g!"GCCW.iT
$
2
X no.2
No.
Current Intelligence Weekly Review
!
DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODE WORD MATERIAL
document contains cluufird jifcrmauon affecting the national
of the United SUIa within Uv mean Jig of the espionage
Uws USCodeTitie is. The Uwtransmission or ihc revelation of lu contenU In any mannerunauthorised person, at well as iu use in any manner prejudicial
the salety or interest of the United States or for the Dene fit of any
government to lhe detriment of the United Sutea
Itto b> aeen only by US personnel especiallyauthorised to receive COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE
IU security must be maintained In accordance with
INTELLIGENCE RECULATIONS.
action is to be Uxen on any COMMUNICATIONS-
which may be contained herein, regardless of lhe advantages
be trained, unless such action is first approved by the Director
Central IntelJigenoe.
I
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Of CURRENT INTEILIOCNCE
1 V,
RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN
CONTROLUOTB4
-
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEEKLY REVIEW
8 June2
SOUTH YEAR OF MILITARY 9
The military regime of General Pak Chong-hulirst year has consolidated Its position and embarked *lth determination on an Inadequately planned program to overcome Sooth Korea's many social, political, and economic problems. Tbe regime has not eon vide support. Its authoritarian tactics and tbe Increasingly clear lotentlon of the leadership toucceeding civilian administration have alienated important political groups. Tbe Junta Ls vigorously seeking to broaden South Korea'sties, while promoting closer regionalagainst the Communists.
OP UCCttCT IU
vl
BRIEFS
APPROVED FOR RELEASE QATHULJOH
SOUTHYEAR OF MILITARY RUIU
military regime of General Pah Chong-hul during Its first year has consolidated Its control of South Korea and is moving to assure the dominance of the present leadershipucceeding civilian Power is In the hands of an armed group which has younger and better informed loaders and Isore efficient and less corrupt administration than any recent South Korean government.
The regime has not won wide support, however, and itstactics havupolitically important groups. While approving the junta's strong anll-Comminlst stance and generally recognising the need for reforms, public opinion increasingly favors an early return to civilian.
The government has initiated programs Tor economic reform, many of which have been too hastily developed and poorly administered. There remain the chronic problems of factionalism within tbe Junta, unemployment, poverty, under-lodustriSliaation, and an overly large military establishment.
Consolidation of Control
General Pak has emerged as the hoy man in the regimeesult of his ability to hold in balance the factions in the Supreme Council for Rational Reconstructiontop executive and legislative body. His personal integrity has won the esteem of the military and considerable respect from the general public. Pah's1 visit to Washington and subsequent expressions of US support enhanced bis prestige.
Following the Washington visit, factional tensions in the SCKR diminished. Mont political prisoners seised during the early days of the regime have been released under close police surveillance. Leftist agitation has been suppressed, and the disorderly student demonstrators
whose activities highlighted the Chang Myon admin)StratIon have
been returned to tho classroom.
In1 the Junta established the semiofficial National Reconstruction(NRM) to build public support for the "revolution" and extend political control to the grass-roots level. Local branches now blanket the country, but the NRM is regarded with apathy and suspicion. Koreans describe Itdragon's head, snake's tail."
The students, at first favorably disposed toward the patriotic appeal of the May coup, soon became disaffected. Arrests of students andgenerated fear and Long-needed educationalclosing ofinstitutions andof liberal artshastily Imposed without adequate preparation.
The Junta's actions toward organized labor have beenby suspicionesire to forestall any actions that might interfere with the regime's economic plans. The unions have been reorganized under newmost of them young mento be dynamic and Strikes are banned, and other activities areby police surveillance.
The junta's efforts to court the farmers,f the population, havo met with only marginal success. Rural conditions appear no worse, possiblyittle better, than before tbe military Policies, however, appear to have been basedsimple soldier's Judgment ofud programs such os the anti-usury law have been well in-tentioned but often ill thought out and hastily Implemented, Although the villagors seem to have some appreciation of what the regime wants to do for then, they are confused by the frenetic activities of the newR KlfMi and tend not to
The Politicians
Corrupt politiciansajor initial target of the military group. Afteraste of power, the coup leadership became increasingly
June 62
ARTICLES
f 11
rr-RR-M INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY RrVIEK
over tbe dangerhallenge from ousted political leaders who retain strong ties In tbelr local areas In the eyes of tbe junta, "corrupt" politicians soon sere equated With former politicians.
The "Political Purificationromulgated onarch, gives the Junta the authority to bar anyone fron political activity for up to six years. mongn the SCNR screening list refuse to apply for permission topolitical activity. Ofho did, the regime has action of young politicians who belonged to the opposition during tbe Chang Nyoo administration was the only prominent group approved
General Pak haa theto clears "conscientious and ood person." Row he exercises this power may Indicate the extent to which the Junta Is willing to risk continuedof responsible older civilian loaders. There are Indications that some politicians have been maneuvering forwith dissatisfied military elements.
The most critical period Is likely to be the transition to civilian authority. The timetable as outlined by Pak
calls for resunptlon of civilian
political activities by promulgation ofew
constitution before Marcb. and
general elections In May.
The regime'* Intention appears to be loelectoat, rubber-stamp legislature mado up of former military officers and selected civilians. Therewillmallcomprised of youngwith wholly civilian The leaders allegedly intend to bold free elections, which tbey believe they cio win through "positive, popular programs." More likely, they plan to use the secret police >nd the Purification Law to manipulate the nomination of candidates and thus avoid blatant fraud and tho coercion of voters
at the polls. In any event, they will have to make atlausible pretense of honest elections if they are to avoid risking serious unrest.
Foreign Relations
The Junta Is vigorously seeking to broaden South Korea's International ties whilecloser regionalagainst the Communists. Eleven additional countries have recognized South Korea since the Junta seized power, Consulates have been established in India and Egypt, where tbe North Koreans also maintain consular relations. Unlike the Rhee government, the present regime has notellicose policy toward the problem of Korean unification, possibly because the military couphadow on theclaim to represent the will of tbe people.
Seoul Is quietlymall group ofinstructors to aid the South Vietnamese.
The junta wants Japanese funds to help finance Its five-year economic development program and Is seeking to end the tea-year Impasse in relatione with Japan. Pak's policy appears to be to offer Tokyo concessions on minor lssuos In the hope of eventuallyarge cash settlement. However, the Japanese do not foresee enough benefits to Justify meeting Seoul's asking price, andprobably will drag on for some tine.
The. leaders seem anxious to continue South Korea's Close ties with the United States but
are highly: Vi.ilfnAr.iaaanraer, intent onWIIW n* "tUASl
country's independence MTtdloUDIl
show an Increasing reluctance
to accept American advice when
they believe South Korea's
interests are not parallel
with those of the United
States.
'ill III. I IHHWl
62
ARTICLES
f 11
Pak has agreed to the principle of subordination of the South Korean arnod forces to the US Command, but tho KoreanBIndicated that they desire {renter control over their oen forces. Thin desire could take several forme. Including pressureeorganisation of the army command structure, with aof the number of troops subject to the UN commander's operational control.thorlty of the UR commander canlonger be taken for granted, particularly in decisions the Junta leaders consider vital to their interests.
Economic Problems
The military government hasotiau ofand discipline that has been missing since the republic was founded This hasa concerted effort to control corruption. At the same time, however, the lack of civil administration experience among military officers and theirof former government and business leaders severely 1imit tbe government's ability to deal with the country'seconomic problems.
Already In control of the central Bank of Korea, tberegime administers the nation's financial system by having. In effect, nationalized all commercial banks. Punitive action still in process against major industrialistsallot whom stand accused of securing large profits illegally throughwith former government officials andlead to the nationalisation of leading business enterprises as well. Uncertainty surrounding the disposition of these cases and businessmen's anxiety about future investments andled to stagnation of the economy during most ofnly recently has industrial activity shown signs of revival, and theme are not definitive.
Perhaps moat serious of all the government's economic problems, however, is itsfor matching its ambitious spending programs with sound sources of revenue, Improved
tax-collection procedures and diminished corruption among government officials areavailable revenues further, but subsidies to farmers, defense spending, economic development costs, and loss of revenue from business stagnation have magnified the deficit andrave inflationary impact.
The regime's five-yearplan envisages Increased agricultural production. expansion, an exportrisingercent and tbe attraction of sizable amounts of foreign investment, both private and official.
Earliest attention is being given to increasing electric-power generation on abasis and0 project to create an Industrial complex at the southeastern port city of TJlsan, Incorporating an oilhermal electric powerertilizer plant, and an iron and steel plant. The government is relying heavily on continued, massive foreign aid to achieve its goals and presumably will continue, once the projects are completed, to require suchto finance raw-naterial imports.
Out look
South Korea's major long-term problem Is the poverty of its economy. Large-scale foreign aid and growing nationalhave generated widespread public expectationsising standard of living. Prospects for improvement, however, are limited by the paucity of natural resources and human skills.
Immediately, the stability of the regime largely rests on Pak's ability to prevent aof factional infighting within the military, and more particularly within the ruling JuntAPPRtwTa FOR RELEASEumber of reported plots against hisbis failure to hold the military factions in balance could at any time setew round of politicaland possible violence.
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: