Network externalities, price discrimination and profitable piracy

Article Abstract:

A simple model is developed to analyze the proposition that in the presence of network externalities, a firm's profits can increase if that firm allows customers to private its products because this raises the user base and the willingness-of-pay of other customers. The results show that allowing piracy cannot raise profits if the monopoly producers can directly price discrimination between potential-pirates and other customers.

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Consumer heterogeneity, incomplete information and pricing in a duopoly with switching costs

Article Abstract:

Monopoly pricing entails second-degree price discrimination with inefficient contracts for low demand types with heterogeneous consumers and incomplete information about individual consumers' types. It is shown that introducing consumer heterogeneity may increase the critical switching cost needed to sustain a pure-strategy equilibrium involving monopoly pricing.

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Information pooling and collusion: an empirical analysis

Article Abstract:

The study utilizes the squared sales test developed by Jin to determine if the information pooling arrangement mandated by the Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act of 1999 is collusive. The study concludes after analyzing data from the five regions used by the United States Department of Agriculture to be either non-collusive or neutral.

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