Article Abstract:
If firm performance affects managers' wealth or reputation, preferences of managers dominate firms' financing decisions. When information about real asset investment is symmetric, managers finance exclusively with equity. If managers know more about asset quality than do investors and if managers are sufficiently risk averse, they signal high-quality projects with debt. Increases in collateral value decrease risky debt use. Increases in interest rates that do not change productive opportunities increase debt use. The explanation for these and further results is based on underpricing of equity and overpricing of debt at the margin. (Reprinted by permission of the publisher.)
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Article Abstract:
This article investigates the claim that debt finance can increase firm value by curtailing managers' access to "free cash flow." We first show that incentive contracts that tie the managers' pay to stockholder wealth are often a superior solution to the free cash flow problem. We then consider the possibility that the manager can trade on secondary capital markets. Liquid secondary markets are shown to undermine management incentive schemes and, in many cases, to restore the value of debt finance in controlling the free cash flow problem. (Reprinted by permission of the publisher.)
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Article Abstract:
Analysis of an endogenous financing constraint on a firmEs investment decision indicates that high-liquidity firms have the greatest investment to cash flow sensitivity, and that a higher level of uncertainty produces an ambiguous impact on investment.
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