11/03/1961 -- SOUTH KOREAN LEADER PAK CHONG-HUI -- CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY

Created: 11/29/2000

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3 November

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Lt. Con. Pak Cbenjt-hul, chairman of South Korea's military Junta, will visit Washington In aid-November. Psk and his associates are pledged to eliminatepolitical and economic abuses but are oot prepared by training or experience to copethe country'seconomic difficulties. Pak is described by the US Embassy aa an able leader; ho haa yet to establish public support, however, and his position dependsalanco among the factions In the Junta. Ho is etrongly nationalist and reluctant to accopt foreign advicr,on political and military matters. jfgsgsgvjl

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SOUTH KOREAN LEADER PAR CHONG-HUI

Can. Pak Chong<hul. chairman of the South Korean Supremo Council for National Reconetructionla to makefficial visit toem o ovember for consultations, has sorkod hard to correct chronic craft and corrupt political practices since ho settced power laat May. Pak hadorce offficers and meneil-planned and Dearlycoup against the weakof Prime Minister Chang Hyon. Pakhose to exercise his power as lie ad of the Supreme Council, while retaining the incumbent In order to maintain the legal continuity of the military government. Be alsoabinet headedrime minis-tor as the nominal executive branch of the military.

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Pak's assertion that he moved against the previousbecause of Its corrupt nature has been generallyby measures the regime has undertaken.

Pak Isenuinefrom tho top and trying to introduce sweeping fundamental reforms. In his first five months Pak has displayed energy and determination. Theand militaryof bis regime have marred his public image, however, and there is little evidence of popular enthusiasm. Pak hopes that his visit will enhance his prestige at home and assure continued large-tenle American aid for louth Korea's shaky economy.

Internal Poeition

most powerful unta. but his on Is limited within tho ruling notaction the degree of able to exercise atea depends ability to keep factions In bal-he has played conaumate skill.

Following the purge last July of Lt.Gnn. Chang To-yong, front man for the Junta following the coup, factional alignmentsinto two major groups, one led by security boss Col. Kim Chong-pil and the other by MaJ. Gen. Yi Ctau-ll and Marine Maj. Gen. Kim Tong-ha. The core of Kim Chong-pll's factionroup of field-grade officers who suffered severe casualties in the Korean war and subsequently found promotions blocked by the relatively youthful generals. Sometimes described as "angry younghoy lend to favor protracted military rule and authoritarian memiures to solve South Korea's probli

Yl's faction is made up largely of senior officers who are more Inclined to preserve traditional relationships and institutions. Theyrake on their more zealous and narrowly nationalistic Juniors but are stigmatised by past Involvement In corruption.

approved for re lease

Pak reportedly QjrTFiit71iv'

rc'duee- the Influence at the

i'leld-grade olfleers, buthowdown he eight veil shift In their direction. kimloee relative by marriage to Pak and In control of the secret police, ia particularly well situated to hold Pak's Also, Pak probablythat Kin's groupreponderance of strength. igh proportion of these officers are battalion and regimental commandersosition to exercise personal commnnd of troops.

constitution before March of that year, general elections in May.ransfer of power that summer. Tho newis to providetrong presidenteat unicameral Former politicians who bavs been declared "corrupt and dishonest" will befrom re-entering Pak is contemptuous of almost all Korean politicians, whom he regards as venal and indifferent to the country's Interest*.

South Koreans are sympathetic with the reformist objectives of tho Junta and are not anxious to return to the instability and drifting of the Chang Kyon government and the lattnr years of the Rheo regime. They fear the junta'sways, hoeever, and are skeptical of the newability to resist the age-old Korean vices ofand factionalism and to make good on their economic promisee. Should the Junta fail to win public confidence, former politician*, students, and intellectuals who havethe regime's heavy hand may agitato For its While such action In itself- unlikely to prevail against the guns of the regime, dissatisfiedelements might boto attempt another coup.

Pak has promised to return the government to civilianinutIntends the Junta to retain ultimate control even then. ublic statement last August heimetablefor the resumption of activities byho adoptionew

Foreign Relations

Pak has reversed Rhee's intransigent and oftencondemnation of thenations and is working to broaden South Korea'sties. loon after hopower, good-will missions wore sent to many non-Communist countries, including several Afro-Asian states, to explain the democratic principles of the South Koreanhe Junta is trying toonsulate in India, where Nor id Korea already has a and to open embassies umber of countries.Brazil, Malaya, the Ivory Consti and Iran. On ISSeoulrade agreement with Thailand to those previously concluded with the Philippines and Nationalist China, and is reported seekingact with Malaya. The government alsoo gain membership In th. Colombo Plan,

The junta is committed to the eventual unifis3*Ion of Korea, but it hasances that LI -ill

to force to achieve this goal,

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Pak rejects any possibility of unification on Communist terms, and the Junta, soon afterpower, arrested man*political, and Leader* who had publiclyegotiatedwith Pyongyang. At the same time, the new government has declared Its support for the UN Charter and announced Its recognition of the and authority of the UN to deal with the "Korean

Relations with Nationalist China have begone more cordial, and Taipei and Seoul recently exchanged military missions. Any mutual defensereached by the twois probably limited to verbal pledgee of assistance in the event of renewed Chinese Communist aggression but Seoul also appears to be pushing South Korea's long-standing desireegional defease organization built around Taiwan and Korea.

Pak appears to appreciate the economic Importance of normalising relations with JapanSouth Koroa's normal trading partner--and hasdetermination toa settlement ofdifferences by the end of the year, "bile Pak Is less subject to public opinion than bisesentment against the Japanese is strong in Korea and he would wish to avoid the appearance of having sold Out Korean Interest* to Tokyo,

Attitude Toward United States

Pak is friendly toward the United States but critical

of American policy In Korea. He holds the United statesfor the misuse of aid funds by former government* and for South Korea'* lackarger industrial base. He particularly distrusts senior Korean generals and civilian officials he suspects of using

their control over American aid to feather their own nests.

Although heledged to maintain South Korea's ties with the Unitedak'snationalistic aentlment militates agalnet easyof US advice, particularly on political sad military Never close to American military advisers, partlyof language difficulties, he oece had an adviserfor giving advice on which Pak blamed tb* lossen in combat.

Pak seems more willing to take advice on economic matters, and soon after coming to power requested an American expert to advise hln In this field.

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