Efficiency and equilibria in complimentary teams: a comment

Article Abstract:

An analysis of the moral hazard in the teams problem reveals that there are discontinuities in the marginal product curves, thereby showing that moral hazard problems are not wholly dependent on the assumption that inputs are perfect substitutes. An analysis of Vislie's claim that moral hazards result from assumptions that inputs are perfect substitutes reveals that the discontinuities are non-complimentary and that these allow for ways to avoid the moral hazard problem altogether.

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The voluntary contributions mechanism with uncertain group payoffs

Article Abstract:

An experimental study introducing an endogenous probability in the voluntary contributions mechanism reveals that uncertainty per se lowers individual but not group contributions, that lagged marginal incentives significantly predict contributions and that individuals significantly react to own-deviations from group contribution averages. The study shows individual responses but may not reflect group responses in voluntary contribution mechanisms.

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The role of linkages in firm performance: Evidence from southern Italy

Article Abstract:

Survey data from southern-Italian small firms was used to determine the probability of success of post-entry performance.

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