Globalialogue Aho luiure Wlih Nungovcmmeni ExpihopAVww inicmei
Global
A Dialogue About the Future With
Nongovernment Experts
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This paper was approved for publication by the National Foreign Intelligence Hoard under the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence.
Prepared under the direction of the National Intelligence Council.
Letter from the Director of Central Intelligence
letter from the Chairman ofonru:ii
Note on Process
In undertaking this comprehensive analysis, the NIC worked activelyange of nongovernmental institutions and experts. We began the analysis with two workshops focusing on drivers and alternative futures, as the appendix describes. Subsequently, numerous specialists from academia and the private sector contributed to every aspect of the study, from demographics to developments in science and technology, from the global arms market to implications for the United States. Many of the judgments in this paper derive from our efforts to distill the diverse views expressed at these conferences or related workshops. Major conferences cosponsored by the NIC with other government and private centers in support of Global5 included:
Foreign Reactions to the Revolution in Military Affairsniversity)
Evolution of the Nat inn-State (University ofrends in Democratization (CIA and academic experts).
. American Economic Powerrade Strategics, San Francisco. CA).
. Transformation of Defense Industries (International Institute for Strategic Studies, London. UK).
Futures in War and Conflict (Defense Intelligence Agency and Naval War College. Newport. Rl. and CIA).
> Out of the Box and Into theialogue Between Warfightcrs and Scientists on Far Future Warfare (Potomac Institute. Arlington. VA).
. Future Threat Technologies Symposium (MITRF. Corporation. McLean, VA).
. The Global Course of lhe Information Resolution: Technological Treod* (RANI) Corporation. Santa Monica. CA).
The Global Course of the Information Revolution: Political, Economic and Social Consequences (RAND Corporation. Santa Monica. CA).
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The Middle East: The Media, Information Technology, and the Internet (The National Defense University. Fort McNair. Washington, DC).
Global Migration Trends and Their Implications for the United States (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC).
Alternative GlobalDepartment of State/Bureau of Intelligence and Research and CIA's Global Futures Project).
Inhe draft report was discussed with outside experts, including Richard Cooper and Joseph Nye (Harvardichard Haass (Brookingsames Steinberg (Marklend Jessica Mathews (Carnegie Endowment for Internationalheir commenis and suggestions are incorporated in ihe report. Daniel Ycrgin (Cambridge Energy Research Associates) reviewed and commented on the final draft.
Contents
Note on Pmecss Overview
The Drivers and Trends
Key Uncertainties: Technology Will Alter Outcomes Key Challenges to Governance: People Will Decide Discussion Population Trends
Divergent Aging Patients
Movement of People
Health
N atural Resources and Environment
Food
Waiei
Environment Science and Technology
Information Technology
nolojiy
Other Technologies The Global Economy
Dynamism and Growth
Unequal Growth Prospects and Distribution Economic Crises and Resilience National and International Governance Nonstate Actors
Criminal Organizations and Networkss Changing Communal Identities and Networks Overall Impacts on Stales
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International Cooperation Future Conflict
Internal Contlicls
Transnational Terrorism
Interstate Conflicts
Reacting to US Military Superiority Major Regions
East and Southeast Asia
South Asia
Russia and Eurasia
Middle East and North Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa
1'urnpc
Canada Lalin America Appendix
Four Alternative Global Futures
Overview
Globalialogue About the Future With Nongovernment Experts
Over the pastonths, the National Intelligence Counciln close collaboration with US Government specialistside range of experts outside the government, has worked to identify major drivers and trends that will shape the world
The key drivers identified are:
Demographics.
Natural resources and environment.
Science and technology.
The global economy and globalization.
National and international governance.
Future conflict.
The role of the United States.
In examining these drivers, several points should be kepi in mind:
No single driver or trend will dominate Ihe global future
Each driver will have varying impacts in different regions and countries.
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The drivers are not necessarily mutually reinforcing; in some cases, they will work at cross-purposes.
Taken together, these drivers and trends intersect to create an integrated picture of the worldbout which we can make projections with varying degrees of confidence and identify some troubling uncertainties of strategic importance to the United Stales.
The Methodology
Global5lexible framework to discuss and debate the future. The methodology is useful for our purposes, although admittedly inexact for the social scientist. Our purpose is to rise above short-term, tactical considerations andonger-term, strategic perspective. Judgments about demographic and natural resource trends are based primarily cm informed extrapolation of existing trends. In contrast, many judgments about science and technology, economic growth, globalization, governance, and the nature of conflictistillation of views of experts inside and outside the United States Government. The former are projections about natural phenomena, about which we can have fairly high confidence; the latter are more speculative because they are contingent upon the decisions that societies and governments will make.
The drivers we emphasize will have staying power. Some of the trends will persist; others will be less enduring and may change course over the time frame we consider. The major contribution of the National Intelligence Councilssisted by experts from the Intelligence Community, has been to harness US Government and nongovernmental specialists to identify drivers, to determine which ones matter most, to highlight key uncertainties, and to integrate analysis of these trendsational security context. The result identifies issues for more rigorous analysis and quantification.
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The Drivers and Trends
Demographics
World population5 willillion, upillion in thend in most countries, people will live longer. Ninety-five percent of the increase will be in developing countries, nearly all in rapidly expanding urban areas. Where political systems are brittle, the combination of population growth and urbanization will foster instability. Increasing lifespans will have significantly divergent impacts.
. In the advanceda growing number of emerging market
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bitthrates and aging will combine lo increase health care and pension costs while reducing the relative size of the working population, straining the social contract, and leaving significant shortfalls in the size and capacity of the work force.
some developing countries, these same trends will combine to expand the size of the working population and reduce the youth bulge -increasing the potential for economic growth and political stability.
Natural Resources and environment
Overall food production will be adequate to feed the world's growing population, but poor infrastructure and distribution, political instability, and chronic poverty will lead to malnourishmenl in parts of Sub-Saharan Africa. The potential for famine will persist in countries with repressive government policies or internal conflicts.0 percent increase in global energy demand, energy resources will be sufficient to meet demand; the latest estimates suggest thatercent of the world's available oil andercent of its gas remain underground.
> Although the Persian Gulf region will remain the world's largest single source of oil, the global energy market is likely to encompass two relatively distinct patterns of regional distribution: one serving consumers (including the United States) from Atlantic Basin reserves; and the other meeting the needs of primarily Asian customers (increasingly China and India) from Persian Gulf supplies and,esser extent, the Caspian region and Central Asia.
contrast to food and energy, water scarcities and allocation will pose significant challenges to governments in the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and northern China. Regional tensions over water will be heightened
Science and Technology
Fifteen years ago, few predicted the profound impact of the revolution in information technology. Looking ahead anotherears, the world will encounter more quantum leaps in information technology (IT) and in other areas of science and technology. The continuing diffusion of information technology and new applications of biotechnology will be at the crest of the wave. IT will be the major building block for international commerce and for empowering nonstate actors. Most experts agree that the it revolution represents the most significant global transformation since the Industrial Revolution beginning in the mid-eighteenth century.
continuing revolutions in information technology, biotechnology, materials science, and nanotechnology willramatic increase in investment in technology, which will further stimulate innovation within the more advanced countries.
. Older technologies will continue lateral "side-wise development" into new markets and applicationsenefiting US allies and adversaries around the world who are interested in acquiring early generation ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) technologies.
will drive medical breakthroughs that will enable the world's wealthiest people to improve their health and increase their longevity dramatically. At the same time, genetically modified crops will offer the potential to improve nutrition among the world's one billion malnourished people.
. Breakthroughs in materials technology will generate widely available products that are multi-functional, environmentally safe. longer lasting, and easily adapted to particular consumer requirements.
. Disaffected states, terrorists, proliferators, narcotrafTickcrs, and organized criminals will take advantage of (he new high-speed information environment and other advances in technology to integrate their illegal activities and compound their threat to stability and security around the world.
The Global Economy and Globalization
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The networked global economy will be driven by rapid and largely unrestricted flows of information, ideas, cultural values, capital, goods and services, and people: that is, globali2ation. This globalized economy willet contributor to increased political stability in the worldlthough its reach and benefits will not be universal. In contrast to the Industrial Revolution, the process of globalization is more compressed. Its evolution will be rocky, marked by chronic financial volatilityidening economic divide.
. The global economy, overall, will return to the high levels of growth reached innd. Economic growth will be driven by political pressures for higher living standards, improved economic policies, rising foreign trade and investment, the diffusion of information technologies, and an increasingly dynamic private sector. Potential brakes on theustained financial crisis or prolonged disruption of energyundo this optimistic projection.
countries, and groups feeling left behind will face deepening economic stagnation, political instability, and cultural alienation. They will foster political, ethnic, ideological, and religious extremism, along with the violence that often accompanies it. They will force the United States and other developed countries to remain focused on "old-world" challenges while concentrating on the implications of "new-world" technologies at the same time.
National and International Governance
States will continue to be the dominant players on the world stage, but governments will have less and less control over flows of information, technology, diseases, migrants, arms, and financial transactions, whether licit or illicit, across their borders. Nonstatc actors ranging from business firms to nonprofit organizations will play increasingly larger roles in both national and international affairs. The quality of governance, both nationally and internationally, will substantially determine how well states and societies cope with these global forces.
States with competent governance, including the United States, will adapt government structuresramatically changed globedthem better able to engageore interconnected world. The responsibilities of once "semiautonomous" government agencies increasingly will intersect because of the transnational nature of national security priorities and because of the clear requirement for interdisciplinary policy responses. Shaping the complex, fast-moving world5 will require reshaping traditional government structures.
- Effective governance will increasingly be determined by the ability and agility to form partnerships to exploit increased information flows, new technologies, migration, and the influence of nonstate actors. Most but not all countries that succeed will be representative democracies.
with ineffective and incompetent governance not only will fail to benefit from globalization, but in some instances will spawn conflicts at home and abroad, ensuring an even wider gap between regional winners and losers than exists today.
Globalization will increase the transparency of government decision-making, complicating the ability of authoritarian regimes to maintain control, but also complicating the traditional deliberative processes of democracies. Increasing migration will create influential diasporas, affecting policies, politics and even national identity in many countries. Globalization also will create increasing demands for international cooperation on transnational issues, but the response of both states and international organizations will fall short
Future Conflict
The United States willtrong technological edge in IT-driven "battlefield awareness" and in precision-guided weaponryhe United States will face three types of threats:
threats in which state and nonstatc adversaries avoid direct engagements with the US military but devise strategies, tactics, andimproved by "sidewise"minimize US strengths and exploit perceived weaknesses;
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Strategic WMD threats, including nuclear missile threats, in which (barring significant political or economic changes) Russia, China, most likely North Korea, probably Iran, and possibly Iraq have the capability to strike the United States, and the potential for unconventional delivery of WMD by both states or nonstate actors also will grow; and
Regional military' threats inew countries maintain large military forcesix of Cold War and post-Cold War concepts and technologies.
The risk of war among developed countries will be low. The international community will continue, however, to face conflicts around the world, ranging from relatively frequent small-scale internal upheavals to less frequent regional interstate wars. The potential for conflict will arise from rivalries in Asia, ranging from India-Pakistan to China-Taiwan, as well as among the antagonists in the Middle East. Their potential lethality will grow, driven by the availability of WMD, longer-range missile delivery systems and other technologies.
Internal conflicts stemming from religious, ethnic, economic or political disputes will remain at current levels or even increase in number. The United Nations and regional organizations will be called upon to manage such conflicts because majorby domestic concerns, perceived risk of failure, lack of political will, or tightminimize their direct involvement.
Export control regimes and sanctions will be less cffeclive because of the diffusion of technology, porous borders, defense industry consolidations, and reliance upon foreign markets to maintain profitability. Arms and weapons technology transfers will be more difficult to control.
Prospects will grow that more sophisticated weaponry, including weapons of mass destruction indigenously produced or externallyget into the hands of state and nonstate belligerents, some hostile to the United Stales. The likelihood will increase over this
period that WMD will be used either against the United States or its forces, facilities, and interests overseas.
Role of the United States
The United States will continue toajor force in the world community. US global economic, technological, military, and diplomatic influence will be unparalleled among nations as well as regional and international organizationshis power not only will ensure America's preeminence, but also will cast the United Stalesey driver of the international system.
The United States will continue to be identified throughout the world as the leading proponent and beneficiary of globalization. US economic actions, even when pursued for such domestic goals as adjusting interest rates, willajor global impact because of the tighter integration of global markets
The United States will remain in the vanguard of the technological revolution from information to biotechnology and beyond.
Both allies and adversaries will factor continued US military pre-eminence in their calculations of national security interests and ambilions.
Someandtry at times to check what they sec as Americanlthough this posture will not translate into strategic, broad-based and enduring anti-US coalitions, it will lead to tactical alignments on specific policies and demandsreater role in international political and economic institutions.
Diplomacy will be more complicated. Washington will have greater difficulty harnessing its power to achieve specific foreign policy goals: the US Government willmaller and less powerful part of the overall economic and cultural influence of the United States abroad.
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> In the absencelear and overriding national security threat, the United States will have difficulty drawing on its economic prowess to advance its foreign policy agenda. The top priority of the American private sector, which will be central to maintaining the US economic and technological lead, will be financial profitability, not foreign policy objectives.
The United States also will have greater difficulty building coalitions to support its policy goals, although the international community will often tum to Washington, even it reluctantly, to lead multilateral efforts in real and potential conflicts.
There will be increasing numbers of important actors on the world stage to challenge andwell as toleadership: countries such as China, Russia. India. Mexico, and Brazil: regional organizations such as the European Union;ast array of increasingly powerful multinational corporations and nonprofit organizations with their own interests to defend in the world.
Key Uncertainties: Technology Will Alter Outcomes
Examining the interaction of these drivers and trends points to some major uncertainties that will only be clarified as events occur and leaders make policy decisions that cannot be foreseen today. We cite eight transnational and regional issues for which the luturc. according to our trends analysis, is too tough to call with any confidence or precision.
are high-stakes, national security issues that Mill require continuous analysis and. in the view of our conferees, periodic policy rev iew in the years ahead.
Science and Technology
We know that the possibility is greater than ever tliat the revolution in science and technology will improve the quality of life. What we know about this revolution is exciting. Advances in science and technology will generate dramatic breakthroughs in agriculture and health and in leap-frog applications, such as universal wireless cellular communications, which already are networking developing countries that never had land-lines. What we do not know' about the SAT revolution, however, is staggering. We do not know to what extent technology will benefit, or further disadvantage, disaffected national populations, alienated ethnic and religious groups, or the less developed countries. We do not know to what degree lateral or "side-wise" technology will increase the threat from low technology countries and groups. One certainty is that progression will not be linear. Another is that as future technologies emerge, people will lack full awareness of their wider economic, environmental, cultural, legal, and moralthe continuing potential for research and development.
Advances in science and technology will pose national security challenges of uncertain character and scale.
Increasing reliance on computer networks is making critical US infrastructures more attractive as targets. Computer network operations today offer new options for attacking the United States within its traditional continental sanctuary- -potentially anonymously and with selective effects. Nevertheless, we do not know how quickly or effectively such adversaries as terrorists or disaffected states will develop the tradccralt to use cyber warfare tools and technology, or, in fact, whether cyber warfare will ever evolveecisive combat arm.
Rapid advances and diffusion of biotechnology, nanotechnology. and the materials sciences, moreover, will add to the capabilities of our adversaries to engage in biological warfare or bio-terrorism.
Asymmetric Warfare
As noted earlier, most adversaries will recognize the information advantage and military superiority of the United Statesather than acquiesce to any potential US military domination, they will try' to circumvent or minimize US strengths and exploit perceived weaknesses. IT-driven globalization will
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significantly increase inieraciion among terrorists, narcotraffickers, weapons proliferaiors, and organized criminals, whoetworked world will have greater access lo information, to technology, to finance, to sophisticated deccption-and-denial techniques and to each other. Such asymmetricundertaken by states or nonstatebecome the dominant characteristic of most threats to the US homeland, "lliey willefining challenge for US strategy, operations, and force development, and they will require lhat strategy to maintain focus on traditional, low-technology threats as well as the capacity of potential adversaries to harness elements of proliferating advanced technologies. At the same time- we do not know the extent to which adversaries, state and nonstate, might be influenced or deterred by other geopolitical, economic, technological, or diplomatic factors
The Global Economy
Although the outlook for the global economy appears strong, achieving broad and sustained high levels of global growth will be contingent on avoiding several potential brakes to growth. These include:
The I'S economyustained dow nturn. Given its large trade deficit and low domestic savings, the USmost important driver of recent global growth- -is vulnerableoss of international confidence in its growth prospects that could leadharp downturn, which, if long lasting, would have deleterious economic and policy consequences for the rest of the world.
Europe and Japan fail to manage their demographic challenges. European and Japanese populations are aging rapidly, requiring moreillion new workers5 to mainlain current dependency-ratios between the working population and retirees. Conflicts over social services or immigration policies in major European states could dampen economic growth.
China and/or India fail to sustain high growth. China's ambitious goals for reforming its economy will be difficult to achieve: restructuring state-owned enterprises, cleaning up and transforming the banking system, and cutting the government's employment rolls in half. Growth wouldthese reforms go off-track. Failure by India to implement reforms would prevent it from achieving sustained growth.
Emerging market countries fail to reform ihcir financial institutions. Many emerging market countries have not yet undertaken the financial reforms needed to help them survive the next economic crisis. Absent sucheries of future economic crises in emerging market countries probably will dry up the capital flows crucial for high rales of economic growth.
Global energy suppliesajor disruption. Turbulence in global energy supplies wouldevastating effect.esult could be driven by conflict among key energy-producing states, sustained internal instability in two or more major energy-producing stales, or major terrorist actions.
The Middle East
Global trends from demography and natural resources to globalization and governance appear generally negative for the Middle bast. Most regimes are change-resistant. Many are buoyed by continuing energy-revenues and will not be inclined to make the necessary reforms, including in basic education, to change this unfavorable picture.
Linear trend analysis shows little positive change in the region, raising the prospects for increased demographic pressures, social unrest, religious and ideological extremism, and terrorism directed both at ihe regimes and at thctr Western supporters.
. Nonlinearas the sudden riseeb-connectedharp and sustained economic downturn, or, conversely, ihe emergence of enlightened leaders committed to good governance- might change outcomes in individual countries. Political changes in Iran in therc an example of such nonlinear development.
China
Estimates of developments in China over the nextears arc fraught withorking
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against China's aspirations to sustain economic growth while preserving its political system is an array of political, social, and economic pressures that will increasingly challenge the regime's legitimacy, and perhaps its survival.
The sweeping structural changes required by China's entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the broader demands of economic globalization and the information revolution will generate significantly new levels and types of social and economic disruption that will onlv add to an already wide range of domestic and international problems.
Nevertheless, China need not be overwhelmed by these problems. China has proven politically resilient, economically dynamic, and increasingly assertive in positioning itselfeadership role in East Asia. Its long-term military program in particular suggests that Beijing wants to have the capability to achieve its territorial objectives, outmatch its neighbors, and constrain US power in the region.
- Wc do not rule out the introduction of enough political reform5 to allow China to adapt to domestic pressure for change and to continue to grow economically.
Two conditions, in the view of many specialists, would leadajor security challenge for the United States and its allies in theeak, disintegrating China, or an assertive China willing to use its growing economic wealth and military capabilities to pursue its strategic advantage in the region. These opposite extremesore commonly held view among experts dial China will continue to see peace as essential to its economic growth and internal stability.
Russia
Between nowoscow will be challenged even more than today to adjust its expectations for world leadership to its dramatically reduced resources. Whether the country can make the transition in adjusting ends to means remains an open and critical question, according to most experts, as does the question of the character and quality of Russian governance and economic policies. The most likely outcomeussia that remains internally weak and institutionally linked to the international system primarily through its permanent scat on the UN Security Council. In this view, whether Russia can adjust to this diminished statusanner that preserves rather than upsets regional stability is also uncertain. The stakes for both Europe and the United States will be high, although neither will have the ability to determine the outcome for Russiaussian governance will be the critical factor.
Japan
lhe first uncertainty about Japan is whether it will carry out the structural reforms needed to resume robust economic growth and to slow its decline relative to the rest of East Asia, particularly China The second uncertainty is whether Japan will alter its security policy to allow Tokyo totronger military and more reciprocal relationship with the United States. Experts agree that Japanese governance will be the key driver in determining the outcomes.
India
Global trends conflict significantly in India. The size of itsbillion byits technologically driven economic growth virtually dictate that India willising regional power. The uncvenness of its internal economic growth,rowing gap between rich and poor, and serious questions about the fractious nature of its politics, all cast doubt on how powerful India will behatever its degree of power, India's rising ambition will further strain its relations with China, as well as complicate its ties with Russia, Japan, and thecontinue its nuclear standoff with Pakistan.
Key Challenges to Governance: People Will Decide
Global5 identifies governanceajor driver for the future and assumes that all trends wc cite will be influenced, for good or bad, by decisions of people. The inclusion ofthe United Statesriver- both the US Government as well as US for-profit and nonprofitbased on the general assumption that the actions of nonstate actors as well as governments will shape global outcomes in the years ahead.
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An integrated trend analysis suggests at least four related conclusions: National Priorities Will Matter
prosper in the global economyovernments will have to invest more in technology, in public education, and in broader participation in government to include increasingly influential nonstatc actors, lhe extent to which governments around the world arc doing these things todav gives some indication of where they will be
US Responsibilities Will Cover the World, Old and New
United States and other developed countries will be challenged5 to lead the fust-paced technological revolution while, at the same time, maintaining military, diplomatic, and intelligence capabilities to deal with traditional problems and threats from low-technology countries and groups.nitcd States,lobal power, will have little choice but to engage leading actors and confront problems on both sides of the widening economic and digital divides in the worldhen globalization's benefits will be far from global.
US Foreign Priorities Will be More Transnational
- Iniernational or multilateral arrangements increasingly will be called upon5 to deal with growing transnational problems from economic and financial volatility: to legal and illegal migration; to competition for scarce natural resources such as water to humanitarian, refugee, and environmental crises; to terrorism, narcotrufficking. and weapons proliferation; and to both regional conflicts and cyber threats. And when internationalinternationalup short, the United States and other developed countries will have to broker solutionside array of internationalncluding governments at all levels, multinational corporations, and nonprofit organizations.
National Governments Will be More Transparent
dealransnational agenda and an interconnected worldovernments will have to develop greater communication and collaboration between national security and domestic policy agencies. Interagency cooperation will be essential to understanding transnational threats and to developing interdisciplinary strategics to counter them. Consequence managementiological warfare) attack, for example, would require close coordinationost of US Govcmmcnl agencies, foreign governments. US state and municipal governments, the military, the medical community, and the media
Discussion
Population Trends
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The world5 will be populated byillion people, upillion in thehe rate of world population growth, however, will have diminishedercent annuallv5ercent today, loercent
Increased life expectancy and falling fertility rates will contributehift toward an aging population in high-income developed countries. Beyond that, demographic trends will sharply diverge. More thanercent of the increase in world population will be found in developing countries, nearly all in rapidly expanding urban areas.
- India's population will growillion to moreillionakistan's probably will swellillion now toillion.
Some countries in Africa with high rates of AIDS will experience reduced population growth or even declining populations despite relatively high birthrates. In South Africa, for example, the population is projected to drop4 million07 million
Russia and many post-Communist countries of Eastern Europe will have declining populations.esult of high mortality and low birthrates, Russia's population may drop from itsillion to as lowillionhile the neighboring states of Central Asia will experience continued population growth. In Japan and West European countries such as Italy and Spain, populations also will decline in the absence of dramatic increases in birthrates or immigration.
North America, Australia, and Newtraditional magnets forcontinue to have the highest rates of population growth among the developed countries, with annual population growth ratesercentercent.
Global
Divergent Aging Patterns
In developed countries and many of the more advanced developing countries, the declining ratio of working people to retirees will strain social services, pensions, and health systems. Governments will seek to mitigate the problem through such measures as delaying retirement, encouraging greater participation in the work force by women, and relying on migrant workers. Dealing effectively with declining dependency ratios is likely to require more extensive measures than most governments will be prepared to undertake. The shiftreater proportion of older voters will change the political dynamics in these countries in ways difficult to foresee.
At the same time, "youth bulges" will persist in some developing countries, notably in Sub-Saharan Africaew countries in Latin America and the Middleigh proportion of young people will be destabilizing, particularly when combined with high unemployment or communal tension.
Movement of People
Two major trends in the movement of people will characterize thend cross-borderof which poses both opportunities and challenges.
Growth in Mega-Cities
Ilie ratio of urban to rural dwellers is steadily increasing.5 more than half of the world's population will be urban. The number of people living incontaining more thanilliondouble lo moreillion.
will provide many countries the opportunity to tap the information revolution and other technological advances.
explosive growth ofcities in developing countries will test the capacity of governments lo stimulate the investment required to generate jobs and to provide the services, infrastructure, and
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social supports necessary to sustain livable and slablc environments. Regional
Divergent demographic trends, the globalization of labor markets, and political instability and conflict willramatic increase in the global movement of peopleegal and illegal migrants now account for more thanercent of the population in more thanountries. These numbers will grow substantially and will increase social and political tension and perhaps alter national identities even as they contribute to demographic and economic dynamism.
States will face increasing difficulty in managing migration pressures and flows, which will number several million people annually. Over the nextears, migrants will seek to move:
North America primarily from Latin America and East and South Asia.
> To Europe primarily from North Africa and the Middle East, South Asia, and the post-Communist states of Eastern Europe and Eurasia.
the least to the most developed countries of Asia. Latin America, the Middle East, and Sub-Saharan Africa.
Regional Population by Age05
For high-income receiving countries, migration will relieve labor shortages and otherwise ensure continuing economic vitality. EU countries and Japan will need large numbers of new workers because of aging populations and low birthrates. Immigration will complicate political and social integration: some political parties will continue to mobilize popular sentiment against migrants, protesting the strain on social services and the difficulties in assimilation. European countries and Japan will face difficult dilemmas in seeking to reconcile protection of national borders and cultural identity wilh the need to
For low-income receiving countries, mass migration resulting from civil conflict, natural disasters, or economic crises will strain local infrastructures, upset ethnic balances, and spark ethnic conflict. Illegal migration willore contentious issue between and among governments.
For low-income sending countries, mass migration will relieve pressures from unemployed and underemployed workers and generate significant remittances. Migrants will function as ethnic lobbies on behalf of sending-country interests, sometimes supporting armed conflicts in their home countries, as in the cases of the Albanian, Kurdish, Tamil, Armenian, Eritrean, and Ethiopian diasporas. At the same time, emigration increasingly will deprive low-income sending countries of their educated elites. An
Health
Disparities in health status between developed and developingthe least developedpersist and widen. In developed countries, major inroadsariety of maladies will be achieved5esult of generous health spending and major medical advances. The revolution in biotechnology holds the promise of even more dramatic improvements in health status. Noninfectious diseases will pose greater challenges to health in developed countries than will infectious diseases. Progress against infectious diseases, nevertheless, will encounter some setbacksesult of growing microbial resistance to antibiotics and the accelerating pace of international movement of people and products that facilitate the spread of infectious diseases.
Countries with Youth Bulges05
Developing countries, by contrast, arc likely tourge in both infectious and noninfectious
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diseases and in general will have inadequate health care capacities and spending.
malaria, hepatitis, and particularly AIDS will continue to increase rapidly. AIDS and TB together are likely to account for the majority of deaths in most developing countries.
AIDS Public Awareness Poster
AIDS willajor problem not only in Africa but also in India, Southeast Asia, several countries formerly part of the Soviet Union, and possibly China.
AIDS will reduce economic growth by upercent of GDP per year and consume more thanercent of health budgets in the hardest-hit countries.
AIDS and such associated diseases as TB willestructive impact on families and society. In some African countries, average lifespans will be reduced by as much asoears, generating more thanillion orphans and contributing to poverty, crime, and instability.
AIDS, other diseases, and health problems will hurt prospects for transition to democratic regimes as they undermine civil society, hamper the evolution of sound political and economic institutions, and intensify the struggle for power and resources.
Natural Resources and Environment
Food
Driven by advances in agricultural technologies, world food grain production and stocks5 will be adequate to meet the needsrowing world population. Despite the overall adequacy of food, problems of distribution and availability will remain.
The number of chronically malnourished people in conflict-ridden Sub-Saharan Africa will increase by more thanercent over the nextears.
The potential for famine will still exist where the combination of repressive government or internal conflict and persistent natural disasters prevents or limits relief efforts, as in Somalia in thend North Korea more recently.
Donors will become more reluctant to provide relief when the effort might become embroiled in military conflict.
Global Grain
The use of genetically modified crops has great potential for meeting the nutrition needs of the poor in developing countries. Popular and political opposition in the KU countries and.esser extent, in the United States, however, has clouded the prospects for applying this technology.
Challenged Water Supply
Water
5 nearly half theillionlive in countries that arclessubic meters of water per capita perin Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and northern China.
In the developing world,ercent of water usage goes intoroportion that is not sustainable; andumber of developing countries will be unable to maintain their levels of irrigated agriculture. Ovcrpumping of groundwater in many of ihe world's important grain-growing regions will bean increasing problem;ons of water arc needed toon of grain.
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water tabic under some of the major grain-producing areas in northern China is fallingate of five feet per year, and water tables throughout India are falling an average0 feet per year.
Developing Countries Challenged to Provide Infrastructure
Measures undertaken to increase water availability and to ease acute waterwater more efficiently, expanding use of dcsalinization, developing genetically modified crops that use less water or more saline water, and importingnot be sufficient to substantially change the outlook for water shortagesany will be expensive; policies to price water more realistically are not likely to be broadly implemented within the nextears, and subsidizing water is politicallv sensitive for the many low-income countries short of water because their populations expect cheap water.
Water hasource of contention historically, but no water dispute hasause of open interstate conflict; indeed, water shortages often have stimulated cooperative arrangements for sharing the scarce resource. But as countries press against the limits of available water between nowhe possibility of conflict will increase.
Nearly one-half of the world's land surface consists of river basins shared by more than one counlrv. and more thanations receive more than one-third of their water from outside their borders.
. Turkey is building new dams and irrigation projects on the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, which will affect water flows into Syria andcountries that will experience considerable population growth.
is proceedingajor diversion of water from the Nile, which flows from Ethiopia and Sudan, both of which will want to draw more water from the Nile for their own developmentater-sharing arrangements are likely to become more contentious.
Water shortages occurring in combination with other sources of tension- such as in.the Middlebe the most worrisome.
World Water Availibility
Energy
The global economy will continue to become more energy efficientraditional industries, as well as transportation, are increasingly efficient in their energy use. Moreover, the most dynamic growth areas in the global economy, especially services and the knowledge fields, are less energy-intensive than the economic activities that they replace. Energy production also is becoming more efficient. Technological applications, particularly in deep-water exploration and production, are opening remote and hostile areas to petroleum production.
Sustained global economic growth, along with population increases, willearlyercent increase in the demand for energy over the nextears. Total oil demand will increase from roughlyillion barrels per day0 to moreillion barrelsn increase almost as large as OPEC's current production. Over the nextears, natural gas usage will increase more rapidly than that of any other energymorestemming from the tripling of gas consumption in Asia.
Asia will drive the expansion in energy demand, replacing North America as the leading energy consumption region and accounting for more than half of the world's total increase in demand.
andesser extent India, will see especially dramatic increases in energy consumption.
.nly one-tenth of Persian Gulf oil will be directed to Western markets; three-quarters will go to Asia.
Fossil fuels will remain the dominant form of energy despite increasing concerns about global warming.
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Efficiency of solar cells will improve, genetic engineering will increase the long-term prospects for the large-scale use of cthanol, and hydrates will be used increasingly as fuels. Nuclear energy use will remain at current levels.
World Energy
Meeting the increase in demand for energy will poseajor supply challenge nor lead to substantial price increases in real terms. Estimates of the world's total endowment of oil have steadily increased as technological progress in extracting oil from remote sources has enabled new discoveries and more efficient production. Recent estimates indicate thatercent of the world's available oil still remains in the ground, as docsercent of the world's natural gas.
Persian Gulfa majorsec large increases in oil production capacity and will rise in its overall importance to the world energy market. Other areas of the
Russia, coastal West Africa, andalso increase their rote in global energy markets. Russia and the Middle East account for three-quarters of known gas reserves.
LatinVenezuela, Mexico, andmoreillion barrels of proven oil reserves andillion barrels of undiscovered oil, according to the US Geological Survey. With foreign participation, Latin American production could increaseillion barrels per day to more thanillion.
Caspian energy development is likely to be in high gearew transport routes for Caspian oil and gas exports that do not transit Russia will be operating.
Oil-producing countries will continue to exert leverage on the market to increase prices but are unlikely to achieve stable high prices. Energy prices arc likely to become more unstable in the nextears, as periodic price hikes arc followed by price collapses.
lobal energy markets will have coalesced into two quasi-hemispheric patterns. Asia's energy needs will be met cither through coal from the region or from oil and gas supplies from the Persian Gulf, Central Asia, and Russia. Western Europe and the Western Hemisphere will draw on the Atlantic Basin for their energy sources at world prices.
Environment
Contemporary environmental problems will persist and in many instances grow over the nextears. With increasingly intensive land use, significant degradation of arable land will continue as will the loss of tropical forests. Given the promising global economic outlook, greenhouse gas emissions will increase substantially. The depletion of tropical forests and other species-rich habitats, such as wetlands and coral reefs, will exacerbate the historically large losses of biological species now occurring.
issues will become mainstream issues in several countries, particularly in the developed world. The consensus on the need to deal with environmental issues will strengthen; however, progress in dealing with them will be uneven.
The outlook5 is mixed for such localized environmental problems as high concentrations of ozone and noxious chemicals in the air and the pollution of rivers and lakes by industrial and agricultural wastes.
Developed countries will continue to manage these local environmental issues, and such issues are unlikely toajor constraint on economic growth or on improving health standards.
The developing countries, however, will face intensified environmental problemsesult of population growth, economic development, and rapid urbanization. An increasing number of cities will face the serious air and water quality problems that already are troubling in such urban centers as Mexico City, Sao Paulo, Lagos, and Beijing.
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Russia and Ukraine will struggle with problems stemming from decades of environmental neglect and abuse, including widespread radioactive pollution from badly managed nuclear facilities. These problems arc unlikely to be adequately addressed. As these countries pursue economic growth, they will devote insufficient resources to environmental remediation.
Central and Eastern European countries face similar problemsesult of the legacy of environmental neglect from the Communist era; nevertheless, driven by their desire to gain EU membership, several will become more effective in addressing Ihcsc problems and will upgrade their environmental standards.
Some existing agreements, even when implemented, will not be able5 to reverse the targeted environmental damage they were designed to address. The Montreal Protocol is on track to restore the stratospheric ozone layer over the nextears. Nevertheless, the seasonal Antarctic ozone hole will expand for the next twothe risk of skin cancer in countries like Australia, Argentina, andof the long lag time between emission reductions and atmospheric effects. Important new agreements will be implemented, including, (orlobal treaty to control the worldwide spread of such persistent organic chemicals as DDT and dioxins. Other agreements, such as the Convention on Biodiversity, will fall short in meeting their objectives.
Over the nextears the pressures on the environmentesult of economic growth will decreaseesult of less energy-intensive economic development and technological advances. For example, increased use of fuel cells and hybrid engines is likely to reduce the rate of increase in the amount of pollution produced, particularly in the transportation sector. Also, increases in the ulilization of solar and wind power, advances in the efficiency of energy use,hift toward less polluting fuels, such as natural gas. will contribute to this trend.
Global warming will challenge the international community as indicationsarmingas meltbacks of polar ice. sea level rise, and increasing frequency of majorThe Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change, which mandates emission-reduction targets for developed countries, is unlikely to come into force soon or without substantial modification. Even in die absence ofa formal treaty, however, some incremental progress will be made in reducing the growth of greenhouse gas emissions.
Both India and China will actively explore less carbon-intensive development strategies, although they will resist setting targets or timetables for carbon dioxide emission limits.
A number of major firms operating internationally will take steps to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
Science and Technology
The continuing diffusion of information technology and new applications in the biotechnology field will be of particular global significance. Two major trends will continue:
integration of existing disciplines to form new ones. The integration of information technology, biotechnology, materials sciences, and nanotechnology willramatic increase in innovation. Die effects will be profound on business and commerce, public health, and safety.
. The lateral development of technology. Older established technologies will continue "sidewise" development into new markets and applications, for example, developing innovative applications for "old" computer chips.
The time between the discovery and the application of scientific advances will continue to shorten. Developments in the laboratory will reach commercial production at ever faster rates, leading to
Globalialogueuture With Nongovernmenthlni!
genetic chanieteri sties will facilitate the development and prescription of custom drugs.
Geneticcontinuing technological and culturalimprove the engineering of organisms to increase food production and quality, broaden the scale of bio-manufacturing, and provide cures for certain genetic diseases. Cloning will be used for such applications as livestock production. Despite cultural and political concerns, the use of genetically modified crops has great potential to dramatically improve the nutrition and health of many of the world's poorest people.
DNA identification will continue to improve law enforcement capabilities.
Other Technologies
Breakthroughs in materials technology will generate widely available products that arc smart, multifunctional, environmentally compatible, more survivablc. and customizable. These products not only will contribute to the growing inlonnation and biotechnology revolutions but also will benefit manufacturing, logistics, and personal lifestyles. Materials with nctivc capabilities will be used to combine sensing und actuation in response to environmental conditions.
Discoveries inechnology will lead to unprecedented understanding and control over the fundamental building blocks of all physical things. Developments in this emerging field are likely to change the way almostvaccines to computers to automobile tires to objects not yetdesigned and made. Self-assembled nanomaterials. such as semiconductor "quantumould5 revolutionize chemical labeling and enable rapid processing for drug discovery, blood content analysis, genetic analysis, and other biological applications.
The Global Economy
lhe global economy is well-positioned toustained period of dynamismlobal economic growth will return to the high levels reached innd, the final years of the post-World War II "longynamism will be strongest among so-called "emergingin the two Asian giants, China and Indiawill be broadly based worldwide, including in both industrialized and many developing countries, lhe rising tide of the global economy will create many economic winners, but it will not lift all boats. The information revolution will make the persistence of poverty more visible, und regional differences will remain large.
Dynamism and Growth
five factors will combine to promote widespread economic dynamism and growth:
Political pressures for higher Irving standards. The growing global middle class-ycle of rising aspirations, with increased information flows and the spread of democracy giving political clout to formerly disenfranchised citizens.
Improved macroeconomic policies. The widespread improvement in recent years in economic policy and management sets the stage for future dynamism. Inflation rates have been dramatically loweredide range of economies The abandonment of unsustainable fixed exchange rate regimes in Asia and the creation of the European Monetary Union (EMU) will contribute to economic growth.
Rising trade and investment International trade and investment flows will grow, spurring rapid increases in world GDP. Opposition to further trade liberalization from special interest groups and some governments will not erode the basic trend toward expansion of trade. International capital flows, which nave risen dramatically in the past decade, will remain plentiful, especially for emerging market countries that increase their transparency.
Regional
Diffusion of information technology lhe pervasive incorporation of information technologies will
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continue to produce significant efficiency gains in the US economy. Similar gains will bein varyingnumerous other countries as the integration of these technologies proceeds. But the absorption of JT and its benefits will not be automatic because many countries will fail to meet the conditions needed for effective ITeducational levels, adequate infrastructure, and appropriate regulatory policies.
Increasingly dynamic private sectors. Rapid expansion of the private sector in many emerging marketwith deregulation and privatization in Europe andspur economic growth by generating competitive pressures to use resources more efficiently. The impact of improved efficiencies will be multiplied as the information revolution enhances the ability of firms around (he world to learn "best practices" from the most successful enterprises. Indeed, the world may be on the vergeapid convergence in market-based financial and business practices.
Unequal Growth Prospects and Distribution
and/or regional conflicts and ihose lhat fail to diversify their economies. The economics of most states in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East and some in Latin America will continue toarge segment of the Eurasian landmass extending from Central Asia through the Caucasus to parts of southeastern Europe faces dim economic prospects. Within countries, the gap in the standard of living also will increase. Even in rapidly growing countries, large regions will be left behind.
World Tradeercentage of World
Emerging Asia will be the fastest growing region, led by breakout candidates China and India, whose economies already comprise roughly one-sixth of global GDP. To the degree that China implements reforms mandated by its entry into the World Trade Organization, its economy will become more efficient, enabling rapid growth to continue. China's economic development, however, will be mainly in the dynamic coastal provinces. Agricultural provinces in northern and western China will lag behind, causing social tensions that Beijing will be challenged to manage. India's relatively strong educational system, democracy, and English-language skills position it welt to take advantage of gains related to information technology. India nevertheless faces enormous challenges in spreading Ihe benefits of growth lo hundreds of millions of impoverished, often illiterate citizens, particularly in the northern states.
GDP by Countries and the05
In Europe and Japan, the picture is mixed. Western Europe is likely to narrow what hasrowing economic performance gap with the United States, and Eastern European countries, eager for EU membership, generally will adopt reform policies and grow apace. South-Eastern Europe will improve economic prospects only gradually as it improves regional security. Although Japan's economic performance in the nextears will be stronger than thul of, its relative importance in the global economy will decrease. Economic prospects for Russia and Eurasia are not promising.
Latin America will manage fairly rapid aggregate growth, but it will be spread unevenly across the region. The market-oriented democracies in Mexico and the southern cone will lead theew generation of entrepreneurs will be inclined to favor additional market openings, but the benefits may further distort income distribution, already the most inequitable in the world. Elsewhere, the Andean region will struggleoorly educated labor force, unstable governance, and dependence upon commodities such as oil, copper, and narcotics.
The Middle East and North Africa will be marked by increasing internal differentiation as some countries respond more effectively to the challenges of globalization or to the uncertainties of closer integration with the EU while others lag. In Sub-Saharan Africa, persistent conflicts and instability, autocratic and corrupt governments, overdependence on commodities with declining real prices, low levels of education, and widespread infectious diseases will combine to prevent most countries from experiencing rapid economic growth.
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Crises and Resilience
The global economy will be prone to periodic financial crises, but its capacity to correct itself will remain strong. The rapid rebound from the global financial crisis. the limited impact of the recent tripling of oil prices on global economic growth, and the successful management of the" problem are the most recent manifestations of resilience. Nonetheless, economic liberalization and globalization entail risks and inevitably will create bumps in the road, some of them potentially highly disruptive.
> Economic crises will recur, lhe trends toward free markets and deregulation will allow financial markets to overshoot, increase the possibility for sudden reversal in sentiment, and expose individual countries to broad swings in the global market. Any of these couldinancial
crisis.
Turbulence in one economy will affect others. Increased trade links and the integration of global financial markets will quickly transmit turmoil in one economy regionally and internationally, as Russia's financial turmoil8 affected Brazil.
. Disputes oser international economic rules. The Asian financial crisis revealed differences among countries regarding global financial architecture. As emerging market countries continue to grow, they willtronger voice in setting the terms of international economicack of consensus could at times make financial markets skittish and undermine growth.
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National and International Governance
uld lead lo
state will remain the single most important organizing unit of political, economic, and security affairs5 but will confront fundamental tests of effective governance. The fust will be to benefit from, while coping with, several facets of globalization. The second will be to deal wiih
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increasingly vocal and organized publics.
elements of globalizationand freer flow of information, capital, goods, services, people, and the diffusion of power to nonstate actors of all kinds -will challenge the authority of virtually all governments At the same time, globalization will create demands for increased international cooperation on transnational issues.
All states will confront popular demands for greater participation in politics and attention to civilthat will encourage greater democratization and transparency. Twenty-five years ago lesshird of states were defined as democracies by Freedom House; today more than half of states are considered democracies, albeit with varying combinations of electoral and civil or political rights. The majority of states are likely to remain democracies in some sense over lhe nextears, but the number of new democracies that are likely to develop is uncertain.
Successful states will interact with nonstatc actors to manage authority and share responsibility. Between nowhree important challenges for states will be:
Managing relations with nonstatc actors:
Combating criminal networks; and
Responding to emerging and dynamic religious and ethnic groups.
r Actors
States continually will be dealing with private-sector organizations -both for-profit and nonprofit. These nonstatc actors increasingly will gain resources and power over the nextearsesult of the ongoing liberalization of global finance and trade, as well as the opportunities afforded by information technology.
The For-profit Sector The for-profit business sector will grow rapidly over the nextears, spearheading legal and judicial reform and challenging governments to become more transparent and predictable At the same time, governments will be challenged to monitor and regulate business firms through measures consistent with local standards of social welfare.
Multinationalnumbering more0 with nearly one-half millionmultiplied in recent years as governments have deregulated their economies, privatized state-owned enterprises, and liberalized financial markets and trade. This trend will continue.
Medium-sized, mostly local firms will multiply in many countries, driven by the shift away from Communism and other socialist models and the broadening of financial services and banking systems. Micro-enterprises also will multiply, not only because of deregulation and liberalization, but also because many states willeclining capacity to stymie small-scale commercial activities. As medium-sized and small businesses become more numerous, they will encourage, and then link into, various global networks.
The Nonprofit Sector. Nonprofit networks with affiliates in more than one country will growaving expanded morefold4ithin individual countries, the nonprofit sector also will expand rapidly.
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Over the nextears international and national nonprofits will not only expand but change in significant ways.
Nonprofit organizations will have more resources to expand their activities and will become more confident of their power and more confrontational. Nonprofits will move beyond delivering services to the design and implementation of policies, whether as partners or competitors with corporations and governments.
Western preponderance will persist buteclining level as economic growth in Asia and latin America produces additional resources for support of civil society. In addition, autocratic governments and Islamic states or groups will increasingly support nonprofit groups sympathetic to their interests.
Nonprofit organizations will be expected to meet codes of conduct. Governments andare increasingly held to standards of transparency andin turn, expect nonprofits to meet similar standards.
Criminal Organizations and Networks
Over the nextears, transnational criminal organizations will become increasingly adept at exploiting the global diffusion of sophisticated information, financial, and transportation networks.
Criminal organizations and networks based in North America. Western Europe, China. Colombia, Israel, Japan. Mexico, Nigeria, and Russia will expand the scale and scope of their activities. They will form loose alliances with one another, with smaller criminal entrepreneurs, and with insurgent movements for specific operations. They will corrupt leaders of unstable, economically fragile or failing states, insinuate themselves into troubled banks and businesses, and cooperate with insurgent political movements to control substantial geographic areas. Their income will come from narcotics trafficking; alien smuggling; trafficking in women and children; smuggling toxic materials, hazardous wastes, illicit arms, military technologies, and other contraband; financial fraud; and racketeering.
risk will increase that organized criminal groups will traffic in nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. The degree of risk depends on whether governments with WMD capabilities can or will control such weapons and materials.
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Changing Communal Identities and Networks
Traditional communalreligious orange of challenges for governance. Using opportunilies afforded by globalization and the opening of civil society, communal groups will be better positioned to mobilize coreligionists or ethnic kin to assert their interests or defend against perceived economic or political discrimination. Ethnic diasporas and coreligionists abroad also will be more able and willing to provide fraternal groups with political, financial, and other support.
hristianity and Islam, the two largest religious groupings, will have grown significantly. Both arc widely dispersed in several continents, already use information technologies to "spread thend draw on adherents to fund numerous nonprofit groups and political causes. Activist components of these and other religious groupings will emerge to contest such issues as genetic manipulation, women's rights, and the income gap between rich andider religious or spiritual movement also may emerge, possibly linked to environmental values.
Criminal Networks and New Technologies
listimales of the number of distinct ethnic-linguistic groups at the beginning of the twenty-first century run, ranging from small bands living in isolated areas to larger groups living in ancestral homelands or in diasporas. Most of thetates are ethnically heterogeneous, and many contain ethnic populations with co-ethnics in neighboring slates.thnic heterogeneity will increase in almost all states,esult of international migration and divergent birthrates of migrant and native populations.
Current World Illicit Trafficking
Worldwide Adherents of Selected Major World Religions,
Communal tensions, sometimes culminating in conflict, probably will increasen addition to some ongoing communal frictions that will persist, triggers of new tensions will include:
Repression by the slate. States with slow economic growth, and/or where executive power is concentrated in an exclusionary political elite and the rule of law and civil or minority rights are weak, will be inclined to discriminate against communal minorities. Such conditions will foment ethnic tensions in Sub-Saharan Africa, Central and South Asia, and parts of the Middle East, often in rapidly growing urban areas. Certain powerfulas Russia, China, Brazil, andare likely to repress politicized communal minorities.
Religious, often fused with ethnic, grievances. Few Muslim states will grant full political and cultural rights to religious minorities. At the same time, they will not remain indiflerenl to the
treatment of Muslim minorities elsewhere: in Russia, Indonesia, India'Kashmir, China, and the Balkans. Other religious denominations also will support beleaguered coreligionists.
Resistance to migration. Some relatively homogenous countries or sub-regions in Asia and Europe will resist ethnically diverse migrants, creating tensions.
Indigenous protest movements. Such movements will increase, facilitated by transnational networks of indigenous rights activists and supported by well-funded international human rights and environmental groups. Tensions will intensify in the area from Mexico through the Amazon region: northeastern India; and the Malaysian-Indonesian archipelago.
Overall Impact on States
The developed democracies will be best positioned for good governance because they will tend to empower legitimate nonstatc actors in both the for-profit and nonprofit sectors; will favor institutions and processes that accommodate divergent communal groups; will press for transparency in government and the efficient delivery of public services; and will maintain institutions to regulate legitimate for-profit and nonprofit organizations and control illegitimate criminal groups. Countries in Western Europe, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan have the requisite agility and institutions to meet the challenges. Countries in Eastern Europe as well as Turkey. South Korea. India, Chile, and Brazil, among other developing countries, are moving in these directions, despite some continuing obstacles.
Some newly democratic states and modernizing authoritarian states will have leaders amenable to technological change and access to substantial human and financial resources. They will encourage business firms, nonprofits, and communal groups supportive of the government and discourage or suppress those that arc independent-minded or critical of government policies. They will have some success in coping with the energy, ideas, and resources of nonstatc actors. Several Asian countries, such as Singapore, Taiwan, and perhaps China, as well as some states in the Middle Hast and Latin America are likely to lake this approach.
Other states in varying degrees will lack the resources and leadership to achieve effective governance. Most autocratic states in the Middle East and Africa will not have the institutions or cultural orientation to exploit the opportunities provided by nonstatcfrom certain forms of humanitarian assistance. In many of these countries, nonstate actors will become more important than governments in providing services, such as health clinics and schools. In the weakest of these countries, communal, criminal, or terrorist groups will seek control of government institutions and/or territory.
Overall, the number ofhas more than tripled5 and has grownercent sincelikely to increaselower ratehis growth will result from remaining cases of decolonization and to communal tensions leading to state secession, most likely in Sub-Saharan Africa. Central Asia, and Indonesia In some cases, new states will inspire other secessionist movements, destabilizing countries where minorities were not initially seeking secession.
At the same time, the very concept of "belonging"articular state probably will eroderowing number of people with continuing transnational tics to more than one country through citizenship, residence or other associations.
International Cooperation
Globalization and technological change arc raising widespread expectations that increased international cooperation will help manage many transnational problems that states can no longer manage on their own. Efforts to realize such expectations will increase, but concerns about national interests as well as the costs and risks involved in some types of international activism will limit success.
Mechanisms of internationalto facilitate bargaining, elucidate common interests and resolve differences amongincreased rapidly in recent decades.
treaties registered with the United Nations more than tripled0n addition, there are growing numbers of agreements on standards and practices initiated by
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self-selected private networks
The number of international institutions increased by two-thirds5hile at tltc same time becoming more complex, more interrelated with often overlapping areas of responsibility, and more closely linked to transnational networks and private groups.
International cooperation will continue to increasearticularly when large economic stakes have mobilized the for-profit sector, and/or when there is intense interest from nonprofit groups and networks.
Most high-income democratic states will participate in multiple international institutions and seek cooperationide range of issues to protect their interests and to promote their influence. Members of the European Union will tackle the most ambitious agenda, including significant political and security cooperation.
Strongly nationalistic and/or autocratic states will play selective roles in inter-govcrnmcntal organizations: working within them to protect and project their interests, while working against initiatives that they view as threatening to their domestic power structures and national sovereignty. They will also work against those international institutions viewed us creatures of the established great powers and thus rigged againstas the IMF and the WI () as well as those thatajor role to nonstate actors.
Low-income developing countries will participate actively in international organizations and arrangements to assert their sovereignty, gamer resources for social and economic development, and gain support for the incumbent government. The most unstable of these states will participate in international organizations and arrangements primarily to maintain international recognition for the regime.
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r<acckeejMng/orecs^nd "standbythority ofecurity Council or-most regional organizations, with the possible exceptionofthc
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*uf human rights'within *st'ates, pursuant to.sscrlcd principle ot i cccssibn. Although
"coalitions ot lite willing^ilfuriuertakc such operations ir'om lime toignificant numberill coi|tinueew such interventions as rillegitimatc inte^^
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Future Conflict
nternal conflicts will pose the most frequent threat to stability around the world. Interstate wars, though less frequent, will grow in lethality due to the avuilabilily of more destructive technologies. The international community will have to deal with the military, political, and economic dimensions of the rise of China and India and the continued decline of Russia.
Internal Conflicts
Many internal conflicts, particularly those arising from communal disputes, will continue lo be vicious, long-lasiing and difficult tobitter legacies in their wake.
frequently will spawn internal displacements, refugee flows, humanitarian emergencies, and other regionally destabilizing dislocations.
If left lo fester, internal conflicts will trigger spillover into inter-state conflicts as neighboring states move to exploit opportunities for gain or to limit the possibilities of damage to their national interests.
states will spawn recurrent internal conflicts, threatening the stabilitylobalizing international system.
Internal conflicts stemming from state repression, religious and ethnic grievances, increasing migration pressures, and/or indigenous protest movements will occur most frequently in Sub-Saharan Africa, the Caucasus and Central Asia, and pans of south and southeast Asia. Central America and the Andean region.
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The United Nations and several regional organizations will continue to be called upon to manage some internal conflicts because major states- stressed by domestic concerns, perceived risk of failure, lack of political will, or tightwish to minimize their direct involvement. When, however, some
Western governments, international and regional organizations, and civil-society groups press for outside military intervention in certain internal conflicts, they will be opposed by such states as China, India. Russia and many developing countries lhat will lend to view interventions as dangerous precedents challenging state sovereignty.
errorism
Stutcs with poor governance; ethnic, cultural, or religious tensions; weak economies; and porous borders will be prime breeding grounds for terrorism. In such states, domestic groups will challenge the entrenched government, and transnational networks seeking safehavens.
Bombed US Embassy in Nairobi
At the same time, the trend away from state-supported political terrorism and toward more diverse, free-wheeling, transnationalby informationcontinue. Some of the states that actively sponsor terrorism or terrorist groups today may decrease or even cease their support5esult of regime changes, rapprochemeni with neighbors, or the conclusion lhat terrorism has become counterproductive. But weak states also could drift toward cooperation with terrorists, creating defacto new state supporters.
now5 terrorist tactics will become increasingly sophisticated and designed to achieve mass casualties. We expect the trend toward greater lethality in terrorist attacks to continue.
Interstate Conflicts
Over the nextears, the international system will have to adjust to changing power relationships in key regions:
. China's potential. Rstimatcs of China beyond live years arc fraught with unknowables. Some projections indicate that Chinese power will rise because of the growth of its economic and military capabilities Other projections indicate that the array of political, social, and economic pressures will increasingly challenge the stability and legitimacy of the regime. Most assessments today argue lhat China will seek to avoid conflict in the region to promote stable economic growth and lo ensure internaltrong China, others assert, would seek to adjust regional power arrangements to iis advantage, risking conflict with neighbors and some powers external to theeak China would increase prospects for criminality, narcotics trafficking, illegal migration. WMD proliferation, and widespread social instability.
decline.ussia will be challenged even more than today to adjust its expectations for world leadership lo the dramatically reduced resources it will have to play dial role. The quality of Russian governance is an open question as is whether the country will be able lo make the transitionanner that preserves rather than upsets regional stability.
Japan's uncertainty. In the view of many experts, Japan will have difficulty maintaining its current position as the world's thiid largest economyokyo has so far notillingness to carry through the painful economic reforms necessary to slow the erosion of its leadership role in Asia. In the absence of an oilcrnul shock, Japan is similarly unlikely lo accelerate changes in security policy.
prospects. India will strengthen its roleegional power, but many uncertainiies about the effects of global trends on its society cast doubl on how far India will go. India faces growing extremes between wealth andixed picture on natural resources, and problems with internal governance.
Current Hthnic Diversity Slates
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The changing dynamics of state power will combine with other factors to affect the risk of conflict in various regions. Changing military capabilities will be prominent among the factors that determine the risk of war. In South Asia, for example, that risk will remain fairly high over the nextears. India and Pakistan arc both prone to miscalculation. Both will continue to build up their nuclear and missile forces.
India most likely will expand the size of its nuclear-capable force. Pakistan's nuclear and missile forces ulso will continue to increase. Islamabad has publicly claimed that the number of nuclear weapons and missiles it deploys will be based on "minimum" deterrence and will be independent of the size of India'soticeable increase in the size of India's arsenal, however, would prompt Pakistan to further increase the size of its own arsenal.
Russia will be unable to maintain conventional forces that are both sizable and modem or to project significant military power with conventional means. The Russian military- will increasingly rely on its shrinking strategic and theater nuclear arsenals to deter or, if deterrence tails, to counter large-scale conventional assaults on Russian territory.
will maintain as many strategic missiles and associated nuclear warheads as it believes it can afford but well short ofr II limitations. The total Russian forcencluding air launched cruise missiles, probably will bearheads.
As Russia struggles with the constraints on its ambitions, it will invest scarce resources in selected and secretive military technology programs, especially WMD. hoping to counter Western conventional and strategic superiority in areas such as ballistic missile defense.
China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) will remain the world's largest military, but the majority of the force will not be fully modernizedhina could close the technological gap with the West in one or more major weapons systems. China's capability for regional military operations is likely to improve significantly
. China will be exploiting advanced weapons and production technologies acquired fromIsrael. Europe. Japan, and the United States- -that will enable it to integrate naval and air capabilities against Taiwan and potential adversaries in the South China Sea.
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the eventeaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue, some of China's militaryas protecting the sea lanes for Persian Gulf oil -could become more congruent with those of the United States. Nevertheless, as an emerging regional power, China would continue to expand its influence without regard to US interests.
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Japanmall bul modern military force, more able than any other in Asia to integrate large quantities of new weaponry. Japan's future military strength will reflect the state of its economy and the health of its security relationship with Ihe United States. Tokyo will increasingly pursue greater autonomy in security matters and develop security enhancements, such as defense improvements and more active diplomacy, to supplement the US alliance.
A unified Koreaignificant US military presence mayegional military power. For the nextoears, however, knowledgeable observers suggest that the procevs of unification will consume South Korra'scnergies and resources.
Absent unification. North Korea's WAiD capabilities will continue to cloud regional stability. Pyongyang probably has one. possibly two, nuclear weapons. It has developed medium-range missiles for years and hashree-stage space launch vehicle.
Pyonyang may improve the accuracy, range, and payload capabilities of its TacpoCBM, deploy variants, or develop more capable systems. North Korea couldew to several Tacpoype missiles deployed
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In the Middle Fast, the confluence of domestic economic pressures and regional rivalries is likely to further the proliferation of weapons of mass dcstriKtion and the means to deliver them. By contrast, spending on conventional arms probably will remain stable or decline in most countries. Some governments may maintain large armed forces to absorb otherwise unemployable youths, but such armies will be less well trained and equipped. Rattier than conventional war. the region is likely to experience more terrorism, insurgencies, and humanitarian emergencies arising from internal disparities or disputes over ethnic or religious identity.
. Iran sees its short- und medium-range missiles as deterrents, as force-multiplying weapons of war, primarily with conventional warheads, and as options for delivering biological, chemical, and eventually nuclear weapons. Iran could test an 1RBM or land-attack cruise missile4 and perhaps even an ICBM or space launch vehicle as early
. Iraq's ability to obtain WMI) will be influenced, in part by the degree to which the UN Security Council can impede development or procurement over the nextears. Under some scenarios. Iraq could test an ICBM capable of delivering nuclear-sized pay loads to the United Statesoreign assistunce would affect the capabilities of the missile and lhe time it became available. Iraq could alsouclear wcupon during this period.
Reacting to US Military Superiority'
l-xpcrts agree thai the United States, with its decisive edge in both information and weapons technology, will remain the dominant military power during the nextears. Further bolstering the strong position of the United Slates arc its unparalleled economic power, its university system, and its investment in research and development -half of the total spent annually by the advanced industrial world. Many potential adversaries, as reflected in doctrinal writings and statements,'S military concepts, together with technology, as giving the United Slates the ability to expand its lead in conventional warfighting capabilities.
This perception among present and potential adversaries will continue to generate the pursuit of asymmetric capabilities against US forces and interests abroad as well as the territory of the United States. US opponentsand such nonstate actors as drug lords, terrorists, and foreignnot want to engage the US military on its terms. They will choose instead political and military strategies designed to dissuade the United Stales from using force, or. if the United States docs use force, to exhaust American will, circumvent or minimize US strengths, and exploit perceived US weaknesses. Asymmetric challenges can arise across the spectrum of conflict that will confront US forcesheater of operations or on US soil.
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i^the interests ot Russia. ChipajaiidjItuiMwell as of Iran and Iintersect in Central Asia; ihe.yatcs qj thai region jvill attempt to balanceas well as keep thecs..ind the West-engagcdJonation bv .an outside power .greatest danger tcp theonflict betuccp states!unlikely, but thecommunal conflicts and poIiticiuTihsargencies^possibly abetted b>
It is also generally recognized that the United States and other developed countries will continue to possess the political, economic, military, and technologicalthrough National Missile and Theater Missile Defense systemsreduce the gains of adversaries from lateral or "side-wise" technological improvements to their capabilities.
Threats to Critical Infrastructure Some potential adversaries will seek ways to threaten the US homeland. The US nationaltransportation, financial transactions.
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energy networks is vulnerable to disruption by physical and electronic attack because of its interdependent nature and by cyber attacks because of their dependence on computer networks. Foreign governments and groups will seek to exploit such vulnerabilities using conventional munitions, information operations, and even WMD. Over time, such attacks increasingly are likely to be delivered by computer networks rather than by conventional munitions, as the affinity for cyber attacks and the skill of US adversaries in employing them evolve. Cyber attacks will provide both state and nonstate adversaries new options for action against the United States beyond mere words but short of physical attack -strategic options tliat include selection of either nonlethal or lethal damage and the prospect of anonymity.
Information Operations. In addition to threatening Ihe US national infrastructure, adversaries will seekttack US military capabilities through electronic warfare, psychological operations, denial and deception, and the use of new technologies such as directed energy weapons or electromagnetic pulse weapons. The primary purpose would be lo deny US forces information superiority, to prevent US weapons from working, and to undermine US domestic support for US actions. Adversaries also are likely to use cyber attacks to complicate US power projection in an era of decreasing permanent US military presence abroad by seeking to disrupt military networks during deploymentthey are most stressed. Many countries have programs to develop such technologies: few have the foresight or capability to fully integrate these various toolsomprehensive attack. Rut they could develop such capabilities over the next decade and beyond.
Terrorism. Much of the terrorism noted earlier will be directed at the United States and its overseas interests. Most anti-US terrorism will be based on perceived ethnic, religious or cultural grievances. Terrorist groups will continue to find ways to attack US military and diplomatic facilities abroad. Such attacks arc likely to expand increasingly to include US companies and American citizens. Middle East and Southwest Asian-based terrorists are the most likely to threaten the United States.
Weapons of Mass Destruction. WMD programs reflect the motivations and intentions of the governments that produce them and, therefore, can be altered by the changeegime oregime's change of view. Linear projections of WMD are intended to assess what the picture will took like if changes in motivations and intentions do not occur.
Short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, particularly if armed with WMD, alreadyignificant
political changes in these countries, will face 1CBM threats from North Korea, probably from Iran, and possibly from Iraq, in addition to long-standing threats from Russia and China.
Weapons development programs, in many cases fueled by foreign assistance, have led to newillustrated by Iran'saunches80 and North Korea's Taepopace launch attempt inn addition, some countries that have been traditional recipients of missile technologies have become exporters.
. Sales of ICBMs or space launch vehicles, which have inherent ICBM capabilities, could further increase the number of countries that will be able to threaten the United Statesissile strike.
The probabilityissile armed with WMD would be used against US forces or interests is higher today than during most of the Cold War and will continue to grow. The emerging missile threats will be mounted by countries possessing considerably fewer missiles with far less accuracy, yield, survivability, reliability, and rangc-payload capability than the strategic forces of the Soviet Union. North Korea's space launch attempt8 demonstrated that Pyongyang isong-range missile capability thai could be used against US forces and interests abroad and against US territory itself. Moreover, many of the countries developing longer-range missiles assess lhat the mere threat of their use would complicate US crisis decisionmaking and potentially would deter Washington from pursuing certain objectives.
Other means to deliver WMD againsl the United States will emerge, some cheaper and more reliable and accurate than early-generation ICBMs. The likelihood of an attack by these means is greater than that of
a WMD attack with anhe goal of the adversary would be to move the weapon within striking distance by using short- and medium-range missiles deployed on surface ships or covert missions using military special operations forces or state intelligence services. Non-missile delivery means, however, do not provide the same prcslige, deterrence, and coercive diplomacy associated with ICBMs,
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Chemical and biological threats to the United States will become more widespread; such capabilities are easier to develop, hide, and deploy than nuclear weapons. Some terrorists or insurgents will attempt to use such weapons against USthe United States itself, its forces or facilities overseas, or its allies. Moreover,nited States would be affected by the use of such weapons anywhere in the world because Washington would be called on to help contain the damage and to provide scientific expertise and economic assistance to deal with the effects. Such weapons could be deliveredariety of means, including missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, or covertly via land. air. and lets
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Theater-range ballistic and cruise missile proliferation will continue. Most proliferation will involveeneration or two behind state of Ihe art, but they will be substantially new capabilities for the states Ihul acquire them. Such missiles will be capable of delivering WMD or conventional payloads inter-regionally ugainst fixed targets. Major air and sea pons, logistics bases and facilities, troop concentruiions. and fixed communications nodes increasingly will be at risk.
Land-attack cruise missiles probably will be more accurate than ballistic missiles.
Access to Space US competitors and adversaries realize the degree to which access to space is critical to US military power, and5 they will have made strides in countering US space dominance. International commercialization of space will give states and nonstate adversaries access rivaling today's major space powers in such areas as high-resolution reconnaissance and weather prediction, global encrypted communications, and precise navigation. When combined, such services will provide adversaries who arc aware of US and allied force deployments ihe capability for precise targeting and global coordination of operations. Moreover, many adversaries will have developed capabilities lo degrade US spaceparticular, with attacks against ground facilities, electronic warfare, and
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denial and deception.everal countries will lave such countcrspacc technologies as improved space-object tracking, signal jamming, and directcd-cncrgy weapons such as low-power lasers.
^
int. negotiations between thebut-tife'future probably willv
Major Regions
The following snapshots of individual regions result from our assessment of trends and from estimates by regional experts as to where specific nations will be inears. To make these judgments, wc have distilled the views expressed by many outside experts in our conferences and workshops. lhe results are intended lo stimulate debate, not to endorse one view over another.
Political Rights in East and Southeast Asia
East and Southeast Asia
Regional Trends. East Asia over the nextears will be characterized by uneven economicbetween and withinand national assertiveness rather than ideology, and potential for strategic tension if not outright conflict.
The states of the region will be led by generally nationalistic governments eschewing ideology and
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focusing on nation-building and development. These states will broadly accommodate international norms on the free flow of information to modernize their economies, open markets, and fight international crime and disease. They also will encounter pressure for greater political pluralism, democracy, and respect for human rights. Failure to meet popular expectations probably will result in leaders being voted out of office in democratic states or in widespread demonstrations and violence leading to regime collapse in authoritarian states.
Political and Security' Trends. The major power realignments and the more fluid post-Cold War security environment in the region will raise serious questions about how regional leaders will handle nascent great-power rivalries (the US-China, China-Japan.elated regional "hot spots" (Taiwan, Korea, South Chinahe future of challenged political regimes (Indonesia, North Korea absent unification,nd communal tensions and minority issues (in China. Indonesia, the Philippines, andn balance, the number and range of rivalries and potential flashpointsctter-than-cven chance that episodes of military confrontation and conflict will erupt over the nextears.
lhe implications of the rise of China as an economic and increasingly capable regional militaryas the influence of Communism and authoritarianismthe greatest uncertainty in the area. Adding to uncertainty are the prospectsimplicationsunification over the nextears, and the evolution of Japan's regional leadership aspirations and capabilities.
Instability in Russia and Central Asia, and the nuclear standoff between India and Pakistan will be peripheral but still important in Fast Asian security calculations. The Middle East will become increasingly importantrimary source of energy.
Economic Dynamism. While governments in the region generally will accept Ihc need to accommodate international norms on ownership, markets, trade, and investment, they will seek lo block or slow lhe perceived adverse economic, political, and social consequences of globalization.
The most likely economic outlook will be that richKorea. Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, and pockets in China andget richer, with Japan likely to continue loeaderevelopment and applications for commercial use. In contrast, the poorCambodia, Laos, and rural areas in western China and elsewhere -will fall fiirther behind. Greater economic links are likely to have been forged between Taiwan, Hong Kong, and South Chinaesult of the development of investment and infrastructure. China will be increasingly integrated into the world economy through foreign direct investment, trade, and international capital markets. Energy markets will have drawn the region more closely together despite lingering issues of ownership of resources and territorial disputes.
Key uncertainties will persist on economic performance and political stability, including the rising costs of pensions and services for Japan's aging population; the adequacy of energy and water for China, political leadership in Indonesia and China, and the impact of AIDS in Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam.
Regional Interaction. Given the weakness of regional political-security arrangements, the US political, economic, and security presence will remain pronounced. At the same time, many countries in the region will remain uncertain about US objectives, apprehensive of both US withdrawal and US unilateralism. Key states, most significantly China and Japan, will continuey using diplomacy, military preparations and other means to ensure that their particular interests will be safeguarded, especially in case the regional situation deteriorates.
Japan and others will seek toS presence, in part to counter China's influence. Feonomic and other ties will bind Japan and China, but historical, territorial, and strategic differences will underline continuing wariness between the two. China will want good economic lies to the United States but also will nurture links to Russia and others to counter the possibility of US pressure against it and to weaken US support for Taiwan and the US security posture in East Asia. US-China confrontations over Taiwan
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or over broader competing security interests are possible.
Although preserving the US alliance. Japanese leaders also will be less certain they can rely on the United States to deal with some security contingencies. More confident of their ability to handle security issues independently, they will pursue initiatives inlernally and overseas that arc designed to safeguard Japanese interests without direct reference to the US alliance.
South Asia
Regional Trends. Ihe widening strategic and economic gaps between the two principal powers, India andthe dynamic interplay between their mutual hostility and the instability in Centraldefine the Soulh Asia region
will be the unrivaled regional powerargenaval and nucleara dynamic and growing economy. The widening India-Pakistan
gap -destabilizing in its own right -willbe accompanied by deep political, economic, and social disparities within both states.
will be more fractious, isolated, aid dependent on international financial assistance.
- Other South AsianSri Lanka, andbe drawn closer lo and more dependent on India and its economy. Afghanistan will likely remain weakestabilizing force in the region and ihe world.
Wary of China, India will look increasingly to the West, but its need for oil and desire to balance Arab tics to Pakisian will lead to strengthened ties to Persian Gulf states as well.
Demographic Challenges. Although population growth rates in South Asia will decline, population still will grow by nearlyercentndia's population alone will grow to moreillion. Pakistan's projected growthillion toillion5 willajor strain on an economy already unable to meel the basic needs of the currenl population. The perccniagc of urban dwellers will climb steadily from theercent of the population toercent, leading to continued deterioration in the overall quality of urban life. Differential population growth patterns will exacerbate inequalities in wealth. Ties between provincial and central governments throughout the region will be strained.
Jammu and Kashmir: Ethnic Mixisputed State
Resource and Environmental Challenges. Water will remain South Asia's most vital and mosi contested natural resource. Continued population and economic growth and expansion of irrigated agriculture over the nextears will increasingly stress water resources, and pollution of surface and groundwater willerious challenge. In India, per capita water availability is likely lo dropercent. Because many of the region's waterways arc interstate, water could become a' source of renewed friction. Deforestation in India and Nepal will exacerbate pollution, flooding, and land degradation in Bangladesh.
Indiandian democracy will remain strong, albeit more faclionalized by the secular-Hindu nationalist debate, growing differentials among regions and the increase in competitive party politics. India's economy, long repressed by the heavy hand of regulation, is likely to achieve sustained growth to the degree reforms are implemented. High-technology companies will be the most dynamic agents and will lead the thriving service sector in four key urbanNew Delhi, Bangalore, and Chennai. Computer software services and customized applications will conlinue to expand as India strengthens economic ties to key international markets. Industries such as pharmaceuticals and agro-processing also will compete globally. Numerous factors provideompetitive advantage in the global economy. It has the largest English-speaking population in the developing world; its education system produces millions of scientific and technical personnel. Indiarowing business-minded middle class eager to strengthen ties to the outside world, and the large Indian expatriate population provides strong links to key markets around the world.
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Despite rapid economic growth, more thanillion Indians will remain in dire poverty. Harnessing technology to improve agriculture will be India's main challenge in alleviating povertyhe widening gulf between "have" and "have-not" regions and disagreements over the pace and nature of reforms willource of domestic strife. Rapidly growing, poorer northern states will continue to drain resources in subsidies and social welfare benefits.
Pakistanakistan, our conferees concluded, will not recover easily from decades of political and economic mismanagement, divisive politics, lawlessness, corruption and ethnic friction. Nascent democratic reforms will produce little change in the face of opposition from an entrenched political elite and radical Islamic parties. Further domestic decline would benefit Islamic political activists, who may significantly increase their role in national politics and alter the makeup and cohesion of thePakistan's most capable institution.limate of continuing domestic turmoil, the central government's control probably will be reduced to the Punjabi heartland and the economic hub of Karachi.
Other Regional States. Prospects for Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka5 appear hleak. Decades of foreign domination and civil war have devastated Afghanistan's society and economy, and the country is likely to remain internationallyajor narcotics exporter,aven for Islamic radicals and terrorist groups. Bangladesh will not abandon democracy but will be characterized by coalitions or weak one-party governments, fragile institutions of governance, deep-seated leadership squabbles, and no notionoyal opposition.
Security and Political Concerns Predominate. The threat of major conflict between India and Pakistan will overshadow all other regional issues during the nextears. Continued turmoil in Afghanistan and Pakistan will spill over into Kashmir and other areas of the subcontinent, prompting Indian leaders to take more aggressive preemptive and retaliatory actions. India's conventional military advantage over Pakistan will widenesult of New Delhi's superior economic position. India will also continue to build up its ocean-going navy to dominate the Indian Ocean transit routes used for delivery of Persian Gulf oil to Asia. The decisive shift in conventional military power in India's favor over the coming years potentially will make the region more volatile and unstable. Both India and Pakistan will sec weapons of mass destructiontrategic imperative and will continue to amass nuclear warheads andariety' of missile delivery systems.
Projected Demographic Trends in Eurasia
Russia and Eurasia
Regional Trends. Uncertainties abound about the future internal configuration, geopolitical dynamics, and degree of turbulence within and among former Soviet states. Russia and the other states of Eurasia are likely to fall short in resolving critical impediments to economic and political reform in their struggle to manage the negative legacies of the Soviet period. Changing demographics, chronic economic difficulties, and continued questions about governance will constrain Russia's ability to project its power beyond the former Soviet republics to the south, complicate Ukraine's efforts to draw closer to the West, and retard the development of stable, open political structures throughout the Caucasus and Central Asia. Those states that could make progress on the basis of potential energy revenues are likely to fail hecause of corruption and the absence of structural economic reform, lhe rapid pace of scientific and technological innovation, as well as globalization, will leave these states further behind the West as well as behind the major emerging markets.
The economic challenges to these countries will remain daunting: insufficient structural reform, poor productivity in agriculture as compared with Western standards, decaying infrastructure and environmental degradation. Corruption and organized crime, sustained by drug trafficking, money laundering, and other illegal enterprises and, in several instances, protected by corrupt political allies, will persist.
Demographic pressures also will affect the economic performance and political eohesivencss of these states. Because of low birthrates and falling life expectancy among males, the populations of the Slavic
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core and much of the Caucasus will continue to decline; Russian experts predict that the country's population could fallillion at presentilliont the other end bf the spectrum, the Central Asian countries willrowing youth cohort that will peak0 beforeore gradual pattern of population growth.
The centrality of Russia will continue to diminish, and5 "Eurasia" willeographic termnifying political, economic, and cultural reality. Russia and the western Eurasian States will continue to orient themselves toward Europe but will remain essentially outside of it. Because of geographic proximity and cultural affinities, the Caucasus will be closer politically to their neighbors to the south and west, with Central Asia drawing closer to South Asia and China. Nonetheless, important interdependences will remain, primarily in the energy sphere.
Russia will remain the most important actor in the former Soviet Union. Its power relative to others in the region and neighboring areas will have declined, however, and it will continue lo lack the resources to impose its will.
The Soviet economic inheritance will continue to plague Russia.rumbling physical infrastructure, years of environmental neglect areoll on theoll made worse by such societal costs of transition as alcoholism, cardiac diseases, drugs,orsening health delivery system. Russia's population is not only getting smaller, bul it is becoming less and less healthy and thus less able to serve as an engine of economic recovery. In macro economic terms Russia's GDP probably has bottomed out Russia, nevertheless, is still likely to fall short in its efforts to become fully integrated into the global financial and trading systemvenest case scenario of five percent annual economic growth, Russia would attain an economy less than one-fifth the size of that of the United States.
Many Russian futures arc possible, ranging from political resurgence to dissolution. The general drift, however, is toward authoritarianism, although not to the extreme extent of the Soviet period. The factors favoring this course are President Putin's own bent toward hierarchical rule from Moscow; the population's general support of this course as an antidote to the messincss and societal disruption of the post-Soviet transition; the ability of the ruling elite to hold on to power because of the lack of effective national opposition, thus making that elite accountable only to itself; and the ongoing shift of tax resources from the regions to the center. This centralizing tendency will contribute to dysfunctional governance. Effective governance is nearly impossible under such centralizationountry as large and diverse as Russia and lacking welt-ordered, disciplined national bureaucracies. Recentralization, however, will be constrained by the intcrconnectedness brought about by the global information revolution, and by the gradual, although uneven, growth of civil society.
Russia will focus its foreign policy goals on reestablishing lost influence in the former Soviet republics to the south, fostering ties to Europe and Asia, and presenting itselfignificant playeris the United Suites. Its energy resources will be an important lever for these endeavors. However, its domestic ills will frustrate its ettorts lo reclaim its great power status. Russia will maintain the second largest nuclear arsenal in the world as the last vestige of its old status. The net outcome of these trends willussia that remains internally weak and institutionally linked to the international system primarily through its permanent scat on the UN Security Council.
Ukraine's path to the West will be constrained by widespread corruption, the power of criminal organizations, and lingering questions over its commitment to the rule of law. Kiev will remain vulnerable to Russian pressures, primarily because of its continued energy dependence, but Ukrainians of all political stripes and likely to opt for independence rather than reintegration into Russia's sphere of influence.
he South Caucasus will remain in flux because of unresolved local conflicts, weak economic fundamentals, and continued Russian meddling. Georgia probably will haveeasure of political and economic stability, fueled in part by energy transit revenues, but it will remain the focus of Russian attention in the region. Armenia will remain largely isolated and is likely to remain apossiblyand,egional wild card. Azerbaijan's success in
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developing its energy sector is unlikely to bring widespread prosperity: Baku willne-sector economy with pervasive corruption at all levels of society.
In Central Asia, social, environmental, religious, and possibly ethnic strains will grow. Wasteful water-intensive practices ami pollution of ground water and arable land will lead to continued shortages for agricultural and energy generation. The high birthrates ofndill lead to strains on education, healthcare, and social services. The region also is likely to be the scene of increased competition among surroundingChina, India, Iran, and possiblycontrol, influence, and access to energy resources. Developments in Afghanistan and Pakistan will threaten regional stability.
Growth in Population05 The Middle East and North Afriea
Regimes in theMorocco tohave to cope with demographic, economic and societal pressures from within and globalization from without. No single ideology or philosophy will unite any one state or group of states in response to these cliallengcs. although popular resentment of globalizationestern intrusion will be widespread. Political Islam in various forms will be an attractive alternative for millions of Muslims throughout the region, and some radical variants will continue to be divisive social and political forces.
srael will haveold peace with its neighbors, with only limited social, economic, and cultural ties. There willalestinian state, but Israeli-Palestinian tensions will persist and occasionally erupt into crises. Old rivalries among coreSyria, Iraq, andreemerge. International attention will shift anew to ihe Persian Gulf, an increasingly important source of energy resources to fuel the global economy, and oil revenues anticipated for Iraq. Iran, and Saudi Arabia in particular will providepotentiallyfor those stales. New relationships between geographic regions could emerge between North Africa and Europe (onndia, China and the Persian Gulf (onnd Israel, Turkey, and India (on economic, technical, and in the case of Turkey, security considerations).
A key driver for the Middle East over the nextears will be demographic pressures, specifically how to provide jobs, housing, public services, and subsidies for rapidly growing and increasingly urban populations.n much of the Middle East populations will be significantly larger, poorer, more urban, and more disillusioned. In nearly all Middle Eastern countries, more than half the population is now underears of age. These populations will continue to have very large youth cohortsith the labor force growing al an average rateercent per year. Ihe problem of job placement is compounded by weak educational systemseneration lacking the technical and problem-solving skills required for economic growth.
Globalization. With the exception of Israel, Middle Eastern states will view globalization morehallenge than an opportunity. Although ihe Imemei will remain confinedmall elite due to relatively high cost, undeveloped infrastructures, and cultural obstacles, the information revolution and other technological advances probably willet destabilizing effect on the Middle East bv raising expectations, increasing income disparities, and eroding the power of regimes to control information or mold popular opinion. Attracting foreign direct investment will also be difficult: except for the energy sector, investors will tend to shy away from these countries, discouraged by overbearing state sectors; heavy, opaque, and arbitrary government regulation; underdeveloped financial sectors; inadequate physical infrastructure; and the ihreat of political instability.
Political Change. Most Middle Eastern governments recognize the need for economic restructuring andodicum of greater political participation, but they will proceed cautiously, fearful of undermining their rule. As some governments or sectors embrace the new economy and civil society while others cling to more traditional paradigms, inequities between and within states will grow. Islamists could come to power in states that are beginning lo become pluralist and in which entrenched secular elites have lost their appeal.
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Sub-Saharan Africa
Regionalhe interplay of demographics andwell as poorbe the major determinants of Africa's increasing international marginal izationost African states will miss out on the economic growth engendered elsewhere by globalization and by scientific and technological advances.ew countries will do better,andful of states will have hardly any relevance to the lives of iheir citizens. As Sub-Saharan Africa's multiple and interconnected problems are compounded, ethnic and communal tensions will intensify, periodically escalating into open conflict, often spreading across borders and sometimes spawning secessionist states.
Current HIV Prevalence Rates
In the absenceajor medical breakthrough, the relentless progression of AIDS and other diseases will decimate the economically productive adult population, sharply accentuate the continent's youth bulge, anduge cohort of orphaned children. This condition will strain ihe ability of the extended family system to cope and will contribute to higher levels of dissatisfaction, crime, and political volatility.
Poverty and poor governance will further deplete natural resources and drive rapid urbanization. As impoverished people flee unproductive rural areas, ninny cities will double in populationut resources will he inadequate to provide ihe needed expansion of water systems, sewers, and health facilities. Cities will be sources of crime and instability as ethnic and religious differences exacerbate the competition for ever scarcer jobs ande number of malnourished people will increase by more thanercent and ihe potential for famine will persist where the combination of internal conflict and recurring natural disasters prevents or limits relief efforts.
Economic Prospects. Conditions for economic development in Sub-Saharan Africa are limited by the persistence of conflicts, poor political leadership and endemic corruption, and uncertain weather conditions. Africa's most talented individuals will shun ihe public sector or be lured abroad by greater income and security. Effective and conscientious leaders arc unlikely to emerge from undemocratic and corrupt societies.
Most technological advances in the nextears -with the possible exception of genetically modified crops- -will not have substantial positive impact on the African economies.
- Although West Africa will play an increasing role in global energy markets, providingercent of North American oil importshe pattern of oil wealth fostering corruption rather than economic development will continue.
There will be exceptions lo this bleak overall outlook. The quality of governance, raiher than resource endowments, will be ihe key determinant of development and differentiation among African states.
South Africa and Nigeria, the continent's largest economies, will remain the dominani powers in the region5 But their ability to function as economic locomotives and siabilizers in their regions will be constrained by large unmet domestic demands for resources to stimulate employment, growth, and social services, including dealing with AIDS.obust South Africa will nottrong pull on its partners in the Southern African Development Communityhe success of the South African economy will be more closely lied to iis relationship with the larger global economy than with Sub-Saharan Africa.
Ethnic, political, and religious conflicts
Hole of Nonstate Actors. The atrophy of special relationships between European powers and their former colonies in Africa will be virtually completeilling the void will be international organizations and nonstate actors of all types: transnational religious institutions; international nonprofit organizations, international crime syndicates and drug traffickers; foreign mercenaries; and international tcnorisis seeking safehavens
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. Fundamentalist movements, especially proselytizing Islamic groups, will plow fertile ground as Atncans seek alternative ways to meet their basic needs.
conflicts willleaders will in some cases welcomecriminal organizations or mercenaries to assist in the plundering of national assets, while faltering regimes will willingly trade their sovereignty for cash.
International organizations will be heavily engaged in Sub-Saliaran Africa over the nextears, given its growing needs and slow growth relative to other regions. Africa will continue to receive more development assistance per capita than other regions of the world.
The international financial institutions willontinuing presence in Africa, as many donor countries ftinnel development assistance through them.
The perpetuation of poor governance and communal conflictsegion awash with guns will generate frequent natural and man-made humanitarian crises, precipitating inlcrnational humanitarian relief efforts.
. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the SADC will be the primarv economic and political instruments through which the continental powers, Nigeria and South Africa, exert their leadership.
European Union Members and Aspirants
Europe
Regional Trends. Most of Europe5 will be relatively peaceful and wealthy. Its residents will do extensive business with the rest of the world but politically will be more inward-looking than the citizens of Europeooking outurope's agenda will be to put in place the final components of EU integration; to take advantage of globalization; to sustains strong ITase to tackle changing demographics; and to wean the Balkans away from virulent nationalism.
EU enlargement, institutional reform,ommon foreign, security and defense policy will play out over the nextears, so that5 the final contours of the "European project" are likely to be firmlyaving absorbed at leastew members, the European Union will have achieved its geographic and institutional limits.
.onsequence of long delays in gaining EU entry (and the after-effects of actualeaders in some Central/Eastern Europe countries will be susceptible to pressures from authoritarian, nationalist forces on both the left and right. These forces will capitalize on public resentment about the effects of EU policy and globalization, including unemployment, foreign ownership, and cultural penetration.
. The EU will not include Russia. The Europeans, nevertheless, will seek to engagestability and maintaining dialogue. Although Russia will continue to recede in importance to the European governments, they will use US handling of Russiaarometer of how well or poorly Washington is exerting leadership and defending European interests.
Economiclobalization. EU governments will continue tothird way" between state control and unbridled capitalism: piecemeal and often unavowed economic reform driven in part by an ever denser network of overseas business relationships and changes in corporate governance. Lingering labor market rigidity and state regulation will hamper restructuring, retooling, and reinvestment strategics. Europe will trail the United States in entrcpreneurship and innovation as governments seek ways to balance encouragement of these factors against social effects. Thus, Europe will not achieve fully the dreams of parity with the United Stateshaper of the global economic system.
ouropean capitals, protestors have questioned the merits of globalization.urope will have globalized more extensively than some of its political rhetoric will suggest It
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also will have less difficulty than other regions coping with rapid change because of high education and technological levels .States will continue to push private sector competitiveness in the international market. Three of the top five information technology centers in the world will be in Europe: London, Munich, and Paris.
Many Europeans will see the role of foreign policy as protecting their social and cultural identities from the "excesses" of globalization -and from itshe United States. One of the ways in which leaders will respond will be to clamor for greater political control over international financial and trade institutions.
The aging of the population and low birthrates will be major challenges lo European prosperirv and cohesion. Greater percentages of state budgets will have to be allocated to the aging, while, at the same time, there will be significant, chronic shortages both of highly skilled workers in IT and other professions and unskilled workers in basic services. Legal and illegal immigration will mitigate labor shortagesimited extent butosi in terms of social friction and crime. As EU governments grapple with immigration policy and European and national identity, anti-immigrant sentiment will figure more prominently in the political arena Uiroughout Western Europe.
Turkey, lhe future direction of Turkey, both internally and gcopolitically. willajor impact on the region, and on US and Western interests. Shifting political dynamics; debates over identity, ethnicity and the role of religion in the state; and the further development of civil society will figure prominently in Turkey's domestic agenda, The road to Turkish membership in the EU will be long and difficult, and EU member states will evaluate Turkey's candidacy not only on the basis of economic performance, but on how well it tackles this comprehensive agenda. Part of Turkeys success will hinge on the effectivenessrowing private sector in advancing Turkey's reform efforts and its goal of full integration in the West. NATO's involvement in the Ballkans and expected enlargement in southern Europe will increase lies between Turkey and the West.
By dint of its history, location, and interests, Turkey will continue to pay attention to its neighbors to the north- -in the Caucasus and Centraland to the south andIraq and Iran. With few exceptions, these states will continue to struggle with questions of governance. As Turkey crafts policies toward the countries in these regions, no single issue will dominate its national security agenda. Rather. Ankara wil! find itself having lo cope with regionalwhat policies to adopt toward internal and interstateof weapons of mass destruction, the politics and economics of energy transport, and water rights.
Europe and (he World. Europe's agenda will require it to demonstrate influence in world affairs commensurate with its size in population and economic strength. The EU's global reach will be based primarily on economics: robust trade and investment links to the United States and growing ties to East and Southeast Asia and Latin America.
In dealing with matters outside the region, European leaders will construe their global responsibilities as building legal mechanisms, encouraging diplomaticesser extent- providing nonmiiitary aid. They will respond sporadically to foreignthrough the UN or in ad hoc "coalitions of the willing" with Washington orthey will not make sirong and consistent overseas commitments, particularly in regard to sending troops.
Transatlantic Links. Economic issues will have overtaken security issues in importancend the United States will sec its relations with Europe defined increasingly through the EU. not only on the basis of trade but in the context of using economicas aid and preferential tradingunderwrite peace initiatives.
ATO will have accepted many, but not all, Central/Eastern European countries. European Security and Defense Policy will be set in terms of partnership with, rather than replacement of. NATO.
Canada
Trends. Canada willull participant in the globalization process5eading player in the
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Americas after the United States, along with Mexico and Brazil. Ottawa will still be grappling with the political, demographic, and cultural impact of heavy Asian irnmigration in the West as well as residual nationalist sentiment in French-speaking Quebec. The vast and diverse country, however, will remain stable amidst constant, dynamic change.
Ottawa will continue lo emphasize the importance of education, and especially science and technology, for the new economy. Canada also will promote policies designed to stem the flow of skilled workers south and will seek lo attract skilledprofessionals from East and Southensure that Canada will be able to lake full advantage of global opportunities. 'Ihe question of Quebec's place in the country will continue to stir national debate.
Canada's status as the pre-eminent US economic partner will be even more pronouncedational sensitivity to encroaching US culture will remain, even as the iwo economics become more integrated. Ottawa will retain its interests in the stability and prosperity of East Asia because of growing Canadian economic, cultural, and demographic links to the Pacific region. As additional trade links with Latin America arc developed through die North American Free Trade Agreementikely Free Trade Area of the Americas, Canada increasingly will take advantage of developments in the Western hemisphere. Although Canadians will focus more on Latin America and less on Europe, they will siill look to NATO as the cornerstone of Western security. Like Europeans, Canadians will judge US global leadership in terms of the relationship with Russia, especially regarding strategic arms and National Missile Defense <NMD).
Despite the relatively small size of Canada's armed forces, Ottawa still will seek to participate in global and regional discussions on the future of international peacekeeping. Canada will continue to build on its traditional support for international organizations by working toore effective UN and greater respect for international treaties, norms, and regimes. Canadians will be sympathetic to calls for greater political "management" of globalization to help mitigate adverse impacts on the environment and ensure that globalization's benefits reach less advantaged regions and states.
Latin America: Average Annual Population
Latin America
Regional Trends.any Latin American countries will enjoy greater prosperityesult of expanding hemispheric and global economic links, the information revolution, and lowered birthrates. Progress in building democratic institutions will reinforce reform and promote prosperity by enhancing investor confidence. Brazil and Mexico will be increasingly confident and capable actors that willreater voice in hemispheric affairs. But the region will remain vulnerable to financial crises because of its dependence on external finance and the continuing role of single commodities in most economies. The weakest countries in the region, especially in Ihe Andean region, will fall further behind. Reversals of democracy in some countries will be spurredailure to deal effectively with popular demands, crime, corruption, drug trafficking, and insurgencies.
LatinVenezuela, Mexico, andbecome an increasingly important oil producer5 and an important component of the emerging Atlantic Basin energy system. lis proven oil reserves are second only to those located in the Middle East.
Globalization Gains and Limits. Continued trade and investment liberalization and the expansion of free trade agreements within and outside of Latin America willignificant catalyst of growth. Regional trade integration through organizations such as MERCOSUR and the likely conclusionree Trade Area of the Americas will both boost employment and provide the political context for governments to sustain economic reforms even against opposing entrenched interest groups.
Latin America's Internet market is poised to grow exponentially, stimulating commerce, foreign investment, new jobs, and corporate efficiency. Although Internet business opportunities will promote the growth of firms throughout the region, Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico arc likely to be the biggest beneficiaries.
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Shifting Demographics. Latin America's demographics will shiftthe distinct advantage of someto ease social strains and underpin higher economic growth. During the nextears, most countries willubstantial slowdown in the number of new jobscckcrs. which will help reduce unemployment and boost wages. But not all countries will enjoy these shifts; Bolivia, Ecuador. Guatemala. Honduras. Nicaragua, and Paraguay will still face rapidly increasing populations in need of work.
Democratization Progress and Setbacksey countries will have made some headway in building sturdier and more capable democratic institutions. Democratic institutions in Mexico, Argentina, Chile, and Brazil appear poised for continued incremental consolidation. In other countries, crime, public corruption, the spread of poverty, and the failure of governments to redress worsening income inequality will provide fertile ground for populist and authoritarian politicians. Soaring crime rates will contribute to vigilantism and extrajudicial killings by the police. Burgeoning criminalmoney laundering, alien smuggling, andoverwhelm some Caribbean countries. Democratization in Cuba will depend upon how and when Fidel Castro passes from the scene.
(.rowing Regional Gaps.he gap between the more prosperous and democratic stales of Latin America and the others will widen. Countries that are unable or unwilling to undertake reforms will experience slow growth at best.ll struggle intermittently with serious domestic political and economic problems such as crime, corruption, and dependence on single commodities such as oil. Countries with high crime and widespread corruption will lack the political consensus to advance economic reforms and will face lower growth prospects. Although poverty and inequality will remain endemic throughout the region, high-fertility countries will face higher rates of poverty and unemployment.
The AndeanVenezuela. Ixuador, undheaded for greater challenges of differing nature and origin. Competition for scarce resources, demographic pressures,ack of employment opportunities probably will cause workers' anger to mount and fuel more aggressive tactics in flu- future. Futigue with economic hardship and deep popular cynicism about political institutions, particularly traditional parties, could lead to instability in Venezuela, Peru and Ecuador. Resolution of the long-running guerrilla war is key to Colombia's future prospects. The Cuban economyustro Government will tall further behind most of the Latin American countries that embrace globalization and adopt free market practices
Rising Migration Pressures for legal and illegal migration to the United States and regionally will rise during ihe nextears. Demographic factors, political instability, personal insecurity, poverty, wage differentials, the growth of alien-smuggling networks, and wider family ties will propel more latin American workers lo enter the United States El Salvador. Guatemala- Honduras, and Nicaragua will become even greater sources of illegal migrants. In Mexico, declining population growth and strong economic prospects will gradually diminish pressures to seek work in the United Stales, but disparities in living standards, US demand for labor, and family tics will remain strong pull factors. Significant political instabilityransition process in Cuba could lead to mass migration.
The growth of Central American and Mexican alien-smuggling networks will exacerbate problems along the US border.
Illegal migration within the region willore contentious issue between latin American governments. Argentina and Venezuela already have millions of undocumented workers from neighboring countries, and resentment of illegal workers could increase. Although most Haitian migrants will head for the United States, Haiti's Caribbean neighbors will also experience further strains.
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Appendix
Four Alternative Global Futures
Inhe NIC initiated work on Global5 by cosponsoring with Department of Statc/INR and CIA's Global Futures Project two unclassified workshops on Alternative Globalhe workshops brought together several dozen government and nongovernment specialistside range of fields.
The first workshop identified major factors and events that would drive global changet focused on demography, natural resources, science and technology, the global economy, governance, social/cultural identities, and conflict and identified main trends and regional variations. These analyses
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became the basis tor subsequent elaboration in Global5
The second workshop developed four alternative global futures in which these drivers would interact in different waysach scenario was intended tolausible, policy-relevant story of how this future might evolve: highlighting key uncertainties, discontinuities, and unlikely or "wild card" events, and identifying important policy and intelligence challenges.
Scenario One: Inclusive Globalization:
A virtuous circle develops among technology, economic growth, demographic factors, and effective governance, whichajority of the world's people to benefit from globalization. Technological development andin some cases triggered by severe environmental or healthutilized to grupple effectively with some problems of the developing world. Robust globaltrong policy consensus on economicwealth widely and mitigates many demographic and resource problems. Governance is effective at both the national and international levels. In many countries, the state's role shrinks, as its functions arc privatized or performed by public-private partnerships, while global cooperation intensifies on many issuesariety of international arrangements. Conflict is minimal within and among states benefiting frominority of the world'sSub-Saharan Africa, ihe Middle East. Central and South Asia, and the Andeannot benefit from these positive changes, and internal conflicts persist in and around those countries left behind.
Scenario Two: Pernicious Global
Global elites thrive, but the majority of the world's population fails to benefit from globalization. Population growth and resource scarcities place heavy burdens on many developing countries, and migrationajor source of interstate tension. Technologies not only fail lo address the problems of developing countries but also arc exploited by negative and illicit networks and incorporated into destabilizing weapons. Ihe global economy splits into three: growth continues in developed countries; many developing countries experience low or negative per capita growth, resultingrowing gap with the developed world; and ihe illicit economy grows dramatically. Gov ernance and political leadership are weak at both the national and international levels. Internal conflicts increase, fueled by frustrated expectations, inequities, and heightened communal tensions; WMD proliferate and are used in at least one internal conflict.
Scenario Three: Regional Competition
Regional identities sharpen in Europe, Asia and the Americas, driven by growing political resistance in Europe and East Asia to US global preponderance and US-driven globalization and each region's increasing preoccupation with its own economic and political priorities. There is an uneven diffusion of technologies, reflecting differing regional concepts of intellectual properly and attitudes towards biotechnology Regional economic integration in trade and finance increases, resulting in both fairly high levels of economic growth and rising regional competition. Both the state and institutions of regional governance thrive in major developed and emerging market countries, as governments recognize the need to resolve pressing regional problems and shift responsibilities Irom global to regional institutions. Given the preoccupation of the three major regions with their own concerns, countries outside these regions in Sub-Saharan Africa, ihe Middle East, and Central and South Asia have few places to turn for resources or political support. Military conflict among and within the three major regions docs not materialize, but internal conflicts increase in and around other countries left behind.
Scenario Four: Post-Polar World
US domestic preoccupation increases as the US economy slows, then stagnates. Economic and political tensions with Europe grow, the US-European alliance deteriorates as the United Stales withdraws its troops, and Europe turns inward, relying on its own regional institutions. At the same time, national governance crises create instability in Latin America, particularly in Colombia Cuba. Mexico, and Panama, forcing the United States to concentrate on the region. Indonesia also faces internal crisis and risks disintegration, prompiing China to provide the bulk of an ad hoc peacekeeping force. Otherwise,
Asia is generally prosperous and stable, permitting the United States to focus elsewhere. Korea's normalization and de facto unification proceed, China and Japan provide Ihe bulk of external financial support for Korean unification, and the United Stales begins withdrawing its troops from Korea and
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Japan. Cher lime, these gcostraiegic shifts ignite longstanding national rivalries among the Asian powers, triggering increased military preparations and hitherto dormant or covert WMD programs. Regional and global institutions prove irrelevant to the evolving conflict situation in Asia, as China issues an ultimatum to Japan lo dismantle its nuclear program and Japan- invoking its bilateral treaty with thefor US rccngagement in Asia under adverse circumstances at the brinkajor war. Given the priorities of Asia, the Americas, and Europe, countries outside these regions are marginalized, with virtually no sources of political or finandul support.
Centralizations Across the Scenarios
The four scenarios can be grouped in iwo pairs: Ihe first pair contrasting the "positive" and "negative" effects of globalization; the second pair contrasting intensely competitive but not conflictual regionalism and the descent into regional military conflict.
all but ihe first scenario, globalization docs not create widespread global cooperation Rather, in the second scenario, globalization's negative effects promote extensive dislocation and conflict, while in the third and fourth, they spur regionalism.
In all four scenarios, countries negatively affected by population growth, resource scarcities and bad governance. Tail to benefit fioin globalization, are prone to internal conflicts, and risk state failure.
all four scenarios, the effectiveness of national, regional, and international governance und at least moderate but steady economic growth are crucial.
. In all four scenarios. US global influence wanes.
Matrix: Drivers in the Global futures
The National Intelligence Council
The National Intelligence Council (NIC) manages the Intelligence ('omMiunity's estimative process, incorporating the best available expertise inside and outside flic government. It reports to the Director of Central Intelligence in his capacity as licad of the US Intelligence Community and speaks authoritatively on substantive issues for the Communityhole.
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(concurrently Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production)
Vice Chairman
Director, Senior Review. Production, and Analysis
National Intelligence
Africa At-large
Conventional Military Issues East Asia
lobal Issues Europe Latin America Near East and South Asia Russia and Eurasiauclear Programs Warning
Gannon
Ellen Iaipson Stuan A. Cohen
Officers
Robert Houdek Stuart A. Cohen John Landry Robert Sutter David Gordon Barry P. Lowcnkronrmstrong Paul Pillar George Kolt Lawrence Gershwinalpole Robert Vickers
Homepage) |WhafsNw| [Pubacaoom pawl
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