthens its influence in Pakistan. Myonmar. Bangladesh, and Central Asia, and some Indians believe that Ghana's growing economic and political penetration tn Central Asia, especially in Kazakhstan, must be countered before il leads to strategic lealiencnats, possiblylhal might threaten India's interests. In thisUzbekistan was referred to as tbe "key to thend India has taken slept lo cultivate close ties io Uzbekistan, President Karimov plans to visit

India Inecond, India and ihe Central Asianshare an inlcrttat in corflrtfling the highly unstable aad onpmkcab'c sirjatjon in nnd around AfEhatttuui sod Pifcscar.oMj/Hhj cccldil dkecaratcfane so Iran aad ro CMiiralrun intali chaoa In Ihe center Ihlrd, Central Alia ia could-ered the ararrheni border of an emerging ttsrl west economic comdor ib.il connectstiikry. ban, tcda, aad Bam Asia, which esecaaauy might teptacc tbe mth uab oirxtucn due rnrjernistaard daneg tbe Cold war. RlnaDj. Central Am ii seenon-duit IO the United Siaiet Itegtct) whs

I US Interest* have the iiutentialairiseel lai

US tod Indian interest, could ahocome in conflict.

certainly hus'd play i

'deve*.

wfiich, for India, central role.

Af South Auk* iirerea in Caoal Asia isecemamtc. Bo* India aad Pakutaa tatk tndartesoo Croneer trade reloxn *Mh the Central Aasa statis. Lnrfia's phartratccaiiacal tnmptatn and soBrls baretrong preteace hi th* region. Paklstaiu tradera

ire< wgly urtve across ulvnd ibe; ivill

benefit from the economic Coopcraton Orguii*-non's efforts to lower trade barriers anaot* Mi ma-

Patrslan aisc tecs Huelfwer

i statu by otlctlng (bran access to Qse

for Cestui

Bota itisrs terra lo be realistic about ihe proapecu foround no one who tellipeline through Afgrnsnistaniable option, even in tho long'term, itio often more promiseransit irate for Turkmen gas. Some Indians suggest that the Afghan pipeline beew hundred kilometers west, so it can link into Iran's existing nonh-Mutb. Infrastructure. India. Inn.iarkmenistsinlBteeal Aspeernentnd last yeaxt

abnuigned an n0 Dement in an attempt to pave il* way tui itch) prebne. But Indians cite two probttrni mat ijjfede the ecamnr-cn nt my pipelineorn dan) Au. or lrsn first. DaeFrakiatin ttitsrtlraT. and tbe vuInedibilities thai suggest, inuil be addressed. The second probteen is US unctions on Iran. Ifbe key transit sum. which is likely to ba the case. US uninoni CO Iran lirnii tbe funding ofOun anilabk so boldx ladi ar* arid Pakistanis <ac agree so coopnsae. In ibis amir. Indian atreiegiita complain lha* US sanctions mi Iranignificant UaperUmentrtorkr Lids*-US irrategX dkatogse

lalacaa law Mart, ta tbey arc wckjg to develop ain Cram] Asia's etsergy seetor.

tiint namedhi

nese Natural On Riplorarano and thivrlopmrnl Cor-pcrancn lomall field in Karttftstan. Tbe lavhaaa arc also eipkribe rhe eosascahry of. ifrom Kyrgyistan. wbsch its asf trydnipowcr This scheme would probobfy bnolre irnrKtnilting the power icrositerrinxy.

for Central Asian gas. and the in bctb states have tii>b. ejpKtationl of

rrnatly. energy willajor drfrt, relationship.

parBc^tur, Cut also from Kjutkhlan andecade, India la paitkolar will be importing energy from maltipie directions. Centaley comporKot ofnergyilitate its dependence on tbe Middle East over the long term.

For all of iheie rcamit- -South Asian cotnpedikio, larger gcorrolirical conaideraratiisa. nxinoouc inaarcatsikely So brkm* playa in Ceioil Awshe mol decade tnda'i rtslanrtrnhrps wili ihe Central Ananwill be multdicrlrd, bund on shared suateelc uiieresu. and partrooder Indian srnflegy inPakistan alan will be [moi'ed.bis snw it is bant so tee the euhnraeheremsrrnegy. Cttrreanly. Pakisian It viewed morehecal so Central Asian stability thanon-itrwova playcc

55

Europ* Roy Allison

Hi'.nl Institute /or International Again

The 'cent of concern for Ihehe region has teen the South Caucasus, which is perceived to irBpuage an tudocean rnwretu far rncec directly lhanin Central Asia, and can even be viewed aa the European past of the CIS. The EU it eiiending its efforts al political dialogue and support formeasures aimed at conflict resolution and regions) cooperation in ihe South Caucasus However. Ihese efforts arc only weakly reflected In RU policy toward Central Asia, which is more distant from direct European concerns. The EU cannot act coherentlyingle staletrategic view on the region. Bul the EUonsiderable lasntrlt for rhe region and could go further toommonwithin its Cctraastsn Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) foe at kraal the Sorts* Catwtnwa.

Three phases in EU policy and thtrihizig may be

identified:

. The strategy was based on bilateral Pon-nership and Cooperation Agreementshe hope waa that the PSU countries had ihe possibility and political will to follow Ihe East-Centmlcoootrtus in the direction of Western baruropean trance rtttwotkof states bound tcgether by ccesuactual cetigst-ro aod cotransoo values-could ba esi ended eastward Regional cocpersooo waa emphaatted through the Tocis and Iraiuport Corridor Europe Caucasus Asia fl RACIrojects.

n this period, the EUnder stood the thfflcutiies of unresolved connicis and reform efforts in the region anduch more poliiical approach. Corrdibonality began to affect policy, although tie term was not usedalso grew us the second pillar of ihepoliticalibis was rmriated withThe EU later weicomcd rhe accession ofto the Council of Europe. Political dialogue, as set out in the PCA treaties, ii intended ro bring about an Increasing convergence of positions onissues and to increase security and stability tn the region.

* Sincet the Luxembourg quadripurtitiie summit for Ihe signing of the PCAs with tbe South Caiacasus states, they were put on notice by the EU that it would not support the status quo by providing generous amostrst* of aid. Action and assistance are now snjewed at sncteajwes for posstrve rhaatge EU otficials are now reflecnng on what kind of dialogue is needed and whether the EU needs more active engagement in tbeew arsproach toAsia is likely also0

EUavoiing greater priority than previously to tbe South Caucasus region can argue that I) The EU is upauhng and the turn re ol ote Mcuth Caucasus will affect rhe intersf Turkey. Bulgaria, aad Romania;he prospects for the Chechnya and Nagorno-Karabakh conflicts, particularly the danger of brooder regional desnbitizatioii. emphasize lhat EU priorities must include conflict resolution:aspian gas is important for European energy strategy. Turkey willajor conduit of gaa onward lo Europe and not justarket for gas. The Shah Droit, ether pccmiul new Ancrbwrjacind established gts&eids ia Twsjoetosian togetherital strategic interest for gas-hungry Europe The gasficlds further reinforce rhe importance of the trade and energy transport corridor supported by TRACECA and the Inogalc and designed to hypatl Ruuia by passing through Georgia, despite ihe tact that the EU continues to declare its support for multiple pipeline routesnbasis:j -pern coenpaxben atto wish totegscally in the energy sector ed the Caspian states;he Caucasus states are alto transit routesegativedrugs and Illegalthis baa interested these countries in the third pillar of the PCA* concerned wilh justice and home affairs. This Issue is ofinterest to those European countries affected by the drug trade.

But aa fact Ihr PCAs are race svertj ng as they were originally irnended, and it could be argued thaihould follow in Northern Dimension initiativeouthernwide regionalinvolves trade, Investment, energy, transport,appro lima lion, and ccuMemnmooci.

KU 1'olicv on Conflict Resuloliun and Regional Cooperation

uxembourg declaration of Ihe El) and the South Caucasus states reflects rhe EU view that the timet to European security posed by bisubility in tbe Caucasus has. If anything, been increasing, and that the root cause of many of the proNciM facing the three republics is the stalemate over ethnic conflicts EU officials argue that ihe present stalemate has aggravated humanitarian problems and has tended to impede the development of demceratic institutions ard tbe market economy. This has reinforced these stales' reliance on international assistance, while at the same rime rendering that assistance less effective. It Is bcliesed that actions aimed al enhancing regional cooperation and post conflict reconstruction offer the best option for progress on both confidence building and economic recovery, The EU considers that its assistance should increasingly be related to conflict resolution and subsequent oonnaiixatioo, as weD as to die political obligations of tbe PCAs end ecooouue obligations with international financial institutions.

In practice, EU efforts at conflict resolution can only complement and reinforce international mediation through the OSCE and UN. The EU supports, for example, the Minsk Group on Nagorno-Karabakh and tbe Friends of Georgia group, it also has proposed specifically that railways linking the countries (Baku-Nakhichevan. Yerevan Jul/a. and Abkhazia-Tbilisi-Yerevan) be tc-operjed to promote inttaregionaland build confidence among the parties to the conflicts.

It is believed lhat EU assistance in the field of regional cooperation should be coordinated wilh other policies and cooperation initiatives (such as those for the Black Sea. the Balkans and Central Europe) and extended westwards. Energy is viewed as an Important factor for intesptation; the EU pays particular attention to die promotion of international cooperation ha this domain. Tbe EU has discussed the US ideaaucasus Cooperation return, but considers It problematic if the countries select projects to be iunded by <Jooors. since these may not be the best projects. This whole issue could be taken up between rhe EU and the United States in the transatlantic dialogue.

EU cooperation wilh Central Asian stales varies from state to state and is less likely to be an active part of the CFSP than such cooperation with the Southstates. PCAs arc in force with Kazakhstan, which seems open to cooperation; Kyrgyzstan, which is sympathetic to European affairs; and Uzbekistan, where eipcot and import controls create problems. Tuikmerustan's PCA is not yet la force. TajikistanCA and the EU cannot work there forreasons. But the BU has launched projects on cucgtnuTicking in Central Asia, and the Caspian states of Central Asia ate important for the overall Eurasian corridor concept and the flow of energy, supported by TRACECA and other EU initialises.

Highlight* From Ihe Dlseussloii Iran's rink

The US-lnsn rttattonikipey driver of regional dynamiei Panelists and Discussants eip*ored how the strained US-lraa. relationship shape* regionaland how lbar mold change if. follow)o longer treatedogue sutr Several paneliiu and drjcussanu rioted that onewill he ihe flow of Caspian and Centra] Asian energy through Iran. It is unclear howhift in US-Iran relations will change politics In the Middle bam. Central Asia's views toward Iran, and Iran's relationship with other major powers, such aa Russia, India, and China The discussion revealed that there has been little attetirioo beyond sanctions to assess ihe threats and challenges of ihe new strategic environment that will emerge when Iran returnsctor

Irani reiaoonshtp wsnt Russia remains an endunng imiin-iom* nail. The Russia-Iran relationihip rcflccu shared strategic, political, and economic interests under current conditions (that is, US sanctions) But panelists were careful to point out 'eveial difficulties in iheir relationihip For example. Iran competes directly with Russia for transport tomes for Caspian energy, and Iranian goals and sympathies dlflcr ndi-cally from Moscow's in Tajikistan and Cbecbnyx Tehran has softened its approach inward Tajikistan and muted it* reaction to Chechnya to tain Russian assistance with its nockeas power program Views were mi red about bow US Iran ncimaliuDan migfu affect Russia-Iran reiabems Several discussant* aaoraaed that Russia is generally nervousotential US-Iran rapprochement Panelist! argued thai US Iran nomiauistron could deepen Russia-Iran ties. II sancuons were lifted, Russia couldloset relationship with Iran, without worrying about irriiaUng Ihe United Slates.

Irani labelogue and revolutionary uale has hindered its ohtruy toerious actoranel lit segued that ideological rbesorsc. wench has dsvtstnitcd the dtKOorse in both regions dating the pan decade, does not reflect Iran's poucics toward Central Asia and tbe South Caucasus He notes thai "Iran's foreign policy toward ideology has been fundamentallye cited seven)for this piugmatic approach: I) geopolitical interest* have prevailed In Iran's foreign policy;

ran recognized that it could not communicate its revolutionary messages to tbe large Sunniandran'* flotations with ideological policy as ihe start of lajikutan's civil war faded away quickly, because of internal dmsiont in meparty Aobserved that Iran's rojcy toward Afghanistan has evolvedealpolnik strategy hi which bssi bow aopsan anyone who Is ami Tali bin He pouted lhat Iran isoreign policy io guarantee Ms borders, not

One discussant noted that Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan have had complicated relabom. at best, with Iran since irdepeader.ee. because of Iranian support Inr tbe United Tajik Oppcaatrcai andosioco leader* inanelist described Iran's policy toward Azerbaijanl-for-tat approach, in which both sides are responding to what they perceive as threats on the other side. In terms of domestic politics. Iron has adopted sensible policies to deal wiih its suable Azeri minority, allowing Aieris to attend their own schools and to speak Ami. He rioted thai suchreflect the tact that tbe Ateri populationumber of loSuatnal sectors in Iran, but it alto it!oherent and senstbte policy For UPstsdstan. Tehran's re< orsudarauon of its Tajik policyhift toward support lor anti-Taliban forces has created objective*.

The EU and South Caucasus

The European Union acts tactically, not strategically, in ihe Southanelist captained that EC's atteouon has been diverted from die South Caucasus to the Balkans. which baa become the primary foreign policy concern of rhe EU daring rhe past taw years. The EU remains concerned about rhe ongoing coa-fliCA in the Smith Caucasus, however, and has been brokering talks between and among the tlirec South

r r uii>pt ,nit'.ir il icbil

rng whether it ahould attach political conditions to Its economic aid in order io posh the negotiatingforward One pandist arguedolicy of ccodCCTiality wculd not be eswogh to push poJ-icslhe Sovrh Caucaso! to lake Mept toward real progress and would undermine EU policies in the rep on. He warned that EU policies lhat are effective in Europe might ac lualiy undermine tbe sovereignty of tbe weak stales in the Caucasus;.

South Asia

Central Asia Is only oneumber of dirrcrions in which India Itisc ussant asked where Central Alia fit into India's strategic calculus relatedtss. The panelist conceded that India has priorities in other directions. Trie Middle Eastop priority for India because of itson oil inspects. India is also Icokuig East and eogaging states is East and Southeast Asia, ancfa as Japan, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia Central Asia is important, however, not only because of India's interest in tbe region's energy, but also because Central Asia it linked to how India thinks about other major actors, sucfcar^ Pakistan, arsd Crnna- For example, the Indians worry about growing Chinese influence in Kazakhstan.

Panel V

Impressions From the Field

panel teal ures scholars who have spenttunc doing research in the region. Panelists shared (heir insights on how tbe regional and internal dynamics are changing based on their experience on the ground, questioned the prevailing verities about the region, and offered an assessment of bow research on tbe region should be focused in the future.

Osaiiroan: Angela Theriault

National Intelligence Council

Nora Dudwick

The World Bank

What are the prevailing verities?

The trajectory of change Is unidirectional, and will ultimately result In democratic societies (as measured by the establishment of electoral democracies and "free and fairt the beguming of, despite the war in Nagorno-Karabakh, manyand many Western observers were optimistic that Armenia was movingemocratic dice doi -Armenians had just votedovernment untainted by connection to tbe Communist Party. They took pride in being the most stable country in the Southact they attributed to the high degree of ethnic homogeneityountrytrong sense of national identity. Most activists preferred tothe "Karabakbhkh had brought the Communists to power,ational democratic rather than purely nationalist movement Aside from severely flawed national elections and near-coups of recent years, the iristitutional framework and "demo-cratic" style of governance (with due respect lo the fact that definitions of democracy vary considerably across cultures) are still lacking. Armenia has lost one-third of its population toerrtigratiorj. and many of the people remaining in the country, particularly those who have not benefited from tbe economic changes, express bitter disappointment and cynicism aboutnd rampant corruption at every level of government. Without predicting the "end point" of tbe political and social changes under way in Armenia, it seems clear that there is no reason to assume any

longer that change will necessarily be smooth, linear, or bring Armeniatructure that resembles Western dernocratic states.

Despite rocky beginnings, which include widespread impoverishment, natural catastrophe (In Armenia) and armed conflict in both Armenia and Georgia, the presence of skilled and educated populations, pie-grams of privatization, liberalization, andshould eventually help restore production and alleviate widespread poverty.ield work on the economic and nonecoootoic dimensions of poverty in Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyistan, and Uzbekistan reveal that sizable segments of thein urban, and particularly rural areas, arc experi-eracing severe poverty. This pcirtion of the poputotion, many of whom worked in agricultural or industrial enterprises, has not particularly benefited fromor hberalizatjoo; on the contrary, privatization has meant (he end of many social services and otheross of which has hurt lew-incomeThe spread of Mormal rnjyrnents for ostensibly free health and education services, coupled with the severe decline in the quality and accessibility of health and education services also means that low-income households, particularly those in poorly served rural areas, are likely to be left further behind as theimproves. Certainly, this portion of tbewill not pauTjcularly benefit fromhich, particularly in the form of unprovedand exposure to the outside world,benefits the urban and Ihe educated.

The strong and extensive kinship networks thatsociety In the South Caucasus will act as 'safetynd soften the unpad of impoverishment far the poorest households. Sadly, one of rhe toast striking social phewrncoa of the pastears has been the weakening of the seerrungly durable ties of kinship and reciprocal obligation that characterized South Caucasian and Central Asian societies in response to the widening gap between rich and poor.

Poor people are beingalso excludethe marry social and cultural events thai traditionally served to affirm these ties, because they can no longer afford Ihe expenses connected with participation. The poor feel humiliated by the need to ask help rrotn richer relatives, svhike the newlyincreasingly find their poorurden they cannot or do not srant to support. Poor people complain that the Soviet-era economy of reciprocal favors and services has become increasinglyand lhat kinship ties must now be supplemented with cash.

What questions should lie asked?

How do informal institutions, particularly connections and networks, actually work on local and nationaland How do they affect political and economic processes? Field studies oemotistrute that whether at the national, regional, and local level, mostare convinced thai politics and economics are determined by personal ues. Even when this is not the case, the perception itself shapes behavior. Caselo date, particularly of entrepreneurs, demonstrate the extent to which personal networks determine the flow of resources between tbe stale and itsewise. fieldwofk in agricultural communitiesthat informal rictwoiks and power relationshipi are highly sigruftcaot in terms of shaping policies and explaining political and economic events It isimportant for research at any level national. resporraL orcarefully examine ihe specific history and character of the informal and rustorical connections among economic and political actors.

How do personal experience and internalizedfrom the Soviet period, and new {ethnically shaped) national identities affect how people perceive and respond to new Institutions and practices? Although very few people in the FSU would express support for Marxism-Leninism, clearly many aspects of "actually existing socialism" were internalized, such as notions of social justice (cgalitarianism) and of positive rights (to employment, forven if they verbally support Ihe ideaarket ecorromy, many people still expect the state to take primary responsibility for creating employment Although they criticize the government for corruption andmore traditional ruraln particular

still consider it the government's responsibility to take initiative and provide direction. When examining how new institutions and structures are (unboning, researchers need to continually pose the question of how local populations interpret these institutions, and in what way their functioning results from internalized assumplioris and local experience specific to postso-cialist reality.

What are Ihe sources and dynamics of social change at the local level? Local forma! and informalhave changed coflsiderably, and new power arrangements and mechanisms are forming. Whether in rural villages or urban neighbotboods. for example local communities have taken tbe initiative; in others, relationships have become even more hierarchical lhan before. What are the key ingredients andthat make some groups and/or communities change? How are local changes affected by eeorsorok and geographic factors? What role is played byby urban or international organizations, by tbe "demonstration effect" of guided change elsewhere? What are the practical implications of these ftndinas?

What Issues should regional experts focus on, and why?

Social and economic exclusion. Even as societies and economies are restructured and globalized, large pans of the population (unskilled youth and unemployed or underemployed older workers in rural areas and depressed single-company towns, poor children, the disabled, elderly people living atone, eihnicare being socially excluded. Poor children and youth have decreasing access to education andwhich will make them less competitive if and when growth increases. Likewise, geographicand deteriorating infrastructure has worsened the position of rural populations. The increasing rich-poor gap reduces social cohesion and potentially leads to political instability (as seen recently inn ethnically heterogeneous countries and politically fragile countries such as Georgia, even tbe perception that exclusion is caused by discrimination based on eihnic affiliation could be politically veryThe economic and social margrnalizatioo ofportions of ihe population should therefore not be ignored.

David Hoffman

University of California-Berkeley

I have spent approximately four of the last seven years in the former Soviet Union, in raartictilar in tbe states of what Russians term "the nearuring thisave bad Ihe opportunity to engage tbe regionumber of differentofenergy consultant, academic researcher, and human rights representative. Naturally, each of these occupations brings to the table its own im ights into tbe region, as well as its own set of institutional "blinders" and biases.

This panel rxings totietber scholars who have been active in conducting in-country fieidwork in the slates of the South Caucasus and Central Asia, and who thus areosition to inject invaluable firsthandinto the largeronversation that daisrepresents. In this milieu, my contribution,nderstand It, might best be made in tbe form of sober reflection, and the juxtaposition of tbe salient qncs-tioos and issues raised by preceding speakersackdrop of tbe realities of political, economic and social life in tbe South Caucasus and Central Asia.esitate lo proffer anything in the wayonereie thesis at this early stage. Given mynot only in studying, living in, and working on this region over tbe past seven years, but in interacting with others engaged in similarhink one or two tentative corrunents can be made at this point, less as definitive statements thanay for framingdiscussico.

Regional experts should be cautious of the sources of information we use in crofting our understanding of the region. The gradual penetration of new forms of electronic ihformation-gaihcring and dissemination into tbe South Caucasus and Central Asia has made it increasingly easier to gather information on the regions from afar. Internet versions of local(Zerkalo from Azerbaijan and the Aimaty-bascd Delovoya Nedelya and Panorama arc particularly goodail listserve groups, news wire compilations and the like are opening up the region to outside observers as never before And, of course, use gradual loosening of visa regimes and intellectual migratory patterns hasuantum-leap inand institutional contacts betweenof tbe Western and regional academic.

government, and business communities. Tbepipeline out of tbe region is clearly vrtderdrig, albeit in fits aad starts (witness virtually everyto control, ia some form or aisorher. access to the internet).

This trend is heartening, but it should be taken with moremall grain ofill limit myself to noting bete two reasons, in particular, that ought to give us pause. Of perhaps immediate consequence to many scholars' work has been my finding, over the course of my fieidwork, that macro economicin many ofthe countries in tbe region are extremely unreliable, and in some cases representfantasy more than the real state of the economy. Interviews wirh regional statistics ccenraitteein one Central Asian department revealed an office guttedack of financing and eigU month wage arrears. It Should be no surprise, then, that bureaucrats who have not been paid forear are less than likely to enthusiastically carry out their assigned task of collecting output, employment, and wage data from the various economic enterprises in their region. In fact, they bad not. and thus current figures were merely extrapolated from (bote of previous years. If one is going to use rancroecorsoroic statistics b)ars is lent manner, it is imperative to"where the rubber hits theo to speak: employees at regional offices of state statisticalare but the foot soldiers in the larger process ofTJcs-gatbeting. Theiround, are often subsetmcatiy manipulated and massaged according to prevailing political winds at each of tbe higher stages of data accumulation, culminating in, as onejokingly called it, Ote "red-pencdhere undesirable figures or number* are banished to obhv-ion with the strokeigh-ranking official's hand. Thus, often by the time autistic* reach tbe Westernhether ioniversity, or an tuternatioiial financial organisation, the cumulative product can be worth less than the paper it's printed on.

Informal and Illegal rent seeking should be colled when ita 'positive spin" on il helps no one, least of all the governments and people. My own work is rooted in rhe intersectionthe peoolcomand stale- building in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan,

spccificnlly in me interaction between Ihe intertwined processesr'.inn, neirokum-led development, while simultaneously attempting toeasure of state capacity acton ciiticalregulatory, and tedisuiboiive. Thoughrune focus of my research, one of my more interestinghas been ihe degree to which informal revenue channels have insinuated themselves in the regions* oil and gas sectors. Whatell you if actual crude and refined oil product output in Azerbaijan was actually almost double the official figure' Theof psTvate profit and public lon damages not only these countries' prospects for economic dervclopovert, but ultunately the perhaps more irripoitanl task of developing strong stale utsu unions.

Short, impretstcmtitic niiti to ihefirld iifitn remain just thai: short and unprrssiorUsiie: Several yearsroup of European expertsorking research visit to Azerbaijan. Their purpose was lo survey the state of the oil machinery sector. On ihe basis of theirevisited what Ihey had judged ihefour enterprises. My walk-through of tlie factory floors, interviews with workers and management, and inspection of the machinery, however, revealed equip-ment with birds nesting Inotk force lhat seemed to beercent invisible or not present, and capital stock that had not been operated in years. The difference between my visit and the previous lay inisited all of the sues, rather than conducting telephone or remote site interviews with the plant managers. Short trips to ihe field, relying heavily on official contacts and translators, are useful, but their limitations should be taken into account

What. then, art tome of the basic lessons we cart karn? Relying on ihe Internet, official stastjstkl.mall circle of local sources (who may or may not_ in fact, be based in Iheir home csstoiry) carries withegree of risk- This, of course, varies with the scope and goalsiven researchtopics obviously lend themselves more lonalysis and/or anthropological observation. In an envuonrneot where the basse statistics gathcrine institutsons of the state have withered, where local experts and/orsometimes have political or personal axes tond where new forms of informationadd breadth, but not depth, to our understanding of the area, we musl be wary, indeed. The first lesson.

obviously, is that numbets and slalistics are malleable: on numerousave seen economic "progress" generated at the dropat. True,can. to it Hal tlssjlll. massage meaning out of the sornetimes perverse raw data generated by state statistics commicees. But the fact remains thai an ovrrreiixscc on official statistics and ccortornic data is an invitation lo facile and flawed analysis.

This cavucflary tale clearlyeavy rnethod-ological burden on the researcher. As mentioned, some topics are easieret at" than others. The political economy of oil, for example, tends to be wrappedouble cloak of political opacity (regional, kinship, and patronage networks are insular and tough to crack if you are an outsider) anddissimulation Nevertheless, effective research requires first of all Hut wo be aware of these dangers. As the intemei casts its net broader und wider, sre should be conscious of the overall lack of depth of most of its offerings up to date; the primary sources for many websites and listscrvca are relatively few aad incestuous. Another basic lesson that follows from this discussion is that field research ideally should: a) consist of multiple trips, in order lo facilitate the dCv-lrxsmcni of deep, rather than broad, contacts; and b) benefit from appropriate language ski Us. sinceranslator, while in some cases unavoidable, is, unfortunately,indrance, especially when the topic at hand is scnsitlvo for the interviewee.

IWerner Pirur College

Almost nine years have pasted since tbe breakup of the Soviei Union, yet the transitionoresystem with free market trade seems to be stalled in the middle of cfsaos. Although the pohocal and economic systems have definitely been changing, they are not itecessarily changing in positive direc-boos. One of the buzzwords that analysts repeatedly use to explain what is wrong with theorrupt cmn Western policy reports and popular newspapers, widespread corruption in rhe former Soviet Union is often portrayed as the leading threat to political democratization and economic liberaliT-at ion.

6-i

or example, have published stories on how corruption impedes political elections, media reporting, factory production, properly privatization, and foreign Dade. These petceprioos of corruption, in turn, force iotcrnarjorsa] crvelopaect cxgani ratine* to caseation whether ors pragmatic to crantinue servling foreign aid to these countries Similarly,trusarsesse* rnirn decide whether or nol potential profits are worth tbe risk of operating introng "mafia" presence

ould like to address the issue of corruption by sharing my own firsthand knowledge of corruption in post-Soviet Kazakhstan.ultural anthropologist conducting lesearchmall Kazakh town, ratherestern ousuicssrnan making dealsarge Kazakh city, my knowledge of corruption is based largely on what people hare told me about corrupooo. rather than my own personal experiences with the local mafia In theas able to acquireinformation about tbe contexts in which bribes are most frtquendy presented, the cash value placed on bribes for various services, and the proper etiquette for presentingas also able lo gatheron the ways in which rural Kazakhs view the morality of bribery and nepotism. Not surprisingly, their ideas of what activities are illegal yet morally acceptable and what activities are illegal and morally rrptrhersible do not exactly correspond to American news. Ia my opinion, irrsch^arxlmg the way people talk about conn poor, and the way they think about corruption can be very unportaat for ocvescenegirraicgies to fight corruption.

Similar to thencer Soviet republics,ii knownlace where "nothing iseverything isn other words,to dismantle (be Soviet bureaucraticand documents still regulate and monitorsocial and economic activities. Yet.control tbe flow of documents and theregulations are known touick serviceprivilege to irsrhvidxrals who pay bribes orrserxooal favors. Everybody knows thatandbribes for real and

imagined offenses; judges receive bribes for favorable sentences; employers secure bribes in exchange for available positions; and uruversrty officials accept

bribes for admission. In addition to paying bribes, people know that personal connections, including clan ties, can be useful for getting around the system.

Everybody in Kazakhstan also knows that bribery and nepotism are illegal. But, tbe way that corruption is legally defined does not correspond perfectly to the way that it is culturally or morally defined. In other words, some crimes are morally acceptable whileare not. Going further, people lake differentwhen it cornea to the moaality of such activities, which further varies depending on the context. When it comes to the morality of bribery, people factor in the content of the bribe, tbe official's personality andhis or her regular salary, tho estimated amount of income received from bribery, and whether or not ihe bribes are volurstarily presented. Similarly, the morality of nepocstn is context-specific. lor example, in southern Kazakhstan, most Kazakhs accept and even praise bureaucrats, who are loyal to their fatally and clan in htnng practices, as long aa the benefactors are somewhat qualified for the position.

For thisas asked lo address several questions: What prevailing verities do you accept or reject? What questions should he asked but arc riot? And, what things should we be focused on? Too believe that pervasive corruptioneal problem that hinders development and democratization inAsia. This is notocal problem, as the level of corruption in Central Asia also affects interna ti anal politics, foreign aid, and foreign trade. Although there are no easy solutions to this problem, the situation is not completely hopeless. International organizations, such as the World Bank, are already raking some miti-atisrs to fight corruption in Central Asia.

As these interriauooal organizations andore active role in fighting corrupooo in Centra! Asia, it is important for us to start raking new questions I'irst. we need to think about ways to develop culturally compatible solutions to theproblem.ave already discussed. Americans and Kazakhs do not rtecessanly snare tbe same under -standings of what cottstitutes "corrupt" behavior, ft would be easier to gain support for an tic eeruptiori carrjpaigo* in (etttral Asia that aro initially targeted

againsi those forms of corruption that are universally perceived lo be immoral. At the same time. localcould in [reduce educational programs that link the anticorniption movement to notions ofpatriotism, and social justice. Second, It is important to think about the unintended consequences lhat will arise with anticorruption campaigns inAsia. As Soviet history demonstrates, theof anticorniption measures often opens the door for practices akin to witch-hunting. Individuals who would ideally be targeted by these efforts tend to possess both the connections and the skills necessaryvoid being caught. At the same time, the mostindividuals often use these campaigns to root out their enemies. We need to determine whether or not it is possible to change the system without trying to identify and remove corrupt leaders. In this regard, we need to study the factors, such as low wages and excessive bureaucracy, that foster corruption inAsia. By addressing these questions, ii is possibleevelop more effective anticorruption measures in Centra) Asia.

Kathleen Kuchrmst

Mellon Foreign Area Fellow, Library of Congre.it

What prevailing verities do you accept or reject?

History is key to understanding the presentiven,ould add that the present may also be key to more fully understanding the Communist past. It is essential that we continue to reexamine the lateperiod from new vantage points, and if need be, to revamp our analysis of it. As we move further away from Cold War rhetoric, new questions most be raised. Since our orientation lo date has focusedon Communism's shoneonu ngs and failings, we must also begin to identify what actually worked during the socialist experiment This additional knowledge will giveetter framework forthe fault lines and impediments of current institutional reforms, since these institutions are based as much on human agency as they are on ideologies.

The states of Central Asia will continue to maintain their Soviet-inherited borders is an assumptionhink will prove to be false. In my estimation, thereigh probability that the current geopolitical borders of Central Asia win be different in ten years lime.umber of recent interregional borderekistan-Kyrgyotan; Urr^irsuvKarattitisn: Ferghanaec on figurations may occur sooner than later. Moreover, it is important to note thatPresident elect Putin also appesis to be making more of an overrule toward Central Asia than did his predecessor. It is not out of the range of possibilities that Russia couldoven rote in destabilizing borderseans of consolidating furtheron Russia's military Strength in the region.another question which Iscgse answered ia how will the countries of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan maintain their independence when economicand .sustainability appears very uncertain at best, and where iheir poverty levels are alercent andercent respectively?

Central Asia's drug trafficking problem is huge and perhapssu rmounkurle. is not only an accurate assessment but begs for global awareness andDrug uaHicking ia aot going to disappear in Central Asia. Growing rural poverty, lack of ccotiotnac derveioprrxesit,eneral willingness by Central Asian go vesnrncnta "to look the other way* makes the situation in the region extremely vulnerable to active drug trafficking Not only isational security issue, but it isatter of tune before "drug money" startsublic and pivotal role inof tbe region.

What questions should be asked?

Although women are actively engaged in the arena of NGO development, why have they not gained footing in the new political arena, either in electedpositions or appointed ministerial positions? Women today have lessole in public discourse lhan they had during the Soviet period, in part.

because mosl women are coping with day-to-dayproblems. In addition, tradibonalism andreligious ideals havear more conservative position for women in Kyrgyz society than the prior Soviet era when Central Asian women were encouraged to be educated and to work outside tbe home. Tbe inraeasingly conservative rhetoric about women's rotes in society may not onlypotential human rights abuses, but it also inrfl-cates the level of tolerance for drversity in the social milieu.

No matter the level of literacy or work experience Central Asian women gained overears, the last decade bas seen many women mired in the newthat has eogulfed these countries. It is not that women are any more poor than men, but they are more burdened. With tbe collapse of socialism andany rrrecbariisms of support, mcluding child care, pensions for the elderly, universal health care,omen are not only relegated to taking care of tbeir own family and extended families, but also in some regions are the prirnary breadwinner. There is simply no time for tnost women to partake in the pubUc political process. Poverty undermines the voices and participation of women. Their silence. In fact,oud signal for the need for nation-building efforts to addresssocial and economic problems. As one young rural Kyrgyz mother expressed angrily in an interview, "New democracies and economies are of no use when people can no longer feed or clothe their faxrnues."

Although women are actively involved In NGOs, it is important that they are not marginalized io theprocesses ut>der way in these rtasxent states. Pro-tKting the constitutional rights of women, as well asound legal system, should not be done without the active participation of wotnen.

What is the long-term impact of poverty on the youth of Central Asia? An important factor to consider in Central Asia is the demography of the population, since nearlyercent of the rxipulation is now underears of age. In spile of the many inadequacies of (be Soviet system, health and education indicators for child rJevcloprnent in Central Asia were high,when compared to other devdoplng countries in the world. It is now proving exceedingly difficult to

maintain the same sort of corrtrrtitmcnt to the needs of chilrJren in the uncertain ecoirorruc and politicalof Central Asia. FuJtrsennore, with theof central planning, many of the new states are having difficulty mnintaining basic infrastructure, such as roads and public transportation.

In the rural areas, where over half erf Central Asians reside, the repercussions of poverty are riarticularly devastating. Poverty destabilizes society and creates stress lines and fissures.esult, many crtildren Ira ve experienced the abrupt dirniniahroem in theof their lives. They have also felt tbe trickle-down effect of economic crises, iricluding such rnxolerns as the increasing rate of school dropouts, the spreadWirlflOng communicable diseases (mbr^osis. syphilis, andalnutrition among younger children, unprecedented boroclessncss, and an increase in youth crimes, mental depression, andamong teenagers.

Although women are often singled outulnerable group, there is growing evidence that unemployed young males are also highly vulnerable. Young males are the most likely group to move into the illegal drug trade, as well as the most likely candidates for mrolvement in radical pou'tkal or religious groups. In various Interviews over rhe past decade, manyin Kyrgyzstan spoke of their terror of these groups of young males. Many complained that "the streets arc no longer safe in the evenings for women andindeed, the incidtence of violence, suicide, and crime among this age group bas increased over the last decade.

Clearly, the problems of criUdren today foreshadow the human oevelopnierit issues of tornorrow.

What things should wc be focused on?

What Is the impact of poverty on democratic reforms? Current poverty levels in Kyrgyzstan are having an impact on national stability. Extrapolated during the coming decade, the widespread poverty cannot be

underestimated in terms of breeding political diicon-icfLi or intensifying illegal activities that mayAkaycv's government, one older Kyrgyz voman in Naryn lorevliadowcd the current economic-political predicament in KyrgyrsUn when rhe saidthe nest round of elections chatould ratherfor Communism aod cat. than vote for democracy and starve."

What are the onplteattons of the increasing stratifica-rion. not only between the neh ami poor, but also the urban and ruraleapidly disappear log "middle class" (at least by former Sovietsing the consumption-based measurement* of the World Bank (versus un income1 percent of the population in Kyrgyzstan now lives below tbe poverty line. The Gini Inequalityhich calculates the degree of classalue lor Kyrgyraianhich is higher than that of Kazakhstanlthough still lower than

The rural poverty rates inercent) ace more lhan twice that of urbannd extreme poverty rates tn ruralercent) are about four times (hose of urban areasercent).

With tbe most orserous ccoiwcruc problems affecting those who live in rural Kyrgyzstan, it ss important to explore how rural poverty can further weaken borders that are already quite porous and potentiallyThree of Kyrgyzstan* four borders are certainly troublesome, especially the ones with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in ihe Ferghana Valley, and of course, western China, insist noiubly the Xinjiang Province. In each instance, these borders are for the most part in remote, mountainous areas, which means that they are often poorly guarded. Where guard posts do exist on tbe roadways, itell- known fact that these guards are generally susceptible to bribes, thus affording easy access for the cross-border drugs or even arms trade

In rhe past five yean, two important devclopcrerats have occurred simultaneously with respect to drug trafficking in Kyrgyzstanussian market for drugs has opened up. Second. Iran, once on the drug-smuggling route,trict antidrug campaign, virtually sealing u> border with Afghanistan. This has redirected the drug trade northward throughIt is essential to consider that as economic

conditions worsen, or even if they remain the same, the only viable business for many of the rural poor may be drug trafficking. Kxtonsive rural poverty makes gainful, albeit illegal cea^ortunity, appearand necessary to desperate people.

Fcooonoc disparity may significantly exacerbatetensions between the titular group, tbeand other ethnic groups This is especially true since agricultural resources are limited, and there an relatively few fertile valleys in the country ForChui Valley in rhe North, the Kyrgyzatent resentment toward successful Chinese and Uighur farmers. Tensions between Russians andKyrgyz living around Lake issyk-Knl peakedarch to cornrnctrsornte Kyrgyz who had died io6 uprising against Russian settlers who had encroached on their grazing larids. And of course there were the now-infamous Oah riotshich erupted over land rights in the Ferghana Valley, borne to both Uzbeks and Kyrygz. Certainly, limited access to arable lands and resources mayatalysi for conflictsegional or ethnic nature.

What Is the impact of poverty on socialhe weakening of rural social networks at the result of increasing isolation and poverty has only recently begun to be consideredign!(leant socialconcern. Since many ol the transactions among people bving in tlte rural regions pertain to survivalfood, obtaining health services,fuel and water, and aonetworks,ype of informal institution,ritical dimension of day-to-day rural survival Tbe Kyrgyz Republic Social Networks Studythat the ability of the social networks of the poor to insulate them from the ntcotstijaj prrabataruraral life is diminishing rapidly.esult. Ihe rural poor arc finding themselvesatronage relationship io which they borrow goods, food, or cash from their wealthier neighbor, and then become Indentured to that neighboreans of paying off their debts. In Georgia and Armenia, this same sort of predicament has been called "medieval workenoting the feudalistic strategic* being used by the poor to survive.

Michael Thuntian

The World Bank

There arc many verities in Ibe prevailing body of rewareh on Central Asiaccept, for example:

Central Asian states and elites are dependent upon Russia.

There are many factors that could lead to instability in Central Asia, such as irredentism, economic decline, possible conflict over transboundaiy resources, and "spillover" from events to the south.

Central Asiaegion in which tbe United States should be actively involved.

Central Asians are politically passive in tbe race of auihoriiariartisrn.

My research in the field, however, lias led me to some conclojioos that are not shared by many scholars of Central Asia. These include the following:

Central Asian society is not overwhelminglyor "feudal" One often hears the comment that you "go back to the middle ages" when you leave the capital cities of tbe region for theThis is basedaise perception that roots rural areastatic, 'Traditional" reality whereamilial tics, and religion are theinfluences on the populntjoo. In fact,social and political structure and religion were greatly transformed by collectivization andyears of rule by the "conuriaDd-arlrrmjisirativelans and kinship ties are ultimatelyto Soviet modes of transmitting power through lie Party, which is closely intertwined with both social and political structures.

The view thai Central Asiaotbed of Islamic fundamentalism is based on Western stereotypes and prejudices, some of which have been acquiredfrom Russian and local elites. Tbe village where Imy field research is predominantly populated by self-avowedowever, their fundamentalism should be likened more to Church

of Christ fundamentalism thanirebrandNo one rejected me based on my ChristianThe imam expressed to me bis belief thai "God is the same" foe all religions. The populationecular government and greatly admires the United Slates.

many factors makeoncern In Central Asia, the region isy research was mainly conducted in rural areas of the Ferghana Valley, one of the roostespite the fact thatconditions in the region are much worse than before bdependence. there has been no repeat of the corifl3gmtwru9any of the tears for my safety expressed by VVesrrrn, Russian, and urban Central Asian friends proved io be entirely unfounded. In my opinion, the rural population is, if anything, too passive in the face of autlioritarianism.

passivity should not be mistaken for lackapability to respond to incentives and changing circumstances. Central Asians are resourceful in adopting mechanisms for coping with the prevailing corrnriand-adrnim strati ve mode of governance. They typically make sound decisions when involved in the decision-rroalcing process. This is evident in the experience of the Lenirisky District Farmersin Tajikistan, which bas empowered farmers to manage their own affairs and overcome resistance from the local government.

Research on Central Asia can be improved in several ways-.

studies are needed. The prevailing body of researchund of specific iriforma-tion that Is often woefully inadequate for the purpose.

Central Asian experience should be ccrrrpared with that of other parts of the world. Specific locales of Central Asia should also be compared with one another.

egion That is predominantly rural, there isresearch on the countryside of Central Asia. In part, this is because it is more difficult to access rural areas, and that it is much easier to conduct research in tha relative comfort of the capital cities,

By adopting an historical perspective, scholars of Central Asia would learn more about change in the past, thus enabling them to identify most significant features of the present system. There isreat deal of room for "old-style" history concerning the

region, since we know only Ihe most basic facts about its past. Soviet interpretations of the past, on which many scholars base weir opinions, are often entirely spurious andloser resemblance to pamphleteering than serious history.

Highlights From the Discussion Economic Challenges

Oiliability more than an asset for economic and political development in Ae region. Several panelists aad discussants noted thai, if ihe oil sector was not managed properly, there ssnll be wide-reaching rco noetic, political, and social inrobxations. Other dltcus-sants expressed concerns about transparency issues.

* Oil has the potentialverwhelm the siMe, One panelist argued that success of these countries will depend largely on bow they deploy and digest energy revenueseaningful way and build institutions to support tbe state. Currently tbeGoverarrtertt is unable (or unwilling) to privatize SOCAR because it isucrative sourcelonnal revenue At the ssxue time, tevc-nnes from the oil iooustry are not being re-Invested in other capadty-buildlng sectors or in other instilj-

Other sectors are neglected as the foreign imesOnent pours into the oil and gas industry. Onu panelist argued that Kazakhstan is the best example of adiverse economic portfolio. Some foreign investment has (lowedariety of sectors, such as light manufacturing and metallurgy. But the energy sector will raootinue to be favored unless tbe local government provides incentives lo attract rnore

tfrorflF ^cjoinT clod *

four regulatory regimes disrourafie investment in many of these countries, and investment is often sou node tctl Regional governments seek to avoid transparency, Turkmenistan baa tbe most opaque system In Ihe region. None of the panelists could comment on what is happening in Turkmenistan.

Strattgiei for assessing economic data were debated. One discuses it argued that despite endemic collection rnobierra- data may be more accurate than we think. First, be observed that the dataharp fall in economic performance in (be region after Ihe Russian crisis, which suggests that the governments were not simply extrapolating past trends. Second, bad data may make It difficult to assess performance levels, but discerning economic trends remains possible. Several

panelists concurred lhat deliberate falsification and simple neglect make economic data from the region very difficult to use for purposes of assessing needs. If the falsification Is done consistently, however, it is still possible to discern various trends. Another discussant attested that accurate data can be crxaincd if an oert-side agency pays the locals to do it property, whichtrategy that the United Nations employed to collect data for its Human Development Report. Otherasserted lhat the quality of data depends largely on tbe country. For example, the quality of datafrom Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan far exceeds tbe quabty and quantity of data from Turkmenistan. Tacts and IMP economic data were asentioried as useful as external checks on rhe economic data from rhe report.

Social Challenges

A number of social problems were raised In dieWhile political and economic problems tend lo be counrry-spociflc, most of the states in the region centree: comrnon social problems at the miczoktrveL Tbe res*tn raised during tbenclude;

Population Dynamics, Tbe population dynamics of the former Soviet empire are in flux. Russia'sIs shrinking, and Central Asia's population is growing. Several paiieusts believed that thein the region will be unable to cope wirh the future population pressures, born growth rates as high asarsehsi noted, however, that this peptization growth must be somewhat qualified by the fact that many women are starting to realize that they cannot afford to raise as many children and are employing self-imposed birth control and having abortions. In addition,are moving from rural to urban areas.

Unemployment The endemic poverty of the region, combined with population growth, isignificant im employment problem for the young generation in Central Asia. Forty percent of the population ilslamic extremism mayirect consequence of the regional tirtrtnploy-rnent problem.

Corruption. Local and national leaders, who exploit their positions for personal gain, are found across both the South Caucasus and Central Asian regions. Mafia leaders and drug traffickers also drain resources and hurt economic prcMhictivity. There are some cultural norms for corruption which are socially acceptable.

Role of Women. Panelists agreed the role of women in these societies has been neglected, but they are playing an increasingly important role in the region. Present gender problems must be understood in tbe context of the past

Breakdown of social order/networks. The collapse of the political and ecoivomk system has alsothe iraditional social order in these countries. Research oa the ground reveals that people are so focused on survival that traditional informaland channels of communication no longer exist. Even traditional family structures are breaking down. Some people are unable to give or attend weddings or funerals, due to cost considerations. These social events were used to exchange news and information.

How should the West be thinking about these problems? An attendee noted lhat the picture painted by the panelists is one of unremitting poverty among Central Asianseemingly unstoppablespiral in their prospects. Panelists observed that the gap between government promises and the reality of increasingly deteriorating living conditions isbut it is unclear how long those impoverished will accept these conditions. One panelist commented that Central Asians do not know anything else, unless they are presented with an ocaponuoity. For this reason, it is difficult to predicthreshold lhat leads to areaction will be crossed.

One panelist offered four possible scenarios,that there are no optimistic outcomes at this moment:

The young will continue to migrate to urban areas and the elderly will be left impoverished in the rural areas.

The population will continue to tolerate poorconditions.

The young will seek alternative economic activities which are primarily illegal, for example, drugA criminal-red economy will have serious political implications.

The population demands change from thewhich leads to civil unrest and possibly nn overthrow of the regime

Why do we not see greater social unrest with such deteriorating conditions? Panelists explained that the pervasive lack of trust mitigates against socialof any kiod. Not only have social networksdown, but people refuse to work together. Small businesses are reluctant to collaborate to protect their mierests because ihey fear that the connections will make them vulnerable. Another panelist, however, had seen people unite around common causes, such as water issues. Forroup of Uzbeks recentlyater association, which could haveimplications, but il was an unlikely vehicle to foment social unrest.

Recommendations

Panelists strongly urged long-term, grassrootsOnly significant time on the ground In these two regions, particularly away from the capitals, will contributereater understanding of them these regions.

Central Asia and the South Caucasus must beon their own terms. Some discussants argued that the Westetter understanding of these countries' cultures, histories, ethnic groups, economics, and the role of Islam. Westerners lend to arrive in the region with an agenda and policythai ihey seek to impose on the natives. It is important to disc cm what ihe locals want and need.

An understanding of political stability in other developing countries that are undergoing structural adjustment programs can provide lessons learned that could be applied to Central Asia and the South Caucasus.

Panel VI

Concluding Round La tile: The Outlook of the larger Geopolitical Environment and Key Variables

The objective of the louodtabie was to rceniphssiie particularly salient points that emerged during thedayalf; to help establish tbe architecture for debate on contentious points; and toresearch menu" for going forward.

ndcrs Wimbusb

ssociates, Inc.

S. Enders Wirnhosb

ssociates. Inc.

Central Asia is at the center or on the near periphery of ihe nauonat security interests of aH states in the region. In the view of stales near Central Asia, Centra) Asia ismall, isolated group of former Soviet colonies that Is of interest only because of itsouuntness. Most countries In the region haveinterests that converge in Central Asia. India, which seerns tar away,ase inIt viewsAsia as its "extended strategic neighborhood" In the competition with Prtkisurn, and itfirectin controlling the political chaos in Pakistan nnd Afghanistan; its interest in Central Asian energy is paramount; and Usees Central Asiaey piece of its effort to ceo tain Chinese expansion and prevent -endrcjenient" by China- In this sense. Centralritical strategic jursaure point in its nationalplartning for China, tbe Middle East and South Asia. Similarly, for nearby states such as Turkey. Iran, Pakistan. China, and, of course, Russia, as well as for score more distant states such as Israel, Central Asia and the Sooth Caucasus are no less important in their strategic calculations.

Since the collapse of the USSR, strategic dynantics sow cascade across regions. Organizations that are unstrainedocus on discrete regions will not see many of the direct consequences that flow from poliii -cal change, and the second- and third-orderof developments in one region for surrounding regions.

Tertrnuotogy matters. Western catch-phrases for desired development such as "civilnd

"giobeJrzfltion" all speak to western goals for the region, but they tend to distort both the reality ofAsia and thwart good judgment ror what is needed there. They tell us bitle about how these peoples think about themselves, which is the critical variable in studying any strategic culture. The language andfUteu mcd for the regioo may need to beor thrown out nil together after we haveetter understanding of bow the people of the region think about these problems.

Rajan Men on

Lehigh University

Many scholars condone to view Central Asiaost-Soviet prism. This conference has highlighted the dangers of clingingTop-down" view. Aof areas require further research or need to be reassessed:

High politics should be replacedground fVtsor" appro*etter uridersianding of thein the region at the grassroots level, and how grassroot issues could affect Western interests in the region is necessary. Pot example. Central Asia's nascent "lostmsurted to attain or accept the benefits of or protect memselvcs against the adverse effects of gkibalrzatiori, will beto extremist movements.

Russia should be reassessedajor player,in terms of the viability of the Russianas it is currently aroroiurcd. Wc should not assume that Russia's borders will not continue to change. What docs the tozthcr fratnrantatkn of Russia imply for the Caucasus and Central Asia

A deeper undersiendina of Islam and its role In the regional contest is necessary. The current debate tends to be unidinsertsional and focused onwhichhobia of Islam From Indonesia to Algeria, Islamic groups play different roles in the poutieal process. The West should expect the same degree of heterogeneity in the role that Islam will play in Central Asia.

is important to think about bow US and Iranian interests might be converging on certain issues. It could turn out that the United Stales and Iran share some strategic interests.

Ian Bremmer

The Eurasia Group

The conference focused on change in the Southand in Central Asia and on the changingsurrounding these regions. The key areas of change Include:

Change. Political Succession during the next decade probably will result in significant changes iouonginan canorce for positive change, as is the case with President Shevardnadze in Georgia. But Georgia hasnique case in the South Caucasus and will unlikely be replicable. Poetising on alternative leadership scenarios and key players who may be involved mayetter understanding of the direction these irate* may goolitical turnover. Another key question of Interest is whether or not the post-Communist generation will be more prorrtarket.

* Change on rhe periphery. Central Asia and the South Caucasus will also change because the major actors that surround these regions are undergoing significant change.

Turkey. Turkey's economic influence in Central Asia and the South Caucasus is underrated and tends to be overshadowed by its cultural affinity. However. Turkey understands bow to conduct business in roth regions. If Turkey's economy changes for the worse in the future, its influence in both regions will probably diminish

I>an The US-Iran relationship is evolving. This will have serious consequences by changing use calculations of all players in and around these regions.

Russia. Should Russiaore coherent policy toward these states, it wouldrsore pronounced and assertive player in these regions.

China. China's growing demand for energy is increasing its prominence, particularly in Central Asw. The Chinese presence is most clear in Kazakhstan.

Tho mas Graham

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

We nuist think about the potential for significant changes in the region; it should not be assumed that the current stales will survive. Conditions in these states lend themselves to irrstabUity. For example, the Ferghana Valley is particularly susceptible to Islamic extremism. What kinds of things couldajor change in the trajectories for countries in the region? Will challenges be internal or external? What can be learned from developments at the grassroots level? One roust took below the surface in these countries to understand the linkages and movements at theIcstl and to assess the possibilities for political mobilization,

Russia is the largest unknown variable. We should not assume that Russia's policy will be rrsore coherent under President Putin. Instead, we shouldussia thai may be weaker and further fragmented-How might legioruihzstion in Russia affect Central Ana? What ties are developing between southernand Central Asia?

Rank Sh. Satfunn

Institute for Strattgic and Regional Studies

For Uzbekistan and tbe other states Ln Certtral Asia security and stability are the top priorities. Without security, there can be no economic growth or Foreign Direct Jnseatrjtento etemocracy. aod no human rights- Central Asian states face myriad Internaland regional threats lhat spill over the region's highly porous borders.

George Kolt

National Intelligence Council

1 fie conference has broughtuid bet of eatcraal variables which will shape rulure tlrvctopc^errts in tbe South Caucasus and Central Asia.

US-Iran rdaHau. Change* in the US Iran ch/narok will aScct all CCber reJaoreiahipi in tbe region Ten ibe -Yofaaooc-oser*alhould be reautrd

notbeai

hear this assessment, wtucbiacornsect between external perceptions ol Georgia and Georgia's self-perceptions.

Gregory Gkason

Vnrrenity of New Mexico

GtobaJua.ee,entral Am Anyone on the ground in tbe rcg.cn see. it lotbe pop culture ace) rhe ue^tftcW America, braarda. BeoethrseaJ assistarxe. so tMsM abet

The chaos and inaubaliiy iaeocnphcatcs everything and exacerbate, all problems In Central Asia. No sobation is likely in the foreseeable future.

Kuisia. ttnssia is likely to bo weaker io rhe future, but mis weakness could foment aggression and anger that could be duccsod at Ihe Uniled Stiles.

We wiii not understand Central Asia and tbe Soolb Caucasus u* we view rhe region through one filler. A

of cfafrercotperspective* ofe incorpor aerd tneo

Paui;

RAND Corporation

Some ccruotrses cannot afford to lakerisk on dcrnoc-racy, given their current dceneslk ilraatioo. Scenarios for regime changes in these regions are disturbing, even if they are carried out democratically.

When thinking about Central Asii and the Southwe should avoid being uiieUectuallvby narrow categories. Central Asia and the South Caucasus consist of more thanVbex they trunk about Cerrtral Asia, poucy sboutt incixde Iran. Western luusa.y. and Use North and South i

Jones

Aft Hotfoke College

Only research based on experience on the ground willull undmiarxUng of the role of Islam la Centra] Asia.

Scenarios based on projections of today's trendsour thinking and svill probably not capture the real change in Ihe future. Mkrolevef research assists in urcSerstarrfujg but will ruobabt,heap us to see the range of future tcersaoos.

tdt*

School of AA.

Some of the past prejudtcaa ttool fa mal Asfcma that existed in theave diminished. The level of scctatictrjon and education of the locals should never be undcrcsdmatrd. RntWhlng die categories thai the Wear uses to analyze Central Asia and the South Caucasus willeeper

Gerard J. Uiuu-idiai.

for Peace. Democr^ori Development

The roost striking impression from the conference is that Georjria has been singled out by the US research community asositive model in an otherwise grim region. Most Georgians would be surprised to

tooag term arproacb -hen thinking about democracy in the South Caucasus andsu. St^nlity must heprecondition, foeEXrinocracyat of values, not laws. Laws and democracy will follow siahihty.

Appendix A

Conference Agenda

Central Asia and the Sooth Caucasus:

Reorieolalions. Internal Transitions, and Strategic Dynamics

Airiie House, Warrcntoo, Virgirua0

Airiie Room

Opening Reception

Dinner

Keynote Address

A US Strategic Perspective on Central Asia and ihe South Caucasus Introduction

John Gannon, Chairman, National Intelligence Council Speaker

General Anthony Zinni, Ccfliuriandcr In Chief, United States Central Command

Federal Room

Opening Remarks

George Kolt, NIO for Russia and Eurasia

Challenges to State-Building: Internal Faultlines and Impediments This panel will examine the internal conditions and challenges these gov-ernrnents face as they modernize their political and economic institutions. The panel will also explore how rhe history of these countries is shaping their future direction and what might be expected ofthe new generation as it rises to leadership positions.

Chairman

S. Coders Wlmbush,ssociates

Creating/httiderntzlng State Institutions Gregory Glcason, University of New Mexico

The Legacy of the Pasl versus New Leadership Generations: South Caucasus

Audrey Altstadt. University of Massachusetts

77m! Legacy of the Pasl versus New Leadership Generations: Central Asia Martha Brill Olcoti. Carnegie Endcrwment for International Peace

Economic Change and Modernization: South Caucasus Ben Slay, PlanEcon

Economic Change and Modernization: Central Asia Boris Rumex. Harvard University

Break

Challenges to State-Building: The Impact of Megatrends on the Region This panel will examine the impact of global and regional trends that are shaping these regions and beyond, and explore how the stales are dealing with these challenges and opportunities. How are the states equipped to deal with both the positive and negative effects of gloryalization, the spread of ideologies and Islam, and the growing grass roots movements across these regions? Are the states capable of mitigating tbe negative effects of rein gious ninoamentalism, and the emerging regional drugs and arms markets?

Chainrtarj

S. Enders Wimbush,ssociates

Globalization: Economics and Communication Rajan Menon, lehigh Uruvexsity

CtvtV Society: Grassroots Organizations in South Caucasus Stephen Jones. Mt. Hotyoke College

Civil Society: Grass Root Organizations in Central Asia Fiona Hill, The Eurasia Foundation

Islam and Other Ideologies Olivier Roy. CNRS

Narcotraffieidng and the Rise of Independent Militias S. Fredrick Starr, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute

Lunch Presentation

Speaker: The Honorable James Schlesinger. Uhman Brothers TTir? Caspian Region: Where Geopolitics and Geo-economics Meet

iBtroduciJoo

Ellen Laipson, Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council

Dynamics

This panel will examine bow each new state views Its relationships with sor-roTinchJig states, including both other Newly Indcpcodcm States and those outside the bounoanes of the former Soviet Unioo.egional approach, not an Intraregtonal approach. This new regional context bas many new features that also involve outside stares (for example, commonand threats, etlmiciiy, tradepeakers from the South Caucasus and Central Asia are asked to outline how each of their respective countries is uunkjng about its strategic universe.

Chairman

Tom Zamostny, Office ofuropean Analysis

Strategic Universe of the States In the South Caucasus Paul Hente. RAND Corporation

Insider Perspective: Reactions/Comments

Nod La. Caucasian Institute for Peace. Democracy, and Development

Alieva. School of Advanced International StudiesUbaridian, East-West Institution

Strategic Universe of the States in Central Asia S. Fredrick Starr, Central Asia-Caucasus Iristitute

Insider Prospective: Reactions/ConuTients

Sb. Saifulro. Institute for Strategic and Regional Smdks

Yertysbayev, Kazakhstan Institute of Strategic Studies

7 AprilRoom

From the Periphery

This panel will explore how the major external actors view ihe ocwthat are unfolding between and among Central Asian/Sooth Caucasian states and their neighbors. Where are strong relationships possible and likely, and where are they mtpossible or less likely, and why? What is the

"glue" lhai will cement Ihese relationships (for example, trade, ethnicity, history, culture, language, shared threats, shared opportunities, common alliances or third parties)?

Chairman

George Koh. MIO for Russia and Eurasia

Turkey, Middle East, and Israel John Daly, Middle East Institute

Iran

Mohitiddin Mesbahi. St. Antonys College. Oxford University and Florida International University

China

Ross Monro, Center for Security Studies Russia

Robert Legvotd. Columbia University South Asia

Juli A, MacDonald. Science Applications Iniernalional Corporation Europe

Roy Allison, Royal Institute for Intentational

Lunch

Impressions From the Field

This panel will feature scholars who have spent considerable time conduct-ing research in these regions. They will share their insights on bow tbe regional and internal dynamics are changing based on their experience on the ground and will offer an assessment of where research of the region should be focused in the future.

Chairman

Angela Therlault, National Intelligence Council

Panelists: David Hoffman, UC Berkeley; Nora Dudwick, Worid Bank; Cynthia Werner, Piizer College; Kathleen Kuehnast, Mellon Research Fellow. Library of Congress; and Michael Thurmao. World Bank

to

Rouncftablc: The Outlook ofthe Larger Geopoliticaland Key Variables

objective of ihe ruundtable is io teempJiasize particularly salient points that emerged during the previous dayalf, to help establish thefor debate oo contentious points, and toresearch rnenu" for going forward.

Chairman

S. Enders Wimbnsb.ssociates. Inc.

ajan Menoo. Lehigh University; Ian Brrmamcr, Tbe Eurasii Group; Thomas Graham, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Robert Legvold, Columbia Univessity; Rafik Sb_ Sairulin. Institute forand Regional Studies; and George KolL National InteUigeoce Council

(General patricipation encouraged.)

Remarks

George Koll. NIC) for Russia and Eurasia

articipant-.

General Anthony C. Zinnl, Comrriander in Chief, United States Central Comrnind

The Honorable Jamra Schleslnger, Lehrnaji Brothers

Dr. Leila Alieva, Research Fellow, School of Advanced International Studies

Dr. Roy Allison, Director, Russia and Furasia ^grarrurK, Royal Institute of International Alfaits

Dr. Audrey L. Albtadt, Associaie Professor, University of Massachusetts- Amherst

Dr. Ian Bremmer, President. The Eurasia Group and Senior Fellow and Director of Eurasia Studies. World Policy Institute

Dr. John C. K. Daly, Scholar. Middle East Institute

Dr. Nora Dodwick, Social Scientist. VVorid Bank

Dr. Gregory Glcason. Director of the Pubisc Finarjce Consortium and Associate Professor, University of New Mexico

Dr. Thomas Graham, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for Intelnational Peace

Mr. Bernard Paul Menze, Resident Consultant, RAND

Dr. Fiona Hill, Director for Strnlegic Manning, Eurasia Foundation

Mr. David Hoffman, Doctoral Candidate, University of California, Berkeley and Senior Associate, Cambridge Energy Research Associates

Dr. Stephen Jones, Associate Professor, Mount Holyoke College

Mr. George Bolt, National Intelligence Cfficer for Russia and Eurasia. National mteliigence Council

.Si

dr. Katbitrn Kuehiiast, Research Associate, George Washtngton University and Research Scholar. Kcnnau Institute lor Advanced Russian Studies

Dr.gvold, Professor. Columbia University

Dr. Gerard J. Ubaridian, Senior Research Fellow. East West InsQtate and Senior Corrsultani, IRE X

Ms. Jtili A. Mac Donald, Program Analyst, Strategic Assessment Crater. Science Applications International Corporatson

Dr. RHjan Menon, Monroe J. Ralhbome Professor and Chairman of the Dersnrtment of Intctnalional Relations. Lehigh University and adjunct professor of Political Science. Columbia University

Dr.n Mcsbahl, Professor ond co-chair of the Asiantuirncnt at Florida Intcnialional Univerbity

Mr. Row Monro, Director of Asian Studies, Center for Security Studies

Dr. Ghla Nodla, Chiairman, Caucasian Institute for Peace, Desnotn^acy and Development

Dr. Martha Brill Okoct, Senior Fellow. Carnegie Eoctowmrat for International Peace and Professor. Colgate University

Dr. Olivier Roy, Senior Researcher. CNRS (French National Center for Scientific Research) and Consultant, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Dr. Boris Rumer, Senior Fellow, Harvard University

Dr. RHflk mi. Salfulln. Direcior, Institute for Strategic and Regional Studies under the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan

Dr. Ben Slay, Senior Economist, PianEcon. Inc.

Dr. S. Fredrick Starr, Chairman of Ihe Centra] Asia-Caucasus Institute, Johnsine School of Advanced International Studies

Ms. Angela Theriault, National Intelligence Council

Dr. Michael Thurman, Consultanl. World Bank

Or. Cynthia Werner, Post-docloral research fellow, Piizer College

Mr. S. Fudi-rs Wimbush, Vice President for jnternaoonaJ Strategy and Policy.ssociates

Dr. Yennuhamcl K. Yertysbuyer, Director, Kazakhstan Insdtutc for Strategic Studies

Mr. Thomas iamostnsy, Transitioning States Issue, Office of Russian and European Analysis

Original document.

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