Two conceptions of benevolence

Article Abstract:

A study was made to demonstrate that Liam Murphy's Cooperative Principle, which suggests that the Compliance Condition is an essential feature of Collective Consequentialism, is not feasible. This is manifested in the two sets of cases presented which show that the Compliance Condition may appear general, but it is actually very restrictive. Thus, there are no principles including Murphy's that can provide a satisfactory account of benevolence. The study proposed that the two conceptions of benevolence should be treated as collaborators instead of rivals.

Author: Mulgan, Tim
Consequentialism (Ethics)

User Contributions:

Comment about this article or add new information about this topic:

CAPTCHA


Theoretical persons and practical agents

Article Abstract:

A general Kantian objection to modern theoretical accounts of personal identity is analyzed using Christine Korsgaard's objection to Derek Parfit's Reductionist theory on personal identity. Korsgaard argued that Parfit's theory ignores the authorial element of the relationship between actions and choices. It is argued that this objection fails because of the Partifitian theoretical approach does not ignore this element. It is also shown that both Korsgaard and Partfit's views share certain similarities.

Author: Shoemaker, David W.
Identity

User Contributions:

Comment about this article or add new information about this topic:

CAPTCHA


The scope of moral requirement

Article Abstract:

Immanuel Kant inquired about the limits of beneficence, and argued it should go no farther than a person expending resources to requiring help for oneself. Personal happiness is more of an ideal than a complete guide to what people must do to meet others' needs.

Author: Herman, Barbara

User Contributions:

Comment about this article or add new information about this topic:

CAPTCHA


Subjects list: Analysis, Benevolence, Criticism and interpretation, Kant, Immanuel
This website is not affiliated with document authors or copyright owners. This page is provided for informational purposes only. Unintentional errors are possible.