Article Abstract:
The winner of an election is likely to implement a policy which lies somewhere between their favored policy and a more moderate, utilitarian optimum. Assuming a two-party representative democracy, voters will elect a party whose policies differ strongly from the other. However, voters are likely to insist on a modified version of any final policy. If the electorate has a stronger affinity for political parties than issues, there will be less of a shift toward the middle.
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Article Abstract:
A study presents an a priori theoretical explanation for votes made for and against term limits. The non-enforcement of term limits is meant to redistribute power in parties, government branches and districts rather than improve the functions of legislative or executive bodies. The intent of redistributing power explains the voting pattern shown in term-limiting voting activities. Both votes on California Proposition 140 and the 22nd Amendment showed favorable results.
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Article Abstract:
A coalition of rich and poor households prefers reduced public provision, with the rich choosing private consumption, in case of an equilibrium. Middle-income households, on the other hand, prefer an increase. These were concluded from a study of the determination of public choice and patronage for a service when there is a private alternative. A majority-voting model is used to clarify issues involved in characterizing a voting equilibrium.
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