A bargaining model of partisan appointments to the central bank

Article Abstract:

A bargaining model describing partisan appointments to the central bank is presented. It is shown that initial appointments differ with later ones in terms of monetary policy. In addition, the timing of board chairman appointment will generate partisan policy. Under equilibrium conditions, confirmations will be just rubber stamp processes. Finally, longer board terms generate more moderate appointments and decreased partisan policies.

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Cross-border trading as a mechanism for implicit capital flight: ADRs and the Argentine crisis

Article Abstract:

Impact of cross-country securities trading on the value of local currency and off-shore investments, with reference to Argentina's experience, is discussed.

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A search-theoretic model of legal and illegal currency

Article Abstract:

The usage of two currencies is examined, in conditions where foreign currency is legally restricted for usage in domestic transactions.

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