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Current Intelligence Weekly Summary
APPROVED (OF RELEASE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
NOT RE LEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS CONTINUED CONTROL
soirrrr Korean leader pax chong-hui
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Gen. Pakf South iU'raattBinnn 1IIP RFIFBCF
balance among the factlo nationalist and reluctant to tlcularly on political and
military1 visit Washington Innd his associates are pledged to eliminateepted political and economic abuses but are not prepared by training or experience to cope with the country'seconomic difficulties. Pak Is described by the us Embassy as an jble leader; he has yet to establish public support, however, and his position depends on maintaining
in the junta. He Is strongly ccept foreign advice, illtary matters.
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briefs
SOUTH KOREAN LEADER PAK CKONG-IIUI
Gen. Pak Chong-bui, chairman of the South Korean Supreme Council for National Reconstruction who Is to make an official visit to Washington from 14 to ovember for consultations, has worked hard to correct chronic graft and corrupt political practices since he seized power last May. Pak hadorce offficers and menell-planned and nearlycoup against the weakof Prime Kinistor Chang Myon. Pak subsequently chose to exercise his poser as head of the Supreme Council, while retaining the Incumbentin order to maintain the legal continuity of the military government. He alsoabinet headedrimeas the nominal executive branch of the military.
Pak's assertion that he noved against the previous because of its corrupt nature has been generallyby measure has undertaken.
enuine from the top and trying to introduce sweeping fundamental reforms. In his first five months Pak has displayed energy and determination. Theand militaryof bla regime have marred his public image, bowever, and there 1* little evidence of popular enthusiasm. Pak hopes that his visit will enhance his prestige at home and assure continued largo-scale American aid for louth Korea's shaky economy.
Internal Position
Pak Ls the most powerful figure In the Junta, but his freedom of action Is limited by factionalism within tho ruling group. He does notaction of his own, and the degree of authority he is able to exercise over his associates depends largely on his ability to keep the contending factions In To date he haw played this game with consumate skill.
Following the purge last July of Lt.Gen. Chang To-yong, front man for the Junta following the coup, factional alignmentsinto two major groups, one led by security boss Col. Kim Chong-pil and the other by MaJ. Gen. Yi Chu-U and Marine MaJ. Gen. Kim Toag-ha. The core of Kim Chong-pll's factionroup of field-grade officers who suffered severe casualties in the Korean war and subsequently found promotions blocked by the relatively youthful generals. Sometimes described as "angry youngbey tend to favor protracted military rule andiLBSt South Kor.a ,WlMI
Yi's faction is made up largely of senior officers who are morn inclined to preserve traditional relationships aud institutions. Theyrake on their morn zealous and narrowly nationalistic Juniors but are stigmatized by past Involvement in corruption.
Pak reportedly desires to reduce the influence of the
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field-grade officers, buthowdown he night well shift In their direction. Kimlose relative by marriage to Pak and in control of the secret police, is particularly well situated to hold Pak's Also, Pak probablythat Kin's groupa preponderance of strength. igh proportion of these officers are battalion and regimental commandersosition to exercise personal command of troops.
constitution before March of that year, general elections in May, and a transfer of power that summer The newis to providetrong presidenteat unicameral Former politicians who have been declared "corrupt and dishonest" will befrom re-entering Pak la contemptuous of almost all Korean politicians, whom he regards as venal and indlflerent to the country's Interests.
South Koreans are sympathetic with the reformist objectives of tho Junta and are not anxloua to return lo tho instability and drifting of the Chang Myon government and the latter years of tho flhee regime. They fear the )unta'aways, however, and are skeptical of the newability to resist the age-old Koreas vices ofand factionalism and to make good on their economic promises. Should the Junta fall to win public confidence, former politicians, students, and intellectuals who have the regime's heavy hand may agitate for its while such action in Itself would be unlikely to prevail again tt the guns of the regime, dissatisfiedelements might bolo attempt another coup.
Pakpromised to return the government to civilianin but intends the Junta to retain ultimate control even then. ublic statement last August heimetablefor the resumption ofactlvltlos byhe adoptionew
Foreign Relations
Pak has reversed Rhee's intransigent and oftencondemnation of thenations and Is working to broaden South Korea'sties. Soon after he seized power, good-will missions were sent to many non-Communist countries, including several afro-Asian states, to explain the democratic principles of the South Koreanhe Junta In trying toonsulate In India, where North Korea already has a and to open embassies in a number of countries, lnclud-ing Brazil. MelmfStteaelnra
agreement wllh Thailand to those previously concluded with the Philippines and Nationalist China, and Is reported seekingact with Malaya. The government also hopia to gain membership In th.. Colombo Plan.
The Junta Is committed to- tho eventual unification of Korea, but lt has given that It will not resort to force to achieve this goal.
Pak rejects any possibility of unification on Communist terms, and the junta, soon afterpower, arrested manypolitical, andleaders who had publiclyegotiatedwith Pyongyang. At the same time, the new government ham declared its support for the UN Charter and announced Its recognition of theand authority of the UN to deal with the "Korean
Relations With Nationalist China have become more cordlaL, and Taipei and Seoul recently exchanged military missions. Any mutual defensereached by the twois probably limited to verbal pledges of assistance in the event of renewed Chinese Communlit agftiesslon but Seoul also appears to be pushing South Korea's long-standing desireegional defense organisation built around Taiwan and Korea.
Pak appears to appreciate the economic Importance of normalizing relations withKorea'a normal trading partner--and hasdetermination toa settlement ofdifferences by the end of the year. While Pak Is less subject to public opinion than his predecessors, resentment against the Japanese Is strong in Korea and he would wish to avoid the appearance of having sold out Korean Interests to Tokyo.
Attitude Toward United States
Pak la friendly toward the United States but critical
of American pollcv In Korea. He holds thetates cul-pablo for the misuse of aid funds by former governments and for South Korea's lsckarger Industrial base. He particularly distrusts senior Korean generals and civilian officials he suspects of using their control over American aid lo feather their own nests.
Although he is pledged to maintain South Korea'a ties with the United States, Pak's strong nationalistic sentiment militates against easyof US advice, particularly on political and military Never close to American military advisers, partlyof language difficulties, he once had an adviserfor giving advice on which Pak blamed the lossen in combat,
Pak seems more willing to take advice on economic natters, and soon after coming to power requested an American expert to advise him in this field.
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Original document.
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