Information and transaction costs as the determinants of tolerable growth levels

Article Abstract:

It has been possible to develop a theory that explains observed patterns of growth in developed countries and undeveloped countries following the second world war. It is suggested that political freedom fulfills the economic role of improving the internal market for political leadership. Political freedom reduces the information costs of discovering how leaders are performing, as well as cutting the transaction costs of removing existing rulers. It therefore limits policy making in order to fulfill voters' wishes and expectations. Democratic countries are generally quite rich, or moving towards high income levels. In contrast, a totalitarian country will probably be undeveloped economically.

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Contract in a rapidly changing institutional environment

Article Abstract:

Recent research has looked at the key role played by contract in institutional economics. Particular emphasis has been placed on the bringing together the historical and institutional aspects of this subject. One are of research has been developments in the current state of the economies of eastern Europe which have been moving towards a market economy.

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What are the lessons from history?

Article Abstract:

The case of German economic development in the 19th century leads to questions about links between political and economic freedom, and there is a need for further work in this area.

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