Article Abstract:
There has been a remarkable amount of progress in the theory of implementation since roughly 1995. This theory attempts to address the problem of designing game forms or mechanisms whose equilibria comply with select, socially desirable properties but do not require considerable information by the authorities to implement them. Within the context of this theory, an analysis is made of the canonical mechanism for implementation in Nash equilibria.
User Contributions:
Comment about this article or add new information about this topic:
Article Abstract:
Contemporary organizational behavioral models under conditions of uncertainty typically assume that the firm desires to maximize expected profit and that the joint probability distribution over all random variables is common knowledge. A study analyzes an implication of relaxing this assumption of common knowledge to create a more probable scenario where the probability distributions of various key variables are known by different people.
User Contributions:
Comment about this article or add new information about this topic:
Article Abstract:
A study was conducted to analyze the evolution of the frequencies of a large population of agents of finitely many types who are conditioned to apply select, pure strategies in a given, finite, symmetric game. There are two possible interpretations of the results of the analysis. Furthermore, this research should not be viewed as a justification for the informal use of a law of large numbers in random matching with a continuum of agents.
User Contributions:
Comment about this article or add new information about this topic: