Article Abstract:
Strategic alliance have been recognized as arenas with potential for opportunistic behavior partners. Hence, a firm needs to have an adequate level of confidence in its partner's cooperative behavior. In this article we examine the notion of confidence in partner cooperation in alliances and suggest that it comes from two distinct sources: trust and control. We make the argument that trust and control are parallel concepts and that their relationship is of a supplementary character in generating confidence. In addition, we suggest that control mechanisms have an impact on trust level and that the trust level moderates the effect of control mechanisms in determining the control level. Finally, we discuss various ways to build trust within strategic alliances and important alliance control mechanisms. (Reprinted by permission of the publisher.)
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Article Abstract:
Hybrid organizational arrangements, in which two or more sovereign organizations combine to pursue common interests, raise significant questions for both scholars and managers. A review of previous research yields four key issues - breadth of purpose, boundary determination, value creation, and stability mechanisms - that form the core of a theory of hybrid arrangements. This theory is then used to generate researchable propositions that explore differences among types of hybrids and to offer insights for managers of hybrid organizations. (Reprinted by permission of the publisher.)
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Article Abstract:
A study argues drawing on transaction cost economies and externalities theory that private public partnerships would be necessary when economic opportunity realization calls for industry-specific competencies but entails significant positive externalities, is covered by high uncertainty for the private actors, and necessitates for private actors high governance costs for contracting, coordinating and enforcing. Specialized resources, positive externalities, uncertainty, and governance costs are all the costs that are jointly implicated in the theory.
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