Ultimatum bargaining with a group: underestimating the importance of the decision rule

Article Abstract:

Ultimatum bargaining with a group is more complex for subjects, and their allocations are related to their insensitivity to the group decision rule. The results of the three experiments, which are modifications of the traditional ultimatum game, indicate that group members will likely experience difficulty in predicting or understanding group decisions. This situation is caused by the difficulty of anticipating others' cognitions accurately.

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Myopic prediction, self-destructive secrecy, and the unexpected benefits of revealing final deadlines in negotiation

Article Abstract:

The results of three experiments conducted with students from Northwestern University, Carnegie Mellon University and University of Pittsburgh to find out the advantages of disclosing deadlines by negotiators have been provided. The procedures used in these experiments have been discussed.

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Playing for peanuts: why is risk seeking more common for low-stakes gambles?

Article Abstract:

The factors influencing the experience of "peanut effect", willingness to take risks when playing for small amounts, are explored. Results indicate that peanut effect is linked o anticipated disappointment but not to anticipated regret.

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