Article Abstract:
This study investigated the influence of institutional investors on CEO compensation policy. Results suggest that institutional owners that have only an investment relationship with a firm influence compensation in accordance with shareholder preferences to (1) lower its level and (2) increase the proportion of long-term incentives in total compensation. However, institutions that depend on a firm for their own business are not able to influence compensation in this manner. This study extends prior research by supporting the viewpoint that the nature of ownership in a firm is an important determinant of CEO compensation. (Reprinted by permission of the publisher.)
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Article Abstract:
The conventional view that CEO stock options help corporate governance by reducing moral hazard with the proposal that CEO stock options might weaken sound corporate governance, were contrasted. The sample studied suggest that large CEO stock option grants were associated with the incidence of fraudulent reporting depending upon whether CEO duality was present and whether directors also held stock options.
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Article Abstract:
Technological dynamism moderates the relationship between a CEO's time in office and company inventive activities. Technological dynamism shifts in such a way that short-tenured CEOs engender more invention under highly dynamic technological environments, while long-tenured CEOs spur greater invention under more stable technologies.
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