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SC1 Copy No. ,ttyS
Current Intelligence Weekly Review
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY1
FACTIONALISM INOREAN REGIMK.
Pactional struggle threatens the stability of South Korea's ruling military council. Security boam Col. TCim Chong-pil, whose followers tend to favor protractedruletate-operated economy. Is pressing for the removal of tbe council's vice chairman. Maj. Gen. Yl Chu-il, whose group appears to wantore moderate approach to the country's difficulties. The chairman of the council, Lt. Gen. Pak Cbong-bui, is believed to be working tohowdown.
FACTIONALISM IN SOUTH KOREAN REGIME
arrest by security forces oneptember ofersons linked to the viceof South Koroa's Supreme Council for National (SCNH), Ma.1. Gen. Yi Chu-il. Is theajor factional struggle between Yl and national security boss Col. Kin Chong-pil. Both men head powerful alliances within the military junta. The chairman of the SCNR, Lt. Gen. Pak Chong-hui, is believed to stand above the conflict and to be working tohowdown. Should he fall, the stability of the regime would be endangered.
Following the purge of tbe coup's front man, Lt. Gen. Cbang To-yong, in July, two majoremerged In theled by Kin. the other Jointly led by Yi and marine Maj. Gen. Kim Tong-ha. The core of Kim Choiig-pil'm factionroup of young officers who were in the "eighth class ofthe Korean Military Academy. This class suffered severe casualties In the Korean war and subsequently found promotions blocked by theyouthful generals. The officers in Kin's faction tend to favor protracted nilltary rule and authoritarian measures to solve the country's economic and political problems. Yi's faction is mado up largely of senior officers who aro more inclined to pronorve accustomed relationships and institutions.
All those seized oneptember are alleged to have been involved in preferential treatment, based on regional loyalties, lo "illicit fortune seekers." Those favored are among theusiness leaders who dominate the country's economy and who have been ordered ton back taxes and fines wltblD Six months. In order to force the reglne to grant them more favorable terms, they bave cut back their business activities, thus depressing tbe domestic economy. Feeling against the group is believed to be particularly strong among Kim's faction, which tends to favor the nationalization of Industry. Pak'a position on nationalizatlon is unknown, but the struggle between Kim and Yi may increase the pressure on Pak totate-operated
Xlm reportedly intends to bring aboutdismissal from the SCNR beforectober. In any showdown. Kin's faction has the advantage that he controls the secret police. Furthermore,r more members of the "eighth class" still on active dutyigh proportion of battalion conmanders. the lowest echelon of command to exercise court-martialand ono of the hlgheiet permitting effective personal contact with and personal control of troops.
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