A communication-proof equilibrium concept

Article Abstract:

Communication-proof equilibrium can be applied as an extension for renegotiation- and coalition-proof equilibrium in situations where participants are allowed to exchange informations but are not allowed to derive benefits from such exchanges. The resultant equilibrium, which provides benefits when common interests are determined, is subject to deviations when cooperative behavior is not sustainable.

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A model of agreements in strategic form games

Article Abstract:

A model is developed to study the implications of coalitions and coalitional behavior in a strategic form game. Coalitions and coalitional behavior incorporate the essential effects of communication which could alter the strategy spaces of the game. The model defines an equilibrium for the bargaining procedure, which takes into account the role of expectations in defining coalitional strategies.

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Strategic interaction between futures and spot markets

Article Abstract:

A firm's positions in a futures market, affect their cost of production in the spot market, thus altering the circumstances of competition. There is a renegotiation-proof, that if firms buy and sell in the futures market there is a monopolistic outcome, suggesting that the introduction of futures market can have an anti-competitive effect.

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