A revelation principle for competing mechanisms

Article Abstract:

Feasible competing mechanisms based on the optimal mechanism design literature must be identified in mechanism designers' modelling competition. However, mechanisms that are normally found in a competitive environment such as mechanisms opted by competitors are not included in the set of feasible mechanisms. A set of universal mechanisms is developed using a language for describing mechanisms that is not associated with any traditional concepts of competition.

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Preference, rationalizability and equilibrium

Article Abstract:

Players in finite normal form games are being commonly hypothesized as rationals. Under the concept of Bayesian rationality, a player creates a prior over the space of the states of the world, which represents the uncertainty being faced by the player. The stated hypothesis is associated with the notion of survival of iterated deletion, posteriori equilibrium and correlated rationability.

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Are probabilities used in markets?

Article Abstract:

Asset demands are assessed to understand investor preference and its link with probabilities.

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