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Errata sheet forI6HC,raq's Continuing
Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction
irst sub-bullet under first full bullet. Replace T
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Baghdad has mobile tacilities for producing bacterial andgents; these facilities can evade detection and arc highly survivable. Within three to six months these units probably could produce an amount of agent equal to the total that Iraq produced in the years prior to the Gulf war.
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Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction
l"U) This Estimate was approved for publication by the National Foreign Intelligence Board under tbe authority of the Director of Central Intelligence.
IV) Preparedtinder theobert DWalpole, National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for Strategic and Nuclear Programs; with assistance from Paul Pillar, NIO for the Near East and South Asia; Lawrence K. Gershwin. NIO for Science and Technology; and Major Generalandry. NIO for Conventional Military Issues.
(U) Inquiries may be directed to the NIO for Strategic
and Nuclear Programs
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Key Judgments
Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction
We judge that Iraq bas continued its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in defiance of UN resolutions and restrictions. Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons as well as missiles with ranges in excess of UN restrictions; If left unchecked, it probably willuclear weapon during this decade. (See HSR alternative view al the end of these Key Judgments.)
judge that we are seeingortion of Iraq's WMD efforts, owing to
Baghdad's vigorous denial and deception efforts. Revelations after the Gulf war starkly demonstrate the extensive efforts undertaken by Iraq to deny information. We lack specific information on many key aspects of Iraq's WMD programs.
Since inspections endedraq has maintained its chemical weapons effort, energized Its missile program, and invested more heavily in biological weapons; in the view of most agencies, Baghdad is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program.
Iraq's growing ability to sell oil illicitly increases Baghdad's capabilities to finance WMD programs: annual earnings in cash and goods have more than quadrupled,0 million8 to aboutillion this year.
Iraq has largely rebuilt missile and biological weapons facilities damaged during Operation Desert fox and bas expanded its chemical and biological infrastruciure under the cover of civilian production.
Baghdad has exceeded UN range limitsm with its ballistic missiles and is working with unmanned aerial vehicleshich allowore lethal means to deliver biological and, less likely, chemical warfare agents.
Although we assess that Saddam does not yet have nuclear weapons or sufficient material to make any. he remains intent on acquiring them. Most agencies assess that Baghdad started reconstituting its nuclear program about the time that UNSCOM inspectors
[How quickly Iraq win obtain its first nuclear weapon depends on
"STDTIcIl
when it acquires sumclent weapons-grade fissile material.
If Baghdad acquires sufficient fissile material from abroad it coulduclear weapon within several monthsear.
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such material from abroad, Iraq probably would not be able toeapon7wing to inexperience in building and operating centrifuge facilities to produce highly enriched uranium and challenges in procuring the necessary equipment and expertise.
Most agencies believe lhat Saddam's personal interest in and Iraq's aggressive attempts to obtain high-strength aluminum tubes for centrifugewell as Iraq's attemptsjjccjmrt, 1tw rind rt"nw^t^ j compelling evidence that Saddam isranium enrichment effort for Baghdad's nuclear weapons program- (DOE agree* thatf the nuclear program is underway but assesses that the tubes probably are not part of the program.)
Iraq's efforts to re-establish and enhance its cadre of weapons personnel as well as activities at several suspect nuclear sites further indicate lhat reconstitutjon is underway.
All agencies agree that0 centrifuges based on tubes of tbe size Iraq is trying to acquire would be capable of producing approximately two weapons' worth of highly enriched uranium per year.
a much less likely scenario. Baghdad could make enough fissile materialuclear weapon57 if It obtains suitable centrifuge tubes this year and has all the other materials and technological expertise necessary to build production-scale uranium enrichment facilities.
We assess that Baghdad has began renewed production of mustard, sarin, GF
nd VX; Hs capability probably is more limited now than it was at the time of the Gulf war, although VX production and agent storage life probably have been improved.
An array of clarrfestine reporting reveals that Baghdad has procured covertly the types and quantities of chemicals and equipment sufficient to allow limiied CW agent production hidden within Iraq's legitimate chemical industry.
Although we have little specific information on Iraq's CW stockpile, Saddam probably has stocked atetric torn (MT) and possibly as muchT of CWof it added in the last year.
The Iraqis have experience in manufacturing CW bombs, artillery rockets, and projectiles. We assess that that they possess CW bulk fills for SKBM warheads, includingimited number of covertly stored Scuds,ew with extended ranges.
[We judge tbat all keyproduction, andor Iraq's otTrnslre BW program are active and that most dements are larger and more advanced than they were before tbe Gulf war.
judge Iraq has some lethal and incapacitating BW agents and is capable of quickly producing andariety of such agents, including anthrax, for delivery by bombs, missiles, aerial sprayers, nnd covert operatives.
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Chances are even thai smallpox is part of Iraq's offensive BW program.
Baghdad probably has developed genetically engineered BW agents.
Baghdad hasarge-scale, redundant, and concealed BW agent production capability.
Iraqmall missile force and several development programs, includingrobably intended to deliver biological warfare agents.
Gaps lo Iraqi accounting to UNSCOM suggest that Saddamovert force of upew dozen Scud-variant SRBMs with rangesm.
Iraq is deploying its new al-Samoud andRBMs, which are capable of flying beyond them range limit; Iraq has tested an al-Samoud variantOas farm.
Baghdad's UAVs could threaten Iraq's neighbors, US forces in the Persian Gulf, and if brought close to. or into, the United States, the US Homeland.
Iraqi UAV procurement network attempted to procure cc*runercially available route planning software and an associated topographic database that would be able to support targeting of the United States, according to analysis of special intelligence.
Director. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance. US Air Force, does not agree that Iraq is developing UAVs primarily intended to be delivery platforms for chemical and biological warfare (CBW) agents. The small size of Iraq's new UAV stronglyrimary role of reconnaissance, although CBW delivery is an inherent capability.
Iraq is developing medium-range ballistic missile capabilities, largely through foreign assistance in building specialized facilities,est stand for engines more powerful than those in its current missile force.
have low confidence in our ability to assess when Saddam would use WMD.
Saddam could decide to use chemical and biological warfare (CBW) preemptively against US forces, friends, and allies in the region in an attempt to disrupt US war preparations and undermine the political will of the Coalition.
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Saddam mighl use CBW after an initial advance into Iraqi territory, but early use of WMD could foreclose diplomatic options for stalling the US advance.
He probably would use CBW when he perceived be irretrievably had lost control of tbe military and security aituaa'on, but we are unlikely to know when Saddam reaches that point.
We judge that Saddam would be more likely to use chemical weapons than biological weapons on the battlefield.
Saddam historically has maintained tight control over tbe use of WMD; however, be probably has provided contingency instructions to his commanders to use CBW in specific circumstances.
for now appears to beoe abort of conducting terrorist attack*
with conventional or CBW against tbe United States, fearing that exposure of Iraqi uivofVement would providetronger cause for making war.
probably would attempt clandestine attacks against tbe US Homeland rf
Baghdad feared an attack that threatened the survival of tbe regime were imminent or unavoidable, or possibly for revenge. Suchlikely with biological than chemicalwould be carried oat by special forces or Intelligence operatives.
Iraqi Intelligence Service (US) probably has been directed to conduct clandestine attacks against US and Allied interests in the Middle East in the event the United States takes action against Iraq. The OS probably would be tbe primary means by which Iraq would attempt to conduct any CBW attacks on the US Homeland, although we have no specific intelligence information that Saddam's regime has directed attacks against US territory.
Saddam, if sufficiently desperate, might decide that only an organization such asworldwide reach and extensive terrorist infrastructure, and already engagedife-or-death struggle against tbe Unitedperpetrate the type of terrorist attack that be would hope to conduct.
such circumstances, he might decide that the extreme step of assisting the Islamist terrorists inBW attack against tbe United States would be his last chance to exact vengeance byurge number of victims with him.
JState/INR Alternative View of Iraq's Nuclear Program
[ The Assistant Secretary of State for intelligence and Research (LNR) believescontinues to want nuclear weapons and that available evidence indicates that Baghdadatimited effort to maintain and acquire nuclear weapon-relatedactivities we have detected do not, however, add upompelling case that Iraqrwrsuing what INR would consider to be an integrated and cxnnprcbensive approachon next
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jState/INR Alternative View
jcquire nuclear weapons. Iraq may be doing so. bul 1NR considers ihc available evidence inudequaleupportudgment. Lacking persuasive evidence lhat Baghdad hasoherent effort to reconstitute its nuclear weapons program. LNR is unwilling to speculatech an effort began soon after the departure of UN inspectors or toimeline for the completion of activities it does not now see happening.esult, LNR is unable to predict when Iraq coulduclear device or weapon.
In INR's view Iraq's efforts to acquire aluminum tubes is central to the argument that
Baghdad is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program, bul 1NR is not persuaded that thequestion are intended for use as centrifuge rotors. DVR accepts the judgment ofat the VS. Department of Energy (DOE) who have concluded that the tubes Iraq seeksare poorly suited for use in gas centrifuges lo be used for uranium enrichment andthe arguments advanced by others lo make the case that they are iMeodcd for1NR considers it far more likely lhat the tubes are intended for another purpose,the production of artillery rockets. The very large quantities being sought, the waywere tested by the Iraqis, and the atypical lack of attention to operational security inefforts are among the factors, in addition to the DOE assessment, that lead LNRthat the lubes arc not intended fur use in Iraq's nuclear weapon program.
lUl Confidence Levels for Selected Key Judgments In This Estimate
| High Confidence:
Iraq is continuing, and in some areas expanding, its chemical, biological, nuclear and missile programs contrary to UN resolutions.
We are not delecting portions of these weapons programs.
Iraq possesses proscribed chemical and biological weapons and missiles.
Iraq coulduclear weapon in monthsear once it acquires sufficient weapons-grade fissile material.
Moderate Confidence:
Iraq does not yetuclear weapon or sufficient material to make one but is likely toeaponSee LNR alternative view,.
j Low Confidence:
When Saddam would use weapons of mass destruction.
Whether Saddam would engage in clandestine attacks against the US Homeland.
Whether in desperation Saddam would share chemical or biological weapons with al-Qa'ida.
HU'I I'll Ml lij^
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^Uranium Acquisition. Iraq retains
approximatelyalf tornercent enriched uranium oxide, which the IAEA permits. This low-enriched material could be used as feed material to produce enough HEU for about two nuclear weapons. The use of enriched feed material also would reduce the initial number of centrifuges that Baghdad would need by about half. Iraq could divert thisIAEA inspects it only once aenrich it to weapons
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gradeubsequent inspection discovered it was missing. Tbe IAEA last inspected this material in late
Iraq has about
etric tons ot yellowcake' and low-enriched uranium at Tuwaitba, which is inspected annually by the IAEA. Iraq also began rigorously trying to procure uranium ore and yellowcake; acquiring either would shorten the time Baghdad needs to produce nuclear weapons.
A foreign government service reported that as ofiger planned to send several tons of "pure uranium" (probably yellowcake) to Iraq. As ofiger and Iraq reportedly were still working out arrangements for this deal, which could be for upons of yellowcake. We do not know the status of this arrangement.
Reports indicate Iraq also bas sought uranium ore from Somalia and possibly the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
from these sources. Reports suggest Iraq is shifting from domestic mining and milling of uranium to foreign acquisition. Iraq possesses significant phosphate deposits, from which uranium had been chemically extracted before Opetation Desert Storm. Intelligence information on whether nuclear-rclatcd phosphate mining and/or processing has been reestablished is inconclusive, however.
1efined form of natural uranium.
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INR's AlternatiTe View: Iraq's Attempts to Acquire Aluminum Tubes
Some of the specialized bat dual-use items being sought are, by all indications, bound tor Iraq's missile program. Other cases are ambiguous, such as thatlanned magnet-productioo line whose suitability for centrifuge operations remains unknown. Some efforts involve non-controlled industrial material anda variety of-rxcause they WOtM Uf MtaWlfa ihe infras true lureenewed nuclear program. But such efforts (which began well before the inspectors departed) are not clearly linkeduclear end-use. Finally, tbe claims of Iraqi pursuit of natural uranium in Africa arc in INR's assessment, highly dubious.
The National Intelligence Council
The National Intelligence Council (NIC) manages the Intelligence Community's estimative process, incorporating the best available expertise inside and outside the government It reports to Ihe Director of Central Intelligence in his capacity as head of the US Intelligence Community and speaks authoritatively on substantive issues for the Communityhole.
ActingA. Cohen
Vice Chairman forLowenthal
Acting Director, SeniorR.and Analysis
Houdck
A. Cohen
Military Issues
Landry
Asia
Brown
& Global Issues
Monaghan.
F. Lcweokron
America
T. Armstrong
Bast and South Asia
Pillar
and Eurasia
Kolt
& Technology
Gershwin
& Nuclear Programs
D Walpole
Vickers
Nil lion al Security
Subject lo CrumajlSswrionr.
Information available at2 was utrd In ilie preparation of Ihi) National intelligence Estimate
The following intelligence orcankatioos participated In tbe preparation of Ihi) Estimate:
The Ceetral Intelligence Agency
Tbe Defense fotelligeoce Agency
The National Security Agency
National Imaging and Mapping Agency
Tbe Bureau cf Intelligence andtrrient of Slate
The Deputmeol of Energy
Aho participating:
The Deputy Chief of Staff for imeJh'gence, Department of ibe Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of tbe Navy
Tbe Director, Intelligence. Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, Department of the US Air Force
The Director of mteUigcoce, Headquaitcrs. Marine Corps
This Estimate waa approved for publication by the National Foreign Intelligence Board under the authority of tbe Director of Central Intelligence.
Original document.
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