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Spatial competition with free entry, Chamberlinian tangencies, and social efficiency: a correlation

Article Abstract:

Research reevaluates Benson's 1984 assertion that Loschian equilibrium is optimal when examining the 'social efficiency' of spatial competition under Loschian pricing behavior. Results indicate that Benson is incorrect in arguing that Loschian equilibrium is optimal in any sense. The results also indicate that Mills and Lav are correct in their assertion that Loschian competition operates on an ineffectively small scale with too many individual competitors. The Loschian equilibrium total surplus is shown to be less than a third of that of the profit-constrained maximum, and less than half of that of the monopoly equilibrium.

Land allotment

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Spatial competition with free entry, Chamberlinian tangencies, and social efficiency: a reevaluation

Article Abstract:

Belenky's criticisms of Benson's 1984 work regarding the characterization of long-run zero profit equilibrium in Loschian spatial competition are examined. Benson's original work contained some analytical short cuts and intuitive discussions that were later found to be inaccurate and misleading. The characterization derivations are corrected by characterizing the long-run equilibrium instead of evaluating a movement to that equilibrium.

Industrial locations, Industrial location

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A tax competition analysis of congestible public inputs

Article Abstract:

Congestion costs are an inevitable part of public inputs. When local public expenditure is financed through a profits tax on businesses and capital taxes, the profits tax is too high and the level of public input too low.

Public Finance Activities, Tax Administration, World, Taxation, Capital

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