panel of life science experts convened for the Strategic Assessments Group by the National Academy of Sciences concluded that advances in biotechnology, coupled with the difficulty in detecting nefarious biological activity, have the potentialuch more dangerous biological warfare (BW) threat. The panel noted:
The effects of some of these engineered biological agents could bo worse than any disease known toman.
; more than any other science, it will revolutionizeentury."
Growing understanding of the complex biochemical pathways thai underlie life processes has the potential lolass of new, more virulent biological agents engineered to attack distinct biochemical pathways and elicit specific effects, claimed panel members. The same science that may cure some of our worst diseases could be used to create (he world's
genomic revolution Is pushing biotechnology into an explosive growth phase. Panelists asserted that the resulting wave front of knowledge will evolve rapidly and be so broad, complex, and widely available to the public that traditional intelligence means for monitoring WMD development could prove inadequate to deal with the threat from these advanced biological weapons.
Detection of related activities, particularly the development of novel bioengineered pathogens, will depend increasingly on more specific human intelligence and, argued panelists, will necessitate aperhaps qualitativelyworking relationship between the intelligence and biological sciences communities.
The Threat From Advanced BW
In the last several decades, the world hasnowledge explosion in the life sciences based on an understanding of genes and how they work. According to panel members, practical applications of this new and burgeoning knowledge base will accelerate dramatically and unpredictably:
As one expert remarked: "'In the life sciences, we now are where information technology was in the
The know-how to develop some of these weapons already exists. For example:
Australian researchers recently Inadvertently showed that the virulence of mousepox virus can be significanUy enhanced by the incorporation ofa standard immunoregulatorechnique that could be applied to other naturally occurring pathogens such as anthrax or smallpox, greatly increasing their lethality.
Indeed, other biologists haveey smallpox viral protein and shown its effectiveness in blocking critical aspects of the human immune response.
A team of biologists recentlyolio virus in vitro from scratch.
According to the scientists convened, other classes of unconventional pathogens that may arise over the next decade and beyond include binary BW agents that only become effective when two components are combinedarticularly insidious example wouldild pathogen that when combined with its antidote becomesW agents created to be antibiotic resistant or lo evade an immune response; weaponized gene therapy vectors that effect permanent change in the victim's genetic makeup;stealth" virus, which could lie dormant inside the
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for an extended period before being triggered. Foe example, one panelist cited the possibilitytealth virus attack that couldarge portion of people in their forties with severe arthritis, concealing its hostile origin andountry with massive health and economic problems.
According to experts, the biotechnology underlying the development of advanced biologicalikely to advance very rapidly,iverse and elusive threath- resulting diversity of new BW agents could enableroad range of attack scenarios that it would be virtually impossible to anticipate and defend against, they say.esult, there couldonsiderable lag lime in developing effective biodefense measures.
However, effective countermeasurcs. once developed, could be leveragedange of BW agents, asserted anendees, citing current research aimed at developing protocols for augmenting common clean nti of the body's response lo disease, rather than treating individual diseases. Such treatments could strengthen our defense against attacks by ABW agents.
They cited the pace, breadth, and volume of the evolving bioscience knowledge base, coupled with its dual-use nature arid the fact thjtt most is publicly available via electronic means and very hard to track, as the driving forces for enhanced cooperation. Most panelists agreed that the US life sciences research community was more or less "over its Vietnam-era distrust" of the national security establishment and would be open to more collaboration.
One possibility, they argued, might be early government assistance to life scicnccs community efforts to develop its own "standards and norms" intended to differentiate between "legitimate" and "illegitioiale" research, efforts recently initiated by the US biological sciences community.
A more comprehensive vision articulated by one panelist was for the bioscience community at large to aid the government by acting asiving sensorinternational conferences, in university labs, and through informalidentify and alert it to new technical advances with wcaponization potential. The workshop did not discuss the legal or regulatory implications of any such changes.
Implications for Warning
The experts emphasized that, because the processes-techniques, equipment And know-how needed for advanced bio agent development are dual use, it will be extremely difficult to distinguish between legitimate biological research activities and production of advanced BW agents
The panel coo Basted the difficulty of detecting advanced bioweapons with that of detecting nuclear weapons, which has always had clear surveillance and detectionuch as highly enriched uranium or telltale production equipment
Consequently, most panelists arguedualitatively different relationship between the government and life sciences communities might be needed to most effectively grapple with the future BW threat.
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